


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AFRICA QUARTERLY

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Kirk Emmert

African Socialism and Western Liberalism



Many leftist critics of Western Liberal Democracy have turned to the "third world" in search of a political regime which is free of what they consider to be the many defects of Capitalist Liberal Democracy. Cuba and Mao's China have been praised by some, but it seems that on balance the Socialist regimes of Africa, and particularly of Tanzania, are seen to embody the standard against which all other regimes, and particularly Liberal Democracy, are found to be wanting.

The critics' indictment of Liberal Democracy is comprehensive, if not always internally consistent. The Liberal Democratic regime, they say, aims too low in that it fosters an acquisitive, self-seeking, narrowly rational man rather than encouraging the development of a creative, self-directed, free man. It promotes the pursuit of the private, economic life at the expense of public participation; fosters individualism rather than community; and fails, thereby, to encourage those important human qualities which develop when citizens govern themselves and actively care for the welfare of others. Finally, Liberal Democracy is said to be an inequalitarian and undemocratic regime in which apathetic citizens, frequently under the illusion that they are living in a democracy, allow themselves to be manipulated by privileged elites and exploited by an economic, social and political establishment. In contrast, the African Socialist regime is often seen by these critics of Liberalism to stand in principle, if admittedly falling somewhat short of these goals in practice, for economic development without competitiveness, acquisitiveness, or

economic classes; for equal opportunity for all citizens to fully develop themselves without this resulting in inequalities or social or political privileges; and for a form of democracy which rejects individualism and majority rule in the name of public-spiritedness and the implementation of the general will, without at the same time suppressing minorities or threatening basic liberties.

Does the African Socialist regime present the standard toward which, to the degree permitted by different circumstances, all nations ought to gravitate? Is the African Socialist regime the best regime possible under modern conditions? Is it the best regime simply? These are the fundamental questions which cannot be avoided either by the thoughtful citizen of a Liberal Democracy who turns his attention to Africa, or by the student of African Socialism. As we, citizens or students, come in contact with political things we find that we cannot avoid evaluating them: They demand that we designate them as better or worse, and what could be more worthy of such evaluation than the great political differences embodied in basically different regimes or forms of government?

This paper will focus on African Socialism. I will outline the basic principles of African Socialism, indicate how these principles differ from some of the central tenets of classical Liberal Democratic theory, i.e., Liberal Democracy unmodified by principles derived from Rousseau, Mill or democratic socialists, and point out certain tensions or difficulties which reside in the principles of African Socialism. This paper will raise some of the considerations that ought to go into a broader attempt to rank and compare Liberal Democracy and African Socialism. The scope of the paper will not, however, permit us to draw any such broad conclusions, for I will only touch on Liberal Democratic principles and will make almost no attempt to consider the political practice of countries which claim to be Socialist or Liberal. My focus will be almost entirely on the two leading proponents of what might be called non-Marxist African Socialism, Julius Nyerere and Leopold Senghor.

* * *

In the struggle "to build new societies and a new Africa", Tom Mboya has observed, "we need a new political philosophy—a philosophy of our own—that will explain, validate and help to

cement our experience."¹ This philosophy is African Socialism, a comprehensive view of man's economic, social, and political life, which, its adherents stress, rejects some of the central tenets of both Marxist Socialism and of capitalist Liberal Democracy. African Socialists believe that they are "creating a new civilization."² Mboya voiced a frequently expressed concern of leading African Socialists when he warned against those who are so "blindly steeped in foreign thought mechanics that...they adopt standards which do great violence to the concept of African brotherhood."³

Julius Nyerere has noted that his doctrine of "Ujama' or 'Familyhood', which describes our socialism," is "opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man."⁴ By excessively simplifying political and economic matters through his doctrine of the class struggle, Leopold Senghor argues that "Marx overestimated the role of the determinism of things and underestimated man's freedom and the organizing power of the capitalist state."⁵ The root of the insufficiencies of Marxism is its "atheistic materialism." Senghor argues, in contrast, for the "primacy of Spirit..., for it is the spirit, in the last analysis, that judges and transcends the material determinants that have formed it."⁶ In the name of "moral" and of "religious values" Senghor rejects both

capitalistic and Communistic materialism....The paradox in the building of socialism in Communist countries, or at least in the Soviet Union, is that it increasingly resembles capitalistic growth in the United States, the American way of life with high salaries, refrigerators, washing machines and television sets, but with less art and less freedom of thought.⁷

Capitalism is rejected because, although it allows for greater freedom, it encourages a materialistic way of life. A society founded on capitalist principles is seen, moreover, to be fundamentally unjust because it "seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man." A true socialist society differs from a capitalist society, Julius Nyerere argues, not so much "in the methods of producing wealth, but in the way that wealth is distri-

buted." African Socialism focuses on the problem of just distribution. It takes account not only of the market value of labour but of its intrinsic value to society as a whole, and it is concerned "to see that those who sow reap a fair share of what they sow." In contrast to capitalism, African Socialism is concerned with "spreading the concept of working together co-operatively for the common good instead of competitively for individual private gain." African Socialism stresses human equality and "co-operation not competition, and its criteria for individual success would be good service, not the accumulation of private property."⁸

African Socialists tend, often it seems unconsciously, to follow Marx in equating Liberal Democracy with capitalism. Although Senghor distinguishes carefully between Soviet Communism and Marxism, and between philosophic and ethical Marxism as against materialistic Marxism, he does not clearly distinguish liberalism from capitalism nor does he analyze adequately, under whatever label, the major principles of Liberal Democracy. But, although it seldom confronts Liberalism directly, there can be little doubt that African Socialism implicitly rejects the guiding principles of Liberalism. Before considering the major differences between the two persuasions, we must outline the principal tenets of African Socialism.

Both Senghor and Nyerere argue that the realization of African Socialism involves in large measure an attempt to return, after the interregnum of the colonial period, to the guiding principles of traditional African society. "We in Africa," Nyerere has declared, "have no more need of being 'converted' to socialism than we have of being 'taught' democracy. Both are rooted in our past—in the traditional society which produced us."⁹ By asserting that the establishment of Socialism involves a return to the older principles of their societies, modern African Socialists seem to imply that the good and the just should be equated with the old. This is precisely the guiding principle of traditional societies, but the modern Socialist is, of course, not simply a traditionalist, for he also argues that the old principles are just and good in their own right, or in the light of what reason and experience tells us about man. Moreover, the African Socialist favors as we will see, certain ends which were not

pursued by traditional society. Finally, the manner in which the Socialist pursues the old values is different than the manner in which they were pursued in traditional society; for what was once a matter of habit will now be a matter of conscious and calculated action: "In the past," Nyerere notes, "we worked together because that was the custom; now we have to do it deliberately and to do it in such a manner that modern knowledge can be utilized for the common good."¹⁰

One of the two roots of African Socialism is the belief in human equality: Without "an acceptance of human equality...there can be no Socialism;" Socialist society must "make a reality" of "equality in all spheres of life." Human equality is seen to have its basis in a "belief in the oneness of man"¹¹ or in what Senghor calls "the *Civilization of the Universal*."¹² Acceptance of equality is a pre-condition for an unqualified respect for human dignity. A truly equalitarian society is classless and it is democratic, for otherwise all members of society would not have an equal opportunity to develop themselves. "Only democracy," Senghor has observed, "will allow the Negro African to realize himself."

To the greatest extent possible, the modern Socialist regime ought, Julius Nyerere argues, to return to the traditional principle of common ownership of land and of the means of production. In traditional African society "all the basic goods were held in common, and shared among all members of the unit." Modern Socialist regimes have to "reactivate the philosophy of co-operation in production and sharing in distribution which was an essential part of traditional African society."¹⁴ In Socialist society co-operation in production and distribution replaces the principles of private "acquisitiveness" and competitiveness which are dominant in capitalist societies. In an

acquisitive society wealth tends to corrupt those who possess it... The visible contrast between their own comfort and the comparative discomfort of the rest of society becomes almost essential to the enjoyment of their wealth, and this sets off the spiral of personal competition—which is then anti-social.¹⁵

Tom Mboya notes that in traditional society the principle of co-

operation "gave members of the society a secure and relatively adequate livelihood." There was a "universal charity" in this society which afforded its members "security regardless of their station in life."¹⁶ This does not mean that a Socialist society can tolerate the "parasite," the "loiterer," or the "idler," one who accepts "the hospitality of society as his 'right' but gives nothing in return." The principle of hard work by every able-bodied person is essential to the establishment and just operation of a Socialist society. No one who is able to work but "contributes nothing to society" has any "right to expect anything from society."¹⁷

Leopold Senghor argues that African Socialism rejects both individualism and collectivism in the name of communalism; "Negro-African society is collectivistic, or more exactly, communal, because it is rather a *communion* of souls than an aggregate of individuals..."¹⁸ From the perspective of the communal society even a "collectivist European society" is an "assembly of individuals." The collectivist society

inevitably places the emphasis on the individual, on his original activity and his needs...Negro-African society puts more stress on the group than on the individual, more on the *communion* of persons than on their autonomy. Ours is a community society. This does not mean that it ignores the individual, or that collectivist society ignores solidarity, but the latter bases the solidarity on the activities of individuals, whereas the community society bases it on the general activity of the group.¹⁹

According to Nyerere the deeper foundation of the principle of co-operation or of community, is human love, "a deep personal affection..., respect..., a recognition of mutual involvement in one another." In traditional society love applied largely within the extended family, and perhaps also within the tribe or village. Modern African Socialism asserts the possibility and need for extending this love, first within the nation and then to all mankind.

Out of what is often a heterogenous population, the African Socialist seeks to mold one "People..., a *community*, where each individual will identify himself with the collective whole and vice

versa.”²⁰ The Socialist stress on unity and community can be partially explained in terms of his political problem of trying to hold together diverse and often incompatible groups in his country and to form them into one nation. But the commitment to community is also a matter of principle for the Socialist since he holds that it is only community with others that men grow into full human beings. The origin of the Socialist’s stress on community, and the second major root of African Socialism, goes back, Tom Mboya observed, “to ancient times. It began with Aristotle’s dictum that man is a social (political) animal which has no potency and no life outside... society...” Since man is a political animal, he is most properly viewed as part of the larger political whole to which he belongs : “Society is an organic thing with individuals playing the role of cells in the organism.” The good of the individual is thus inseparable from the good or proper functioning of the whole. As parts of a greater whole, the primary political fact is one’s duties or obligations to the whole, rather than one’s right to be free from the claims which the community may have on the individual. The Socialist stresses that “every member of society has certain obligations to... society” and that, following from this, “every society has certain responsibilities toward its members.”²¹

We are now in a position to consider some of the fundamental differences separating African Socialism from Western Liberalism. Liberalism is based on the view that man is not naturally a political animal. By nature, according to Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the leading philosophers of liberalism, man is a social, if not anti-social, at least in Hobbes’ view. In his natural condition man lives a solitary life and is in frequent conflict with other men. The law of nature, by which he ought to guide himself in his natural state, is in essence a set of rules by which he seeks to preserve his own rights of life, liberty and property. The insecurity of the state of nature drives men into civil society in order to protect their individual rights. According to the liberal persuasion, Aristotle was wrong when he asserted that men join together with others out of a natural desire to live together with others or because some of the most human faculties are those which are exercised by active participa-

tion in the governing of themselves and others. Men join civil society solely out of necessity and they continue to look first to their own private interests. Nor is it necessary in order to have a stable and free society for the vast majority of men to be public-spirited or to put the common good ahead of their own private good. In any case, morality, or self-restraint, is not up to the task of restraining self-interest. If civil society encourages its members to pursue within broad limits their own economic and other private interests, they will give it their allegiance and loyalty. If it has properly constructed political institutions such a society will be tolerably just, for out of the clash of private interests the public interest will be attained through a politics of accommodation and compromise.²²

The Liberal disagrees with the African Socialist who, in following Aristotle, affirms the "primacy of *politics*" and thus of the things which pertain to the whole community as against the merely private and individual things. Senghor has suggested that the state or government is the primary means by which a nation seeks to realize its view of culture or civilization. The "state is to the nation," he notes, "What the contractor is to the architect....It fulfils the nation's will and ensures its permanence. In domestic affairs it... shapes the individuals into the mold of the archetype."²³ Compared to liberal democracy, the African Socialist regime expands the public (political) sphere of life and contracts the private (individual) sphere. Out of a desire to maximize individual freedom, and that human happiness is a subjective condition, relative to the idiosyncratic desires of each individual, (that there are no ends appropriate to man as man) the leading theorists of Liberalism declared that the pursuit of happiness is rightly a private matter. The state ought to be concerned only with establishing the objective conditions—prosperity, respect for rights, public order—which will enable each citizen to pursue happiness as he sees fit. In contrast to Liberalism, African Socialism seems to assume that the content of happiness is not wholly subjective, that it is possible to outline the substantive content of a truly human, and thus truly happy life.

It is not difficult to discern which human qualities Nyerere rejects and which ones he thinks society ought to promote because it will thereby make its members more fully human. Due to the more

theoretical and abstract character of his speeches and writings, and also to his apparent recognition that there are some very desirable kinds of men, such as artists, poets, and thinkers who transcend political life, one is less clear as to exactly what kind of man Senghor hopes to foster in his Socialist society. To the degree to which Senghor understands "Socialist philosophy" to be "existentialist" and to the degree to which he views man's "proper characteristic" to be an effort to "Snatch himself from the earth, to rise above his roots and blossom in the sun, to escape in an act of *freedom* from his 'natural determinations,'"²⁴ to that degree the goal of the Socialist regime would seem for Senghor to be more open-ended and the case for a diminished public sphere, and an expanded private sphere, more compelling. Senghor's failure, noted by some observers,²⁵ to institute in Senegal as thorough-going a socialist regime as Nyerere has established in Tanzania may well reflect not so much a disjunction between Senghor's theory and his practice as the practical consequences of his existential humanism and of his awareness that human excellence transcends politics.

The dispute between African Socialism and classical Liberalism is in one sense a difference between those who claim that the political regime which they support is a deduction from their sober, realistic assessment of human nature—an attempt to take man's selfishness and acquisitiveness as given and to construct a tolerably decent and free regime on this foundation—and those who seem to seek a more elevated form of community based on what men have the potential to attain if they live in the right kind of regime. But while we might acknowledge that the African Socialist regime is in some measure more just, produces a higher form of common life, and even fosters a generally more desirable kind of human being than capitalist Liberal Democracy, do not we, nevertheless, have to take seriously the Liberal Democrat's objection that the African Socialist is hopelessly Utopian? What reason is there, beyond a romantic attachment to an increasingly irretrievable past, to believe that the kind of co-operative, public-spirited, non-materialistic, hard-working man and society that is postulated by African Socialism can ever be achieved, or even approached? Are not the ends of the Socialist,

the Liberal asks, wholly disproportionate to any available means he, or anyone else, might have to attain those ends?

Julius Nyerere's reply to our Liberal critic is first to deny that African Socialism is "Utopian" either in its understanding of equality or of the power of human selfishness. Socialism is not "unaware that men are unequal in their capacities." On the contrary, argues Nyerere, "It is based on the facts of human nature. It is a doctrine which accepts mankind as it is and demands such an organization of society that man's inequalities are put to the service of his equality." The Socialist recognizes, moreover, that "every person has both a selfish and a social instinct which are often in conflict." It would not "be sensible" to expect everyone to be "willing to think only of the community interest and never of his own." This kind of "unselfishness is rare in man, and no social organization should be based on the expectation that all members will be angels." What is required. Nyerere argues,

is a sensible organization which can be shown to be to the benefit of all members. This can be done if every member has certain responsibilities to the community, and is able to see his benefits from it because they are benefits to himself and his village.²⁵

The other side of the Socialist regime's attempt to "deprive people of the incentives of selfishness" is to establish "effective social incentives." And because it knows that these social incentives will sometimes fail, Socialism also "demads the deliberate organization of society in such a manner that it is impossible—or at least very difficult—for individual desires to be pursued at the cost of other people, or for individual strength to be used for the exploitation of others." African Socialism does not, Nyerere suggests, rest on a romanticized view of the past: "Traditional Africa was," he observes, "no more composed of unselfish and hard-working angels than any other part of the world."²⁷ and it refused to grant equality to women. Nevertheless, it stress on co-operation, communal ownership, and religion, the influence of all of which is said to be still strongly felt in modern African life, leads the Socialist to conclude that there is a good prospect that Socialist principles can take

hold firmly and permanently in Africa.

In addition to the existence of particularly favorable circumstances in his country and to his willingness to recognize, and try to compensate for, ineradicable human selfishness, the African Socialist stresses the importance of education and of religion in helping to foster the kind of attitude which is the basis for a Socialist regime. African Socialists attribute a great deal of importance to the use of the formal educational system to encourage certain political and moral attitudes. A Socialist educational system must stress "the social goal of living together, and working together, for the common good"; it must "inculcate a sense of commitment to the total community"; it must "emphasize co-operative endeavour, not individual advancement; it must stress concepts of equality and the responsibility to give service which goes with any special ability." In a society striving to construct a classless society the impact of the educational system on the few who go on to the University is perhaps even more important than its influence on the masses. Higher education, which can in these countries reach only "a selected few," must be "education for service to the many." It must "ensure that the educated know themselves to be an integral part of the nation and recognize the responsibility to give greater service for the greater the opportunities they have had." It must, in short, "counteract" any "temptation to intellectual arrogance."²⁸

Important as it is, the African Socialist views the formal educational system as only one of the means by which the Socialist regime can cultivate desirable human qualities. In a manner again reminiscent of Aristotle, the African Socialist argues that political leaders and civil servants ought to see themselves as teachers of their fellow citizens. The government, the organized representative of the Socialist way of life, ought to be a great educational institution which teaches by exhortation, by example, and by involving the citizen in the solving of their own problems according to appropriate Socialist principles. Through the establishment of a mass party, through his own actions and exhortative speeches, and through the example of his own way of life Julius Nyerere illustrates the many ways in which the political regime can attempt to mold the life of its members.

The central importance attributed to education by Julius Nyerere

seems to have its counterpart in the political and moral importance attributed to religion by Leopold Senghor. Love and a "sense of brotherhood" are seen by both Senghor and Nyerere to be an essential support of the Socialist way of life, but Senghor more clearly connects the passion of human love to love of a higher being. The basis of mutual co-operation in traditional society was, Senghor argues, "religious feeling, which gives its members a single soul, a high quality of solidarity in which all communed." Religion is "the source of an effective morality." It is because the African is "inspired by religions that preach love and, above all, because they live these religions" that he is capable of forming a Socialist community. Religious commitment will, Senghor suggests, enable the African Socialist regime to resist the modern tide of materialism and acquisitiveness: Religious countries tend to be more "unselfish countries, where money is not king,"²⁹ where "individual material wealth" is not the "major criterion of social merit and worth."³⁰

The African Socialist is aware, then, of the danger of being too Utopian or visionary and he has, compared to Liberal Democracy, expanded the scope, and the means at the disposal of the political order in order that it may attain the elevated end which he understands to be its proper goal. But the problem of whether the Socialist's means are proportionate to his ends is complicated by the tension between equality and community on the one hand, and the distinctly modern ends which the Socialist also posits for his regime. The difficulty is, simply, that in addition to his other ends the Socialist also wants economic development and, probably to a lesser extent, liberty.

Julius Nyerere makes clear that, whatever its many virtues, a central defect of traditional African society was its poverty. Nyerere clearly rejects "material wealth for its own sake." He argues that when "the pursuit of wealth clashes with things like human dignity and social equality, then the latter will be given priority." But he clearly considers the "creation of wealth" to be "a good thing and something which we shall have to increase,"³¹ for, although it may stress spiritual values, Socialism cannot be attained without the proper material foundation. The African Socialist seeks something which, it seems, is unprecedented, great expansion of national wealth

without the growth of acquisitiveness, materialism or differentiation into economic classes. In Tanzania Nyerere has attempted to overcome the problem of the moral degeneration associated with economic development by stressing the importance of agriculture and by encouraging the people to remain on the land, to hold their land in common, and to co-operate in production and in distribution. An increasing portion of the production of these communal farms, assuming that local farmers can be persuaded to pool their land will, however, be for the market. Such commercial agriculture is likely to produce a collective, if not an individual acquisitiveness. In the non-agricultural sectors of the economy, public ownership of major industries and the development of co-operatives have been encouraged, but here again one runs into the inevitable change in values associated with production for the market and payment of cash wages, to say, nothing of the fragmentation in human relations which is a consequence of large-scale economic organizations and of urban life in general.

Will traditional religions be able to prevent the degeneration, at least from the Socialist's point of view, in public and private morals and manners which seems to be necessarily associated with economic development? This seems doubtful. A decline in the authority of religion seems to be necessary in order to get a people interested in improving their economic condition, and the subsequent effort to accumulate wealth seems to lead to a further decline in the authority of religion.

By undermining the social virtues of the individual, economic development also undermines the kind of democracy that seems to be favored by African Socialists. On the village level, Nyerere argues for communal, participatory democracy. The consensus collected by these local units is then to be gathered up by a national party (TANU) which can be said to express the general will of the people as a whole. African Socialism tends to reject the classical Liberal view that a democracy ought to be guided by "the will of the majority and adopts the language of Rousseau: the general will," the undifferentiated "will of the people."³² In *The Social Contract* Rousseau stresses that the general will can be realized only if each individual suppresses that part of his desires or will which are in

conflict with the general good of society: Individual self-seeking is the enemy of the general will. To the extent that attempts at economic development release self-interested and acquisitive passions, democracy, as understood by Rousseau and by African Socialists, is undermined. Although attempts to suppress merely private interests by political education and leadership may have a measure of success, the Socialist's stress on active leadership is in tension with his advocacy of general-will democracy in which the government is understood to be merely the instrumentality of this will. Rousseau understood that leadership by a great legislator, and perhaps subsequently by a few great statesmen, might be necessary to form the virtuous populace who could express a true general will, but he also suggests that the need for such leadership is a sign of the imperfect character of the democracy which requires it. At present, Tanzania seems to find itself in this quasi-democratic condition of being molded by a statesman who seeks to form a people who will no longer need statesmen. Thus Nyerere says "the people must be, and must know themselves to be, sovereign. Socialism cannot be imposed upon people..." But he then goes on to observe that the people "can be guided; they can be led."³³

There is a direct connection between the Socialist's advocacy of public spiritedness and equality and his support for a democracy based on the general will. To the extent that he fails to form a truly Socialist man, he will also fall short of general-will democracy. It is then not unlikely that the African Socialist, unless he simply wants to abandon democracy entirely, will have to be content with a form of majority-will democracy supplemented by restraining institutions and vigorous leadership (when available) which is difficult to distinguish from the Liberal Democracy that he formally rejects.

Although it is difficult to judge its ultimate importance for someone like Nyerere, it seems that the African Socialist also seeks to foster a regime which respects basic civil liberties. There is, however, a tension between advocacy of civil rights and liberties and support for a communal, co-operative ethic or for the primacy of duty and the needs of the whole. It is then difficult to understand why the first part of the famous Arusha Declaration, in a manner reminiscent of the American Declaration of Independence, lays

overwhelming stress on the rights of the citizen. One finds a similar stress in a 1967 address by Nyerere at Cairo University in which he spoke of the Socialist's "belief that every individual...is an equal member of society, with equal rights in the society and equal duties to it."³⁴ And there is the further difficulty that if the Socialist really is committed to civil liberties, he seems to have destroyed the most solid grounds for their support, a belief in the primacy of natural rights. Since the Socialist begins from the premise that men are by nature social, it is not clear how rights can have any independent status apart from a prior performance of duties, and thus why they should be stressed ahead of duties. The following statement by Senghor illustrates this difficulty :

The rights of the minority, of the opposition will...be respected in Mali. They will find their natural and legal limits in the rights of the majority, the popular will, which is sovereign; in other words in the rights of the nation-state...³⁵

Senghor's precise view of the status of rights is unclear, but he seems to say that the scope of a man's rights is a matter to be determined by the popular will. From the point of view of Liberalism, a man's basic, natural rights have a very tenuous foundation in an African Socialist regime. Liberalism might, however, be wrong when it accords such importance to liberty and rights. But if it is wrong why then does Nyerere use the language of rights and stress their priority in the most important statement of the principles of his regime? This stress on rights and liberty is bound to promote individualism and enervate the citizen's sense of duty to the whole.

One is drawn to the conclusion that the possible disproportion between the means and the ends of the African Socialist regime reflects the deeper problem of that regime, a tension, amounting perhaps to an incompatibility, between its ends. If the Socialist were willing to renounce economic development and his adherence to the importance of rights or liberty he might attain his other ends. It seems very unlikely that one can hope to construct a regime which successfully attains most of the major goods that are attainable through politics—wealth, liberty, equality and the virtues associated

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with self-denial, co-operation and public spiritedness. Politics does not seem to allow for the attainment of all good things within any one regime.

FOOTNOTES

1. William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, *African Socialism* (Stanford : Stanford U. Press, 1964), p. 250.
2. Leopold S. Senghor, *On African Socialism* (New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 103.
3. Friedland, *African Socialism*, pp. 250-51.
4. Julius K. Nyerere, *UJAMA : Essays on Socialism* (New York : Oxford U. Press, 1968), p. 12.
5. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, p. 32.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 48 & 46.
8. Nyerere, *UJAMA*, pp. 12, 2, 4, 102 & 121.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 50 & 32.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 50 & 32.
12. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, p. 83.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
14. Nyerere, pp. 107 & 103.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
16. Friedland, *African Socialism*, pp. 258 & 251.

17. Nyerere, *UJAMA*, p. 5-6 & 107.
18. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, p. 49.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
21. Friedland, *African Socialism*, p. 252.
22. See particularly *The Federalist Papers*, Paper 10.
23. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, pp. 51, 49 & 12.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 49 & 12.
25. See for instance Walter A. E. Skurhik, "L. S. Senghor and African Socialism," Vol. 3, No. 3, 1965, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Dar-es-Salaam.
26. Nyerere, *UJAMA*, pp. 79 & 125.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 79 & 108.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 52, 61, 74 & 52.
29. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, pp. 59, 161, 147 & 77.
30. Nyerere, *UJAMA*, p. 47.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.
32. Friedland, *African Socialism*, p. 8. See also C. B. MacPherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 29.
33. Nyerere, *UJAMA*, p. 88.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
35. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, pp. 52-53.

P. O. Olusanya

Extended Family Relationship in Nigeria

Second Thoughts on the Relationship Between
Extended Family Obligations and the Standard
of Living with Particular Reference to Nigeria

Complaints are frequently heard, particularly from urban-based members of extended families, about the heavy burden of responsibilities. These complaints are a new phenomena. In the past the Nigerian society was largely rural and peasant agriculture was the main occupation of the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants. Consequently a large number of co-residential, able-bodied relatives constituted a great economic asset. Everybody earned his living. Wants were modest and often limited to what could be easily obtained around the village and the farms. No particular head of an extended family bore the burden of members. The head fed and clothed only the junior members. Even the junior members worked on the farms for the common good. In short, extended family responsibilities were limited.

Changes in the social structure taking place during the last three to four decades, particularly among the ethnic groups of southern Nigeria, have tended to create what has been regarded as problems of extended family obligations. Urban populations have shown quick increase since the end of the Second World War. The accelerated rate of urbanisation has been largely due to rural-urban migration which has increased in tempo with the widening socio-economic gap between the rural and the urban sectors of the country.

Thus while the traditional extended family was localised and agriculturally occupied, the modern extended family is dispersed and many of its members are engaged in non-agricultural activities in the urban centres. Here lack of space restricts the size of the family and

the number of relatives living in the household.¹ Nevertheless, one of its essential features—assistance among members based on normative expectations—persists. In other words, although all the members of an extended family no longer live together, and although joint economic, legal, welfare and leisure activities of members are no longer feasible by reason of their dispersal, mutual obligations are still widely discharged, albeit grudgingly at times, by members wherever they may be.²

Of course, it is difficult to quantify the degree of dissatisfaction with extended family obligations since relevant data are lacking. But the fact that this topic has become one for newspaper polemics³ and is widely discussed, particularly among the urban middle class may be taken as a clear indication that it has acquired importance.⁴ Whether or not the problem is solely or mainly one created by extended family obligations has, however, hardly been given any thought by the complaining group. The validity of the complaint is critically examined in this article.

The Extended Family Burden as an Essentially Urban Middle Class Problem

From what has been said above about the reciprocal nature of extended family obligations in the rural agricultural setting, the problem, to the extent that there is one, may be said to be essentially one of the city. The whole problem revolves around the relative importance of money in the rural vis-a-vis the urban setting. Over the years, Nigerian towns have moved progressively from their agricultural economic base to varying degrees, depending on the sizes of their populations. For example, mass migration from the rural areas of south-western Nigeria to the urban centres has been partly a movement away from agriculture. Rural migrants found in very large numbers in both small and large Yoruba towns are those who have come from widely scattered villages into environments where, in the majority of cases, they have no family land and consequently cannot practise agriculture even if they wished to do so and urban agricultural land were available.⁵

The result is that today, particularly in the larger towns of Nigeria, non-agricultural occupations predominate and an over-



whelming proportion of inhabitants depend on wage incomes. The implication of this is that food which constitutes perhaps the most important item in man's scale of necessities has to be bought. Unlike in the village where accommodation is free, shelter has to be paid for in the large towns with large proportions of migrant "strangers". Distance to work becomes greater both in terms of frequency of journey (a daily affair) and in terms of the space traversed. Consequently transport costs become an important item in the monthly budget of the town-dweller. Under these and other circumstances peculiar to urban centres, money acquires much more importance than it does in the village. In short, money imposes a severe limit on the extent to which an urban-dweller can accommodate all his wants. At the same time, it shifts his economic horizon farther than a village-dweller could possibly aim at.

However, as far as the problem of extended family obligations is concerned, a distinction must be made between groups in the urban setting. In the larger towns the population can be divided into two broad social groups—the economically inferior and the economically superior groups. The economically inferior group generally inhabit the "indigenous" and less developed area of the town with relatively poor housing and environmental condition. The group is made up essentially of low income families such as carpenters, blacksmiths, labourers, petty traders and the like. On the other hand, the economically superior group, which comprise persons in the clerical, professional, managerial and technical cadres, inhabit the newer and more developed residential areas usually skirting the "core" or "indigenous area".

The economically inferior group earn very inadequate incomes. In many cases, however, the meagre incomes of the men are supplemented by the wives' incomes from trading activities. In many cases children also hawk light articles or food when they are not in school, or after school hours if they are. They thus add their little quota to the family's income. In other words, among this group children to a large extent earn their keep.

Apart from the junior clerical ranks, the incomes of the economically superior group are many times higher than those in the economically inferior group. The children in this group are wholly

dependent on their parents because almost invariably they are in school and usually remain there much longer than the children in the economically inferior group. This is important if members are to conform with the traditions of their group. Moreover, the children have to be provided with such modern trappings that distinguish them from the other group. Thus the upbringing of children costs substantially more in this group. It is from members of this group that much of the financial assistance required by extended family members is demanded and obtained and it is members of this group who usually complain about the burden of extended family obligations.

In short, although in theory assistance can be asked for and is usually given by any member of an extended family, the economically superior urban-dwellers bear the brunt of the burden; the burden, that is, is relative to the economic circumstances of the town-based member of the extended family. Moreover, the so-called burden complained of by members of the economically superior group is brought on them not only by the demands of their less fortunate relations in the village but also by the demands of those who, like them, have come to live in the town and are subjected to the vicissitudes of an urban wage economy.

How the System of Extended Family Obligations operates

There are two levels on which the system of extended family obligations may be said to operate. The first level, may be termed "non-compulsive" because the obligations included are those which depend more on the attitude of the member and are largely permissive. The second level, which may be called "compulsive", include obligations which are morally binding.

Perhaps the least important of the non-compulsive obligations is the distribution during home visits of occasional gifts to village members of the extended family and neighbours by the town-based member who is usually assumed to be economically better off by reason of his living in town. At this level of obligation hardly is a hole left in the purse of the visiting member since the nature of the gifts depends on his financial capability (and he is the best judge) as well as on the frequency of his visits. The gifts, for example, may

be no more than a few loaves of bread cut into little bits for the children of the household and the immediate vicinity. It may be restricted to a shilling piece here and there—a kind of useful “foreign exchange” which is conserved by the villagers for the purchase of city goods.

Next in importance among the non-compulsive obligations are the occasional unannounced short visits from members of the extended family. A Nigerian member of the middle-class puts the problem as follows: “Relatives arrive in your house without prior notice and decide to stay on for a day or two. Little cousins are sent over, again without notice, to spend a week or two of the holidays with you.”⁶ To a Western European or North American family this would probably be regarded as an unwelcome encroachment on the freedom and hospitality of the nuclear family. In this regard the extended definition of the family in the Nigerian context given by another Nigerian⁷ may be enlightening. According to him, “a family is composed of not only the husband, wife and the children, but also close and remote relations like cousins, nephews, nieces, uncles, aged parents of the wife and even destitute friends and neighbours.” In fact, all persons of the same generation as the extended family member, however distant the blood relationship, are significantly, referred to by him as “brothers” and “sisters”.

In other words, the “little cousins” are as much part of the household of the extended family member as his children, though limitation of space and perhaps the fact that their parents may be financially capable of maintaining them put them in the category of “absentee” members. The occasional unexpected additions to the family budget, of course, affect somewhat a man’s savings from his income. But there is a consolation: the visits are reciprocal (at least in theory) and are welcomed by other members of the family.

The last in the category of non-compulsive obligations, and perhaps the most telling on the income of the extended family member are the contributions made occasionally to the cost of a member’s wedding or funeral ceremony. These are occasions for all members to come out in full force in the “family uniform” (*aso ebi*). The lavishness of these ceremonies, particularly in the Yoruba area, and the irrationality of the “family uniform” which often

drains the purses not only of members, but also of well-wishers, are currently the butt of attacks in newspapers and magazines by those who have broken the shackles of tradition—at least in this regard.

The compulsive obligations include:

- (a) the assistance to members of the extended family in their drive to establish themselves in business or trade or to secure employment;
- (b) the maintenance of parents, particularly aged ones; and
- (c) the education of members of the extended family.

The assistance given to members of the extended family in order to set them up in business or secure employment for them are of two types. First, financial assistance may be given to a member to enable him to pay the “kola” (bribe) demanded by a prospective employer. Secondly, a man may be called upon to provide board and lodging for a relative until he is established either in business or secures employment. The length of stay of the relative depends on circumstances. For example, if his aim is to go into small business, the length of stay depends on how soon he gets enough funds for this purpose. If it is to get a job, which has become very difficult as a result of growing urban unemployment, the length of stay will depend also on how soon he can raise the money for “kola”, whether or not the person to whom the money is given is the person in charge of recruitment or his agents, and whether the person is himself in a position to offer a job; he may well be a swindler in the guise of a prospective employer. In the latter case, the pressure on him to help an unfortunate member of his family to find a job often leads to abuse of office whereby the man’s department or establishment is filled with members of his extended family and clan.

In short, the charges of official corruption made in recent years against some Nigerians in influential positions would be tempered if consideration is given to the circumstances surrounding the act. This problem has been aptly stated in the following words: “The people of this nation have made so much hullabaloo about bribery that everyone seems to have forgotten some hard facts... Among what we inherited from our predecessors is respect for elders. What happens when your less fortunate senior brother brings his son to you for work? Dare you turn him down because some other appli-

cants are better qualified ?”⁸

The answer to the rhetorical question is obvious. Of course, you dare not, otherwise your nephew may (and if his parents live elsewhere, he almost certainly will) be asked to live with you at no cost to his parents until you find him a job.

Two main reasons why the southern Nigerian parents make vigorous efforts to educate their children are first, to give the children a good start in life and, secondly, to give the parents economic security in their old age. Studies of fertility attitudes from many parts of Africa have shown that by far the most important reason why parents desire a large number of children is to guarantee that some, at least, survive to take care of their parents when they become too infirm to work. By giving these children the highest education they can afford, their earning power outside peasant agriculture will be enhanced and they will be in a much better position to maintain their parents. This is why the moral obligation to support parents is almost invariably discharged by children, usually by sending at regular intervals money for food and other necessities.

However, the frequency with which money is sent to parents depends on where they live, that is, whether they are farmers in the village or are settled in a town and engaged in non-agricultural occupations, the proceeds which are not sufficient to enable them live a decent life. If the parents are farmers in the village, home remittance by the children is restricted to occasional money gifts during home visits or whenever money is asked for to settle some financial commitments. The farmer often has enough to eat and to spare. It is only where parents are settled in town and are engaged in occupations the remuneration which is insufficient to enable them live a comfortable life that financial help from children becomes part of their monthly budget.

Although all the various obligations combine to create the so-called problem of the extended family, by far the most important single obligation is the assistance given in the training of members of the family by the more fortunate ones. This is so because of the close link between the training of members for future employment and their ability to maintain aged parents.

The introduction of formal education into a non-literate,

largely peasant agricultural society, and the increasing awareness of its importance as a means of ascending the social ladder has, since the past two decades in Nigeria, created a problem of lack of congruence between parents' aspirations for as much formal education as available for their children, and their ability to pay for such education. The traditional solidarity of the extended family has provided a framework within which the problem is being resolved.

There are two main systems of assistance as far as formal education is concerned. The assistance may be either diffused or restricted or both, depending on the level of education involved and the southern Nigerian ethnic group concerned. The Ibo and the Yoruba ethnic groups are two good examples of the operation of these systems.

Among the Ibos the obligation is usually restricted to parents in the case of education of children to secondary or high school level. It is the same among the Yorubas. In the process of educating their children, parents often strain their resources and make many sacrifices. Sometimes heavy debts are incurred, with farmlands as security. These farmlands are sometimes forfeited to the creditors in the event of failure or inability to liquidate the debts.

As soon as one or two of the children complete their education (usually up to secondary or high school level) and have secure jobs, they are expected, and they themselves feel obliged to assist in the training of those of their junior brothers and sisters that are willing to be educated. The assistance may include board and lodging.

Education beyond the secondary school level (i.e. higher professional, university, etc.) is in Nigeria a privilege which only a few enjoy. Among the Yoruba, education up to University level, if it is given at all, is the sole responsibility of the parents of the person concerned, though some financial assistance can be had from members of the extended family by individual appeal at specific times when fees have to be paid. But this is not to be regarded as a continuous source of assistance. Most children from indigent Yoruba families, therefore, depend on scholarships and personal savings over a number of years to finance their university education.

Among the Ibos, however, the system of assistance in education at University or equivalent levels is more institutionalised and

this fact probably accounts for the rapid advance they have made in recent years in the field of education at all levels. Of course, where parents are well-to-do, they bear the responsibility of educating their children beyond secondary school level as in the majority of cases), the clan, a much larger grouping than the extended family and usually occupying the same village except for absent members, comes to their aid. By means of levies on members both at home and abroad, the amount required is raised. The existence of well-organised tribal unions⁹ with branches throughout the country was an asset in this respect. Invariably members of the clan pay these levies more or less willingly because some of them have in the past benefited from the scheme and also because the increase in the number of highly educated sons of the village is a source of pride to the clan. Moreover, with more people trained, the circle of contributors widens and the amount of levy paid subsequently by one individual becomes smaller.

Financial assistance in education, of course, is not restricted to Nigeria and seems to be a phenomenon common to many African countries where similar conditions exist. The following passage from a study on Ghana¹⁰ summarises aptly the nature of an attitude to extended family obligations :

Most financial support for education came from parents, although the role of uncles and brothers was also important. Well over half of recipients regard the repayment of the assistance as a definite obligation. The two main forms of repayment will take the form of assistance with the education of brothers and sisters and the support of parents, especially when old or sick. It is noteworthy that support for education sets up a kind of chain reaction which engenders the further support of education...

Thus, the financial obligations of the extended family remain very strong. On the whole, such obligations are not resented. Less than a tenth of all students claimed that they resented it in anyway. The majority approved and a third strongly approved.

Thus although there are frequent complaints about extended family obligations, cases of outright refusal to discharge such obligations are extremely rare. Given the circumstances of their own education and upbringing, extended family members cannot on moral grounds repudiate such obligations.

Extended Family Obligations and the Standard of Living of Members

An important question around which extended family obligations revolve is the effect of these obligations on the members' standard of living. These obligations, as has been shown, vary in importance, that is as far as their demands on the purses of members are concerned. For example, the discharge of non-compulsive obligations depend very much on the attitude and ability of the person concerned. As Goode¹¹ says in his survey of family patterns in Africa, "...the established person may receive his relatives from the tribal area, and help them to get an education or become established. Nevertheless, in the city these economic and social relationships do not force the individual to submit to all the demands made by his kin, and he may at least begin to choose which obligations he will accept and how far he will carry them out."

As for the very important obligations of educating children and maintaining them until adult age, these are the direct responsibilities of the nuclear family. Members of the larger family, if they do contribute, do so only peripherally. Morally then, the most important obligations of the children—those which take precedence over any other—are the maintenance of indigent parents, usually in old age, and relieving them of their responsibility for educating the other children.

But then, these obligations often involve not one individual but ultimately several. With the successful education and job placement of one or two junior brothers, for example, the burden of the senior brother becomes lighter since, where there was one before, there would be two or more to share the responsibility. Moreover, the discharge of these obligations does not go on perpetually, and with the passing of the years, the incomes of the members increase while their responsibilities outside their families of procreation progressively dwindle. It would appear, therefore, that the financial

involvements of extended family obligations are such as can be conveniently accommodated within the household budgets of members.

Admittedly, there are problems which members face in their discharge of extended family obligations. They have to make a number of personal sacrifices. Take for example, the case of a senior administrative, technical or professional worker. One of the status symbols of his grade is a car. Another is a sumptuously furnished flat with a kitchen equipped with all modern gadgets. In an effort to discharge extended family obligations, he may not be able to afford a car immediately or a television set within the first two years and can own only a transistor radio rather than a radiogram. His wardrobe may not be as full as he would have liked and his furniture may consist of only a bed and a few not-so-decent chairs. The ownership of one or more buildings (usually for commercial purposes) which is the ambition of many a Nigerian may seem remote and an almost unattainable ambition because, initially his savings are meagre. These are sources of anxiety to the extended family member who is rather in haste to acquire these things quite oblivious of the fact that he would not have been in a position to aspire to these things without the sacrifice of others.

In an issue of the Nigerian *Sunday Times*, a contributor on this topic who is obviously against the system complained as follows: "People with small incomes find it hard to comprehend the greater costs of living of individuals with higher incomes. A successful civil servant or company employee may be unable to withstand the pressure on him to contribute to the welfare of other members of that family and *still live the style of life that he believes to be socially necessary for him and his family*. This is why there is the temptation to go into borrowing and engage in fraudulent ways of meeting his expenses."¹² He, however, admits that people whom he calls "Senior debtors" (i.e. senior government and commercial employees) are those "who fail to accept the realities of economics—the 'budget constraint' on all our desires." He continues: "In fact, going into debt is a result of each individual's preferences and his valuation of his station in life and not because of extended family system."

In spite of these problems, it does not appear that the standard of living of the extended family member is lowered. Of course, the

term "standard of living" itself is a fluid one and this accounts for the fact that it has often been invoked in the various arguments against the extended family system. But perhaps a member should measure his socio-economic advancement against the background of his family of orientation rather than against a nebulous status category to which he considers himself a member by virtue of an education or employment which, but for the personal sacrifices of a humble parent, he may never have attained.

Today, many of those who complain about the lowering effect of extended family obligations on their standard of living own cars (usually expensive ones) and live in sumptuous apartments in beautiful surroundings in spite of their obligations to the extended family. They try their best to provide for their children those basic necessities which make life pleasant and of which they themselves were denied when they were young, though they cannot, admittedly because of extended family obligations, provide all that they would have liked for these children since, with socio-economic development and increased contact with the outside world, the urban economic horizon shifts farther and farther. In short, even when extended family members save very little of their incomes, particularly in the first few years of their working lives, their level of living stands out in bold relief against that of the family in which they were nurtured. These are concrete indications of a rise rather than a fall in the standard of living.

It follows, therefore, that the so-called problem of the extended family is largely a myth. The dissatisfaction with the obligations on the part of a member arises from his perception of a gap between his socio-economic aspirations and the level of achievement. Aspirations vary with the individual's position on the socio-economic scale, but certainly far ahead of achievement. As Davis¹³ puts it "Men are end-pursuing animals."

But this is not all. The excesses to which Nigerians are prone—lavish parties on the flimsiest of excuses, expensive cars, prolific childbearing, etc—aggravate any financial problems to which extended family obligations might have given rise. The following extracts are taken from the 'Problems Page' of the *Sunday Times*¹⁴ :

PROBLEM

"I earn less than £500 a year and I am just a little above 25 years of age with two wives and three children all of whom together with my two younger sisters depend on me. Now I have just fallen in love with a very beautiful and liberal girl... What advice can you give me?"

ANSWER

"With two wives, three children and two sisters not to mention your parents as your dependents on your salary of less than £500 a year, one would have thought that you would direct your attention towards trying to improve your income rather than seeking another woman's favour... You should thank your stars that you are still able to make ends meet as things stand now. Don't worsen your situation and cause yourself an unnecessary financial embarrassment by marrying a third wife."

However apocryphal the passage might sound to persons outside this culture, it does, at least illustrate quite clearly the kind of irrational behaviour to which extended family members are prone and which usually brings about much of the financial difficulty they often attribute to extended family obligations.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be said that extended family obligations have served and continue to serve a very useful purpose in the context of Nigerian society where social security schemes are virtually non-existent and where, consequently, each family has to fend for itself in times of joblessness, illness and at old age. Today as a result of the operation of the system, a large proportion of people have been recruited into the ranks of well-educated and highly paid persons who neither require the help of extended family members to bring up their children, nor the assistance of their children in old

age. Although mutual assistance will probably not disappear completely, the next generation of children will be relatively free from the compulsive extended family obligations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. Michael Banton, *West African City: A Study of Tribal Life in Freetown* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 208.
2. Peter Marris, "Slum clearance and family life in Lagos." *Human Organisation* 19 (Fall 1960), p. 124; Joan Aldous, "Urbanisation, the extended family and kinship ties in West Africa", *Social Forces* 41 (October 1962), p. 8.
3. Dayo Ajaša, "Am I my brother's keeper?" (Lagos: *Sunday Times*, August 17, 1969), p. 7; G.B. Ajayi, "Yes, an African is his brother's keeper" (Lagos: *Sunday Times*, August 24, 1969), p. 7; Labanji Bolaji, "Being your brother's keeper can be a joy" (Lagos: *Sunday Times*, September 7, 1969), p. 7.
4. R.C. Fuller and R.R. Myers, "The natural history of a social problem." *American Sociological Review* 6 (June, 1941), pp. 320-328.
5. H. A. Oluwasanmi, *Agriculture and Nigeria's Economic Development* (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 68.
6. Labanji Bolaji, *op. cit.*, page 7.
7. G.B. Ajayi, *op. cit.*, page 7.
8. *Daily Times*, Lagos: June 10, 1971, page 7.
9. J.S. Coleman, "The role of tribal associations in Nigeria." *Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research*, 1952, pp. 61-66.
10. J.C. Caldwell, "Population prospects and policy." p. 159 in W. Birmingham, I. Neustadt and E.N. Omaboe (eds): *A Study of Contemporary Ghana*, Vol. II. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1967.
11. William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns*. (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 190-191.
12. *Sunday Times*, Lagos: 1969, page 7.
13. Kingsley Davis, *Human Society*. (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1966, Students ed.), p. 126.
14. *Sunday Times*, Lagos: January 16, 1972, p. 11.

Mrs. Juliet I. Okonkwo

The Talented Woman in African Literature

In African novels, especially those set in the more olden times, the paucity of women characters who are of more than background interest attests to the complete realization of the claim that "it is a man's world". Through the pages of *Things Fall Apart*, *Arrow of God*, *Danda*, *The Only Son*, *The Concubine*, *The Great Ponds* women come and go with mounds of foo-foo, pots of water, market baskets; fetching kola, being scolded and beaten before they disappear behind the huts of their compounds. These novels reflect the African belief that the physiological differences between men and women dictate complete distinct social roles for the sexes. Although their own role is subordinate, and quite often menial, practically every woman accepted it. Much more interesting is the fact that the most reluctant members of the society to sanction any changes in the social set-up, even when they might ameliorate their own position, are the women themselves. One of the most detailed studies of this type of woman is presented in Ihuoma of Elechi Amadi's *The Concubine*.

Ihuoma is presented as the perfection of the traditional African woman. Her creator approaches her with a great deal of tenderness and sympathy. She combines great physical beauty with a measure of wisdom, gentleness, reserve and good nature. Amadi relates his heroine totally to her society; they merge and fuse into each other to produce one component, harmonious whole. Ihuoma's great charm lies in her achievement of a complete integration with the values of her community, Omokachi. She embodies both its strength and

weakness and becomes a symbol of its integrity.

Omokachi village life was noted for its tradition, propriety, and decorum. Excessive or fanatical feelings, over anything were frowned upon and even described as crazy. Anyone who could not control his feelings was regarded as being unduly influenced by his agwu. Anyika often confirmed this, as in Ahurole's case.

Even love and sex were put in their proper place. If a woman could not marry one man she could always marry another. A woman deliberately scheming to land a man was unheard of. True, she might encourage him, but this encouragement was a subtle reflex action, a legacy of her prehistoric ancestors. A mature man's love was sincere, deep and stable and therefore easy to reciprocate, difficult to turn down. That was why it was possible for a girl to marry a man without formal courtship. Love was love and never failed.

That was Ihuoma's world and she behaved true to type! In this effort to retain in herself the ideals of this conservative, rather narrow society, she obliterates, for a while, all signs of her separate identity, subordinating her innermost desires to the approbation of her society.

Secretly, however, Ihuoma chaffs at the restriction which these social demands place on her freedom of action and expression. Thus, even though she behaves properly when Wigwe, Ekwueme's father bursts on her in the night to make a mock marriage proposal on his son's behalf—"She sat upright and directed her gaze meekly to the floor. That was the correct posture to adopt when being spoken to by an elder. She was desperately trying to be as blameless as possible"²—she feels outraged. "Whoever heard of such a stupid marriage proposal? she mused. It was the greatest insult she had ever had to bear."³ But, remembering her reputation, she behaves properly, stifling her anger and sense of assault. With time, however, Ihuoma recognizes the absurdity in suffering and sacrificing so much in her attempt to avoid public censure:

As her prestige mounted its maintenance became more trying. She became more sensitive to criticism and would go to any lengths to avoid it. The women adored her. Men were awestruck before her. She was becoming something of a phenomenon. But she alone knew her internal struggles. She knew she was not better than anyone else. She thought her virtues were the products of chance. As the days went by she began to loathe her so-called good manners. She became less delighted when people praised her. It was as if they were confining her to an ever-narrowing prison.⁴

Ihuoma is only one in a long line of women characters to whom fulfilment comes only in the attainment of the positions of wife and mother. They work out their lives subordinated to the caprices of their menfolk. Even when such women are as individualized as Chiaku of *The Only Son*, the conflicts which surround them are not conflicts which originate from their character but from the dislocation of the social set up around them.

There may be a temptation to attribute this failure to project any intellectual or progressive aspirations in African womanhood to male chauvinism. Most writers of African literature are men, and might prefer to keep women in the same un-awakened state, perpetually. But, in Anna of *Obi*, John Munonye has presented a woman with the modern ideas of companionship and partnership in a marriage. Anna's modified vision springs from her exposure to western education and the encouragement of her educated husband. Together, they plan their lives and strive to complement each other. Anna's greatest satisfaction lies in the opportunity to share in her husband's work.

At the end of each day, he would hand the stamp over to her for safe keeping; and she would keep it under her pillow. Then, in the morning, she would return it to him; and she would observe him as he put it inside his pocket. That gave her the feeling that she shared in his work. And, to add to it all, he had made a good name for himself, and for her, by his integrity and sincerity.⁵

So much is Anna's life interwoven with that of her husband, Joe, that she become an indispensable part of him. Both she and Joe had declared their independence by marrying without the traditional involvement of parents and families. Anna's individual occupation of being a seamstress does not detract from the mutuality of their relationship. In fact, on the lone occasion when Anna is forced to withdraw from her home, the impact is felt severely by her husband. Moreover, the community learns to appreciate her contributions:

Back in Umudioba, Joe felt solitary and abandoned, because of Anna's absence. The hours dragged and the days were dreary. It had not been like that at the time he was angry, before he went to Anaa to see her. Those days had, besides, been full of activity and there were really no lonely moments. Now that they had been reconciled, he longed for her presence and he felt awkward without her. This was especially so in the hours after supper—the time they usually sat and talked intimately and he told her his plans.

Wherever Joe went in Umudioba people asked him about Anna... They had only noticed that her workshop had remained closed for sometime now. And besides, Anna had been missing in church and at women's meetings. Like the moon that shines at night, Anna did not have to announce her departure before it would be known.⁶

But Anna, with her slightly widened horizon does not diverge seriously from the common run of womenfolk around her. She is neither a woman of vision nor of revolutionary ideas.

Two women writers have projected a new type of heroine. This heroine, with new ideas challenges the constricting role which has been reserved for women, and seeks something more than marriage and children, in the quest for fulfilment. Flora Nwapa's *Efuru* and Ama Ata Aidoo's *Anowa* present heroines who reject the accepted norms and try an experiment with something new. Marriage, being the focal centre in a woman's traditional role, it is through their conception and arrangement of their own marriages that both *Efuru* and *Anowa* declare their intention to rebel against the old tradition,

Nwapa's Efuru shocks her relations and society by ignoring the usual procedures in a marriage transaction, by simply packing her things and going to live with the man she chooses:

They saw each other fairly often and after a fortnight's courting she agreed to marry him. But the man had no money for the dowry. He had just a few pounds for the farm and could not part with that. When the woman saw that he was unable to pay anything, she told him not to bother about the dowry. They were going to proclaim themselves married and that was that. Efuru was her name. She was a remarkable woman. It was not only that she came from a distinguished family. She was distinguished herself. Her husband was not known and people wondered why she married him.⁷

Efuru's next move is to reject the occupation of farming, regarded exclusively as a feminine preserve. She chooses to trade and make big money. Not only does she arrange her own life, but also for sometime she directs that of her husband. "If you like", she said to her husband, "go to the farm. I am not cut out for farm work. I am going to trade."⁸ Adizua fails at the farm, working alone and comes complaining to his wife. Efuru treats him almost like a child, "In that case, I would like you to leave the farm. But you have to wait until the harvest and after that you can come to town. Both of us can trade together."⁹ In spite of being the dominant partner in the marriage, Efuru takes great care of her husband and has great affection for him. Adizua however deserts Efuru without warning. Her second marriage collapses and she returns to her father's house becoming a worshipper of the woman of the Lake who endows her with immense wealth, but no children.

Aidoo's Anowa, in the same manner defies her parents in her choice of a marriage partner. Anowa's restlessness for a different type of life other than the conventional is emphasised at the beginning of the drama:

A child of several incarnations,
She listens to her own tales,
Laughs at her own jokes and
Follows her own advice¹⁰

The old woman has complained that "Anowa is something else...she has refused to marry any of the sturdy men who have asked for her hand in marriage. No one knows what is wrong with her!"¹¹ Her father is solicitous: "...what man would I order from the heavens to please the difficult eye of my daughter Anowa?"¹² Anowa's marriage is even more disastrous than Efuru's. The friction between her and Kofi Ako ends with Kofi shooting himself and Anowa drowning herself.

The similarity between these two heroines is remarkable. Of equal interest is the almost parallel development of their marriages and life. Both Efuru and Anowa are beautiful talented women from good families. Efuru's beauty is in everybody's mouth; Anowa is referred to as

A dainty little pot
Well-baked
And polished smooth
To set in a nobleman's corner.¹³

Both of them intend to live their lives in the manner that satisfies an inner craving. To her mother's condemnation of her choice of Kofi Ako for a husband, Anowa retorts: 'I do not care, Mother. Have I not told you that this is to be my marriage and not yours?'¹⁴ Efuru and Anowa choose the same type of men for husbands. Adizua is a nobody, with neither name nor money. If Adizua has any hidden powers to offset those disadvantages, they never come into the open. Miss Nwapa does not explain Efuru's motives, for the initiative certainty comes from her: "Efuru told him that she would drown herself in the lake if he did not marry her. Adizua told her he loved her very much and that even the dust she trod on meant something to him."¹⁵ Kofi Ako's shiftlessness makes Badua, Anowa's mother to lament "Of all the mothers that are here in Yébi, should I be the one whose daughter would want to marry this fool, this good-for-nothing cassava man, this watery male of all watery males?"¹⁶ It would appear that the talented woman in African literature who wants to execute some of her ideas finds great attraction in the weak male. Perhaps with the inferior and subordinate position which women possess in an African society,

the only cause open to an ambitious woman with a strong individual will is to marry an ineffectual male, who, she hopes, will not interfere with her plans for a life of her own conception. This certainly happens with both women at the commencement of their marriages.

Efuru decides policies between herself and Adizua. When she refuses to work in the farm, she does not suggest it as a possibility, but proposes it as final. She later organizes the trade undertaken by both partners and when one line of strategy fails, she proposes another.

"We won't go again," she told her husband.

"Yes, we won't go again. But what are we going to do?"

"We are going to look for another trade.

These women spoil trade so easily. When they see you making profit in one trade they leave the trade they know and join yours and of course in no time it is no longer profitable. So we shall look for another thing to do..."¹⁷

Later, it is stated quite categorically that "Adizua was not good at trading. It was Efuru who was the brain behind the business. He knew this very well..."¹⁸ In the same way, Anowa claims that she is going to help Kofi Ako in his business, travelling rough roads at very unpredictable times, even in inclement weather. For a while all is well for both women, but, gradually without knowing what has been happening, they find power and control slipping out of their hands. Tired of dancing to Efuru's tunes, Adizua deserts her without giving any reason. Of Anowa's zeal in being companion and business partner, Kofi comes to suspect:

Sometimes I do not understand. Whereever we go, people take you for my sister at first. They say they have never heard of a woman who helped her husband so. "Your wife is good" They say "for your sisters are the only women you can force to toil like this for you... Perhaps if they knew what I am beginning to know, they would not say so much. And proverbs do not always describe the truth of reality. Anowa truly has a few strong ideas. But I know she will settle down."¹⁹

What has happened is that in a society as male-dominated as in

Africa, even the weakest of men, just by virtue of being a man, claims the same traditional subservience from his wife. The woman of talent and intelligence will therefore discover that she is reckoned only secondary to the claims of man. Kofi Ako, in desperation, bursts out his claims.

I like you and the way you are different.

But Anowa, sometimes you are too different.

I know I could not have started without you. but after all, we all know you are a woman, and I am a man.²⁰

Both Efuru and Anowa are good, generous, lovable, hardworking women. Their goodwill towards their husbands knows no bounds. They are ready to sacrifice everything they have for the comfort and prosperity of their husbands, provided they are allowed the liberty of self-expression and initiative. In one thing, however, they stand at cross-purposes with their husbands. Anowa's mother puts it succinctly thus: "A good woman does not have a brain or a mouth."²¹ Efuru and Anowa have both, and insist on exercising them. Moreover they repudiate the clearly defined roles of men and women in an African society, attempt to substitute the humanization of men and women. Not only do they fail, they are destroyed in the process. Too late Anowa realises the hopelessness of her position :

Someone should have taught me how to grow up to be a woman. I hear in other lands a woman is nothing. And they let her know this from the day of her birth. But here, O my spirit mother, they let a girl grow up as she pleases until she is married. And then she is like any woman anywhere: in order for her man to be a man she must not think, she must not talk. O—o why didn't someone teach me how to grow up to be a woman?²²

For both Efuru and Anowa, criticism and opposition crystalize in the comments and efforts of their fellow women. The woman called Omirima does not rest without voicing her condemnation of Efuru's close relationship with her second husband; she tirelessly endeavours to persuade others to obstruct Efuru's moves, and finally, in a burst of maliciousness, sponsors the accusation of adultery against Efuru

which finally dissolves her second marriage. Likewise, in *Anowa*, the Old Woman's resentment of Anowa's claim to a different, better life is borne out in her outburst:

Who is she to bring us new rules to live by?

.....

As the sourest yam
Is better than the sweetest guava,
The dumbest man is
Always better than a woman.
Or *he* thinks he is !
And so Kofi shall teach Anowa
He is a man !²³

It is the woman who insist on the old ways. They advise polygamy where a wife is unable to have a child. They remind all the growing young women how to accept their life of hardwork and suffering. This attitude is universal among the generality of womenfolk as a writer from the United States of America testifies:

Women come to terms with their situation of social and familial limitation by seeing themselves in a great company of their kind, enduring what others have endured and achieving what women have always achieved. If their fantasies attach perhaps excessive value to such endurance and such achievement, casting the female protagonist in heroic roles, those fantasies also aid in the precise communication of what feminine experience feels like.²⁴

Surprisingly men appear more tolerant to the amelioration of the lot of women. And so, it is left to Osam to defend Anowa against Badua's tyranny : "My wife, people with better vision than yours or mine have seen that Anowa is not like you or me."²⁵ The Old Man speaks out of her finest apologia

"A good husband would himself want advice from his wife, as the head of a family, a chief, a king, any nobleman has need of an adviser."

"I do not know if I can believe all this you say of the pitiful

child. But certainly, it is not too much to think that the heavens might show something to children of a latter day which was hidden from them of old?"²⁶

And finally, as an epilogue :

"Who knows if Anowa would have been a better woman, a better person if we had not been what we are?"²⁷

These two writers clearly suggest that in the largely illiterate and limited horizon of an African setting, an intelligent, talented and ambitious woman is doomed to a life of frustration. Her problems are twofold. The menfolk refuse to accept her on anything but the traditional platform of a bearer of children, who ministers to the comforts of men. On the other hand, the women, partly out of a limited vision and ignorance are unable to imagine any other life than that handed down by their mothers. Possibly also, there is a motivation of jealousy of a woman who may enjoy the privileges which they themselves were denied. Caroline Ifeka says of Efuru that "Because she is a woman who stands head and shoulders above the rest of her sex in her home village, she is doomed to a life of lonely frustration."²⁸

This, however, is only half the story. Maryse Conde has written that :

Both writers convey the impression that a gifted woman simply has no place in African society. Not only because she cannot find a proper match, but because the price she has to pay for unusual gifts is so high that she would be better born without them...In a word, intelligence, sensitivity and creativity are poisoned gifts. Happiness belongs to the mediocre, at least to the average.²⁹

Efuru and Anowa, though they stand out among their fellows are semi-literate themselves. Not having acquired the intellectual discipline that comes with formal education, their own conception of their roles, even if distinct, is limited. Like most of their fellow women, marriage and children are central to their idea of fulfilment. Denied that, "There are all too few choices of action open to Efuru

which would solve her difficulties."³⁰ Anowa does not break down over this quite as completely as Efuru. Both accept many traditional ideas without question. As Joyce Cary had remarked, 'The conservatism of women is more formidable than that of men because it is anchored to her deepest feelings and to natural responsibilities.'³¹ For instance, they suggest to their husbands to marry other wives when they are unable to have children. They accept bad treatment from their husbands as part of their life. However, their careers indicate a growing restiveness among African women about the traditional roles assigned them in society. But they have been moulded within the narrow confines of that society. Their rebellion, therefore, tends to be half-hearted, because their alternatives have not been clearly worked out. With greater education, and opportunity to benefit from ideas external to her particular society, it may be possible for a talented woman to handle the situation in a more definite manner. She may not allow issues to crowd her out, but will actively work out clearly defined alternatives. Such women abound in the short stories that make up Flora Nwapa's *This is Lagos*, particularly in the character of Bisi of 'The Traveller' and 'The Child Thief'.

FOOTNOTES

1. Amadi, Elechi, *The Concubine*, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., African Writers Series, London, 1966, pp. 165-166.
2. *Ibid*, p. 146
3. *Ibid*, p. 149
4. *Ibid*, p. 199
5. Munonye, John, *Obi*, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., African Writers Series, London, 1969, p. 43.
6. *Ibid*, p. 183
7. Nwapa, Flora, *Efuru*, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., African Writers Series, London, 1966, p. 1.
8. *Ibid*, p. 5
9. *Ibid*, p. 19
10. Aidoo, Ama Ata, *Anowa*, Longman Group Ltd, London, 1970, p. 7.
11. *Ibid*, p. 7.
12. *Ibid*, p. 11
13. *Ibid*, p. 7
14. *Ibid*, p. 17

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15. Nwapa, *Op Cit* p. 1
16. Aidoo, *Op Cit* p. 15
17. Nwapa, *Op Cit* p. 20
18. *Ibid*, p. 39
19. Aidoo, *Op Cit* p. 27
20. *Ibid*, p. 30
21. *Ibid*, p. 33
22. *Ibid*, p. 52
23. *Ibid*, p. 41
24. Spacks, Patricia Meyer, "Reflecting Women" *The Yale Review*, Vol. LXIII, No. I, Autumn 1973, p. 28.
25. Aidoo, *Op Cit* p. 13
26. *Ibid*, pp. 40-41
27. *Ibid*, p. 64
28. Ifeka, Caroline, 'The World of Women' *Efuru, Nigerian Magazine*, June 1966, No. 89, p. 131.
29. Conde, Maryse, "Three Female Writers in Modern Africa" *Presence Africaine*, 82. 2nd Quarterly 1972, p. 139.
30. Ifeka, *Op Cit* p. 132
31. Carry, Joyce, *The Case for African Freedom*, London, Secker and Warbur, 1944, p. 120.

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The Place of Morals in African Foreign Policy

The publication of E. H. Carr's *Twenty Year's Crisis* in 1939¹ marked the beginning of a protracted intellectual debate in Western Europe and America over the general philosophy of politics and the way of thinking about political matters. The crucial issue concerned the general limitations on statecraft. As Tucker aptly puts it, the intention was not to tell the politician what he can do in a concrete situation but rather what he cannot expect to do in almost any situation.²

More specifically the disagreement involved the role of morality in politics. It is difficult to summarize the views of the two contending positions without falling into the errors inherent in the use of ideal type categories. One of these mistakes is the tendency to think of the debate in terms of power versus morality. Among the so called "realists" there are some like Carr who believe that power must determine all political purposes, that morality is inherent in political reality and that the historic must be accepted as the normative.³ Although there is nothing in the "realist" view that eschews this position, it is, nevertheless, not valid to think of "realism" in terms of the equation of power and morality. Morgenthau explicitly disclaims this equation.⁴ Similarly, the opposite view does not envisage the disappearance of power in political life.

Essentially, one believes that a rational and moral international political order based on universally valid moral principles can be achieved and, therefore, appeals to these principles as a guide to action. According to this school of thought the demands of morality transcend the limits of expediency and narrow self-interest. Foreign policy is limited by morality which is not simply the expression of national self-interest but rather of principles universally binding on states.⁵ Convinced that politics is characterized by inherently conflicting forces, the other viewpoint holds that moral principles can never be fully realized. Consequently, it appeals to historic precedents rather than universally valid moral principles as a guide to political action.⁶ This school, therefore, believes that while states must seek to achieve congruence between their national interest and the demands of universally valid principles the latter must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place, particularly by the evaluation of political interests. There cannot be political morality without serious considerations of the political consequences of the application of universal principles.⁷

Just as this debate was subsiding in the early 1960's a similar one was emerging in the newly independent African states. The Casablanca and Monrovia groups represented the two major contending foreign policy orientations on the continent during this period.⁸ The policies of the two sides consistently differed over such important African foreign policy problems as relations with the former colonial power; attitudes towards the cold war, association with the European Economic Community, the chaos in Zaire 1960-1965 and African unity; and relations among the African states. Zartman interprets the differences in terms of the primacy of national interest versus that of ideology.⁹ A similar observation is also made by Nye.¹⁰ Essentially, however, the opposing views vary on the role of universally valid principles in foreign policy. The Monrovia group like the "realists" of Europe and America stressed the importance of political success over the demands of principles; while their opponents like their counterparts in these continents contended that political success in itself is meaningless unless it is brought into line with the true interest of the African peoples as embodied in some rationally

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logical and consistent set of principles. Otherwise, short-run success based on expediency may lead to longrun difficulties.

A much more comparative debate in Africa is the perennial controversy between Tanzania and Malawi over their policies towards the white minority regimes of the continent. Both countries agree on the goals, namely, the elimination of white oppression of the black. However, one insists that its adherence to the principle of human dignity and equality must be subordinated to the demands of the state for economic welfare, and the other maintains that economic welfare must yield priority to human dignity. As Tandon and Shaw observe, "there are 80,000 Malawians working in South Africa, 120,000 in Southern Africa if Rhodesia were included. They send back remittances to Malawi which help in financing Malawi's Budgetary deficit."¹¹ The country is land-locked and has traditionally depended on the port facilities of Mozambique. Its "heavily populated heartland in the south is almost totally surrounded by Mozambique, so that almost half of Malawi is within Mozambique like an enclave."¹²

Tanzania does not suffer from such disadvantages. It has a sea coast; and has not traditionally depended on Mozambique for revenue or transportation. Nevertheless, it pays a price for its policy against white supremacy in Africa in other ways. First, both Tanzania and Mozambique are important producers of cashewnuts. Together they are capable of influencing world prices of this product to their mutual benefit.

A related palaver revolved around the issue of interstate dialogue between African states and South Africa. The most dramatic period of this controversy was sparked off by Houphouet Boigny's press conference of April 28, 1971 during which he unequivocally endorsed the policy of dialogue. Underlying the views of the proponents of dialogue were ideas which inform the argument of the "realist" school of thought. Among these are (a) moral principles can never be fully realized and as such states should seek not the absolute good but the least of the evils (b) a rejection of a simple

rationalistic faith in the inevitability of human progress (c) that grandiose attempts to transform society underrate the forces resistant to change and consequently the repressive measures necessary to overcome the resistance (d) the perfectionism is one of the most pervasive and recalcitrant of all political diseases (e) and that success in politics is contingent on an understanding of the laws of power.

On the other hand the opponents of dialogue base their views on beliefs akin to those of the "idealist" school of thought. The premises of their policy are: (a) no matter how depressing a frustrating an enterprise, it is worth pursuing relentlessly if the goal is right and means good (b) time is on the side of a people who are united in their desire for progress on the basis of human principles (c) if a people do not pursue policies guided by universally valid morality they can easily be the victims of tyranny from within or without (d) those who implement policies based explicitly on tenets contrary to the most fundamental human principles constitute enemies of mankind. Their views are based on fundamental beliefs which are not subject to argument or reason. The only hope of influencing them is to force them to realize the full implications to themselves of their false doctrines and perhaps shock them into thinking more deeply about their basic assumptions.¹³

Another confrontation along similar lines took place in Tanzania in 1966. It is reflected in the publication by President Nyerere of the pamphlet *Principles and Development*.¹⁴ His critics had complained about the loss of economic benefits to the country arising from his pursuit of abstract principles in foreign policy. Implicit in this point of view is the belief that there can not be successful foreign policy without prudence or the consideration of the consequences of moral action to the nation in concrete terms; that statesmen seldom, if ever, act for reasons as disinterested as they profess; and that politics neither follows nor reflects a simple rational scheme. These conform to the viewpoint of "realism". In his reply contained in the above pamphlet, President Nyerere maintained that a genuine foreign policy necessitates the absence of hypocrisy; it must demonstrate in practice that the principles upon which the state is founded are more sincere than their alternatives;

that the contention that moral ideas in foreign policy are a mask for exclusive national interests is both immoral and unrealistic; that moral appeals based on principles are urgently required for the generation of power; and that it is myopic to base foreign policy on expediency and narrow short-term benefits rather than the genuine and longer-lasting interests of the nation. His view, therefore, represented the "idealist" perspective.

Finally, Africa has witnessed a debate of a very brief duration over the correct African attitude to military coups on the continent.¹⁵ On the one hand there were those who sought a general principle to guide the actions of the African state on the matter. These consisted of two divergent viewpoints. One sought to outlaw governments installed by force in favour of a constitutional ascent to office. The other while condemning military coups argued for the doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of other states to provide the guiding principle. Both tendencies share the "idealist" belief in the conduct of foreign policy along rationally predetermined norms. On the other hand there were those who believed that the recognition or non-recognition of a military regime is the sovereign right of each state to be exercised on political grounds of national interest rather than on the basis of commonly agreed principles. They, therefore, share the "realist" attitude that statecraft should not, in the final analysis, be limited by an act of will or appeal to reason not arising from the national interest in the particular situation.

Unlike its counterpart in Europe and America, the debate in Africa has not been comprehensive. It has, by and large, been confined to specific policy issues such as relations with South Africa, attitude to military coups, and relations with former colonial power. Only with regard to the Casablanca and Monrovia groups was there an attempt at a comprehensive discussion of the bases of realism in African policy. But even then there was no rigorous attempt to justify one viewpoint or another. The debate in Tanzania had some elements of this but it tended to be confined to the specific issues of the country's foreign policies particularly its relations with West Germany, Britain, the United States and Southern Africa. Consequently, it was more limited in the scope of its generalizations.

This lack of rigour is probably the result of the confinement of the controversy to the level of the practitioners of politics. Academicians displayed no more interest in it than was consistent with explaining African international behaviour. The intellectual heat, rigour and intensity which characterized its Americo-European counterpart were noticeably absent in Africa. In fact, hardly any record exists of an academic debate of the subject in the journals patronized by students of African politics. This paper seeks to remedy the situation by, as it were, taking the debate to the intellectuals. Doing so at this time is particularly important because of the increasing need for the African states to be clearer than during the early period of their independence of the limits of action in international life.

The external monopoly of their diplomatic activities during the colonial period meant that they entered the comity of free nations with virtually no diplomatic experience or tradition. Their foreign policy goals were not clear in concrete and specific terms; they were only vaguely aware of the major areas of incompatibility of their objectives with those of other states; and were particularly ignorant of the limits of their national power, as well as the role of the latter and national interests in international transactions. The essence of their inter-state activities at the time was the mobilization of international support against colonialism, and external economic resources for national development by appeals to humanitarian sentiments; as well as the co-ordination of the activities of the neighbouring nationalist movements in the drive towards independence.

Over the years, however, they have learnt, sometimes painfully, of the limits of national power and interest in world politics. Their objectives have become less vague and more specific, national enemies and friends have emerged or are emerging; and a certain diplomatic tradition is certainly taking roots. With, thus, a better understanding of the major areas of compatibility and incompatibility of national objectives with those of other states, and the relevant configurations of power for the achievement of their foreign policy goals the need for a correct perspective on foreign policy becomes urgent. The question of the place of universally valid

principle in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy needs to be answered.

Unfortunately, the answers cannot be provided by the foregone debates in Europe and America or in Africa. Their tendency towards a dichotomization and polarization of concepts does not entertain an empirical situation of congruence between principles and national interest. A characteristic observation of this attitude is Carr's contention that man's intellect continuously seeks an escape from the logical consequences of realism by the creation of an international order which as soon as it is realized in concrete political form becomes tainted with political interest and hypocrisy and must once more be attacked by realism.¹⁶ On the basis of this dialectic he concludes that "politics are made up of two elements—utopia and reality—belonging to two different planes which can never meet."¹⁷ They are permanently incongruent; the one can never be the other.

Such analyses fail to correctly reflect a certain reality of international life notably the distribution of present and potential power and influence in the world community. And it is, in fact, this reality that provides "realism" with its *raison d'être*. From these discussions it is not clear if the injunction against adherence to universally valid moral principles applies to all states irrespective of their present and potential power capabilities. Can "idealism" be congruent with "realism" given a certain level of power, type of foreign policy objectives and the style of politics of a state? Is it possible that the "idealism" of a major power may be the "realism" of a small power? These are questions which have been left unanswered by these debates and which this paper addresses itself to. Answers to them are very crucial if the debates are to be relevant in any meaningful way to the largely small powers in Africa. In the absence of any significant power capability how can they conduct realistic foreign policy?

The Poverty of African Power

Cook and Moss seem to be the only ones who have seriously considered these questions.¹⁸ While accepting that power is the central element in world politics, that it is idiotic to talk of power-

less politics, they go on to argue that the major issues of foreign policy concern how to generate and use power, the interest that power is to serve, and the conception of interest most effective in generating power.¹⁹ Most textbooks of international relations categorize the resources which go to make up the power of a nation into two: the tangible and the intangible resources. The former refers to such factors as the size, population, military strength and industrial capacity; and the latter consists of variables like national morale, the quality of government and the political will of the leadership.

However, a better understanding of the limits of African power may be achieved by grouping these resources into (a) those which contribute to positive power or the ability to get other states to accede to African demands, and (b) those which are relevant for negative power or the capacity to prevent other states from achieving their objectives at the expense of the national goals of an African state. Positive power requires the availability of valuable minerals, strategic goods and services, military strength and industrial capacity. On the other hand, negative power depends on the size of territory and population, national unity and morale, the quality of government and society, and the political will of the national leadership.

The poverty of positive power in Africa is reflected in many ways. Economically, Africa comprises mainly countries of small market size, in which levels of economic growth are extremely low; and in which per capita income has been declining, stagnating or rising very slowly in recent years.²⁰ For example, in 1966 the GDP of an underdeveloped country, Brazil, was 40% of the total for all of the African states with the exception of South Africa.²¹ And the GDP of the United Kingdom, USSR and US were respectively about three, six and nineteen times greater than this African total.²² For the same year, the eight largest African markets, namely the UAR, Libya, Nigeria, Morocco, Algeria, Ghana, the Sudan and Ethiopia represented an aggregate purchasing power roughly equal to that of 230,000 US citizens whose income tax returns for 1965 showed annual incomes of over US \$50,000.²³ And the GDP of the largest economic unit in Africa at the time, the UAR, was less than 3%

that of the USSR and less than 1% that of the US. And there were at least 24 states whose GDP was less than 10% of that of the UAR.²⁴

During the mid-1960s the per capita income for a middle range advanced Western country such as the UK or France was about US \$1,500 and for a rich one, such as Canada, Sweden or US, about US \$3,000. This contrasts very sharply with the situation in Africa. In 21 African states with about 62% of the total population of the continent (minus S. Africa) in 1966, per capita income was less than US \$100; and in 34 states comprising about 90% of the population it was less than US \$200. In only two countries constituting less than 1% of the population was it in excess of US \$300. Similarly, in 16 countries with more than 25% of the 1966 population the annual growth rate of GDP per head was negative between 1960-1966; in a further 8 nations comprising about 20% of the population it was 1% or less; and in yet another six with more than 28% of the population it was 1% and 2%.²⁵

The level of industrial development is also low. More than 50% of total output is agricultural, and 50% or more of such output is produced by traditional non-mechanized methods.²⁶ Manufacturing contributed as much as 20% of the GDP in only the UAR, Zaire, and Rhodesia in 1966. In Africa (minus South Africa) as a whole the figure was less than 12%.²⁷ This contrasts very sharply with the equivalent figure of 39% for Western Europe, 45% in West Germany, 56% in the USSR and 65% in East Germany.²⁸ In addition, only very few African countries possess significant strategic mineral resources. These are Nigeria, Libya, Zaire, Gabon, and Zambia.

Militarily African states are equally underdeveloped. Assuming the will to commit available resources to the creation of an adequate military might this military weakness is the result of the low per capita income and level of industrial capacity which has been shown to be a feature of the continent. In 1966, Africa as a whole had the lowest ratio of servicemen to inhabitants and servicemen per square mile.²⁹ With regard to the scale of servicemen to inhabitants the 35 independent black African states South of the Sahara had 1 : 900 compared with France 1 : 780, China 1 : 260, the

US 1 : 65, South Africa 1 : 829 and Rhodesia 1 : 963.³⁰

In another respect, while in 1966 the US spent over 40% of its GDP on the military, most African states spent less than 1% of their GDP.³¹ Tanzania's total expenditure for 1966 was £47.04 million of which £8.12 million was spent on law, order and defence. The relative figures for 1967 were £52.92 million and £8.53 million respectively. In 1966 Uganda spent a total of £52.26 million out of which £5.20 million was used for law, order and defence. Comparative figures for 1967 were £60.78 million and £5.03 million respectively. And for Kenya the equivalent figures were £72.84 million and £4.03 million in 1966; and £80.44 million and £5.28 million in 1967. These compare very unfavourably with equivalent figures for South Africa and Rhodesia their declared enemies. South Africa's total defence expenditures were £105 million in 1964-65 and £128 million in 1966-67. The Rhodesian budget for defence rose from £11.1 million in pre-UDI days to £14 million in 1967-68 and £14.7 million in 1968-69. And Portugal, another national enemy, spent at least 40% of its budget on defence.³² Even in April, 1970 subsequent to the vast expansion of the Nigerian Armed Forces dictated by the Civil War 1967-1970, the country maintained a force of 185,000 men at a cost of US \$161 million or 11.4% of the national budget, South Africa, the same year, maintained a total force of 200,000 at a cost of US \$380 million or 11.8% of the national budget.³³

By 1970 the total Armed Forces of the rest of Africa had grown to be larger than the combined total for the white minority regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies. The figures are 759,000 and 334,000 respectively.³⁴ However, in the conflict between the two sides while most of the defence forces of the racists are devoted to the internal and external fronts practically none of the military personnel of the other African states is devoted to the struggle. The few, such as Egypt and Algeria, and perhaps Libya, with strong and well-equipped armies are pre-occupied with the Middle East crisis. More relevant still is the fact that while almost the entire defence budgets of South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as a very significant proportion of that of Portugal, are devoted to the struggle against the African Liberation Movements,

only a very tiny proportion of the defence budgets of the African states goes into the confrontation. Prior to 1971 the entire OAU budget for Liberation was less than £ $\frac{1}{2}$ million. This was increased by 10% in 1971 and again by 50% at the OAU Summit in 1972. It is estimated that in addition to other funds the Liberation Movements cannot count on more than £6 million. This is about 30 times less than the South African defence expenditure alone.³⁵

Thus Africa is relatively low on the elements of positive power. And with the widely acknowledged increasing gap between the have and the have-not nations of the world its comparative position can be expected to worsen in the future. The experience of the period 1966-1973 supports this expectation. But without a high level of military capability, the ability to ensure a high level of productivity of goods and services, or significant scientific achievements to its credit, a nation is largely powerless to influence others on behalf of its national objectives.

Factors of negative power are also weak on the continent. Of particular significance is the existence of poles of contradictions and cleavages which adversely affect national unity, morale, the quality of the government and society, as well as the national will. The arbitrary nature of colonial boundaries created ethnic cleavages within and among the African states. In part, the crises which have marked the politics of Nigeria, Zaire, Uganda and Kenya arise from such divisions. Similarly, the disputes between Somalia and Kenya, and between Somalia and Ethiopia are a variant of the same problem. At the same time the widening socio-economic gap between the urban and the rural areas, and between the elite and the masses, the struggle for power among the elites, the intergenerational differences among African civil servants, the conflict between the forces of tradition and those of modernity, and the gulf between African economic realities and African expectations of material welfare hamper national cohesion and morale. Acting alone each of these poles of conflict can, and do, frustrate national power. Their permutation and combination as well as their mutual reinforcement of one another intensify this frustration.³⁵ During the period 1960-1973 the effects of these contradictions were reflected

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in civil wars which afflicted 8 African states; rebellions which disturbed the social order in 13 of them; and 35 successful coups, 11 attempted coups, 74 plots, and 17 mutinies reported on the continent.³⁸

As a result, also of the weakness of the governmental bureaucracy, the inadequacy of the media of mass communication, and the underdevelopment of public opinion and pressure groups in the African states the quality of their governments and societies is low. Facilities for data collection and analysis are limited. And so are those for the planning, evaluation and implementation of policies. There is a severe lack of resources for contingency planning. Consequently, uncertainty is high regarding the course of the past, present, future or hypothetical conditions. This hampers governmental effectiveness, the national will to act and, therefore, negative power.

Classical "Realism" and the National Interest of the African States

The minimum basic foreign policy objectives of all states include the maintenance of state security, and the freedom to make major domestic decisions. For most of the African states the problem of state security is not posed. The obvious exceptions are those countries which border on the white racist and colonialist regimes. The widely and strongly held norms in favour of territorial integrity and against the use of force in inter-African relations precludes the possibilities of a direct attack by one African state on another. Even indirect attacks such as the invasion of Uganda by dissident Ugandans living in Tanzania generate a widespread condemnation of the countries from which the dissidents operate. Similarly, the spread of the legitimacy of the nation-state in the world community has lessened the fear of direct major power attacks. Events such as the partitions of Poland during the nineteenth century are largely inconceivable. The universal outcry against Belgian efforts to dismember Zaire immediately after its independence in 1960 is a testimony to this fact.

Therefore, the major foreign policy problem of African states concerns their independence to adopt any form of socio-economic



and political organisation they wish, and make the major decisions which affect their lives. In classical terms, "realism" demands that each should seek to achieve this goal by relying on its own power when this is sufficient, or allying with a more powerful state when it is not. The other alternative is submission to a major power. In the contemporary international community, however, these small African nations cannot realistically follow any of these paths. Their poverty of power precludes self-sufficiency. The large discrepancy in power between them and the major powers dictates against the path of alliance. For the same reasons submission is intolerable.

The present international environment favours a total control of the small by the big power which does not allow the former enough latitude to adopt a form of socio-economic and political organisation which it may prefer. The pervasive cleavage along ideological lines, the intense struggle for external resources, the large power gap between the super powers and the rest, and the chronic instability of the weak nations combine to transfer the boundaries of the major powers from the geographical to the psychological realm. By virtually neutralizing the resistance against involvement in the internal affairs of one state by another they have eliminated a major difficulty against external intervention which existed in earlier international systems. At the same time, increased interdependence arising from greater specialization of functions in the world; faster communication and increased horizontal mobility made possible by the recent revolution in the technology of transportation and communication; and greater sophistication in the use of propaganda and advertisement have considerably improved the art and changed the nature of control of the major over the minor powers.

Under these conditions alliances between the weak and the strong are beneficial to the former only when the interests of the partners are compatible or complementary. On the contrary, however, the interests of the African states and those of the advanced countries are in general largely incompatible. This may be illustrated by a few examples. Primarily because the contemporary international economic system ensures the allocation of a disproportionate share of the world's riches to the advanced nations, they have

strongly opposed measures designed to revamp its rules and regulations in order to make it less hostile and more benign to the interests of the poor countries.³⁷ Such a transformation would make serious inroads into their privileges.

Their approach to problems of development from the perspective of highly advanced and technologically sophisticated economies for which their experience and training prepare them tends to distort the solutions they provide for overcoming underdevelopment in the predominantly agricultural societies of the Third World. In another aspect, the high rate of technological advance in the industrialized countries frequently and rapidly renders the skills, processes and products of the poor states obsolete. The experiences of the producers of sisal and rubber in the last decade together with the increasing possibilities of synthetic cocoa; coffee and tea is illustrative. Similarly, the protectionist policies of the rich states, and their restriction of the export of capital and skills on grounds of national interest or national prejudice hamper the ability of the new states to trade, industrialize, diversify their products and in general achieve economic growth.

More specifically, domestic political pressure causes the industrialized nations to subsidize the production and export of primary products in which they cannot compete effectively in the international market. The US not only protects its weak agricultural commodity but promotes its expansion and consequently frustrates the expansion of the export of more efficient producers in Africa, Asia or Latin America. The Soviet instance on barter trade creates a situation in which African primary producers compete eventually with themselves because of the Soviet sale of their commodities in the world market. Under these circumstances the African states cannot maximize their export potential.

Only an insignificant proportion of goods manufactured in Africa are sold in the advanced countries. Since the cost of their manufacture is usually high they cannot compete effectively in the world market without being subsidized. However, the rich nations frown at suggestions of subsidies of these manufactures. Nevertheless, such subsidies and the consequent increase in export may be the most rational and economical way of expanding the economies

of the poor states and through it the world economy at large.³⁸ At the same time high effective tariffs protect their light industries from whatever meaningful competition some of the Third World states can mount. In fact, it is not an oversight that the Kennedy Round liberalization of trade did not include the types of products manufactured by these states.

As far as foreign investments are concerned foreign private enterprises have pursued goals which contradict those of the African states. They usually go into economic activities such as plantation agriculture which feed the world market with primary products, and cater for the high-income internal market for luxury goods.³⁹ This contradicts the national interest in a balanced inter-sectional growth of the economy and sections of the population. In any case the amount of foreign capital necessary to ensure sustained economic growth in the poor states is much greater than the foreign enterprises are willing to provide. In fact, the net foreign capital inflow to Africa has been slackening off.⁴⁰

At the governmental level advanced foreign-aid donor countries pursue policies divergent from those of the recipient states of Africa. Aid tends to come much later than expected and not always in the form wanted. Grants are the most beneficial of all types of foreign donations. They go directly into capital formation and carry neither the burden of repayment nor interest charges. However, the percentage of total aid to Africa which comes in the form of grants has been decreasing.⁴¹ And with the current decline in the popularity of foreign aid in the advanced nations the demands of the African states for more and better aid is easily ignored. This declining trend is reflected in the lower proportion of grants, the continued insistence on tying the funds to the purchase of goods from the donor country instead of from the cheapest or most efficient source, the rising debt burden in the recipient states, and their deteriorating export prices. In addition, Africa suffers from peculiar problems. For example, its share of total aid fell from 35% in 1960 to about 27% in 1965 and 23% in 1967. On the other hand, between 1960 and 1967 the net flow of investment income out of the continent more than tripled from 12.6% of net official inflow to 42%.⁴² In some cases in fact, governmental aid is detrimental to

economic growth in recipient nations because they serve to support feudal, conservative or corrupt regimes which are unwilling to carry out the social political reforms necessary for economic progress.

More important still is the obvious ruthlessness of the advanced countries against any African nations desirous of asserting their interests against those of their mentors. Thus in 1958 France sought to cripple the young Guinean nation. Belgian attempt to dismember Zaire 1960-1963 was in response to Lumumba's implacability against Belgian exploitation of the country. Similarly, Tanzania's reluctance to toe the West German line over the recognition of East Germany invited punitive measures. And its policy over rebel Rhodesia in 1965 brought an abrupt end to British aid programs at the time. Under these circumstances an African state's alliance with or submission to a major power is most likely to be destructive of national independence.

Adherence to Moral Principles as a Source of Power

It is increasingly evident that under certain conditions specific national interests vitally require a moral appeal for their accomplishment. This applies even to the major powers, as the Vietnam war amply demonstrates. Force as an aspect of power must be credible to its victim to succeed. Such credibility is to a significant extent dependent on moral ideals, the ability to capture the moral imagination of the population. The following changes within the world community have relatively decreased the importance of force and increased that of principles as instruments of foreign policy: (a) the intense conflict of ideologies, closely associated with moral ideals, which has characterized world politics since 1945 (b) the annihilative potential of nuclear weapons which has created a widespread distaste for warfare as an instrument of national policy (c) the nuclear stalemate between the super powers which forces them to emphasize other than force in their interstate competition (d) the new emphasis on guerilla warfare which depend more on the revolutionary consciousness of the population rather than on material resources of power for success (e) the spread of the legitimacy of the nation-state leading to a reduction in the incidence of inter-state wars and conquests particularly among the major powers, (f) the greater

interdependence of states and increased inter-national communication which have reinforced the use of propaganda in diplomacy.

Inter-state politics of informal access and control which are now significant elements of world politics take these changes into account. A correct perception of other nation's goals, ideals and handicaps, as well as the limits within which manouvre is possible is necessary for the new politics. It has become a partial substitute for force. Therefore, the emphasis of international political action has shifted, albeit slightly, from the physical mastery of other states to the shaping of their ideals, from the tangible to the intangible factors of power, and from the use of force to the employment of propaganda, argument and other non-military means of influence. As the importance of force declines power increasingly becomes the art of subtly making other states see the world the way one sees it and making them behave according to that vision.⁴³ On the continuum from coercion to persuasion a shift in the direction of the latter is obvious. With this shift "idealism" has edged closer to "realism".

This is a favourable development for the weak states which they should exploit to the maximum. The only influence they can wield in world politics is through an adroit manipulation of the commonly accepted principles of justice and humanity. Ideas of liberty, equality and brotherhood common to the great world religions and embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights⁴⁴ now play vital roles in world affairs. Inter-state competition involves getting the support of third parties. This includes the possibility of a collective alliance of minor and middle powers against domination by one or all the major powers. For the poor nations this supplementary power may be the only instrument available for increasing their influence in international life. In most cases it can be achieved by a larger common appeal directed at universal interests.⁴⁵

The weak states are favourably placed to do this. In general, the underprivileged of any community tend to serve as its conscience. They emphasize justice rather than self interest as the guiding principles of action. It is in their interest to do so. Consequently, they tend to speak for the whole of mankind. In order to succeed

in this task their ideas must be more universalistic than those of the privileged groups. Since the citizens of most states tend to think more universalistic terms when the interests of their states are not directly involved in an international dispute, and very few inter-state crises directly involve the interests of most states at the same time, the underprivileged nations tend to be influential in world opinion. Although the impact of such opinion on foreign policy is limited it is generally accepted to have some influence. In any case, it is the only realistic instrument at the disposal of the small powers, particularly in their relations with the major powers. Under these conditions, "idealism" is not utopian or destructive of realistic foreign policy. It is basic to such a policy.

In an international community characterized by a sphere-of-interest mentality on the part of the major powers the minimum basic objective of African foreign policy must be to maximize national independence. They must resist the desire of the major powers to use them against their will. Appeals to moral principles are useful in this regard. For example, ethical standards may be usefully applied in the Middle East crisis to create an international opinion favourable to the idea that territories should not be acquired by force. If successful, it will undermine any possible future annexation of the territory of African states by their racist and colonialist neighbours. Similarly, condemnation of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic and US policies in Indo-China may serve African interest in protecting national independence against any possible designs by a big power.

In another respect, the general weakness of African power dictates a reliance on negative rather positive power. Today the dominant mode of inter-state influence is informal access of the control.⁴⁶ Since this thrives best in situations of domestic conflicts, division and instability the cohesiveness of the national society of a poor state becomes a cardinal factor in the new politics. The weak states are unable to maintain a cohesive society by force. Out of necessity, at least, they must use persuasion. But they are unable to use material rewards for this purpose because of their pervasive economic indigence. Their only alternative is psychological reward. It may be hypothesized that for a small state to wield any relatively

significant influence in world politics its domestic life must be based on principles of human justice which are indivisible, absolute and universal. Only then can it ensure a truly cohesive national society, prevent the deleterious effects of informal access, and adequately mobilize its human and material resources for the pursuit of foreign policy goals.

However, appeals to moral principles may be realistic in the pursuit of long-term objectives but unrealistic with respect to short-term objectives, particularly when these are in conflict with the vital interests of the major powers. World opinion may create a favourable climate for future policies, but it yields very insignificant short-term benefits during and actual clash of interests. Therefore, sole reliance on philosophical and ethical guidelines which are silent on the nature of the operative forces of world politics, namely the configuration of power and interest, is likely to lead to a chain of diplomatic frustrations.

Realistic foreign policy in Africa must, therefore, be guided by an intellectual framework based on moral principles, and another which reflects strategic and tactical considerations. The latter must provide ways and means of avoiding a clash with the major powers and of diluting the adverse effects of such a clash on national life. This must be preceded by a clear and unambiguous definition of the national interests of the African states in as clear and concrete terms as possible, and the correct identification of the areas of incompatibility of interests in-world politics, as well as how to avoid any possible antagonism in these areas. The emphasis on morality must be supplemented by another on strategy and tactics. Guidelines for the successful pursuit of longterm interests need to be coordinated with others for the pursuit of short-term goals.

At the same time efforts should be made to improve the domestic base of positive power. The tendency for African states to base their foreign policies on appeals to humanitarian sentiments should yield to efforts to reorganise the domestic power base, and mobilize the collective power of the Third World countries in their relations with the advanced countries. The domestic base of national power is the most critical factor in world diplomatic influence.

Consequently, additional guidelines for diplomacy need to embody a program for independent economic development, the most effective way of increasing national power. Again, since the interests of the poor states are largely compatible relative to the major powers these supplementary guidelines must also embody a program for Third World economic and political unity, particularly before, during and after major negotiations with the advanced countries. Only under the above conditions can the African states achieve a high proportion of those of their basic objectives which do not contradict the most vital interests of the major powers.

FOOTNOTES

1. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London, MacMillan, 1939).
2. Robert W. Tucker, "Political Realism and Foreign Policy" in *World Politics* Vol. XIII No. 3 April 1961 p. 463.
3. E.H. Carr, *op. cit.* pp. 63-94.
4. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National interest of the United States" in *American Political Science Review* Vol. XLVI December 1952 pp. 961-988.
5. Representative examples of this viewpoint sometimes referred to as "Idealism" include : Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (London : Aringdon : Aringdon Press, 1954); Charles de Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1956); A.H. Feller, "In Defence of International Law and Morality" in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 282 July 1952; Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Policy and National Interest" in *Partisan Review* Vol. 18, Nov.-Dec. 1951; Frank Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power Versus the Co-ordinate State" *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 67, June 1952; Frank Tannenbaum, "The American Tradition in Foreign Relations" *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 30, October 1951.
6. Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit.* pp. 961-962.
7. Representatives of this school of thought often referred to as "realism" include : E.H. Carr, *op. cit.*; Kenneth Thompson, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1960) ; E.H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (NY : MacMillan, 1942); E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (NY : MacMillan, 1945); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nation* (NY : Alfred K. Knopf 1948); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1946); Hans J. Morgenthau, *in Defence of the National Interest : A Critical Study of American Foreign Policy* (NY : Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Twilight of Interna-

tional Morality" *Ethics* Vol. 58 January 1948 pp. 79-99; Hans J. Morgenthau, "National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy: The Primacy of National Interest" *The American Scholar* Vol. 18 Spring 1949 pp. 207-212; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Moral Dilemma in Foreign Policy" *The Year Book of World Affairs* 1951 London 1951 pp. 12-36; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Pathology of Power" *American Perspective* Vol. 4 Winter 1950 pp. 6-10; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Views of Nuremberg: Further Analysis of the Trial and Its Importance" *America* Vol. 76 Dec. 7, 1946; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Machiavellian Utopia" *Ethics* Vol. 55 Jan. 1945 pp. 145-147; Arnold Wolfers, "Statesmanship and Moral Choice" *World Politics* Vol. 1 Jan. 1949 pp. 175-195; Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol" *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. LXVII No. 2 Dec. 1952 pp. 481-502; George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N. J: Princeton Univ. Press, 1954); Louis J. Halle, *Civilizations and Foreign Policy* (Ny: Harper and Brothers, 1955); Charles Burton: Marshall, *The Limits of Foreign Policy* (NY: Holt and Co. Inc. 1954); Walter Lippmann, *Isolation and Alliances: An American Speaks to the British* (Boston Little, Brown and Co., 1952); Nicholas Spykeman, *The Geography of the Peace* (NY: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1944); Rinehold Niebur, "The Myth of World Government" *Nation* March 16, 1946; Rinehold Niebur, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defence* (NY: Scribner, 1944); Gerhard Niemeyer, *Law Without Force* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1941); John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma" in *World Politics* Vol. II No. 2 Jan. 1950 pp. 157-180.

8. States included in the Casablanca group are Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Morocco and later Algeria. Those in the Monrovia group were: Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, and Upper Volta.

9. I. William Zartman, "National Interest and Ideology" in Vernon McKay ed. *African Diplomacy* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966) pp. 25-54.

10. Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Pan-Africanism and East African Federation* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965).

11. Y. Tandon and T. Shaw, "Contrasting Attitudes and Behaviour Towards Southern Africa: Tanzania and Malawi". A paper presented at the University of East Africa Social Sciences Conference, Makerere University College Kampala Uganda, December 30, 1968—January 3, 1969 p. 5.

12. *Ibid* p. 13.

13. The most articulate exponent of these views has been President Nyerere of Tanzania. Cf. Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966) pp. 6, 112, 221, 284.

14. Julius Nyerere, *Principles and Development* (Dar es Salaam Government Printer, 1966).

15. Cf. Yash Tandon, "Military Coups and Inter-African Diplomacy" in *Africa Quarterly* Vol. VI No. 4 Jan.-March, 1967 pp 278-284.

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16. E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 op. cit.* p. 94.
17. *Ibid* p. 93.
18. Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moss, "Foreign Policy : The Realism of Idealism". In *American Political Science Review* Vol. XLVI June 1952 pp. 343-356.
19. *Ibid* p. 348
20. The trend becomes obvious from an examination of the economic situation in Africa undertaken by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and reported in UN. ECA Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa for various years; and UN Economic Bulletin for Africa published periodically.
21. Cf. J. Pickett, "An Assessment of Economic Development in Africa in the 1960s" in *Afro-American Dialogues*. Background papers of the first conference held in Nairobi, Kenya in 1968. p. Pickett/2
22. *Ibid* p. Pickett/2
23. *Ibid* p. Pickett/3
24. *Ibid* p. Pickett/3
25. For all the information contained in this paragraph refer to UN. ECA. *A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa 1967* (NY: United Nations, 1969) pp. V-XIII.
26. *Ibid* p. xiv.
27. UN. ECA. *Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa, 1970* (NY: UN, 1971) pp. 167-169.
28. Sources : UN, Economic Commission for Europe. *The European Economy from the 1950s to the 1970s* (NY: UN, 1972) Part I p. 9; UN. *Economic Survey of Europe Part I* (NY : UN, 1970) pp. 11-12.
29. Cf. Henry Bienen, "Military Assistance and Political Development in Africa." A paper prepared for the Working Group of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society of the International Sociological Association Conference, London, England. September 13-15, 1967.
30. *Ibid* pp. 8-9.
31. *Ibid* pp. 8-9.
32. Sources : *The Military Balance 1968-1969* (London : The Institute for Strategic Studies 1968) pp. 52-59; Garth Legge et al, *The Black Paper : An Alternative. Policy for Canada Towards Southern Africa*. A monograph of the Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa 1970. *The Military Balance 1969-70 op. cit.* pp. 53-54; UN. Statistical Year Book 1967 (NY: UN, 1968) pp. 576-577.
33. Sources : Richard Booth, "The Armed Forces of African States 1970" in *Adelphi Papers* No. 67, May, 1970; *The Military Balance* (London : Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970); Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Recurrent Estimates of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1970-71* (Lagos : Government Printer, 1970) p. 13; Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Second National Development Plan, 1970-74* (Lagos : Government Printer, 1970). p. 92.

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34. Cf. Douglas G. Anglin, "The International Arms Traffic in Sub-Saharan Africa" in W. Fox, D. Anglin and J. Gellene *Arms Trade and International Politics* School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa Canada. Occasional Papers No. 12, May, 1971 p. 9.

35. Cf. Okwudiba Nnoli, "Some Implications of Contemporary World Politics for African Development" in *The African Review* Vol. I No. 1 March 1971 pp. 46-65.

36. Cf. Okwudiba Nnoli, "Socio-Economic Insecurity and Ethnic Politics in Africa." A paper presented at the Third International Congress of Africanists, Addis Ababa Dec. 9-19, 1973, and at the Universities of East Africa Social Science Conference, Dar-es-Salaam, Dec. 18-20, 1973. p. 2.

37. For a discussion of the salutary nature of the international economic system for the interests of the advanced countries and its hostility to the poor ones refer to R.H. Green, "The International Economic System and Development", University College, Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau Paper No. 70.4, March 1970; Samir Amin, "UNCTAD III: A Critical Appraisal." in *Newstatements* Vol. II No. 1, 1973 pp. 17-22.

38. *Ibid* pp. 6-7.

39. A case study of this pattern of investment is available in Okwudiba Nnoli, *Self Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania* (N.Y: NOK publishers) Forthcoming 1974 Chapter four.

40. Cf. *Ibid.*; J.F. Rweyemamu, "The Political Economy of Foreign Private Investment in Africa" in *The African Review* Vol. I No. 1 March 1972 pp. 108-118; Thomas E. Wiesskopf, "Underdevelopment, Capitalistic Growth and the Future of the Poor Countries." A paper prepared for and supported by the World Order Models Project of the World Law Fund, April, 1970; J. Taylor Ostrander, "US Private Investment in Africa" in *Afro-American Dialogue op. cit.*

41. Cf. Paul Streeten, "Aid to Africa" UN Economic and Social Council. ECA. E/CN. 14/WP. 1/30. OAU/TRAD/29 July 22, 1970.

42. *Ibid* pp. 31-32.

43. This point is discussed in greater detail in Stanley Hoffman, "Perceptions, Reality and the Franco-American Conflict" in John C. Farrel and Asa P. Smith ed. *Image and Reality in World Politics* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1968) pp. 57-58.

44. For the The Universal Declaration of Human rights refer to UN OP1/ 15-1588/- August 1964—100M.

45. The same point is made by Cook and Moss, *op. cit.* pp. 348-351.

46. For greater discussion of informal access and control refer to Okwudiba Nnoli, "Some Implications of World Politics for African Development" *op. cit.*

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India and Africa

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE

Ist Quarter (January-~~MAR~~ 1975)

World Hindi Convention

The first-ever "world Hindi convention", attended by over 3,000 Hindi scholars and writers from all parts of India and 75 foreign invitees from 27 countries, was held on 10-13 January, at Nagpur (Maharashtra).

Inaugurating the four-day convention, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, said that "our is land of multi-languages and multi-religions and it will continue to be so in the years to come". She urged scholars and writers to make Hindi simpler, elastic, dynamic and more useful for the needs of the people. In his presidential address, the Mauritius Prime Minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, said that he was happy that the promotion of equality and fraternal relations in the world was the main objective of the convention. Mankind could not progress without removing economic disparities and colour prejudices, he added.

Addressing the seminar on the place of Hindi in the world, on 11 January, India's External Affairs Minister, Mr. Y. B. Chavan, said that Hindi was being taught in 90 universities of the world and people in several countries were keen to know India and learn Hindi. Mr. Chavan noted that the credit for whatever status Hindi had gained in the world went to a large extent to the Indians who had settled down in 80 foreign countries.

Most of the foreign delegates expressed the view that Hindi could acquire an important place in the world. India's famous educationist, Kakasaheb Kalelkar, advocated that Hindi should be

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one of the official languages of the United Nations. According to him Hindi was spoken and understood by 360 million in India and 60 million abroad.

International Hindi Academy

India's Agriculture Minister, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, laid the foundation stone of the Vishva Hindi Vidyapeeth (*International Hindi Academy*) in the campus of the Rashtrabhasha Prachar Samiti in Wardha on 14 January. The object of the Academy is to raise Hindi from the national to the international level. It will have a special department for promotion of Devanagari as an additional script for Indian, Asian and other languages.

The convention concluded with India's Vice-President, Mr. B.D. Jatti, stating that Hindi had emerged as a powerful language reflecting mass consciousness and, in course of time, was bound to acquire an important place in the world. Mr. Jatti honoured 15 authors from all the major Indian languages on behalf of the convention for their contribution to the enrichment of the composite culture of India. In addition, several foreign delegates and 13 other Indian authors whose mother tongue was not Hindi but who made significant contribution towards the progress of Hindi were also honoured. (January 14, 1975.)

World Federalists Conference

Inaugurating the 16th Biennial Congress and the Fourth Asian Conference of the World Association of World Federalists (WAWF) on 16 January in New Delhi, President Ahmed called for restructuring of international economic relations for a more equitable use of world resources. The only way to assure a safe and meaningful life for every citizen of the world today and tomorrow, he said, was to direct the power of the strong to the service of the weak.

Mr. Ahmed said that economic growth and development were indispensable if the quality of life of the people was to be improved. "The gulf between the rich and the poor nations is still widening. More than two-thirds of humanity still lives near the subsistence level, while the other privileged segments live in super affluence," he said.

Earlier, that day, delegates to the congress, about 200 in number, called on the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi. Speaking to the delegates, Mrs. Gandhi said that the U.N. had not been able to achieve the objectives for which it was formed. "However, we have no other alternative to maintain peace in the world." Mrs. Gandhi said the world federalists' movement for realising [the concept of "one world, peace and progress of humanity" was not only a laudable ideal but also a necessity." Among those who attended the congress were Mr. Norman Cousins, President of the WAWF and editor, *Saturday Review*, New York, who emphasised the need to develop a world mechanism to solve problems relating to security. (January 17, 1975.)

India Cautions Developing Nations

Indian Agriculture Minister Jagjivan Ram addressing the International Symposium on World Food Crisis, at Khartoum, Sudan reminded developing countries that it would be 'suicidal' for them to sit back and wait for assistance to increase food production.

While assistance was needed and would be most welcome, the primary responsibility for increasing food production rested on the developing countries themselves, he said.

The Minister said developing countries fortunately were endowed with the material and human resources that are needed to meet the challenge.

He pointed out that vast land resources at present employed on cultivation of commercial crops in developing countries, some of which were used as raw material for industries in the developed countries, could be diverted for production of foodgrains to eradicate hunger and malnutrition. But the question was whether such diversion would be in the larger interest of world community as a whole. (February 2 1975).

Keen Interest Abroad in CBRI Housing Technique

Several countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania have shown keen interest in the technique evolved by the Central Building Research Institute for laying strong foundations for buildings in black cotton soil where buildings with the traditional foundation usually develop cracks.

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More than 30,000 buildings have so far been constructed on such soil with the latest CBRI technique effecting an overall saving of Rs. 6 crores.

The system has been used by the Rural Engineering Department (U.P.) for the construction of 14 one-room houses in a village in Meerut district. Estimated to cost Rs. 2,000 this provides for a carpet area of 18.9 sq-metres for the conventional type structures.

As most housing schemes envisage use of aided self-help, the concept of construction in stages with durable support and roof was considered suitable. Two systems have been developed by the institute for the purpose one using brick and the other cement concrete as basic material.

Another system known as the 'Holopan System' developed by the institute has been adopted by Public Works Department for housing schemes for Gaziabad. The recently developed "stone masonry block" technique is becoming popular even in areas where good clay is available. An analysis of the consumption of cement in stone masonry block walls has shown that the requirement of cement for a 20-cm thick wall is almost equal to that required for a 23.5-cm brick wall. This technique is being adopted in Dehra Dun and in Delhi. (March 1, 1975).

Scindia to start Cargo Service to E. Africa

The Scindia Steam Navigation, an Indian Shipping Company started regular cargo service to East Africa from March 1975.

The service was introduced in collaboration with Bank Line, a British liner company. Bank Line has been covering the trade alone till now. Hereafter there will be twelve-monthly sailings in a year to be undertaken alternatively by Scindias and the Bank Line. Scindia's "Jalagopal" is the first ship to sail from Calcutta. (March 9, 1975).

India sent 1,592 Experts Abroad

A total number of 1,592 Indian experts were selected through official channels for assignment abroad during 1974.

Tanzania recruited 93 engineers and eight doctors. Indian experts in large numbers are also working in Zambia and Libya.

On direct contract with the Governments of various developing countries were 423 engineers, 339 doctors and 726 other specialists. (March 21, 1975).

India Affirms Support to World Struggle Against Apartheid

Reaffirming India's resolve to support the cause of racial equality and human dignity, Mr. Chavan, India's Minister for External Affairs, said that the struggle for eliminating apartheid from Africa has to be intensified. In a message on the International Day for Elimination of Racial Discrimination on 21 March, Mr. Chavan said that for more than a decade we have been observing this day in memory of the victims of racial discrimination all over the world. This day was chosen to remind the people of the inhuman massacre of Sharpeville when unarmed and innocent people of Africa were shot down because of their nonviolent demonstration against the oppressive law of apartheid. Human beings are still being denied basic dignity by the oppressive racist regimes in that part of the world.

The government and the people of India, Mr. Chavan added, had consistently supported the struggle against racism and would continue to do so until it was successful. "The apartheid in the union of South Africa, the illegal occupation of Namibia and the denial of political rights to the people of Zimbabwe are all based on the doctrine of superiority of certain race," he said. (March 22, 1975).

O A U Delegation in Delhi

The seven-man delegation of the Organization of African Unity, headed by the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Mr. John Malecela, conveyed to the Government the OAU's highest appreciation of the moral and material support given by India to the various liberation movements in Africa.

The support had proved very useful for the success of the liberation struggle in the continent of Africa, Mr. Malecela who heads the liberation committee of the OAU, said after a meeting at the Foreign Office. Talking to reporters at the end of the meeting, Mr. Malecela said his delegation was seeking more support for the liberation movement of the African people, some of whom were still subjected to colonial domination. He was glad to be in India because of her unflinching support to these movements.

Interestingly, the O A U delegation is understood to have sounded India about the necessity of giving assistance to countries

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like Angola, Cape Verde islands, Mozambique which after attaining freedom will need considerable help to be able to cope with widening deficits and shortages. The delegation also inquired about the extent of technical assistance and cooperation which India will be able to provide to the newly emerging territories to help them tide over their initial difficulties.

Mr. Malecela told reporters that he had conveyed the view of African Governments to India on the latest developments in that continent and had apprised Indian Government of the progress made by the various liberation movements. (March 25, 1975).

O A U Group Calls on PM

The delegation of the liberation committee of the Organization of African Unity, led by Mr. J. S. Malecela, Foreign Minister of Tanzania, called on the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi. (March 26, 1975).

Reception to O A U Delegation

The O A U delegation was accorded a warm reception by the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organisation (AIPSO) on Wednesday, at the Vithal Bhai Patel House, New Delhi.

Speaking at the function, Indian National Congress President D.K. Barooah said the Indian Government and the people had been sympathising with the cause of the O A U. India, he added, fully supported the liberation struggle of African people. He said anti-imperialism was the common factor that brought the people of Africa and India closer.

Thanking the delegation, Union Steel Minister Chandrajit Yadav also expressed the same view and assured full solidarity with the struggling people of Africa.

Earlier CPI member of Parliament S.G. Sardesai said that the struggle against imperialism in this country and in Africa had been strengthening the people of these countries in their fight. He noted that imperialists offensive in this country and some newly liberated countries of the world was being mounted and this had to be fought together.

The Tanzanian Foreign Minister thanked the Government and

the people of India for their support to the African people in their struggle for freedom. (March 27, 1975).

Botswana President Commends India's Role

Commending India for being always in the forefront of the struggle for human freedom and dignity, President Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, said on March 13 in Gaborone that history would never forget Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru, India's two illustrious sons, who gave their lives to the cause of human liberty and peace. President Khama was receiving the credentials of India's new high commissioner, Mr. K. Srinivasan, to Botswana.

(March 14, 1975).

Indian Envoy to Gambia

Shailer Hiralal Desai, Indian Ambassador to Senegal, has been concurrently accredited as High Commissioner to Gambia, with residence at Dakar. (February 11, 1975).

Indian Envoy to Ghana

Miss Chonira Belippa Muthamma has been appointed High-Commissioner of India to Ghana in succession to Mr. Shardul Bikram Shah. (January 1975).

Indian Offer to Kenya

The Indian Agriculture Minister Jagjivan Ram, expressed India's willingness to help Kenya in the development of its water resources.

Speaking in Nairobi during a four-hour stop-over on his way to attend a food conference in Khartoum, Jagjivan Ram said there was scope for sending Indian technical personnel to Kenya to help in its water development programmes.

Welcoming Jagjivan Ram, the Kanyan Agriculture Minister, Jeremiah Nayagah, said he appreciated the development India had achieved in the field of agriculture and irrigation. He hoped that the newly setup Ministry in his country for the development of water resources could greatly benefit from Indian experience and expertise.

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Nayagah said "India is in a better position to help us than many other developed countries". (February 2, 1975)

Libyan oil team meets Malaviya

A high-level Libyan delegation, led by Mr. Syed Jamhoor, Chairman, National Oil Corporation of Libya arrived in New Delhi. Soon after arrival the delegation called on the Minister for Petroleum and Chemicals, Mr. K.D. Malaviya.

The delegation's visit is a sequel to the decision of the joint Indo-Libyan committee on oil which met in Tripoli in October last. At that meeting the two countries discussed the proposal for training Libyan technical personnel in India.

The delegation during its eight day visit, studied the capability built up by the Engineers India Limited in setting up refineries, petrochemical complexes and fertiliser plants. (January 11, 1975)

ONGC team to visit Libya

The Indian Ambassador to Libya speaking at a function at Bombay stated that an ONGC team will visit Tripoli to finalise the terms and conditions of the concession offered by Libya to India for oil exploration in that country. The team would also discuss the various areas to be offered by Libya. This will be the second visit of an ONGC team to Libya. (January 16, 1975).

Tea Order from Libya

The National Supplies Corporation of Libya (which looks after the nationalised tea trade in that country) offers to buy 6000 tons of Indian Tea. Tea will be supplied in two instalments. Prices are being negotiated between the two public sector corporations.

Indian tea has lately become popular in Libya and this is the first time that a sizable quantity is being bought. (February 22, 1975).

Mauritius P.M. lauds role of Hindi

The Mauritius Prime Minister, Dr. Seewoosagar Ramgoolam in his presidential address to the first-ever World Hindi Convention in Nagpur said that Hindi should be made an instrument to bring closer various world languages. All the languages were like the branches of a tree, and growth of Hindi should aim at promoting equality and understanding in the world. He was happy that the

promotion of equality in the world and fraternal relations among various social groups was the main objective of the convention. He felt no progress could be made without removing economic disparities, colour prejudices and casteism.

Dr Ramgoolam said the presence of some delegates from his country and the invitation to him to preside over the convention would further strengthen friendly ties between India and Mauritius.

(January 5, 1975).

Indian drama team invited to Mauritius

Mr. Kher Jagat Singh, Minister for Economic Planning, Mauritius, extended an invitation to India to send a drama team to his country, especially the one which played *Ramayana* at Nagpur on the eve of the World Hindi Convention there.

Introducing members of the Mauritius cultural delegation to newsmen, Mr. Singh said Mauritius had a breakthrough in Hindi plays during the last two years and had two drama competitions. Sixty to seventy clubs were engaged in Hindi plays.

The performance of *Andhayug* was staged by Mauritian artists at Peayare Lal Bhavan, New Delhi on January 18, 1975. The performance was highly appreciated by the audience.

(January 19, 1975).

India to give Mauritius Rs. 17.5 crores as Aid

India has agreed to grant Rs. 17.5 crores as assistance, including Rs. 10 crores in commercial credit, to Mauritius for its Second Plan beginning in July 1975.

This was announced by the Mauritius Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Mr. Kher Jagat Singh, after a 90 minute "very cordial and friendly" meeting between the visiting Mauritius Prime Minister, Dr. Seewoosagar Ramgoolam, and the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi.

(January 14, 1975).

Ramgoolam Visits India

Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her Mauritius counterpart, Sir Seewoosagar Ramgoolam, on January 14 "deplored the setting up of any military base on the islands of Diego Garcia" and called on "all concerned to renew their efforts" to keep the

Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. In a joint communique issued at the end of Seewoosagar's ten day visit to India, the two leaders wanted total ban on the use of nuclear weapons and destruction of existing stockpiles. They stressed the importance of harnessing nuclear power for economic development and human welfare, and declared that the benefits of nuclear energy should not remain confined to a few countries.

Seewoosagar and his Ministerial aides held discussion with Mrs. Gandhi, Mr Y.B. Chavan and other Indian Ministers on issues of international importance as well as bilateral co-operation. The communique noted that the "talks revealed a close identity of views on all subjects". The communique said: "Reiterating their faith in the principles of the United Nations" Charter, the two Prime Ministers stressed the continuing validity of non-alignment and reaffirmed their "adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence and non-interference, as fundamental to international conduct and relations between States on the basis of sovereign equality."

Both the leaders hailed the emergence of "Guinea-Bissau as an independent sovereign State and welcomed the declaration of the new Government of Portugal on granting self-determination and independence to the peoples of Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe Islands, Cape Verde Islands and Angola. The two Prime Ministers noted some positive developments in Zimbabwe, and hoped that this would lead to the establishment of a democratic and free government there on the basis of majority rule.

They deplored the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by the Union of South Africa, and hoped that it would abide by the latest UN resolutions and recognise the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia and transfer power to the people of Namibia without further delay. Both Prime Ministers reiterated their opposition to all forms of racial discrimination and apartheid now being practised in South Africa.

The two Prime Ministers called for universal disarmament including a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of all such weapons. While reviewing the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the two Prime Ministers stressed the importance of harnessing nuclear power for econo-

mic development and human welfare and of ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology do not remain confined to a few countries.

"The two leaders stressed the importance to all countries of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, free from foreign military bases and great-power rivalry and tension. They called on all concerned to renew their efforts for earliest realisation of the objective of the UN resolutions in this regard. The two Prime Ministers deplored the setting up of any military base on the Islands of Diego Garcia. The two leaders agreed to keep in close contact on developments in the regard.

"The two Prime Ministers called for the earliest settlement of the West Asia crisis which continues to threaten the peace of the world. They expressed their conviction that the earliest implementation of the UN resolutions was essential towards creating the conditions necessary for a just and equitable peace. Such a settlement must take into account the legitimate and inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the recent resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the recognition as the legitimate representative of Palestinian people and their inalienable right to their homeland.

Indo-Mauritius Pact Ratified

India and Mauritius exchanged instruments of ratifications of the Indo-Mauritius cultural agreement signed at Port Louis on February 6, 1973.

In pursuance of the agreement an Indo-Mauritius joint committee is to be set up which will meet alternatively in New Delhi and Port Louis to formulate cultural, scientific and educational programme and to review their working periodically.

The agreement envisages exchange of professors, writers and artists, exchange of publications and exhibitions, award of scholarships and visits to tourists.

It also provides for the teaching of Indian civilisation, culture and languages in educational institutions in Mauritius. Provisions have also been made in the agreement for facilitating mutual recognition of degrees, diplomas and certificates awarded in the two countries and for the establishment of cultural institutes and friendship association in both the countries. (January 8, 1975).

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Indian Relief Supplies Reach Mauritius

An Indian navy ship INA Deepak, was sent to Mauritius with the relief supplies for the cyclone-affected areas of the Island Republic.

The Indian High-Commissioner, Mr. M.M. Khurana, accompanied by the commander of the naval ship, Capt. Vir called on the Mauritius Premier, Dr. S. Ramgoolam, to make a token presentation of cyclone relief supplies.

The ship has also taken on board additional technical personal for restoration of power and telephone lines and of housing.

Dr. Ramgoolam expressed appreciation of the work by Indian technicians deployed earlier in the restoration of communications.

(March 22, 1975).

Nigerian Order for Buses

Ashok Leyland India, a bus producing firm has secured an order from Nigeria for 300 vehicles, goods and passenger models, valued at Rs. 2.37 crores. This was the second biggest order from an African country. The Nigerian order is the first from a distributor for individual transport operators. Hitherto, export orders have come mainly from Government agencies or public sector undertakings.

(February 3, 1975).

India-aided complex in Zanzibar

The First Vice-President of Tanzania, Mr. Aboud Jumbe laid the foundation stone in Zanzibar of an industrial estate which is being set up in the spice island with Indian technical cooperation.

The estate will comprise 24 factories, machinery for which is being obtained by Tanzania from India.

Among those present at the ceremony were the members of the ruling Afro-Shiraji Party of which Mr. Jumbe is the President. The Indian High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. K.D. Sharma was specially invited to be present on the occasion.

Speaking on the occasion, Mr. Mnoga, chief director of the Zanzibar State Planning and Development Commission, said the launching of the industrial estate was first mooted when former Indian President V.V. Giri visited Zanzibar in September 1972.

(January 10, 1975).

Zanzibar to buy buses from India

Zanzibar is to purchase 20 buses from India valued at about £ 400,000 to give the Tanzanian off-shore island its first public transport system.

The purchase agreement was signed in Zanzibar on January 10, 1975 and includes an additional provision of about £30,000 for spare parts.

The buses will begin arriving in Zanzibar half way through 1975. (January 11, 1975).

Welcome to Tanzanian Prime Minister

A warm and cordial welcome was accorded to Mr. Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa, Prime Minister and second Vice-President of Tanzania who arrived on January 15, in New Delhi on a nine-day official visit to India. Mr. Kawawa had spent the previous day in Bombay. Among those who welcomed him at the Delhi airport were the Vice-President, Mr. Jatti, and the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi. He later called on the President, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, visited Rajghat and laid a wreath at the samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi, and received African heads of missions in New Delhi.

At a social function held in Mr. Kawawa's honour on January 16 Mr. Jatti praised Tanzania's "leading role" in the struggle for liberation of Africa from foreign domination and added that this was now crowned by solid results and achievements. "We see today the dissolution of Portuguese colonialism in Africa under a new and liberal government," Mr. Jatti said. "We see the beginning of the end of the illegal minority regime in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), and we have no doubt that Namibia (South-west Africa) also cannot long remain under iniquitous and unlawful occupation against the will and conscience of the world community."

In reply, Mr. Kawawa said that the non-aligned stand taken by Tanzania and India had "enabled our two countries to chart our national courses for the best interests of our people and to be friend but not to play second fiddle to great powers." Assuring India that Tanzania would continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with her in carrying on the tradition of peace and justice, Mr. Kawawa said, "We in Tanzania, feel especially honoured that our leader Mwalimu

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Julius Nyerere has been selected to be one of the distinguished recipients of the Nehru Peace Award." Africa's priorities now, Mr. Kawawa said, were freedom for both Zimbabwe and Namibia. "In this respect we are happy that the impending collapse of Portuguese colonialism has meant the lessening of our logistical problems."

Mr. Kawawa also said that India and Tanzania, both being littoral states, cannot afford to sink into inertia in the face of increased great power rivalry in the Indian ocean. "We in Tanzania have watched these developments with great anxiety and have not failed to express our disquiet", he said. "We are pleased to note that India's position on this question is close to our own. We, therefore, believe that concerted efforts on the part of all littoral states is necessary, so as to ensure that the Indian ocean remains free from great power rivalry."

During his stay in India, Mr. Kawawa visited places of cultural and industrial importance at Agra, Bangalore, Goa and Bombay. (January 25, 1975).

Indo-Tanzanian Pledge to Fight Racialism in Africa

Second Vice-President and Prime Minister, Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, and the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi pledged the two countries to stand by each other in benishing all vestiges of colonialism and recialism in Africa. The wide-ranging discussions between the two leaders and their delegations covered various international developments and progress of bilateral co-operation. (January 25, 1975.)

Indo-Tanzanian panel set up

India and Tanzania decided to set up a joint commission at the ministerial level on economic, technical and scientific co-operation. Tanzanian Labour Minister Mr. G. Mapunda and External Affairs Minister Mr. Y. B. Chavan exchanged formal letters in Delhi.

Mr. Chavan and Mr. Mapunda told newsmen that the first meeting of the commission would be held as soon as possible at a mutually convenient date.

The commlssion, to begin with, will make assessment of the progress of the on-going projects on hand in which the two countries are co-operating. Some 500 Indian experts are working in Tanzania

at present in various capacities. A public sector consultancy agency has already taken up various geological and hydrological surveys in the Singdi region of Tanzania. The National Coal Development Corporation has been discussing with Tanzanian official possibilities of finding coal reserves in that country.

Talks to expand sugar production in Tanzania through Indian collaboration are already in progress. India will begin the joint efforts by supplying sugar machinery to Tanzania. (January 25, 1975).

India Tanzania sign cultural agreements

Tanzanian Labour and Social Welfare Minister G. Mapunda has signed an agreement with Education Minister Mr. Nurul Hasan on cultural exchanges. (January 25, 1975).

Uganda Seeks Sugar Plants

Uganda has made inquiries for import of sugar machinery from India for two more sugar mills.

One of the sugar mills being constructed in Uganda by an Indian firm is due to start production this year. The construction was held up for some time when there was drastic action against non-Ugandans. The Ugandan government is reported to have been impressed by the Indian workers engaged in constructing the sugar mill. They want machinery from India for two more mills. (February 17, 1975).

India-Tunisia Trade Accord Signed

A three-year trade agreement has been signed between Tunisia and India.

Under the agreement, Tunisia will export to India live oil, phosphates, mercury, cork and cork items, leather, paper pulp, handicraft articles and other traditional export items.

India's exports to Tunisia will include motorcycles, bicycles, sewing machines, sports equipment, window glass, silk, spices, rice, tobacco, and other products. (March 1, 1975).

Warm Welcome to President Kaunda

The Zambian President accompanied by a high-level delegation, arrived in Delhi. An affectionate welcome was given by a large gathering, which included scores of African students who greeted him

with the song "Let us move forward together as one people." Known as African Gandhi, President Kaunda told President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed that "we want to learn, we have come to learn, we are ready to learn and, I believe, we are going to learn something from your own experience here." President Ahmed, who praised his "great achievement" in Africa and his "considerable contribution" towards the promotion of better understanding among nations of the world at large said that they in India were looking forward to the exchange of views.

A 21-gun salute greeted the Zambian President as he alighted from the Zambian aircraft, which brought him to New Delhi from Mauritius after a two-day visit to that country. He thanked the Indian leaders for giving him an opportunity to come "and renew our acquaintances once again." Immediately after his arrival at Rashtrapati Bhavan (President's House) after a ceremonial drive from the airport, President Kaunda called on President Ahmed.

Later at a banquet given in honour of the distinguished visitor, President Ahmed assured President Kaunda of India's "continuing support" in the struggle against racialism and oppression in Africa. President Ahmed said that the winds of change were sweeping South Africa and the days of oppression and racial exploitation have come to an end. "Namibia remains in unlawful occupation, its people suppressed but unconquered. Zimbabwe whose ruins speak of a glorious past will surely regain its freedom, and join us in the world community of free nations," he said.

Recalling what he described as "a long and bitter struggle", which had left many scars on the conscience of civilisation, President Ahmed said that this had also been illuminated by the shining example shown by President Kaunda of friendship and forgiveness and the absence of hate or recrimination despite of bitter past. Referring to the developments in the Indian sub-continent, President Ahmed told Dr. Kaunda that India could never forget his understanding of India's problems and his sympathy during India's difficult days.

On the developments in the Indian Ocean, President Ahmed said that the build-up of foreign armaments in the Indian Ocean which, he said, threatened to destroy the detente between the big

powers and to involve the countries of this area in a global power conflict in which they wished to have no part. He, however, believed that it was not too late to arrest the momentum of these developments before it became irreversible and led to a disaster which would spare no one. Noting that there were no problems between India and Zambia President Ahmed said that there were only questions of strengthening and deepening their economic exchange, cementing their political solidarity and concerting their efforts on the international plane for a just and equitable world order.

Thanking President Ahmed for his "well reasoned message," Dr. Kaunda said he joined the Indian people in rejoicing at a "quarter century of successes" after many difficulties. "Twentyfive years as a nation in not a joke. India's victories, Dr. Kaunda said, "were there for all to see." Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Kaunda had an informal exchange of views lasting about 45 minutes on January 25 within two hours of the Zambian leader's arrival in Delhi on a five-day State visit. The talks reviewed the decolonisation process now in progress in Africa in which President Kaunda has played a leading role. The talks also touched on the need to diversify bilateral economic relations. The two leaders also discussed the outlines of four agreements signed between Zambia and India on January 26 on various aspects of economic, technical, scientific and cultural co-operation.

Nehru Award for President Kaunda

Dr. Kaunda was presented the Jawaharlal Nehru award for international understanding for the year 1970 by the President, Mr. Ahmed, on January 25, at a special function in New Delhi. The award included an amount of Rs. 100,000, and a citation.

(January 28, 1975)

2nd QUARTER

(April-June 1975)

Indian Support to Liberation Movements

The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi intervening in the debate in the conference of Commonwealth heads of state on southern Africa pointed out that all along India had given concrete support to African liberation movements.

It was India's belief that as long as racialism and denial of freedom were allowed to prevail in any part of the world the entire mankind was, to that extent, in chains.

She assured the leaders of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia that India favoured unrelenting pressure to achieve their independence.

Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that though South Africa had great mineral wealth its economy was based on the labour of non-white people and its wealth was derived, to a large extent, from investment from abroad and partnership in international trade.

Mrs. Gandhi added : "It is widely believed that South Africa is being provided comfort in the name of larger strategic considerations. It is the responsibility of big powers not to defy UN resolutions and to become partners of the racist regime". (May 1, 1975).

Indian Know-How Welcome in Africa

A Five men Indian delegation of consultants, led by Mr. Sen Gupta visited Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya on a five week tour.

The tour was sponsored by the Commerce Ministry. The delegation felt that the industries which could be set up in these

countries with Indian technical know-how are steel rolling mills, agro-industries and general engineering goods.

The copper-rich Zambia had recently taken up several welfare schemes for the people, Mr. Sen Gupta said the Indian consulting engineers should provide architectural and engineering services for major community development programmes in various towns.

In Tanzania, government officials and nationalised banks welcomed Indian consultants and entrepreneurs setting up industries in Tanzania with capital participation.

India could export plant and equipment to Tanzania and could also assist in improving its processing industries for the export of raw materials.

Export of components of small machinery items for assembly in East Africa could be one way of increasing trade, the team felt. (April 13, 1975)

Indian Transistor Radios for Africa

Exports of Indian transistor radios have gone up in value to Rs. 21 million (estimated) in 1974-75, as against Rs. 16.5 million in 1973-74. Transistors were exported mainly to the U.K., Holland, the *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARÉ)*, *Nigeria*, *Dahomey*, *Ethiopia*, Czechoslovakia, Bangladesh, Singapore, Malaysia, United Arab emirates (UAE), *Zambia*, Sri Lanka and Switzerland. (April 1975).

International Trade Fairs-Indian Participation

India will participate in 13 international fairs in 1975-76 to project her achievements. These fairs will be held in Paris, Milan, Brussels, *Zambia*, Zagerb, Teheran, New Zealand, Poznan, Baghdad, Frankfurt, Leipzig, *Cairo*, and *Tripoli*. India also proposes to organise eight exclusive Indian exhibitions in Brazil, Venezuels, *Gabon*, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, the U.K., and the Gulf Areas. (April 1975).

Cashewnuts from Africa

The Cashewnuts Corporation of India has finalised agreements with Tanzania and Mozambique for purchase of a total quantity of

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95,000 metric tonnes of cashewnuts worth Rs. 25 crores. The Agreement was signed in London. (April 24, 1975).

Indian Minister visits Africa

The relations between Africa and the people of Indian origin in Africa were "Generally quite good" said Mr. Bipinpal Das, India's deputy minister for external affairs, who returned to New Delhi on June 23 at the end of his two-week visit to Mauritius, Kenya, the Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. Talking to newsmen, Mr. Das said that he saw that an ideal relationship existed between Indians and Africans in Zambia, which could be a model for others to follow. He also said that there was vast scope for cooperation between Indian and the African countries in economic and cultural fields.

Mr. Das visited Zambia for four days, Tanzania for three days, the Sudan for two days, Kenya for four days, and Mauritius for four days.

During his visit to Zambia, ending June 21 Mr. Das called on Mr. Eliah Mudenda, Zambian Prime Minister, Mr. R.B. Banda, Foreign Minister, and Mr. Kamanga, Central Committee member in-charge of foreign affairs. He also met separately representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa, the African National Council of Zimbabwe, the South West African Peoples Organization, and the Unity Movement of South Africa.

Earlier, he had wide ranging discussion on bilateral and international matters with the Tanzania Foreign Minister, Mr. J.S. Malecela, on June 16 in Dar-es-Salaam and the Kenyan Vice President, Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, on June 11 in Nairobi. He called on the Governor-General of Mauritius. Sir Raman Osman, on June 9 in Port Louis and also presented the *abhinaudan patra* (certificates of honour) issued by the recent world Hindi Convention held in Nagpur, to the Mauritius Prime Minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, who had presided over the convention.

Welcoming Mr. Das on June 19 in Lusaka, the Zambian Prime Minister, Mr. Mudenda described Mr. Das's visit as an important follow up to President Kaunda's tour of India towards cementing friendship between the two countries. Mr. Das said that

India and Zambia were already cooperating in various fields on the basis of four agreements signed between the two countries during President Kaunda's visit to India, and expected increased cooperation in economic fields to their mutual advantage and benefit.

The Tanzanian leaders expressed great satisfaction at India's contribution in their country's economic development, especially by way of despatch of experts. Both sides agreed on the need to continue to work together closely in keeping the Indian ocean a zone of peace, free from great power rivalry and foreign military bases. During his visit to the Sudan, Mr. Das said in an interview with the Sudan new agency on 14 June that the last visit of President Nimeri of Sudan to India contributed very much to the strengthening of the cordial bonds between the two countries.

The Kenyan Vice President, Mr. Moi, said that his country had a lot to learn from India regarding rural development schemes. In a separate meeting earlier with the Kanyan Foreign Minister, Mr. Das renewed Foreign Minister, Mr. Chavan's invitation to him to visit India' which the Kenyan Minister accepted.

In Mauritius, Mr. Das, paid a visit to the Mahatma Gandhi Institute at Port Louis on June 8, He also met the Indian soliders engaged in relief work in connection with damage caused by a recent cyclone. (June 25, 1975).

Afro-Asian Press Support Emergency Measures

Several newspapers of African countries, such as Egypt, Libya, have editorially and in their speal articles supported the declaration of emergency measures in India.

"We are with Indira Gandhi, because we are with India", stated Abbar Al Youm, weekend edition of the Al Akhbar, a Cairo daily. In its signed editorial the paper said : "We are with Indira Gandhi also in her battle on behalf of socialism.... India has stood firmly with us at a time the countries of the world plotted against us. We must, therefore, stand firmly with India if any foreign country plots against it". The paper added that Mrs. Gandhi championed the cause of the poor, the weak, the downtrodden and the umprivileged, She "was not made to be a dictator because she is a great human being herself."

Another Cairo daily, Al Ahram, of June 28 in an article by Dr. Sami Mansur, inter alia, said that "while Indira Gandhi's declaration of a state of emergency in India revealed her boldness in taking decisions against the plot to chaos, at the same time the dimensions of the plot to smite socialism in India. The main thing now is that Indira should succeed in liquidating this plot."

Highlighting Mrs. Gandhi's achievements, Arabic newspaper, Al Jumhuriyah, said that the successes achieved by Mrs Gandhi along the local and international levels, "have doomed the right-wing into an oppressive isolation and deprived it of all possibilities for recovering the political positions which it had previously occupied in the party and the state." In an article by Peter Yousif captioned "A Large Scale Conspiracy Against Government of Indira Gandhi in India" another paper, Al Thawra, said ; "Keeping in view the present situation there was no alternative before government of Mrs. Gandhi, except to take measures for restoration of law and order in the country, especially in those areas which were considered to be the centre of reactionary elements". (July 1975)

Suez Reopening to Boost Indian Exports

The re-opening of Suez will cut by 30 to 40 per cent the distance and movement time for Indian cargoes shipped to eight countries in Europe, West Asia and Africa.

According to latest indications. India is likely to have favourable delivery schedules. (July, 1975).

Indo-Egyptian Nuclear Accord

India and Egypt have agreed to co-operate in harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful of purposes economic development and human welfare.

In a joint communique issued at the end of a four day visit to Egypt by the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Y.B. Chavan, both sides agreed that "access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes should not remain confined to few countries only". (July, 1975).

Indian High-Commissioner to Gambia

Accepting credentials from India's new High-Commissioner, Mr. Shailen Hiralal Desai, on June 6, in Banjul, President Sir Dauda Jawara of Gambia conveyed his greetings to the President and the Prime Minister of India. President Jawara congratulated India on its progress in all fields, and appreciated the welcome development of bilateral relations in recent years. (June 7, 1975).

Tapioca gift to Guinea

As part of the contribution to the international efforts in combating caloric deficiency and providing cheap food for the masses, a massive gift of 10,000 stems weighing about two tonnes of the improved varieties of tapioca evolved at the Central Tuber Crops Research Institute, Trivandrum, was presented by the Government of India to the government of Guinea.

The stems were airlifted from Trivandrum airport to the Indian embassy in Conakry, Guinea, for presentation to the Government of Guinea on May 1, by the Indian Ambassador there. (May 13, 1975).

Kenya Seeks Services of Indian Water Experts

Kenya has requested India for technical aid to make the best use of her water resources. The request was made by Minister for Water Development Mr. Eliud Mwamunga, when India's High Commissioner, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, called on him on April 3. Kenya, Mr. Mwamunga said, needed 10 engineers and 16 technical assistants. Kenyan experts would tour India to interview those interested in working in Kenya, he added. Arjan Singh said India's vast knowledge on water conservation would be of great assistance to Kenya. He invited Mr. Mwamunga to visit India to acquaint himself of India's projects.

Meanwhile, a five-member Indian team of industrial consultants, on a market orientation tour of East Africa, had consultations with Kenyan officials on industrial collaboration recently. The leader of the team, Mr. Sen Gupta, said that Indian technical know-how and goods were most suitable for tropical African conditions. The team, toured harbour installations and industrial units in Kenya. It

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indicated the possibility of setting up a spare parts factory. (April 6, 1975).

India and Libya reach accord

An understanding for wide-ranging economic cooperation between India and Libya was reached at a meeting Petroleum Minister Sri K.D. Malaviya had with Libyan Petroleum Minister Mr. Al Din Al Mabrouk. It is understood the two Ministers agreed for grant of more oil exploration facilities to India by Libya. India would also set up down stream petro chemical unit in Libya and undertake a big programme for training Libyan technicians in this country. Libya is also expected to afford an opportunity to India in developing its railway system.

There is a possibility that India and Rumania might jointly undertake oil exploration in Libya. The Rumanian participation will reduce the exploration risk for India. The Libyan Minister is understood to have indicated that the country would have no objection to association of Rumania in the oil exploration facility. (April 14, 1975).

ONGC to drill in Libya

The Libyan Arab Republic and India have agreed that there was a big scope for economic cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the field of oil and oil-based industries.

During visit to India, Libyan Minister for Petroleum met the President and the Prime Minister and discussed bilateral relations and areas of co-operation. He also met the Indian Minister of Petroleum and Chemical Mr. K. D. Malaviya.

Mr. Mubarouk told of Libya's willingness to let the Indian Oil and Oil and Natural Gas Commission look for oil in Libya and thus start a new phase of economic collaboration between the two countries. A beginning could be made with oil, he said. The two countries already have agreements on crude oil supplies and technical cooperation.

Mr. Malaviya assured Mr. Mabrouk that India with her expertise and experience would be prepared to offer whatever co-operation she can in Libya's development efforts.

The Indian Minister said that his country was seriously considering reports submitted by the two technical teams of the Indian Oil and the Oil and Natural Gas Commission that had earlier visited Libya to evaluate possibilities of securing an area for oil exploration and that a decision in this regard would be taken shortly.

In the field of technical cooperation in engineering and refinery programmes, India was ready to train Libyan engineers and technicians in various branches of engineering, he added. (May 22, 1975).

Libyan Ambassador to India

Mr. Ezzedin Ali Mohamoud Al-Ghadamsi has been nominated as the Ambassador of Libya to India.

Born in 1935 in Tripoli, Dr. Al-Ghadamsi is a graduate in Commerce from the Cairo University. He has served as Secretary General in the Ministry of Treasury of Libya, as a member of the Libyan Bank Council, as a member of the Administrative Council for Petrol and is at present Ambassador of Libya in Vienna. (June 2, 1975).

Indian Minister meets Mauritius Prime Minister

The Minister for Health and Family Planning, Dr. Karan Singh on a tour of Mauritius called on the Prime Minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam; the speaker of Mauritius Assembly, Sir Harilal Ranchordas Vaghajee and exchanged views with the Education Minister, Mr. Louis Regis Chaperon. (May 22, 1975).

Mauritius seeks Indian buses

Mauritius Minister for Works and Transport A.H.M. Osman called on Commerce Minister D. P. Chattopadhyaya and discussed the possibility of expanding Indo-Mauritius trade.

Mr. Osman was leading an eight-member delegation to India for finalising the purchase of about 100 buses and chassis under a commercial credit arrangement.

India had earlier agreed to provide Rs. 5 crores worth of credit to Mauritius through banking institutions for purpose of capital equipment and manufactured goods. (June 2, 1975).

India to have strong ties with free Mozambique

India accorded full diplomatic recognition to Mozambique from June 25 on the day it achieved independence.

India had established contact with the leadership of the liberation struggle headed by Mr. Samora Machel. An Indian delegation was invited to attend the independence ceremony.

The Indian mission in Mozambique is of the level of an embassy. As a demonstration of India's solidarity with the liberation struggle, the Additional Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, Mr. Jagat S. Mehta visited Mozambique soon after the September accord was reached between Portugal and the Mozambique leadership. (June 28, 1975).

India greets Independent Mozambique

Mozambique became an independent nation from the midnight of June 25-26 after centuries of foreign domination. Both President Ahmed and Mrs. Gandhi hailed the emergence of Mozambique as a free sovereign nation, and expressed the hope that there would be close cooperation between Mozambique and India for their common ideals of peace, equality and progress.

Congratulating Mr. Samora Moises Machel, President of Mozambique, President Ahmed said that the victorious struggle of people of Mozambique against colonialism "is a brilliant example of human courage and sacrifice in the cause of freedom". Mr. Ahmed was confident that under Mr. Machel's leadership "Mozambique will progress and make significant contributions to Africa and the world".

In a message to President Machel, offering India's "warm congratulations and good wishes", Mrs. Gandhi said : "We rejoice that the heroic struggle of people of Mozambique against colonial domination has at last been crowned with success. This victory will give inspiration to those still struggling against racialism and colonialism".

Mr. Raj Bahadur, India's Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation, who attended Mozambique's Independence Day Ceremony in Lourenco Marques as the special representative of the Government of India, conveyed personally Mrs. Gandhi's message of congratulations and good wishes to President Machel.

The Indian Centre for Africa

New Delhi and the Mozambique Students in India celebrated Mozambique Independence Day on June 26 at a meeting in New Delhi expressing solidarity of the Indian people with the people of Mozambique over the victory of their struggle for Independence. (June 27, 1975).

Inaugurating the Independence Day Celebrations of Mozambique on July 9 in New Delhi, Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, said that Mozambique had "a long and hard struggle which we have watched with keen interest and sympathy and we are glad that, although overwhelmed with our own difficulties and problems, we were able to give them support, not only moral but also material". Greeting President Somara, Mrs. Gandhi said that under his leadership Mozambique will march to progress and prosperity.

Pointing out that there were still some countries which were under colonial rule, Mrs. Gandhi said that "it will not be long before they also are free and we wait to greet them and have them also amongst the free countries of the world."

The Prime Minister said that "even though we are so involved in our problems, with our hearts and minds, we are with all those who face problems in the world and especially with our friends in Africa and in Asia". The function was organized by a number of organizations including Indian Centre for Africa. (July 10, 1975).

India's Full Support to Namibian Struggle

India reiterated the paramount importance of putting an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, her consistent opposition to all racist and colonial policies in Africa, as also its continuing support to national liberation movements in territories still under colonial domination. This was stated in a joint communique issued on May 4, 1975 in New Delhi at the end of the visit of a mission of the United Nations Council for Namibia from April 29 to May 3 to India. The Mission was led by the President of the Council,

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H. E. Ambassador Rupiah B. Banda from Zambia, and included representatives for Colombia, India, Indonesia, Romania and Turkey. The Mission was accompanied by Mr. Theo-Ben Curirah, the Representative of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO).

During their visit the Mission called on the Vice President, Shri B. D. Jatti. The Mission also held discussions with Shri Bipinpal Das, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Shri G. Parthasarthy, Chairman, Policy Planning Committee, Shri V. C. Trivedi, Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Shri B. K. Sanyal, Secretary in charge of economic affairs and other senior officials.

The Mission and the Government of India reaffirmed their conviction that policies of Colonialism, Racialism and Apartheid are flagrant violations of Fundamental Human Rights. India welcomed the significant success achieved by liberation movements in some parts of Africa and hoped that these developments would hasten the inevitable end of colonial rule and racial discrimination in other areas.

The Mission and the Government of India emphasized that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and suppression of the fundamental rights of its people by the racist Government of South Africa in violation of the Charter, the decisions and Resolutions of the International Court of Justice, constitute a threat to international peace and security. The India Government reiterated the paramount importance of putting an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. The Government also reaffirmed its full support to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter as the basis for finding a solution to the problems of peace and security that faced the international community and, in this context, to the work done by the United Nations Council for Namibia.

The Mission and the Government of India discussed the efforts being made to implement Security Council Resolution 366 of December 17, 1974 asking South Africa, inter alia, to make a solemn declaration to recognise the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia

as a nation. The Government of India reaffirmed its full support to any positive and concrete measure taken by the U.N., in pursuance of the Resolution, to achieve the withdrawal of the illegal administration and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia.

The Government of India also reiterated its full sympathy and support for the legitimate struggle of the people of Namibia for freedom and independence under the leadership of SWAPO, the sole representative of the people of Namibia.

India assured the Council's Mission of its continuing and active support to the Council in all its activities.

The visiting Mission expressed its deep appreciation of the continued economic and material support which the Government of India has been giving to the people of Namibia through SWAPO, the UN Fund for Namibia and the OAU Fund against colonialism and apartheid. Discussions were held between the members of the Mission and the senior officials of the Government of India to consider how to strengthen further their cooperation in these fields, particularly for post-independence construction of Namibia.

India agreed to provide training facilities to 150 people from Namibia immediately and to send experts, professors and lecturers to serve in the Institute proposed to be set up in Lusaka for the people of Namibia. The Government of India would also supply to this Institute whatever equipment could be made available. The two sides further agreed to remain in close touch regarding additional facilities and supplies which might be required.

The Mission conveyed its appreciation for the efforts made by the Government of India to disseminate information about the struggle of the Namibian people for independence and the Council's activities. The Government of India assumed the Mission of its continued cooperation in this regard, including, in particular, the observance of Namibia Day on August 26.

The Indian Centre of Africa organized a public reception for the Mission at New Delhi. The reception was attended by more

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than five hundred people and was followed by speech by Mr. Banda. A film on Namibia was also screened on the occasion. (May 4, 1975).

Fundraising Dance Programme by Indian Women of Lagos

The Federal Commissioner for Information called on all well-meaning Nigerians and international philanthropic organizations to donate generously to the noble cause of Nigerian women.

He made the call while opening a fundraising dance organized at the Institute of International Affairs by Indian women resident in Lagos, under the auspices of the National Council of Nigerian Women Society.

The Commissioner thanked the organisers of the dance, adding that the occasion exemplified inter-relationship and co-operation between women of the two nations. (June 16, 1975).

Tanzania keen to buy Autos, Spares

A two member Tanzanian Trade Delegation visited India to explore Indian Auto Market.

Tanzania has plans to establish joint ventures with Indian entrepreneurs in both the countries and the possibilities for such ventures would be examined during the delegations talks with Indian private and public sector manufacturers, the members of the delegation said.

Welcoming the delegation, Mr. H. A. Sujan, Western Regional Chairman of the Council, observed that the exports of Indian engineering goods to Tanzania were on the increase. It was worth Rs. 16.3 million. The estimated exports to that country during the period was Rs. 37.5 million, he added.

Mr. K. S. Kondo, M.P., Chairman, and Mr. D.S.T. Ballali, Director of the State Motor Corporation, Dar-Es-Salam, during their discussion said that this year Tanzania would buy from India nearly 500 vehicles and spares worth about 160 million Tanzanian shillings (Rs. 100 = 85.10 shillings). (April 14, 1975.)

Mr. B. D. Jatti, Vice-President of India Visits Tanzania

At the invitation of Mr. Aboud Jumbe, First Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania and President of the Afro-Shirazi Party, the Vice-President of India, Shri Basappa Danappa Jatti, leading a sixteen-member delegation paid an official visit to the United Republic of Tanzania from May 23rd to 30th, 1975.

During their visit Shri B.D. Jatti, Shrimati S. Jatti and delegation visited a number of places both in the mainland and the islands. During their visits to industrial and agricultural projects in Zanzibar and Pemba they particularly noted with deep interest the rapid economic progress being made by the people in the islands. On the mainland they visited Mtwara, Dodoma, the proposed new capital, [where he was received by the Prime Minister and Second Vice-President Mr. M. Kawawa] and the world famous game park at Lake Manyara.

Throughout their stay and wherever they went Shri B.D. Jatti and his delegation were accorded a very warm and friendly reception by the Government, TANU and Afro-Shirazi parties and the people of the United Republic of Tanzania.

The visiting Vice-President took the opportunity to apprise Mwalimu President Nyerere, of the recent developments in Asia and particularly in the Indian sub-continent. Mwalimu noted with appreciation the steps taken by India and hoped these would contribute to the stability of the region.

In an atmosphere of fraternity, understanding and warm cordality the First Vice-President and his guest, Shri B.D. Jatti held official talks at the State House, Zanzibar on Saturday, May 24, 1975. Present at the talks on the Indian side were :

1. Shri K. D. Sharma, High Commissioner of India to Tanzania,
2. Shri S. S. Nath, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.

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3. Shri V. P. Singh, Consul General of India in Zanzibar,
4. Shri G. Parthasarathy, Deputy High Commissioner of India in Tanzania.

Present at the talks on the Tanzanian side were :

1. Hon. Mr. Thabit Kombo, Member of the Revolutionary Council and Secretary General of the Afro-Shirazi Party,
2. Hon. Mr. Hassan Moyo, Minister of State in the First Vice-President's Office,
3. Hon. Mr. Ibrahim Makungu, Member of the Revolutionary Council,
4. Hon. Brig. Yusuf Himii, Member of the Revolutionary Council of the Afro-Shirazi Party,
5. Hon. Mr. I. A. Sepetu, Junior Minister for Foreign Affairs,
6. Mr. Hassan Diria, Tanzanian High Commissioner in India, and
7. Hon. Dr. S. A. Monga, Secretary to the Revolutionary Council and Chief Director, Zanzibar State Planning and Development Commission.

During the talks held in the State House the two Vice-Presidents exchanged views on matters of mutual interest between the two countries. The First Vice President informed Shri Jatti about the efforts being made by Tanzania in the field of economic development and rural transformation through the policy of Ujamaa villages in accordance with the Arusha declaration. He explained recent developments in East Africa and Africa in general with special emphasis on the liberation of Southern Africa where the First Vice-President noted that the situation had changed with the collapse of Portuguese colonialism. Nevertheless free Africa's main preoccupation now was to attain immediate majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia and work for the eradication of racial oppression and apartheid in South Africa.

Shri Jatti informed the First Vice-President about the technological progress made in the fields of agriculture and industry in India and the efforts of the Government and people of India for accelerated economic development. Shri Jatti also explained the efforts that were being made by India to bring about mutual trust and understanding in the Indian sub-continent and the progress made in this regard. Recalling his successful visit to India the First Vice-President expressed his appreciation of the efforts being made by India both in its economic development and in the creation of mutual trust and understanding amongst neighbours and hoped that these would lead to stability and closer cooperation in the region.

The Vice-President of India expressed his admiration for the efforts being made by the people of Tanzania to achieve the goals of socialism and self-reliance as enunciated in the Arusha declaration under the enlightened leadership of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere and the TANU and Afro-Shirazi Parties. Shri Jatti commended the efforts being made by Tanzania to foster unity and cooperation not only in East Africa but in the African continent as a whole, where Tanzania has been in the forefront of the struggle against colonialism, racialism and imperialism. The Vice-President of India reaffirmed the unwavering commitment of the Government and the people of India to the people of the African continent in their struggle against colonialism, imperialism, racial oppression and apartheid.

As neighbouring littoral states of the Indian Ocean the India and Tanzania stressed that the Indian Ocean be preserved as a zone of peace free from Great Power rivalries and from foreign military bases. They reaffirmed the determination of India and Tanzania to work closely together for achieving the objectives of the U. N. General Assembly to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment and support to the movement of non-aligned countries which has since its inception followed an active policy of opposition to the forces endangering international peace and security.

In the light of the rapid growth in mutual cooperation between India and Tanzania the two sides noted the continued validity of

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closer cooperation between developing countries in the economic technological and scientific fields. They reviewed the international economic situation in the light of the difficulties faced by developing countries and called upon the developed nations to cooperate with the developing countries in order to ensure the establishment of a just and equitable international economic order.

In the area of bilateral relations the two Vice-Presidents discussed matters of common interest and expressed their satisfaction at the continuous growth of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. They resolved to further strengthen the expanding cooperation as stipulated in the Indo-Tanzania Joint Economic Commission agreement. In this connection the two Vice-Presidents expressed hope that the areas of cooperation would be widened and consolidated through the aegis of the Indo-Tanzania Joint Economic Commission. The First Vice-President recalled with appreciation the progress already achieved by India in the fields of agriculture industry, education, science and small-scale industries and accordingly the First Vice-President expressed thanks for the assistance being rendered to Tanzania by India in those fields. (May 31, 1975).

Book Review

Rebel: Bediako Asare, Heinemann Educational Books Limited, London. Sh. 40.

One book which has hit the press headlines and has since been selling like hot-cake all over Europe, America and East Africa is the *REBEL*. Written by that prolific writer, **BEDIAKO ASARE**, a seasoned Ghanaian journalist, and presently the Deputy Editor of the "Ghanaian Times". The book has since the year of its publication in 1969 sold over 150,000 copies, having by the end of 1973 been reprinted four times and translated into Swahili.

What has made this book the best-seller that it is? It is simply: its peculiarity, its uniqueness in point of its theme and narrative style, its plot and setting, and more importantly, its philosophical cast.

It has a radical, revolutionary and realistic sting which made it tower above most of the contemporary

African Writers' Series.

In it, we clearly see the interplay of the concept of revolution banging against revisionism, radicalism classing with reactionariness, realistic rebellion seeking to rumble over and crush romantic revanche. This is a struggle par excellence, the struggle of two opposites, what Karl Marx will call—dialectics! And which one wins? Revolution or revisionism?

Bediako Asare has the answer for us in his *REBEL*.

In one respect, *REBEL* stands to be rated as a realistic book for any leader of any group. If you are a militant or a revolutionary you've something to learn from the book. A minister of a religious group isn't forgotten in the *REBEL*. He has his cut there.

It is a book for everybody. The *REBEL* is a novel which

tosses up to the eye the dangers of always bowing to an archaic custom or swallowing the precepts of obsolete tradition without question, all in the name of culture !

ATTITUDE

In *REBEL*, we see the modern-day scientific mind raking through the dump of social beliefs and questioning the meanings of certain rituals and traditional thinking. We have such a questing mind in the personality of Ngurumo, one of the principal characters in the book.

Bediako Asare writes that : "Ngurumo wondered about these things (traditional beliefs). He had long since concluded that the gods were capricious and malicious. At times he was puzzled to know just what the gods wanted people to do. Why had the gods not provided enough food for them ?"

The agony of the questing mind, the starving stomach.

The book itself opens on to this principal character, Ngurumo, we see him as a strong man, rather deep-chested, sinegy, burly and

muscular at the thighs and shoulders. The morning sun catches on him in his room as he lies on his bed thinking and worrying, looking haggard from lack of sleep in the previous night.

What has engaged his thoughts ? A host of tricky problems. His village called Pachanga, insulated from the rest of the world, is faced with an acute shortage of food. The land yields no more. Starvation and famine starkly stare the people in the face. Epidemic diseases come on the poor, ignorant inhabitants.

Couldn't there be a change in the pattern of life ?

The land to the East is fertile. Why can't his people defy the gods and go to settle there ?

But then that's the wish of the formidable fetish priest, Mzee Matata, whose word is the word of the gods, unchallenged and unchallengeable.

To Mzee Matata, it is not the soil or a new settlement elsewhere that will produce the magic of creating abundant food, or better living. It is the sacrifice of hens and in sheep to propitiate the gods, it is the

absolute obeisance to the rocks and stones which will conjure up abundance of food and prosperity.

AUDACITY

To challenge the thinking of this most powerful personality of the deities, is but to invite trouble. The end-result is death.

Bishara and Omari, two daring citizens, had tried to defy Mzee Matata and they have died.

Said Mzee Matata : "Bring me the maize or your wife and children will die. Already the gods are annoyed that you should dare oppose them."

Bishara had disobeyed, and he and his family had died.

Omari, probably unbalanced had exploded into a sudden laughter, when Mzee was communing with the dieties. The outcome was : "The gods are offended... For this you shall die." And so he did die.

How could Ngurumo succeed in debunking this social mystification which for long had held sway on the people's minds ?

It was how to kick against and destroy all these reac-

tionary banal beliefs; it was how to amass support and lead the villagers to the new and fertile land in the East, that engaged Ngurumo's attention.

The story spins off in its continuous sweetness, unfolding scenes of pity and poverty in the midst of plenty and prosperity, and scenes of conspiracies and intrigues to outwit or destroy.

Here we see Bediako Asare at his 'plotting' best dividing the characters into two opposing factions, he deftly plays one group against the other. Ngurumo, with the backing of Bakari, leads the radicals to agitate for a change. Mzee Matata and Fundi are in the vanguard of the conservatives who consider that the status quo should by all means be maintained.

Bediako Asare employs some cunning literary subtlety in graduating the tension of the plot in such a way as to keep the reader in suspense all the time.

At the end of every chapter the reader becomes impressed with a certain eternal sweetness of the story, so exquisite and poignant on the mind, as to urge him on to read to the last.

In my own point of view the story has two distinct and exciting climaxes, inseparable though they seem to be. The one screens on gradually to where Ngurumo and his wife have been tightly tied up ready for public execution, for having supposedly offended the gods. Here we see the crime passion of Mzee Matata, the fetish priest, at its topmost. Now, whether the condemnation of Ngurumo will trigger off any changes in Pachanga, is left to the reader to find out for himself from his own copy of the *REBEL*.

From this point, just as we seem to dive slowly down to the end, the story surges slyly up again and tides over at another hair-raising climax. Ngurumo's public swording with, and resultant killing of the other arch enemy of the revolution, Fundi.

At last the scores become settled. Ngurumo gains the upperhand. What next? What happens to their infertile land? To their traditional mores? To their religious lores? It's at this stage that we read and laugh like mad.

As we see Ngurumo scoring success after success with forces

of reaction splitting and ripping before his visionary power, we cannot but imagine the setting in which the author wrote the *REBEL*.

Bediako Asare was signed on to the Tanzanian daily newspaper, "Nationalist" when he wrote his book. That vast African country, Tanganyika, led by the radical socialist Julius Nyerere had emerged from the colonial struggle as independent country only seven years back. It had been joined in 1964 by the revolutionary Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba to form a strong, unified state of Tanzania.

SOCIALISM

In that political atmosphere of freedom, where Nyerere's revolutionary tactics had eventually gained command, and progressive socialism was gaining headway, there is every reason to conceive of the emergent literature in the period being infested with tints of socialist ideals of self-reliance, and heroic struggle of the ordinary people.

Part of the uniqueness of the book lies in its style of

presentation. The story is couched in simple, juicy English. To read it is like enjoying the clear lucid style of Bertrand Russel's philosophical works, or of Rider Haggard's story books or of William Conton's novels.

REBEL thus yields to a quick, palatable reading. Even the slowest reader is certain to do the book in a day or two. For those who will like to know about, or reminisce over the past village life with its rustic simplicity, its forest thrills, its pastoral adventures, its superstition, witchcraft beliefs and diseases, the book presents an interesting package.

If we do agree to the point that literary realism is the act of "observing life with scientific exactitude" and portraying it as it is, without sentimentalisation, or glamour or bias or the intention to influence the reader's impression" then this book fits into the literary pigeon-hole of realism.

The realistic life is the life of the practical and the scientific; of the radical and the specific. And Bediako Asare's REBEL teaches us much life.

That is the didactic nature of the book.

SATISFACTION

For those who stand to romantic life the book gives a good satisfaction. There is the life of love and marital warmth. Seething through the whole story. To see Ngurumo's wife, Seitu a bush-girl, trying for the first time, a crude, awkward kiss on her husband's lips makes one burst into laughter. How so amusing that is !

The book, however, cannot be without some shortcomings. In the REBEL, We see Bediako Asare's tendency towards hyperbolic imagery. An example is the sound one hears when Fundi is thrown to the ground. And then in the subsequent exodus, how the sick managed to journey unaided. Again the action of fifty people putting up buildings for more than seven hundred inhabitants may also appear coverly revived-up.

Another tendency is towards quick characterisation. More especially the subsidiary characters. At any rate, I feel, these are

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no blemishes which spoil the excitement or enjoyment the book gives. After all, they are bound to pale before the overwhelming merits of the

book. Thus the supposed shortcomings do not in the least detract from the excellences of this literary piece.

A Trust Betrayed : Namibia. United Nations Publication,
New York.

This 43-page booklet put out by the U.N. Office of information reviews more or less the state of the African peoples in the former German colony of South-West Africa, now known as Namibia. From 1884 imperial Germany occupied this portion of southern Africa and after its defeat in the First World War, the territory was handed over to white South Africa by the so-called victorious Allied Powers with the British, the French and the Americans as the senior partners. Namibia thus became absorbed into the Union of South Africa by the Smuts government as its fifth province. The country's apartheid laws were also extended to this

newly acquired province.

Of course, all this information is not interpreted in exactly the same way as the reviewer looks at the situation in Namibia. The U.N. is not yet fully representative of majority world opinion as can be judged from the big-power wrangles and their influence on decision-making which may not always coincide with the wishes or aspirations of the under-developed third world nations. Perhaps it is understandable in the circumstances that the U.N. information publications, like the one under review, have to take a formal—sometimes 'neutral'—approach to world issues to be on the safe side. The Namibia book-

let does just that. It begins with a strict legal presentation of the case against Vorster's South Africa and is followed by an "objective" narration of the events leading up to the U.N. decision to withdraw the old League of Nations mandate on Namibia. At no point does the booklet raise the issue as to who betrayed what trust? Was it Smuts or Vorster? Or the major imperialist powers who decided to dispossess the Germans of their colonies as war booty and distribute them among themselves and their junior allies?

It may well be argued, in the first place, that "trust" was not involved in the case of South Africa and, therefore, the question of "betrayal" does not arise. Rather, was it not really a betrayal on the part of the members of the League to abandon the peoples of Namibia to the care of the Smuts regime? Consequently, the responsibility lies squarely on Britain, France, United States and their League associates for their decision. Was not apartheid South Africa permitted by the "Allied Powers" to "apply to the territory its own laws?" And

helpless Namibia was to be administered—of all people by white South Africa "as a sacred trust of civilization!" All that is now history which should neither be buried nor forgotten.

But the problem of Namibia is still with us and it requires urgent attention. What is to be done about it? Do we, as the Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim emphasized in his annual report for 1973 urge "the competent U.N. organs, Security Council in particular, to continue to seek effective approaches to bring a solution based on the inalienable rights of the Namibian people to self-determination, national independence and preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia?" Or, is there another, quicker way out to free this territory?

It is hardly likely that some member-nations of the Security Council who founded the League of Nations and are still colonial in their outlook would rally to the call of Waldheim. They are more concerned with keeping Namibia's rich deposits of uranium and diamonds in the "safe hands" of their

ally, Vorster. Or so they imagine. In the last analysis, however, only Namibians can

liberate Namibia.

—L.V. Naidoo.

East Africa : W.T.W. Morgan, Longman, London, 1973, pp. 410.

An interesting aspect associated with a study of Africa, not excluding its geography, is a study in transition. This transition is total and embraces a wide variety of aspects like physical, morphological, social, economic, political and cultural aspects. The rate of contemporary change in Africa is much faster than in many other parts of the world. If one misses this aspect of transition, one loses the quintessence of contemporary Africa. Another related feature is the fascinating picture of the coexistence of apparent contradictions in the events and phenomena on the African scene. The existence of glaciers on the summit of Mount Kenya, 5200 ms, almost on the equator itself is one of the more obvious contradictions. But, there are several others not only and hence the more oft quoted in the field of physical geography but also

in the domains of economic geography, demography or anthropology. In an anxiety to stress on what it considers the non-transient features of East African geography, Morgan's treatise misses these fundamental features of a study of transition and the apparent contradictions in the life and body politic of East Africa.

In physical geography, a reference may be made to the prevalence of impeded drainages and extensive swamps as an aspect of this phenomenon of transition, which does not receive the coverage it deserves in Morgan's *East Africa*. The indistinct water divides in the upper reaches of the Katonga and Kafu (Figure 1.5 on page 12) point to the geomorphological transitions which the Lake Victoria region is passing through.

The swampy Katonga is known as an outstanding example of reversed and hence

impeded drainage. The exit of the Nile from Lake Victoria and that of the Lukuga from the Lake Tanganyika are also known to be the results of tectonic changes which are examples of transitions in physical geography. A treatment of such unique physiographic features pertaining to the riverain the lacustrine geomorphology would have enhanced the topical interest of Morgan's work in the field of physical geography.

The significance of transition is of much greater relevance to the study of social, economic, demographic and political geography than even physical geography, and, it is particularly in these domains, that Morgan's approach and treatment give the impression of having missed to have hit the nail on the head.

On the subject of 'tribes' Morgan writes, that "this (the tribe) is a unit difficult to define, but universally used. It may be said to be a group to which the individual feels a strong sense of belonging, and which is usually united by a common language, culture and since marriages are mostly within it, it may have inherited

traits." (page 138). "The unfortunate effect of tribalism is to increase the forces of these divisions. A tribal will tend to have a common economic interest because of the nature of its economy (say, in the price of cotton or the need for boreholes) and of its position (e.g. the alignment of a new road or the position of a new hospital) which is reinforced by being in distinction to the interests of other communities from which it is separated by barriers of language, culture and perhaps of physically identifiable racial characteristics."

This postulation misses the fundamental fact that the tribal organisation is a socio-economic organisation suited to a certain level of economic production of a society in the olden days, apart from current conflicts on road assignments or hospital locations or cotton prices. The sense of belonging, common culture, and other common features are the result of a common economic interest and not the cause. Such a scientific understanding alone of the nature of the production relations in African society, both traditional as well as con-

temporary, would guarantee a rational and unbiased understanding of and attitude to the social tensions referred to by Morgan in his book.

Take, for instance, the statement that, "the cautious position was to be found of missionaries working to abolish slavery and convert to Christianity relying for supplies and, in some cases, for protection upon the Islamic Arab slave traders" (page 149). The juxtaposition of "Christian missionaries working to abolish slavery" with "Islamic Arab slave traders" is an un concealed statement that Christianity was against slave trade whereas 'Islam' and 'Arabs' were perpetrating slave trade. Was not all the slave trade between West Africa and the US across the Atlantic carried on by "Christians" ? What, then, is the point in blaming 'Islam' and 'Arabs' for the slave trade ?

Dealing with the land problem in Kenya, Morgan states that "Border lands in traditional society were often in dispute and left unpopulated. Such no-man's lands were in some places occupied by Europeans, as in the Kenya high-

lands where they had the advantage of keeping apart disputing parties." (page 144). Then again, "the highest altitudes were not favoured by the indigenous people : they were too cold for comfort..." (page 156). This is indeed a great euphemism to state ! The Africans were dispossessed of the land in their possession and non-whites were not allowed to acquire land in the 'white' highlands. It is common knowledge that the resulting agrarian unrest sparked off the 'emergency' in Kenya.

The above examples would show that, while Morgan's treatment of physical features like geology or climate, vegetation or soils of East Africa is fairly scientific and objective, the same spirit of scientific and detached objectivity does not seem to pervade his treatment of the social, political and economic geography of East Africa.

A useful section of Morgan's book is the one dealing with "references and bibliographies" which provides a listing of some of the more important publications by individual experts on the themes

selected by him for treatment.

On the whole, the work is a valuable reference book to not only under-graduate and post-graduate students of East African geography but also to those studying a variety of other subjects in East Africa like economics, anthropology

or geology. The text is rendered all the more interesting and attractive by the inclusion of a large number of first class photographs of the various geographical features of East Africa, almost one photo covering each half page.

—K.V. Krishnamurthy

Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania: The Case of Mwanza Region, James R. Rinucane, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1974, pages 192.

The developing countries face problems of development different in nature and magnitude than the developed countries. They are all trying to solve them according to their special historical, ethnic, social and economic circumstances. For this different methods have been adopted according to the special needs of individual countries. The objective of all these efforts, however, is to increase both output and equality. Bureaucracy has been used as the means to effect these changes. On the other hand the people's participation in decision making has been encouraged. It has created a conflict between the bureau-

cratic machinery inherited from the colonial past, which had at its disposal laws framed during the pre-independence period to 'rule' the people, and the requirements of citizenry, largely illiterate and ignorant. New organizational set ups, such as the Panchayat and Development Block systems in India and the formation of Village Development Committees and Regional and Area Development Committees in Tanzania, are efforts towards greater participation of people in shaping their future in close co-ordination with the bureaucracy, which has been charged with the execution of plans formulated by committees at

different levels of hierarchy.

The balance struck between hierarchy and participation in these organizational structure is a delicate one. In practice, the bureaucracy tends to take an upper hand in deciding what the people should have. It is this then which the book examines in a broader perspective of Tanzania, but is greater details from Mwanza Region, and looks at the "efficacy of these organizational arrangements in achieving a satisfactory mix of hierarchy and participation, output and equality."

It begins with the objectives and functioning of bureaucracy in Tanzania in the colonial period, and looks at the traditional and colonial political organizations in Tanganyika in general and Mwanza Region in particular, and how they changed during the German and then the British rule. It is followed by changes in political organizations directed towards a monopolization of political-administrative functions by the nation's only party, TANU, and the central government bureaucracy including the parastatal organizations. With

the abolition of chieftainship in 1963 TANU was free from any other leadership group and it was given new responsibilities in both hierarchy and participation. The party was to be, in President Nyerere's words, a "two-way all weather road along which the purposes, plans and problems of government can travel to the people at the same time as the ideas, desires and misunderstandings of the people can travel direct to the government." The TANU Village/Ward Development Committees and M.P.'s were to represent local interest and involve people's participation. In their organizationalities with the bureaucracy the TANU officials were supposed to bring up people's problems and requirements.

This, however, presents a conflict between the bureaucracy and TANU officials in which the two are involved in a dispute over who is eligible to make which decisions and which rules or principles are to determine the process of change. This conflict of hierarchy and participation right from village to subnational level has been detrimental in producing intended results.

The book further examines various aspects of this conflict, and correctly concludes that, except for a few isolated cases of successful participation of people in taking decisions about their requirements and ways of fulfilling them, it is the bureaucracy which has the upper hand. The composition, functioning in principle and practice, allocation of funds for development projects by the Village and Ward Development Committees and the role of Regional and Area Commissioners and their powers in comparison to their counterparts in TANU organizations have been critically examined. Besides, the position of M.P.'s in relation with the party, the bureaucracy and the people have also been dealt with. By and large an attempt has been made to see how far these organizations and the bureaucracy have succeeded in becoming the channel of two-way traffic of information between the people and the central government.

The results are interesting and those who have interest in developmental problems of the third world in general, and although most of the findings

are in a background of Mwanza Region, and of Tanzania as a whole in particular, will find the book very useful and informative. In agreement with the author, what is being done in Tanzania's rural areas is thus an experience worthy of observation. The book deals vividly with most aspects of the balance struck by Tanzania between hierarchy and participation in organizational structures in relation to the government's rural development goals of increasing both equality and economic output. It has been lucidly written and ideas clearly expounded.

Having said all this about the book it is pertinent to bring out the weaker aspects also. One would have liked more elaboration of the research techniques adopted during the field work, especially if a sample of the schedules used for interviewing people in different capacities, was also appended. The thirteen tables of mainly primary data seem to be too few for the prolonged interviews, based on schedules, and field work for such an empirical study. Other scholars would have surely benefited

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from fuller information, even if it was given in the form of appendices.

The subject of the book is certainly not a lesson in the geography of Mwanza Region but a location map of the Region showing places mentioned in the text would have been of great help, especially to those who are not so familiar with this part of Tanzania.

Besides, the reference given after each chapter become repetitive after the first chapter as many standard works have been referred to in all the chapters. It would have been possibly better if a select bibliography was given at the end of the book avoiding repetition.

—*C. P. Singh*

Pakeeza Sultan

Africa Through Indian Eyes

A Documentation List
(July-December 1974)

AFRICA THROUGH INDIAN EYES is a Documentation based on coverage of Africa in Indian newspapers and periodicals. It is arranged in a classified order. However, subject headings are broad and are in alphabetical sequence. Under each subject heading entries are listed alphabetically under the name of author or title and for each article reference is made to the publication (name of publication is in italics) including its volume, number, date of issue and the page on which the article appears. The matter in brackets has been provided in order to make captions more clearly understood. Annotations have also been given to the articles and editorials wherever found necessary.

AFRICA : GENERAL

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

RADHAKRISHNAN (E.P.) : How they act and react in Developing Countries (Multinational Corporation). *Yojana*, 18 (16), September 1974; 16-17.

CONFERENCES

Islamic Summit, Lahore

SAREEN (Rajendra) : Impact on the Sub-Continent (Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore) *Weekly Round Table*, (108), 7 September 1974 ; 13 & 16.

Kuala Lumpur

CHANDOLA (Harish) : Participants in Common Struggle (Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, attended by 36 States of Asia and Africa in Kuala Lumpur on 25 June 1974) *Economic and Political Weekly*, 9 (27), 6 July 1974 ; 1058.

MUKERJEE (Dilip) : Kuala Lumpur Conclave : Groping Towards New Goals. *Times of India*, 25 September 1974 ; 4.

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SAHNI (Bhisham) : Afro-Asian Writer's Movement. (Asian-African Writer Conference). *Mainstream* : 8 (14), 7 December 1974 ; 30-31.

Non-Aligned Conferences

MEETING OF Non-Aligned Countries (Representatives of the non-aligned countries met from September 9 to 13 in Belgrade). *Socialist India*, 21 September 1974; 28.

POLICY OF Non-alignment (Indian foreign policy). *Link*, 17 (20), 29 December 1974; 16-17.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT Bank aids many nations. *Economic Times*, 24 November 1974; 8.

McNAMARA (S) : Millions in Third World face Desperate Future. *Eastern Economist*, 63 (15), 11 October 1974; 651-661.

SEMINAR ON use of communications for development in Africa and Asia. See under Transport and Communication.

VOLKOL (M.Y.) : Public Sector in Developing Countries. *Mainstream*, 8 (13), 30 November 1974; 10-13.

EDUCATION

KHANDELWAL (Brig): A university for the Third World. *Young India*, 4 (46), 24 October 1974; 7-8.

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

HOWE (Russel Warren) : Chinese Role in Africa : More Emphasis on Aid and Trade. *Statesman*, 24 November 1974; 7.

France

AFRICAN ROUND UP : A new Look for French Cooperation. *Century*, 12 (16), 24 August 1974; 8-10.

India

AGONIES OF Soap Manufacturing (Indian soaps and detergents are popular in Africa and other countries of the World), *Economic Times*, 9 July 1974; 5.

MALY (Jan) : Economic Relations with Developing States. *Mainstream*, 8 (13), 30 November 1974; 30-32

PARASHAR (R.K.) : Export of Technical man power (Most of the developing countries of Asia and Africa do not have highly developed skills, they have shown a decided preference for Indian technology). *Economic Times*, 5 & 6 December 1974; 5.

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Accra, May 1974). *Indian Trade Journal*, 26 (6) 7 August 1974; B304-310

United Nations

RAMA RAO (G.J.) : UN Economic Charter and the Third World. *New Age*, 29 December 1974; 11.

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Arab World

New Epoch in Africa-Arab Countries (Comments). *Contemporary*, 18 (17), July 1974 ; 10.

India

GANDHI (Indira) : African Solidarity. *Contemporary*, 8 (17) July 1974; 11-12.



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- GOPAL (Ajit S.): A Portuguese C'Vealth? *Indian Express*, 4 August 1974; 4.
- INCHING OUT (Though it is announced by the Portuguese government that the Three African colonies are to become independent but it is not clear that how and when Lisbon will extricate itself from Africa). *Democratic World*, 10 August 1974; 2.
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- PORTUGAL'S SHRINKING colonial territory. *People's Democracy*, 28 July 1974; 9.
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Romania

- SURJEET (Harkishan Singh): The Eleventh Congress of the Romanian Communist Party. *People's Democracy*, 29 December 1974; 5 & 8.

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- ARORA (R.S.) and CHAWLA (Amita): U.N. approach to new world economic order. *Economic Times*, 16 July 1974; 5.

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BHAGAT (B.R.) : Minorities, immigrants and the brain-drain (Asians in Africa) : *Eastern Economist*, 63 (13), 27 September 1974; 555-556.

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KNAPP (Wilfrid): Boumedienne's Algeria : Stability now but strains

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LIBERATION MOVEMENT

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Libya

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56.	Indian Political Science Review	(H-Y)	Delhi
57.	Indian Recorder & Digest	(M)	New Delhi
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60.	Indo-African Trade Journal	(M)	New Delhi

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
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◦ *Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Impressions*

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
Multi-national Firms in Africa

Sudip: a Kuviraj

Nigeria's Relations with South Africa 1960-75

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India and Africa



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ERRATA

Dr. (Mrs) Priya Mutalik Desai who contributed an article "Ujamma Villages: A Tanzanian Experiment in Rural Development" in *Africa Quarterly* Vol. 16, No. 2 is Reader, University of Bombay and not Research Associate as wrongly mentioned. The error is regretted.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Impressions

Liberation Struggle in Africa Cannot be Pushed Back

The Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, who returned home on 17 October, 1976 after a ten-day tour of Mauritius, Tanzania and Zambia and a brief stop-over in Seychelles, told correspondents that the liberation struggle in southern Africa "has got its own momentum" and "no one can push it back". Mrs Gandhi expressed the hope that the Geneva conference on Zimbabwe would achieve some acceptable result but added "the situation is not at all clear and one does not know what will happen at Geneva but as President Nyerere and President Kaunda have said the struggle has to go on either at the conference table or otherwise".

The Prime Minister described her African tour as very worthwhile but as usual "very hectic". She said, she had been on a visit to "proven old friends of India whose friendship is based on shared views and policies". This had been a specially interesting time to be in Africa because of the new situation which has developed there. India, Mrs Gandhi pointed out, had been very firm and consistent in its support to liberation struggles in Africa or anywhere else and "we have given moral support, we have given them understanding and we have also given material support whenever we could." Mrs Gandhi said that during her visit she had renewed India's pledge to support the liberation struggles in Africa. Wherever she had gone, she had found great friendship for India and her stand on Africa. About her talks, she said, it had been a pleasure and privilege not only to meet the heads of state but also the leaders of the liberation struggles.

The Prime Minister was given a tumultous welcome as she arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on 11 October on a three-day visit to

Mrs Gandhi's Impressions

Tanzania. Traditional African dances and music were in attendance at the airport and all along the 16 km route to the city. President Nyerere and top dignitaries were present at the airport to welcome her.

Speaking at a banquet given in her honour by the Tanzanian President, the Prime Minister reiterated India's solidarity with the freedom fighters of Africa. "There can be no doubt as to its final outcome", she said. Mrs Gandhi referred to the ancient ties between India and Africa which had been further strengthened by Mahatma Gandhi's work in Africa. She applauded Tanzania and her President for promoting world peace and helping African nations and added "The African people are yet to achieve ultimate victory in their struggle. Zimbabwe and Namibia are in the midst of crises. The attainment of freedom and self-determination for the African peoples can brook no obstacles. The question is one of time and manner. Now it seems a matter of months, not years."

In a reference to world issues, Mrs Gandhi said that though there are now more contacts between members of opposing blocks, the age of confrontation has by no means ended. "Military presences are being extended and camp-followers and clients sought. We, who live along the Indian ocean are especially perturbed at the intrusion of friction and dangers into our area. In Asia and Africa, tensions are being provoked which will imperil peace. The motivation of the actions of several governments is not the good of the people of these areas but the presumed advantages to themselves and their global strategies."

The Prime Minister added: "We in India are resolved to resist pressures and continue to play our part in reducing conflict while supporting the cause of freedom and equality." She said the economic declaration adopted at the Colombo conference of nonaligned countries must become a manifesto for diplomatic action at the United Nations and its specialised agencies.

In his speech, President Nyerere said that under Mrs Gandhi's leadership, India was tackling her problems with determination, and commitment to justice for all the people and not just a few. He said: "Powerful economic and social vested interests, for a long time, waged an unscrupulous economic and political war against the

democratically elected Indian government and did so in the name of democracy. Finally, in June last year, Mrs Gandhi was forced to declare a state of emergency in order that her government should be able to carry out the mandate on which it was overwhelmingly elected. Even in this short time, the results are beginning to show."

Paying a tribute to India's support to African liberation struggles, President Nyerere said : "India has been unstinting in her aid towards African liberation and Africa has gained very much from her support against colonialism in Angola and Mozambique and now in Zimbabwe and Namibia and South Africa. These struggles have benefited greatly from Indian diplomatic, material and political support. Indeed, India has from the moment of its independence played a leading role in the fight against apartheid... The people of Africa have learnt that any requests for assistance that are within the capacity of India will be met with sympathy and promptness."

Speaking at Dar-es-Salam university, Mrs Gandhi said : "The new generation in India and in Africa must cast aside the props and crutches of a bygone system of education... We have to study each discipline from our own point of view and in relation to our own environment. We must develop our own source material and not depend unduly on foreign scholars. For cultural imperialism is the more devastating because it is subtle and insidious. Political liberation is incomplete without liberation of the mind."

Mrs Gandhi said that political freedom is meaningless without economic independence and cultural self-expression. Much of the anger of the affluent countries against developing nations like India and Tanzania is because they do not pay them homage of emulation and are trying to evolve a different way which will probably give the people the same satisfaction on less expense in material resources and money and also without regimentation. The possibility of a different approach disturbs the ego of advanced societies. The Prime Minister in a reference to India asked why is India the butt of criticism ? It is not possible to believe that it is because of the declaration of emergency—a measure provided in the constitution. No two western democracies have identical systems of governments.

Western powers have given not only moral but even military support to dictatorships and authoritarian regimes all over the world. She said that if the criticism was because of India's peaceful nuclear experiment, she would answer that India had violated no treaty. She added, "but we are not prepared to be left behind in the second industrial revolution which will be the fall-out of nuclear technology." The only one reason for this anathema, Mrs Gandhi further added, was India's independence of thought and action, her determination not to be pressurized and her commitment to her own interests.

Mrs Gandhi was given a rousing reception when she went to Zanzibar on a day's visit on 12 October. She saw the small industries estate in the establishment of which India is co-operating with the Zanzibar government. The national industrial development corporation of India has been appointed by the Zanzibar government to help the establishment of the estate.

Three units in the estate engaged in the manufacture of wire products and carboard cases and tyre retreading were commissioned in January this year and three other units—sheet metal unit, aluminium utensils unit and PVC insulated unit—are expected to go into production by the end of this year. Besides these, contracts have been signed for the establishment of a dozen more unit including a dessicated copra unit, a hosiery and an oil mill.

The joint communique issued at the end of Mrs Gandhi's visit to Tanzania said the crisis in Zimbabwe, the lack of progress in Namibia and the continuation of racial discrimination and apartheid in South Africa present to the conscience of the world, the greatest moral and political challenge of our time. Mrs Gandhi and President Nyerere gave a call for unity and steadfastness of purpose so that the true representatives of the people are able to determine the future of their countries. The two leaders condemned the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and reaffirmed full support to the Namibian people in their legitimate struggle by all necessary means, including armed struggle under the leadership of SWAPO. While welcoming the statement by the five front-line African states on the Geneva conference in Zimbabwe, they called

on the people there to continue their struggle until real transfer of power has been brought about. They expressed their full support to the struggle against racial discrimination in South Africa and strongly condemned the massacre of innocent Africans in Soweto.

The joint communique reiterated support for the Indian ocean being made a zone of peace free from great power rivalry and all foreign military bases. President Nyerere and Mrs Gandhi expressed particular regret and concern at the continued military build-up in Diego-Garcia. They called upon the great powers and the major maritime users to fully cooperate with the littoral and hinterland states in achieving the objectives of the United Nations declaration making the Indian ocean a zone of peace. The two leaders said there can be no just and lasting settlement in west Asia without Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied by force in 1967 and restoration of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.

President Nyerere emphasized the importance of the contribution by India for Tanzania's vital endeavour to promote development in rural areas, particularly the setting up of small-scale industries. Mrs Gandhi expressed deep admiration for the success achieved in development and for working for the attainment of national goals.

As earlier in Mauritius and Tanzania, the situation in southern Africa dominated the talks between the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, and the President of the Republic of Zambia, Mr Kenneth David Kaunda, in Lusaka from 14 to 17 October. The latest developments in Zimbabwe and Namibia and the explosive situation in South Africa resulting from apartheid were discussed. The two leaders re-affirmed their conviction that the struggle for freedom, justice, peace and independence in the region is now entering the last and potentially the most dangerous phase. The two sides also pledged their total support for the oppressed people of southern Africa in their just struggle.

The joint communique, issued at the end of the Prime Minister's visit to Zambia said that the two sides noted favourable developments in Zimbabwe brought about by the heroic armed struggle of the people. The illegal minority regime has been compelled to accept the demand by the people of Zimbabwe for the attainment

of majority rule. On Namibia, the two sides re-affirmed the inalienable right of the people to freedom and independence and called for renewed efforts to ensure South Africa's compliance with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, the non-aligned countries and the Organization of African Unity.

The two leaders strongly condemned the massacres of the African people in Soweto and other African townships by the racist South African regime. They reaffirmed complete solidarity with the courageous people of South Africa in their struggle to end the abominable system of apartheid.

Mr Kaunda explained to Mrs Gandhi the efforts of the front-line Presidents to achieve majority rule in southern Africa, and also various measures taken for the rapid economic and social development of the people of Zambia. India's Prime Minister conveyed her appreciation of these efforts and of also measures taken by President Kaunda for creating a non-racial society based on the philosophy of humanism.

Mr Kaunda expressed his full understanding of and support for the measures taken by India to safeguard the fundamental values of the constitution against the forces of disruption. He also appreciated the steps taken by India to normalise and improve relations with her neighbouring countries in the interest of promoting peace, mutual understanding and good neighbourliness, through bilateral means.

The joint communique added that both sides expressed satisfaction at the strengthening of their co-operation in the economic and technical fields and agreed to explore further areas to expand these relations. The Zambian side expressed appreciation of the contribution made by Indian technical personnel working in Zambia and the training facilities extended to Zambian nationals in a variety of technical institutions in India. Both sides also noted with satisfaction the progress made in the implementation of various Indo-Zambian projects. They reaffirmed their determination to further strengthen and diversify the mutually beneficial economic ties between the two countries.

Mrs Gandhi's official talks with Mr. Kaunda in Zambia confirmed the fundamental similarity of outlook which has existed and continues to exist between India and Zambia in their common adherence to non-alignment, and their views on colonialism and racialism and also a genuine belief in constructive bilateral and multilateral co-operation, particularly between developing countries, for solving the major economic challenges which face the world today.

Speaking at the banquet given on 16 October in her honour by President Kaunda in Lusaka, Mrs. Gandhi said that people in Africa, Asia and Latin America are discovering that political freedom without economic equality is full of hazards. Even our modest plans to provide the bare essentials of a decent living for our people are thwarted by international monetary and economic developments over which we have no control. The slightest movement towards greater economic independence, evokes angry reaction from the affluent. A new and spacious philosophy has come into being regarding the enormous indebtedness and moral obligation which aid-receivers owe to donor nations. "We do need credits and we have always welcomed aid which furthers development. But it is not fair to expect us to acquiesce in their perpetuating relations of inequality and conditions of discrimination", she added.

Mrs Gandhi further stated that we, the poorer countries of the world, have to win the battle against minority dominance over the world economic resources. We seek no confrontation with the rich but it is imperative for us to build our economic strength so as to reduce our vulnerability to pressures, and also to increase cooperation and the sharing of skills and resources among developing countries.

Technological help from the relatively more advanced among the developing countries has been found to be more easily assimilable than equipment and advice obtained from affluent countries. We should learn from one another. The Colombo nonaligned conference, two months ago, marked a new step towards a more equitable world order. But the deliberations demonstrated how far we still are from our political and economic goals.



Mrs Gandhi said that we have always believed in negotiations, dialogue and compromise to solve international problems and we do hope that in spite of their inadequacies, the United Nations and world agencies will be able to bring out some solution acceptable to the rich and to the poor.

We are glad, Mrs Gandhi said, that no bilateral problem complicates the relations between Zambia and India. We hold each other in esteem, share similar ideas and have developed tradition of constructive co-operation. Sharing the same view of the world, Zambia and India must continue to work together in the United Nations, in the non-aligned movement, in the Commonwealth and elsewhere for regional and global peace, for regional and global disarmament. It is tragic that detente, which aroused so many hopes, has not led to any reduction in arms expenditure on the part of leading nations. While the hungry call for bread and the newly awakened for education, while millions are without shelter, the sorely needed resources are not devoted to development but earmarked for a destruction. The extension of conflict to the Indian Ocean and the establishment of bases are unacceptable to the littoral states, she added.

Replying to a civic reception on 14 October in Lusaka Mrs Gandhi said that while India believed in freedom and independence it also believed in inter-dependence for in the present day world no country, however big could be self-sufficient. Mrs Gandhi said that India admired Zambia which despite its preoccupations in building up the country is also concerned at the troubles of its neighbouring people and helping them in their freedom struggle. Undoubtedly Zambia is bearing the brunt of the liberation struggles in southern Africa. India's own stand is firm and consistent. She has always supported freedom struggles and believed that freedom is indivisible. Paying high tributes to President Kaunda's leadership Mrs Gandhi described him as a "a great nationalist and an equally great internationalist".

Earlier, a 19-gun salute—usually accorded to heads of state greeted Mrs Gandhi when she arrived in the Zambian capital. Thousands of singing and dancing Zambians thronged the Lusaka airport to demonstrate profound friendship and close ties existing

between India and Zambia. All along the 20 km route from the airport to the state house, where Mrs Gandhi stayed during her visit, hundreds of school children, smartly dressed in their uniforms, cheered her chanting "India, India" as her motorcade passed through.

Zambia also conferred its highest honour, "The Order of Grand Companion of Freedom" on Mrs Gandhi. Decorating her with the order at a special investiture ceremony on 16 October at the state hall of Lusaka, President Kaunda described her as a great internationalist and a great leader of the people of India. He said that Mrs Gandhi has continued to champion the noble cause of human equality and social justice in India, Asia and the world. Her courage, outstanding leadership and statesmanship have earned India great admiration and respect in the international community.

Accepting the award on behalf of India, Mrs Gandhi conveyed her warm thanks for the honour and for the generous hospitality extended to her and members of her delegation by the people of Zambia during the visit.

Mrs Gandhi made a two hour stopover in the new republic of Seychelles on her way back home. Almost the entire 50,000 population of the main island of Mahe turned up to see her drive round the island in a motorcade from the Seychelles international airport. At a reception accorded to her at the airport, Mrs Gandhi said she was very happy to see that the mixed society in Seychelles lived very harmoniously and happily, working for the prosperity of Seychelles as a whole.

Toward a Greater East African Community

African nations, large or small, have been imbued with a spirit of Pan-Africanism through their common historical experience and long years of colonial subjugation and aspire toward an African unity and development of an African personality. While these experiences, sentiments and aspirations predispose them to some kind of cooperation and unity, the practical problems of sublimating nationalism and separate development goals remain supreme. Creations of colonial powers, without any regard for ethnic homogeneity or geographical reality, African territories carry today their heavy burden of distinct and diverse legacies of administration, language, education, and international orientation. Transport and communication are neither integrated nor inward-looking, currencies are different and fiscal policies are divergent, and trade relationships and tariff policies are diverse. So, to bring these countries together in some kind of economic union poses formidable problems, yet, because of the potential benefits that such a union are likely to bring, African countries have accepted this goal as a worthwhile challenge.

For many African countries the common market, and especially the Economic Community, of East Africa has provided a useful model of cooperation. Several neighbouring countries of the East African Community have applied for membership in the Community. Many studies made by the Economic Commission of Africa have pointed out the potential benefits of a greater East African economic community. The present paper is an attempt to analyze the problems and prospects of such an expanded community.

For our purpose the following countries will be considered as potential partners of the existing East African Community : Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique. Table I shows the area, population, gross national

product, per capita GNP, and purchasing power density (GNP per unit area of the territory)¹ of each, and of the three members of the EAC (East African Community). In such an expanded common market the total area would become 20% larger, although the total population would remain about 60% less, than those in the U.S.A. respectively.

Need for a Common Market

The central argument for a common market is that it can create conditions conducive to growth by enlarging the market, by providing opportunities for industrial specialization, and by reducing dependency on external resources. Robson² has elaborated the arguments for a common market and has emphasized the following benefits :

- (a) changes in the level of output obtainable from given factor inputs due to increased specialization according to the comparative advantages in production of the different countries ;
- (b) improvement in output obtainable from given factor inputs due to the exploitation of scale economies ;
- (c) changes in the level of output due to increased factor inputs of labour and/or capital and entrepreneurial skills ;
- (d) changes in efficiency accompanying increased competition and structural change ; and
- (e) changes in the rate of growth of output.

What is important in the context of an African country is that its future development will depend on a structural change in its economy, and a common market can lead to such a possibility.³

It may be relevant here to examine the experience of several Latin American countries. A U.N. document has stated unequivocally that the economic problems facing Latin America

“can be solved only if the following fundamental fact is recognized : Latin America, however great the external assistance it receives, however, high the rate at which its exports expand—and they cannot do so very rapidly—will be unable to carry out its development plans, will be unable to regain

the rate of growth it achieved in the ten post-war years, unless it makes a sustained effort to establish within its territory the capital goods industries of which it is in such urgent need today, and which it will require on a large scale during the next quarter of a century...In order to produce these capital goods and to develop all the intermediate goods industries required in order to launch these highly complex dynamic industries . Latin America needs a common market."⁴

The substance of this statement is equally applicable to Africa. In the development process of Africa a common market can facilitate the establishment of capital and intermediate goods industry, thereby changing the structure of the economy. Such structural change will be brought about by the establishment of those industries where optimal technical and economic scale is high, the volume of output is large in absolute terms and in excess of the needs of any one, even the largest, country (examples : iron and steel, fertilizers).

Economic integration, by bringing the partner states together to share the benefits, may also lead to a lessening of the political tensions among them. Boundary disputes, arising out of migrant workers, and other such problems which create political dissension among states may become more easily amenable to settlement when these states are working together within the framework of a common market.

Forces Affecting Integration

Conditions influencing integration include considerations like whether there is a tradition of thinking about the region as a unit ; if the region has some kind of geographical contiguity and unity ; the nature of economic, social, and political conditions prevalent in the territories ; what are the characteristics of economic production in each unit ; what is the leadership role with regard to the idea of cooperation, and whether there are conflicting ideologies influencing the views and actions of the leaders of the potential partner states.

But economic integration necessarily involves giving up a portion of national sovereignty, and since African nations are currently engaged in nation building and are very zealous of their newly-won independence, there consequently arises the dilemma :

how can the needs for regional economic cooperation be reconciled with the forces of economic nationalism ?

It is also known that economic integration results in a disequilibrium in intra-regional trade and in disparities of growth among partner states, especially with regard to the industrial sector, and so, unless some measures are included in the economic integration plan to distribute the benefits of integration in an equitable manner satisfactory to the partner states, the cooperation sought for may be short-lived or may not be forthcoming at all.

Conditions for a Smooth Functioning of the Common Market

The following seem to be the minimum conditions for a smooth functioning of a common market :

- (a) establishment of a preferential system of trade between the partner states ;
- (b) mobility of labour and capital ;
- (c) joint development of infrastructure and other common services ;
- (d) coordination of national development plans and of national economic policies ;
- (e) most efficient and equitable allocation of industries by joint planning ;
- (f) differential treatment for the relatively less-developed countries to ensure a fair balance of reciprocity of benefits and equal opportunities of growth ;
- (g) maintenance of comparable levels of social services ; and
- (h) setting up of a sound and vigorous institutional structure for the implementation of the aims and principles of common market arrangements.⁵

The extent of welfare through a customs union depends, among other things, on the quantum of interterritorial trade. As Lipsey has pointed out, given a country's volume of international trade, a customs union is more likely to raise welfare the higher the proportion of trade with the country's partners and the lower the proportion with the outside world. Further, he states that a customs union

is more likely to raise welfare the lower the total volume of foreign trade relative to domestic purchases prior to the formation of the customs union.⁶

Other students of common market have stressed a coordinated regional investment policy as a necessary ingredient for the success of the common market. This policy can be so formulated as to achieve an equitable distribution of benefits of integration.⁷

According to Wionczek,

“...to keep intraregional political tensions from detracting from its effectiveness, an integration programme aimed at accelerating development will have to incorporate the following elements : a treaty for the gradual establishment of a customs union ; a regional mechanism for settlements and monetary-policy coordination ; a regional development bank ; a system—also coordinated—to provide incentives for regional and external private investment ; an instrument that promotes the above indicated aims of “industrialization specialization by agreement ;” and a fund to compensate those countries which are relatively less developed. In addition, the efficient functioning of all these elements presupposes that the developed sector of the world economy will coordinate its economic-aid policies toward the customs-union territory.”⁸

Centrifugal Forces

It may very well be said that lack of economic integration is in part a reflection of low levels of economic development, of lack of diversification in economic activities, and of inadequacy of transport facilities.

The general inadequacy of the transport and communication system is probably one of the principal obstacles to economic integration in the region under consideration. Several international transport links are currently missing between pairs of Eastern African countries, in the sense that no all-weather surface connection exists. For example, vital links are missing between Ethiopia and Sudan (the Sabderat-Kassala line). It might be desirable for economy and efficiency to join Ethiopia and Kenya respectively to the deep-

water port of Kisimaio. A stimulus to development may also take place by the building of a railway line between Uganda and the Isiro region of Zaire, and of a road between Burundi and Tanzania.

Many of the rail connections are missing (e.g. Ethiopia and East Africa ; Zaire, Malawi and Zambia to other systems of the southern network), but a more serious drawback is that the railways are built to different technical specification, particularly in respect to gauge of the track, type of wagon coupling and height of the coupling above rail level.⁹

Among other centrifugal forces which hinder integration are different trade regimes and payment systems, the competitive structure of the industries and natural resources of potential partners, the existence of vested interests unwilling to give up the enjoyed protection, and unrealistic exchange rates.

"The most serious difficulties are encountered in three fields : the effective coordination of investment through the region, the need to compensate Member Countries which may suffer losses in the early stages, and the step-by-step surrender by member countries of powers to take economic and social decisions at the national level."¹⁰

Hazlewood identifies several other obstacles to integration. First, harmonization of customs administration and procedures of a group of countries is difficult in itself ; but even more difficult is the establishment of a common tariff. Second, an inland state will require special revenue allocation when it imports through the seaport of another. Third, since the market mechanism operating in a *laissez-faire* customs union distributes benefits unequally, some kind of 'regulated union' is desirable, But this implies an even further surrender of autonomy by the partner states.¹¹

Possible Types of Cooperation

Because of the great many difficulties to be overcome in the formation of the common market, it has been seriously suggested that East African countries should take a more flexible approach. The argument is that not all countries need be involved in all the cooperative projects, nor there be from the beginning an attempt to

form an all-embracing economic union. Functional cooperation among two or more countries in individual areas may be easier to establish. Setting up of joint road or railway development, cooperation in the field of industrial establishment, in research, education and other fields may be easier to plan for and implement, and success in these cooperative projects should inspire further cooperation.

Wider East African Cooperation ?

The three territories which form the East African Community are currently in great difficulty because of many conflicts that have developed, but which have not as yet been resolved. At an official conference held in 1972 several of these problems were identified :

- “(a) domestic fragile political structures tend to pre-occupy the national leaders with local national problems ;
- (b) owing to different economic systems in East Africa, common political decisions are difficult to take and implement.”
- (c) a high rate of unemployment is sought to be remedied nationally ;
- (d) nation building takes priority over regional economic cooperation ;
- (e) while a common colonial power was an integrating force in East Africa, its absence has weakened that force ;
- (f) lack of an indigenous entrepreneurial class stands in the way of economic cooperation ;
- (g) the national markets not being developed sufficiently as yet, an operationally efficient larger regional market is still absent.”¹²

In considering an enlarged community, it is very likely that the same problems will have to be contended.

The recent disputes among the East African partner States in respect of balance of payments, migrant workers, location of development projects are too well known to need any elaboration. In the Kenya Parliament, in the summer of 1975, Mr. Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General, asked for the dissolution of the EAC, because

as he put it, of a lack of "political goodwill." However, it should be noted that support for a continuation, and even expansion, of the Community is not lacking in Government circles either. Thus, in the same Parliament, the Finance Minister, Mr. Mwai Kibaki asserted that since Kenya benefited "a lot" from the EAC, "we should be encouraging the Community to expand instead of talking of breaking it. Countries like Mozambique, Angola and others should be encouraged to join the Community."¹³ However, the present problems are so pre-occupying the administrative machinery of the Community that the applications for membership from the neighbouring territories have not been acted upon. There are recurrent reports in the press of an impending break-up of the community. But somehow the partnership has continued and it has been agreed that the Treaty is in need of a thorough revision.

With the building up of new links between Zambia and Tanzania and with the independence of Mozambique and its friendly relation with Tanzania new considerations have come into the forefront with regard to either an expansion of the existing community or a reorganization and re-alignment of partnerships in Eastern Africa. The agreement in principle on the building of a bridge across the Ruvuma in a way symbolizes a new partnership being forged between Tanzania and Mozambique. Also, it has been reported that in June 1975 the Foreign Ministers of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire agreed on a draft convention for setting up the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), and signed a series of agreements on cooperation, security and trade.¹⁴

While the total area and the total population of the Greater Eastern Africa appear quite impressive, the per capita GNP and the purchasing powers per square mile are evidently rather modest. These figures become even more reduced in their significance when one considers the pattern of population distribution. The purchasing power is concentrated in a few areas of what Hance has called "islands of economic activity"¹⁵ set in the midst of virtually empty lands. There are great distances, without any adequate transport network, between say, central Ethiopian population center and Nairobi or Lake Victoria littoral, ; between Dar-es-Salaam-Tanga-Moshi-Arusha region and Northern Zambia. It may, of course, be

argued that an infrastructural development will stimulate economic activity and trade, but finding the investment capital for such a development will remain a problem. But this may perhaps be overcome through cooperation among partner states. Since it is expected that interterritorial trade among the East African states will be more in processed and manufactured goods, development of road transport will be able to take care of the transportation needs of these products with a relatively low weight-to-value ratio. The total investment in road development will not be a formidable task compared to that in railway construction.

The East African Community's total external trade (imports plus exports) with her neighbouring countries (Table II) has increased by 78.6% between 1967 and 1974. All countries show an increase except for Malawi. The greatest growths are with Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Rwanda. Zambia, Zaire and Burundi have shown only modest growth. While the extent of the current trade is not great, it is generally agreed that the creation of a customs union will stimulate further trade.

If we examine the import and export figures (Table III) of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda with respect to their neighbours, it becomes apparent that both Kenya and Tanzania export much more to their neighbours than they import from them. In the case of Uganda the data are incomplete. But with regard to Zambia, for which data are available, it is seen that Uganda imports more than she exports. Thus, in an expanded customs union, unless there is a regional investment policy with a view to an equitable distribution of growth, the trade imbalances will tend to continue and even increase.

The total resources of the East African Community together with the neighbouring territories is very extensive in terms of mineral and water resources, agricultural and livestock products, and fisheries and forestry. In accordance with the principles of economies of scale, specialization, and comparative advantage several viable industries can be set up for the enlarged market. But although the emphasis thus far has been placed usually upon industries for which the minimum technical and economic scale is high, there is scope also for some of the smaller-scale industries. Three categories

of industries have been identified from the point of view of opportunities for cooperation :

- 1) large multinational projects ;
- 2) projects where the need for cooperation arises out of the vast hetero-geneity of the end-products ; and
- 3) projects small in themselves, but in need of large markets, and therefore eligible for cooperation.¹⁷

The UN team has enumerated the industries for cooperation under each of the above category. For example, under (1) it lists, among others, manufacture of fiberboard, pulp, paper, rubber, tires, basic industrial chemicals and fertilizers, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, machinery, and transport equipment. Under (2) it includes many industries, important among which are textiles, printing, pottery, china, asbestos-cement products, bicycles, electrical appliances, watches and clocks. There is a very long list under category (3). Only a few could be mentioned to illustrate the point : baking powder, carpets and rugs, rainwear, hardwood flooring, metal office furniture, drugs and medicine, metal cans.¹⁸

In order to locate industries efficiently and equitably within an expanded common market a comprehensive industrial development plan is called for. But the existing East African Community, despite its years of existence and experience, has not been able to formulate such a plan as yet. It seems then that there is much less chance for an enlarged community of twelve members to do so, at least in the immediate future. Cooperation might be easier on the basis of individual industries and in respect of two or more countries at a time. But sooner or later the development of institutions and policies that would actively encourage and facilitate industrial cooperation will be essential.

Massell, in his study of a wider East African union, sounds, however, a note of caution :

“The difficulty of achieving economic coordination in a Greater East African setting forces one to be pessimistic concerning the prospective gains from enlarging the East African market. In addition, it appears likely that any expansion in the common market would be brought about at the cost of regional coor-

dination and unity in the smaller East African grouping as well. If this is the case, then the larger grouping might not only promise a small gain but might threaten an actual loss. If the choice is between a larger common market on the one hand, and a smaller but tighter group, the latter is probably preferable... This is particularly true in view of the obstacles raised by the transport system. Because of high transport costs—and a high cost of improving the transport network—the gains from an expanded common market would be limited in any event. But because of the difficulty of achieving economic coordination in the larger group, it makes more sense to proceed slowly, first strengthening the existing common market, and then adding new countries only at a later date.”¹⁹

The advantages of a common market are too well known among the territories in Greater Eastern Africa for them to give up such an opportunity for economic development. On the other hand, it is also being increasingly realized that economic cooperation can be sustained on a long-term basis only when international relations are amicable among nations and when their ideologies for economic and social development are not conflicting. That the provisions set up in the Treaty for East African Cooperation of 1967 have not been successful in distributing the gains of the common market equitably is now common knowledge. But what is not known with a reasonable amount of certainty is what institutions and policies are required to make an enlarged Community a viable and successful partnership in cooperation and of equitably shared economic gains. But such shared economic gains can be obtained only by giving up a part of economic nationalism. In the words of E.A.G. Robinson,

“The advantages which may potentially accrue from increase of size of market may quite easily be lost if a group of collaborating economies fail to coordinate their policies effectively, operate at less than full capacity, restrict their investments, and thus individually and collectively grow less rapidly. If a group of countries are to gain, they must be prepared from the first to recognize and accept significant losses of individual sovereignty over their economic affairs. This is the price of their gain.”²⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. B.F. Massell, in his *East African Economic Union: An Evaluation and Some Implications for Policy*, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1963, p. 21, introduced the concept of purchasing power density as a measure of the capacity of the market in a country.
2. P. Robson, *Current Problems of Economic Integration: Fiscal Compensation and the Distribution of Benefits in Economic Groupings of Developing Countries* (UN/TD/B/322/rev. 1), New York, 1971, p. 2.
3. United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa. *Planning and Policy Aspects of Economic Cooperation in Eastern Africa* (E/CN. 14/EA/EC/3), 25 September, 1967, p. 2.
4. *The Latin American Common Market*, Mexico City: United Nations, 59.II. 1959; G4, p. 1. Quoted in J.S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), *International Regionalism: Readings*, Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1968, p. 288.
5. United Nations. Economic and Social Council. ECA Working Party on Intra-African Trade. *Elements of a Model Convention for Sub-Regional Common Markets in Africa* (E/CN. 14/WPI/1), 16 July, 1965, p. 11.
6. L.B. Mennes, *Planning Economic Integration Among Developing Countries*, Rotterdam, University Press, 1973, p. 3.
7. F. Kahnert and others, *Economic Integration Among Developing Countries*, Paris (?), Development Center, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1969, p. 44.
8. M. Wionczek (ed.), *Latin American Economic Integration*, New York, Praeger, 1966, p. 14.
9. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *Cooperation for Economic Development of Eastern Africa. Report of the East African Team. Part One: Introduction and Summary of Recommendations*, New York, United Nations, 1971, pp. 30-31.
10. F. Kahnert and others, *op. cit.*, p. 9. (Preface by Andre Philip, President of the OECD Development Center).
11. A. Hazlewood, "Problems of Integration Among African States" in *African Integration and Disintegration* ed. by A. Hazlewood, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 14.
12. East African Community. *The 1972 EAC Study Seminar on Integration and Regional Plan Coordination held in the Kampala International Conference Centre from 6th to 16th June, 1972*, Arusha, Common Market and Economic Affairs Secretariat, October, 1972, pp. 55-61.
13. *Africa Research Bulletin*, Economic Series, 12, 6 (July 31, 1975), p. 3544A; Political Series, 12, 6 (July 15, 1975), p. 3649B.
14. *Africa Research Bulletin*, Economic Series, 12, 6 (July 31, 1975), p. 354C.
15. B.F. Massell, *East African Economic Union: An Evaluation and Some Implications for Policy* Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1963, p. 21.

16. W.A. Hance, *The Geography of Modern Africa*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1975, p. 38.

17. United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Cooperation for Economic Development of Eastern Africa. *Report of the Eastern African Team. Part Four: Cooperation in Industry*, New York, United Nations, 1971, (ST/ECA/140/Part IV), p. 21.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-28.

19. B.F. Massell, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

20. E.A.G. Robinson, *Economic Consequences of the Size of the Nations*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1960, p. XXI.

TABLE I
Some Geographical and Economic Indicators
of Eastern African Territories

	Area (Sq. miles)	Popula- tion (mid- 1972) million	GNP at market price (US \$ millions) 1972	Per capita GNP (US \$) 1972	GNP per unit area ('000 \$ per sq. mile) 1972
Burundi	10,747	3.5	230	70	21.4
Ethiopia	471,800	25.9	2,140	80	4.5
Malawi	45,747	4.7	460	100	10.1
Mozambique	303,070	8.0	2,400	300	8.0
Rwanda	10,169	3.9	250	60	24.6
Somalia	246,300	3.0	240	80	1.0
Sudan	967,500	16.6	2,030	120	2.1
Zaire	905,365	19.1	1,920	100	2.1
Zambia	290,586	4.5	1,730	380	6.0
Kenya	224,961	12.1	2,050	100	9.1
Tanzania	364,943	13.6	1,580	120	4.3
Uganda	91,452	10.5	1,560	150	17.1
Greater Eastern Africa	3,932,640	125.4	16,590	132	4.2

Source : World Bank Atlas 1974. Last column computed.

TABLE II
East African (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) External Trade
(Imports plus Exports) with Neighbouring Territories
(Thousands of U.S. dollars)

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Somali	47	1367	1570	1808	2356	3963	4200	3881
Ethiopia				2964	3320	3850	5098	6566
Sudan	3318	5107	2968	5617	6092	4054	10107	9410
Rwanda	1086	1204	3779	2174	3894	2668	3596	7443
Burundi	3942	4874	3579	4034	4634	4667	4163	4312
Zaire	3424	4549	4205	5267	6780	5879	4615	4016
Zambia	23467	26560	23634	24228	34108	33496	31813	29706
Malawi	1297	925	644	959	857	993	63	
Total	36581	43586	40379	47051	62041	59570	63655	65334

Source : UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1972-73 and unpublished data in UN Statistical Office.

Note : Blank indicates data not available.

TABLE III
General Imports (c.i.f.) and National Exports (f.o.b.) by
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
In Thousands of U.S. Dollars
(1973)

	Kenya		Tanzania		Uganda	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Burundi		1306	59	2803	1	0
Ethiopia	497	4186		142	13	
Malawi				63		
Mozambique	274	495				
Rwanda		3320		276		
Somalia	197	2502	18	834	2	647
Sudan			0	340	34	8106
Zaire	1525	2280	0	733	75	
Zambia	1626	17652	2199	10103	179	54

Source : UN Statistical Office, unpublished data.

Note : Blank indicates data not available.

L.O. Dare

The Patterns of Military Entrenchment in Ghana and Nigeria

The essay examines the evolving pattern of military entrenchment, drawing upon Ghanaian and Nigerian examples. It argues that the increasing self-confidence of the officers and their belief that they can govern better than civilians are responsible for their unwillingness to relinquish power notwithstanding their initial promises to this effect.

In the early sixties when military rule was still viewed with moral reprobation, even within military circles, military-dominated regimes appeared illegitimate. The only acceptable justifications for military dominated governments were that the civilians had failed and the disciplined forces had intervened to prevent national disaster, and that the military would remain in power no longer than was necessary to re-orient the nation back to democratic civilian rule. In fact, legitimacy for the military was sought first in the apology for intervention, attempting to show that the intervention was "reactive" rather than intervention by "design"¹.

The type of defence which this frame of mind produced were evident in the writings of Africa² and Ocran³ in Ghana, and Major Nzeogwu in Nigeria.⁴ Africa began by discussing his commitment to British military and non-political traditions, viewing the 1966 Ghanaian coup as a painful but necessary decision. He stated:

I have always felt it painful to associate myself with a coup to overthrow a constitutional government, however perverted that constitution may be. It was...painful therefore to come to the conclusion that the coup was necessary to save our country and our people.⁵

And he continued :

The aim of the unconstitutional military action we took is to regain this freedom and to create the conditions and atmosphere in which true democracy can thrive. This is our defence.⁶

The Ghanain coup leaders made it clear that they only wanted to liberate the nation from Nkrumah, not to create a permanent military regime and not to change the society. Like most African military regimes, at that time, they promised to stay in power till they could return the country to stable civilian politics. Africa stated his belief in a non-political military, and General Ocran also asserted this philosophy most clearly by writing :

I believe that soldiers should leave politics alone. When they try to run a country in spite of their enthusiasm, they run it badly because they are, right from the beginning, expected to assume the role of policy-makers in a job for which they have had no previous training.⁷

And he continued:

Uniformed men have no political ideology; at any rate, not those in Ghana; and therefore they can hardly plan and maintain any political action. They should never purport to govern; they cannot, because they generally lack the political education, the mentality and, above all, the flexibility of mind and approach to governmental problems.⁸

Not all military men subscribe to this viewpoint which must have been widely shared by the 1966-1969 hierarchy of the Ghanain army, hence it voluntarily relinquished power.⁹ However, eighteen months later another group of officers, much junior, and with radically different ideas on the role of the military intervened and ousted the Busia government in January 1972.

General Ocran again reasserted his belief in a non-political military in 1972 when another military coup occurred.¹⁰

In Nigeria, the Coup leaders of January 1966 were very defensive of their action. Major Nzeogwu the leader, dissociated himself from any thoughts of permanent military rule. He claimed that as soldiers, they had no business in politics but had earmarked certain civilians of proven ability for posts in government while the soldiers

would "stand behind them with our hands on the trigger",¹¹

After the civil war, 1967-1970, the Nigerian military leaders expressed the view that the rightful place of the military was in the *barracks*. Consequently in October 1970, General Gowon reaffirmed that the *goal* of his government was to establish conditions for stable civilian rule and then disengage from politics. Nine-point programme which he pledged to accomplish by 1976 stated this objective unequivocally.

These orientations and pronouncements by military leaders and the belief that officers had no political aspirations led observers like Professor William Gutteridge to comment that the armies of the kind which Africa has inherited lack political ideology or revolutionary zeal, and are convenient agents for suspending political activity in a deteriorating situation even though they are unsuited by their nature for the radical orientation of the state and the effecting of rapid social and economic changes.¹² This statement is no longer true. African armies have become more directly involved in politics.

The pledge to disengage from politics was made by the first generation of Africa's officers who took over political power. The later generations are not as willing to quit as a result of a combination of the following factors:

(a) *The increasing phenomenon of military governments:* In the early sixties, there were very few military dominated regimes in Africa. This number has gradually risen as Kenneth Grundy had illustrated from the two attempted coups of 1961 to sixteen in 1966.¹³ By 1975, twenty-eight of the forty-two independent states of Africa are headed by military officers.¹⁴ Thus, what was considered unnatural and deviant phenomenon before 1960 has now become widespread: Military intervention in Africa has acquired some respectability. One can refer to African governments as a military club, similar to that of Latin America.

(b) *The Erosion of foreign military values.* In the sixties when African countries had just attained political independence, the leaders found it necessary to maintain military ties with the metropolitan countries. Many countries retained foreigners as generals. For the indigenous officers, it was reputable to emulate or appear to

emulate the metropolitan military doctrines, most especially the non-political roles of the armed forces. The influence of the foreign reference group was strong.

The period 1966-70 can be categorized as that in which African armies emerged from their colonial chrysalis. During this period, the Africanization of the armies was completed, the training of officers was diversified, they were exposed to different ideologies and the indigenous political cultures began asserting themselves and affecting military behaviour. Metropolitan military values began having less impact on the officers. And as more and more African military men enter into politics, they developed some comradeship with sympathy for those who stage coups. They no longer view coups with moral indignation but rather as entering into an exclusive club.

(c) *Positive Self-Image of the Officers.* Africa's military men have developed positive and rather exaggerated images of their ability to govern better than civilians. Their utterances portray the conviction that military rule is the only alternative to chaos and political disorder. Hence General Gowon felt confident to say "...military withdrawal would...certainly throw the nation back into confusion"¹⁵ and Brigadier Esuene supported him by saying "it is in the interest of unity and stability of the country-that the handing over of power had to be deferred."¹⁶ Due to this self-image, military officers tend to view intervention in politics, not as a temporary episode but as something permanent. Consequently, they have stopped discussing both the date and the possibility of a return to civilian rule. Instead of the pledge of a temporary and corrective regime of the mid-sixties, present-day military leaders accept direct responsibility for governing and feel they can effect revolutions in their respective societies.

(d) *Foreign Acquiescence in Military Rule.* The outside world has reconciled itself to politicians in military uniform and uniformed presidents are no longer seen as unnatural. Such international understanding gives military leaders some confidence and seeming moral support. Hence, England's Queen Elizabeth was able to host a state visit by General Gowon of Nigeria without public disapproval or opposition.

Apart from these reasons, there are other explanations inherent in the nature of political power which hinder disengagement. Some of these centre around the fact that the benefits of political power are such that no rational person would willingly barter them unless it was for some similar rewards. Hence Claude Welch concluded:

Having tested power, excitement and rewards of political life, officers may be personally reluctant to step aside. Second thoughts and procrastinations about handing over to civilians thus become common phenomena in the history of military dominated governments.¹⁷

Hence it is much easier for the armed forces to seize power than to give it up.¹⁸

Other reasons are the risks of disengagement which Samuel Finer has listed namely:

- (a) The return of opponents at some future date thus jeopardizing personal safety. This may also result from the fear that personal safety and privileges of officers together with social status which they enjoyed while in control of the reins of power would be difficult to maintain under civilian politicians;
- (b) The reversal of the principle by another group; and,
- (c) Further military intervention by junior officers.¹⁹

Given the change in orientation as outlined above, many of the new military rulers have refrained from making promises to disengage and those who earlier had pledged, have gone back on their words with appropriate rationalizations for the decision to stay on.

As the new set of military leaders do not seek legitimacy through a promise of a temporary and corrective regime, they have substituted political ideologies, slogans and symbols. In addition, conscious efforts have been made to institutionalize military rule by getting more and more members of the top military hierarchy involved in the political process. Thus, as the hierarchy of the military becomes more and more politicized, the military organization becomes a part of the institutional structures of the political system, the Supreme Military Council emerging as the highest legislative authority in the land.

It must be emphasized that cases where the military has been able to blend well into the civilian structures are few. Ataturk's Turkey and Nasser's Egypt are good candidates for this blending exception than the rule.

One overt manifestation of the trend in African military leaders towards personal entrenchment in office is that they gradually reduce or completely exclude civilian politicians or commissioners from the governing council while increasing the number of armed forces personnel in them. Concurrently, the military leaders abandon the notion of a short-term, corrective military rule and plan for direct and unlimited stay in politics.

In line with the philosophy of transitory military government, the first military government in Ghana relied upon civilians to perform all political functions; no officers were appointed to government departments, state enterprises and statutory boards.²⁰ Politics to the members of the National Liberation Council as it termed itself, was indeed the giving of correct orders or by merely vetoing the decisions of civilians.²¹ Its members wrongly felt that it was possible to govern by delegation of powers to civilian appointees while military personnel stayed out of day-to-day administration. The danger in this kind of arrangement was that while the military accepted responsibility for the success or failure of its civilian agents, it had no assurance that public affairs would be run the way it wanted. The only way to secure such an assurance was for the military itself to take over administration. This the National Liberation Council failed to do.

For his part, Colonel Acheampong who led the coup of January 1972 saw nothing wrong or immoral in active military participation in politics. He affirmed approvingly :

We had taken over the government of Ghana because we wanted to change the whole order of things and bring new blood into the confused political and economic scene of Ghana. Our aim is to make a fundamental change in the attitudes, tastes and general way of life in this country.²²

In subsequent public pronouncement Acheampong shield away from discussing dates, or, if he would ever return power to civilian

politicians, In his third anniversary broadcast he had commented :

The army came to power with a clear-cut policy of self-reliance aimed at ensuring a viable economy and providing opportunities for the advancement of the people... The government had not gone half-way. It would therefore be premature to set a date for a return to civil rule. Politicians must be patient and wait until the Council was ready to announce its plans for a return to civil rule..... Such an announcement would come only if the Council was satisfied that the measures spelt out in its charter of redemption had been carried out.²³

This represents a marked departure from the non-political role visualized by Ocran and Africa. One can explain this as a reflection of the personality differences between the Ocran and Afrifa generation and Acheampong's. However such an explanation falls short when we examine the Nigerian situation, where the same set of leaders have been in power since July 1966 with remarkable stability in the membership. Initially, the Nigerian military leaders promised a return to their barracks. From time to time, the pledge was forcefully reasserted. Brigadier Esuene's statement was quite representative of this pledge :

As man of honour, we the men of the Nigerian Armed Forces are bound to keep our words that we shall hand over power to the civilians in 1976... Since the armed forces did not assume power by popular demand in the normal democratic spirit of the term, they could not allow such demands, no matter how strong or apparent to away them from their solemn undertakings or detract them from the path of honour.²⁴

The same leaders later went back on their "solemn undertakings" or "path of honour," and have decided to stay indefinitely "until the foundation for political stability." is laid. This was not unexpected. There had been indications of official thinking in this direction since March 16, 1974 when Brigadier Ogbemudia suggested that the army should forget about the promise of abdicating in 1976 since it was delivering the goods. This was subsequently followed in October 1974 by General Gowon's announcement "that 1976 was unrealistic" and that his government would remain in office.

No new date was given for disengagement. Incidentally, the evaluation of government's performance by the citizens appears different from this official argument.

Gowon's decision required justification or rationalization mainly because it involved a radical policy change. The arguments must also be good or else there would develop a credibility gap between the government and the people. Furthermore, the reason for the decision to stay had to be different from the fact that the government would not have completed its Nine-Point Programme which by itself would suggest failure on the part of the government. Understandably, General Gowon gave long explanations :

A large number of well-meaning and responsible Nigerians from all walks of life and from all parts of this country, as well as well-wishers of Nigeria at home and abroad have called attention to the lack of wisdom and danger inherent in adhering to the target date previously announced. Our own assessment of the situation as of now is that it will be utterly irresponsible to leave the nation in the lurch by a precipitate withdrawal which will certainly throw the nation back into confusion. Therefore, the Supreme Military Council after careful deliberations and full consultation with the hierarchy of the Armed Forces and Police have decided that the target date of 1976 is in the circumstance unrealistic and that it would indeed amount to a betrayal of trust to adhere rigidly to that target date.²⁵

The General went further to argue that the decision to remain in politics was taken because the military was convinced that its withdrawal would create chaos. He again stated :

Four years ago when I gave 1976 as the target date for returning the country to normal constitutional government, both myself and the military hierarchy honestly believed that by that date, especially after a civil war for which there had been a great deal of human and material sacrifice and for which we had expected that every Nigerian would have learnt a lesson, there would have developed an atmosphere of sufficient stability. We had thought that genuine demonstration of

moderation and self-control in pursuing sectional ends in the overall interests of the country would have become the second nature of all Nigerians. Regrettably from all the information at our disposal, from the general attitude, utterances and manoeuvres of some individuals and groups and from some publications during the past few months, it is clear that those who aspire to lead the nation on the return to civilian rule have not learnt any lesson from our past experiences.

In spite of existence of a state of emergency which have so far precluded political activity, there have already emerged such a high degree of sectional politicking, intemperate utterances and writings which were deliberately designed to whip up ill-feelings within the country to the benefit of the political aspirations of a few.²⁶

The General indicate what lessons civilians were supposed to have learnt. In any case, his reasons for the decision to stay are anti-disengagement arguments. In all military dominated governments, there are pressures both from civilian and military quarters for either continuation of military rule or complete disengagement. The choice that is eventually made is a combination of factors among which is the political aspiration of the ruling clique.

In the Nigerian case, the military seems to have equated its rule with stability and the civilian politicians with disunity. For as Brigadier U.J. Esuene affirmed, "Nigeria's military rulers will be unable to hand over power to civilians in 1975 because of the inordinate political ambition of some people."²⁷ Whatever other reason might be there has emerged a clear hostility towards political activities and politicians from Nigerian and Ghanaian military leaders. It is claimed by official spokesmen that some elements within the civilian society are attempting to subvert the military regime. Whether this is true or false is difficult to establish. It is, however, probable that such arguments may be escapist ones; the regime dismissing genuine complaints and feedback about the inadequacies of its policies and performance by branding them as motivated by the under cover plan of some people to discredit government. Such has been the official reaction of the Nigerian military to the protests over the Udoji Public Service Review report

and the Government White Paper on it, and also the protests by University students over the continued detention of some educationists. When a government takes such a stand, it relieves itself of the obligation to look into the complaints and, instead, finds repression an acceptable response.²⁸

The decision of the military to stay and govern will lead to certain organizational changes reflecting the relationship between civilian groups and the military. Since the military intends to take a greater control of decision-making, one structural change may be that more military officers will be present in government while the number of civilians will be correspondingly reduced. On the contrary, the military may decide to rule by itself without the aid of civilians, only using the latter for ad-hoc and technical duties as was the case under Colonel Acheampong in Ghana where no civilian commissioners, except the Attorney General, were selected.

The main advantage of the Ghanaian experiment is that the military will not be hindered in its programmes by civilian allies. It will be able, if it so desires, to act decisively like a military organization. In this process, however, the regime should be conscious of the fact that it will sacrifice the advantages of representation and political communication which civilians provide. It must be emphasized that military rule and democracy are incompatible. For a military to say it wants to govern democratically is to confuse itself and issues. By its very nature, military rule is autocratic. However, it is in the interest of the military to encourage communication and dialogue with the citizens. There are numerous agreeable mid-points for this function. The military regime can call for a time-limited debate on certain vital national issues, after which the regime makes firm decision. Such arrangement combines the advantage of debate without the disadvantage of indecision. Furthermore, the regime can tap civilian talents in form of ad-hoc expert task forces to advise on technical issues. Finally, channels of mass participation such as referenda and plebiscites are always available if the regime wishes to use them.

A coalition of civilian politicians and officers as in Nigeria can only function as a stop-gap. In the long run it will lead to political deadlock. The reasons for this are not far fetched. A military-

civilian coalition faces the crisis of identity. Civilian populations will be unable to identify with the regime as one they elected, and the junior officers who may be eager to share in power and the privileges of office will agitate that the regime is not decisive enough to their liking. Tensions are therefore bound to develop, leading to a possible ouster of the military by its own dissident elements,

A military that enters into politics can therefore no longer insulate itself from political pressures, either from civilians agitating for a return to democratic politics far from the ranks of the military. On the one hand such military regimes run the risk of being violently overthrown by its own dissident factions. Stepan has observed that military men are more prone to overthrow military regimes by arguing :

The incentive to overthrow a military government may be increased *because* the military as an institution feels responsible for the performance and success of the government. This added responsibility makes groups within the military more intolerant of slowness in reform, compromise or of corruption than they would in a civilian government to which they could afford to be more indifferent.²⁹

On the other hand, an undiluted military government will most likely become the object of civilian attack while a mixed civilian-military government may be unable to act as decisively as a pure military clique, civilian commissioners do act effectively as channels of communication between civilians and the dry decrees and edicts of the military to which civilian populations are not used. In effect, civilians in military government may slow down the orders of military men but at the same time, they provide vital communication links between the military and the ordinary citizen.

Concluding Observations

There is as yet no fool-proof solution to the problems of internal subversion and coups. Some regimes have been more capable of managing discontent than others. Many coups are precipitated by military discontent and personal aspirations rather than a desire to effect an economic or political breakthrough. Empirical evidence shows that the effect of a coup is often not mere order but simply a different kind of ruling clique and political formula. The problem

of creating political order is not one that can be solved once and for all time. Each generation and each time in history deals with the problem in its own peculiar way. It is therefore preposterous for any group, be it military or civilian to claim to have all time solution or that it would not relinquish political power until the problem of order or stability has been solved.

Perhaps it is a good decision on the part of the military to rule unencumbered by civilians. In that case, the identity of the government is not blurred and in the case of failure the citizens will know who is responsible. In addition, such failure will reduce the present confidence of the officers who feel they are better equipped than civilians to govern. Failure may not reduce the tendency for ill-motivated intervention, but would at least dismiss the claim by some officers in developing societies that only the military organization is capable of effecting rapid socio-economic transformation.

A military regime's claim to govern democratically is a reflection of confused thinking. The army cannot govern by popular debate without acquiring the trappings for which it blamed politicians. A military should either govern like a military, accepting credit or blame for its action or leave politics to the professional politicians. It should govern by itself rather than play the role of king-makers, appointing "acceptable" civilians to office. Officers who take over power must therefore be prepared to justify their action, and must govern directly so that the line of responsibility for success or failure will be easy to trace. The second Ghanaian military regime fits this model whereas the Nigerian military is a rather bulky omnibus appearing to lack both identity and direction.

The Nigerian decision to continue with a coalition of a reduced number of civilians and military officers is difficult to justify. Such a coalition ruled from 1970 to 1974 and as General Gowon himself admitted in his October 1, 1974 broadcast, the experiment failed. Perhaps if the Nigerian military had a brilliant record of achievement it would have been easy for its leaders to adopt the Ataturk model, seeking legitimacy through popular mandate. This has not been the case; hence, the leaders have wisely shied away from founding a popular base like President Nkomo of Zaire.

FOOTNOTES

1. M. Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964, pp. 16 and 85.
2. A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup, 24 February 1966*, Frank Cass, London, 1966.
3. A. K. Ocran, *A Myth is Broken*, Harlow, Longmans, 1969.
4. See R. Luckham, *The Nigerian Military, 1960-1967*, Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 284-285.
5. Afrifa, *op. cit.* p. 39.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
7. *A Myth is Broken*, Longmans, 1968, p. 94.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
9. Advocates of military rule argue that civilian politicians did not have any experience or training in the art of governing before political independence. It is argued that during the colonial era, the indigenes were given no positions of responsibility so that one cannot argue that the politicians are better placed than the military to govern. If anything, the argument goes on, the military officer has had some experience with managing large organizations, the military is perhaps the most modern organization in developing countries, so that the armed forces are better equipped than any other group to govern.
10. General Ocran, *West Africa*, 11th February, 1972, pp. 154-155.
11. Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military, 1960-67*, pp. 284-285
12. William Gutteridge, "Why African Armies Take Power," *Africa Report* October, 1970 pp. 18-21.
13. Kenneth Gruudy, *Conflicting Images of the Military in Africa : East African Publishing House, Kampala, Uganda, 1968*, p. 3.
14. Abstracted from : *Africa, A Handbook*, Daily Times of Nigeria, 1974. This includes both Ethiopia and Chad.
15. General Yakubu Gowon, Broadcast to the Nation, October 1, 1974. Text of broadcast was reprinted in all Nigerian newspapers on October 2, 1974.
16. *Daily Times*, January 5, 1975, p. 4.
17. Claude Welch, *Soldier and State in Africa*, Evanston, North Western University Press, 1970, p. 50.
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22. *West Africa*, May, 19, 1972, p. 609.
23. *Daily Times*, (Lagos) January 15, 1975.
24. Brigadier Esuene, *Daily Times*, Saturday September 8, 1973, p. 2.
25. General Yakubu Gowon, Broadcast to the Nation, October 1, 1974.
26. *Loc. Cit.*
27. *Daily Times*, January 5, 1975, p. 4.
28. See "Gowon Warns Saboteurs". *Daily Times*, Thursday, January 30, 1975, p. 1.
29. A Stepan, *The Military in Politics : Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton University Press, Princeton N. J. 1971, p. 253.

Dr. M.B. Akpan

Economic Development in Liberia & Tanzania —1960—1972

Welfare Economics is controversial since it involves ethical and value judgements.¹ Nevertheless, for this study, the degree of social welfare induced by an economic system will be assessed by the extent to which the resulting social structure is egalitarian. We define an egalitarian society as one which conscientiously minimizes poverty, inequality and unemployment.² For a developing country, this implies that the "benefits" of development like roads, schools, hospitals and housing should accrue to the largest possible segment of the population ; that incomes and wealth should be equitably distributed ; and that the individual should have a fair voice in determining public policies. To what extent do these conditions prevail in Liberia and Tanzania ?

Both republics present striking similarities and contrasts. One similarity crucial to economic development is the preponderance of their rural population, which was 80 percent for Liberia in 1968³ and 94 percent for Tanzania in 1967.⁴ On the other hand, whereas Liberia has vast iron ore and diamond deposits whose exports have largely caused a phenomenal rise in her GDP since the early 1960's, Tanzania has a comparatively less resource endowment.⁵

It is, however, largely contrast not similarity, which dominates the economic objectives and strategies of both countries. The Liberian system is modelled on the free enterprise system of America and closely resembles the "Brazilian Model." Its cornerstones are the "Open Door" and "Unification policies" enunciated by President Tubman in 1944 ; and the "Investment Incentive Code" established in 1966 by the Liberian Government.⁶ These policies have sought to attract foreign investment and, in theory, to provide Liberia's aboriginals with greater participation in Liberia's social,

political and economic life ; and generally to increase output.⁷

Economic and political decisions in Liberia are controlled from Monrovia, the capital city, largely by the Americo-Liberians, the descendants of the American Negroes who settled in Liberia during the nineteenth century and have constituted the ruling oligarchy. Until 1964, the aboriginals were de facto subjects of the Americo-Liberians. They were ruled through a colonial system of indirect rule ; and they were subjected to exploitation and other injustices similar to those practised by Europeans in their colonies in Africa. Political and judicial institutions similar to those in the Americo-Liberian communities have since 1964 been established in the tribal areas in an attempt to mitigate any exploitation and to cushion foreign criticism. Nevertheless, we emphasize the point that economic development particularly to benefit Liberia's tribal population, is a recent phenomenon. The Liberian leaders are yet to be conscientiously committed to implementing it since they fear that any large scale social and economic changes in favour of the natives might diminish their own power and prestige.⁸ One major result of this attitude is the excessive dependence on foreign technical and financial assistance for provision of infrastructure investments like schools, roads, health facilities, electricity, and banks ; and for agricultural and industrial development.⁹

The upshot has been an extreme concentration of activities on primary production for export at "enclaves" of rubber plantations, mining, and manufacturing centers.¹⁰ Although these concerns have employed large numbers of unskilled or semi-skilled native Liberians, and provided them with some schools, housing and clinics,¹¹ they have also repatriated huge profits at will and not re-invested these in development as such. Hence, the Liberian economy is characterized by excessive dualism between a fast growing "modern" sector dominated by foreigners, particularly iron mining firms ; and a largely backward subsistence sector involving the great mass of the native population. Liberia has accordingly been depicted as an example par excellence of "growth without development",¹² since economic growth by itself has not been accompanied by any tangible structural changes.

Tanzania's development on the other hand, is largely patterned after the "Chinese model" of Socialism.¹³ Adopted shortly after

independence in 1961, and elaborated by President Nyerere in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, development policy seeks foremost "the development of people", not things or mere increase in output.¹⁴ A conscientious attempt is made to ensure that the rural population is reached by, and benefits substantially from, the development process.¹⁵ Development strategy emphasizes mass participation in deciding and controlling this process; collective (or public) ownership, particularly through Ujamaa villages, "state farms" and co-operatives; self-help and self-reliance as against excessive dependence on foreign assistance; equality of man and aversion for class distinctions and exploitation based on them.¹⁶

The upshot has been Tanzania's increasing control over her development. Banking, insurance business, milling and import-export were nationalized in February 1967.¹⁷ Subsequently, Tanzania acquired interests in mining, cement, tobacco and sisal products.¹⁸ Moreover, government functionaries are obliged to closely interact with, and be responsive to the rural population and local initiative¹⁹.

Considering the various sectors for both countries for the period 1960-1972 would be enlightening. In Liberia, besides encouragement of production of cash crops like rubber, coffee and cocoa, the principal agricultural policy since the mid 1960's has been "Operation Production" intended particularly to increase the output of rice, the country's staple. Some rudimentary government experimentation with different rice species backed by tribal co-operative unions and foreign technical assistance has been carried out but the results have been meager.²⁰ Besides natural factors like adverse weather, the greatest hindrance to rice cultivation by the native people has perhaps been the excessive extra-legal exactions of money, rice, and forced labour from the native people by Liberian government officials and Liberian rubber planters.²¹ President Tubman's threat to replace or fine tribal chiefs whose people failed to produce some stipulated output of rice illustrates this reliance of Liberian leaders on coercing the native population. The scant attention paid by the Liberian Government until recently to road-building and other means of communication with the hinterland of Liberia indicates the slight concern for the interests of the native population. Even so, areas into which new roads are being built have not infrequently been

abandoned by the inhabitants to be less accessible to exactions by unscrupulous government officials.²²

The persistent backwardness of the Liberian hinterland is one of the major causes of increasing rural-urban migration, which in turn has detracted from rice cultivation. Hence, imports of rice have continued an upward trend : amounting to 53,150.0 long tons valued at \$10.2 million in 1971 as against 48,236.2 long tons valued at \$9.8 million in 1970.²³

The major Liberian agricultural success has been the emergence of independent Liberian rubber planters, thanks largely to the patronage of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, the leading rubber producer, which buys up their rubber and offers technical advice. In 1971, the Liberian planters numbered about 4,000 and accounted for 32 percent of the total rubber output for that year.²⁴ Most of these planters are, however, well-to-do Americo-Liberians who are absentee landlords. Besides working full-time for the Liberian Government, some of them also provide professional and consultant services to foreign companies in Liberia. Moreover, since the Liberian Government claims title to all Liberian land, it has not hesitated to dispossess the native population of their land to grant to foreign and Liberian planters and other concessionaires.²⁵ Since the Liberian planters are interested in keeping wages low, the result has been an increasingly unequal distribution of wealth among the Liberian people and increasing resort to forced recruitment of labour from the rural areas for the Liberian and foreign planters.²⁶ Thus the Liberian Government has severely suppressed workers striking for increased pay.

Tanzania's development policy on the other hand, emphasizes rural development. Admittedly the earlier village settlement schemes were hastily conceived, and handicapped by lack of skilled Tanzanian technical and administrative personnel.²⁷ Accordingly, most of them failed. Nevertheless, the Ujamaa villages and state farms which replaced them in 1967 have won some significant though modest success. These villages are voluntarily formed and have increased from about 350 at the end of 1968 to about 1000 (or 5 percent of Tanzania's population) by the middle of 1970.²⁸ Moreover, although emphasis

is on the production of cash crops like cotton, cashews, tobacco and wheat, food crops like maize and rice have not been neglected.²⁹ Farmers have been encouraged to use fertilizers and tractors. At least the target output for rice has been achieved ; and rice exports actually commenced in 1971.³⁰

Moreover, the Tanzanian Government has taken some steps to minimize inequality of wealth and income. It has taken over title to all land ; and in Zanzibar and Pemba some of this has been re-distributed to previously landless peasants.³¹ Salaries of the higher civil servants and politicians were cut in December 1966, and since then the separation of political and public sector leadership from private business has been enforced. An income and prices policy has been established. Machinery has been set up to ensure that excessive wage increases do not re-distribute income from the poorer rural to the less poor urban communities. And fiscal policy has emphasized new taxes on relatively high income groups and altered the balance of both recurrent and capital expenditure in favour of rural areas.³²

In Liberia the emphasis of "development" on urban and industrial centers particularly Montserrado county (which includes Monrovia and is the "focus" of the Americo-Liberian population) is obvious from available data on secondary schools. Admittedly between 1960 and 1972 the annual growth rates for different levels of education exceeded 10 percent, and many schools were established in the Liberian hinterland. Nevertheless, all the high schools were located at county headquarters, and the rural and native schools were generally of lower quality. This situation has exacerbated the rural-urban migration of youths particularly to Monrovia in search of quality education.³³

Similarly, the Liberian Government has successfully eradicated yaws ; small-pox and yellow-fever campaigns are on the way ; and some clinics and health centers have been established in the Liberian hinterland. Nevertheless, hospitals, doctors, and other medical facilities are heavily concentrated in urban and industrial centres, particularly Monrovia.³⁴ Moreover, the quality of the facilities in the rural areas are as a rule inferior to those in the urban centres.

The poor transportation and communication in the hinterland due to lack of feeder roads compounds the medical problems.³⁵

Indeed outside Monrovia social programmes like adult education and literacy campaigns were also said to be rudimentary. Government budgetary appropriations for them were unsatisfactory, and co-ordination from Monrovia was slight.³⁶

The Liberian Government has since 1972 attempted to tackle its manpower problems by waiving half-tuition cost to students at Liberia's two universities, and providing free tuition attendance at all public secondary schools.³⁷ It remains to uplift the quality of the schools in the country as a whole and in the hinterland in particular, and to end Liberia's patronage system which discriminates in scholarship awards for Liberians studying abroad.

Many of the school and hospital facilities in Tanzania are likewise inadequate but this is due not to the indifference of Tanzanian leaders but to the lack of trained teachers and medical and nursing personnel. Moreover, Tanzania has succeeded to some extent in providing rural areas with water supply, and farmers with the rudiments of adult and political education. She is also boldly tackling the problem of lack of technical personnel by emphasizing science education.³⁸

But, perhaps most revealing are the budget allocations of both countries for development. For Tanzania, an important milestone was the creation during 1967/1968 of the Regional Development Fund to increase the resources available for implementation of projects in the Regions.³⁹ The fund finances small-scale directly productive projects in the Regions, which are organized, designed and implemented at the regional level and would be too small to include in the Central Government Development Budget. The fund thus encourages local initiative.⁴⁰ Moreover, the trend of distribution of expenditure in recent years has been increasing proportions to be allocated to economic services, and to rural areas resulting from the high rate of growth of spending on agriculture and co-operatives, rural roads, and education and health services to rural residents. Correspondingly, the proportions of allocation especially to administration has been decreasing.⁴¹ (Tables I, II).

TABLE I (TANZANIA)
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF EXPENDITURE (Million shillings)

<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>1964/65</i>	<i>1965/66</i>	<i>1966/67</i>	<i>1967/68 Estimate</i>	<i>1967/68 Revised Estimate</i>
Economic Services :					
1. Agriculture, Forestry and Veterinary...	73.56	78.46	98.52	129.79	136.70
2. Mines and Survey ...	14.58	5.42	5.16	17.86	17.86
3. Water Supply Development ...	57.50	70.80	45.53	80.75	80.96
4. Railways ...	—	0.92	—	—	—
5. Aviation and Meteorology ...	3.38	1.50	12.77	13.12	15.84
6. General Economic Services :—					
(a) Fuel and Power	0.68	6.70	—	—	—
(b) Other (including parastatal) ...	43.94	35.64	76.64	59.46	65.83
	193.64	199.44	238.82	301.17	317.19
Community Services :					
7. Roads ...	51.42	68.14	123.10	131.93	145.95
8. Township Development ...	2.46	15.74	11.44	17.48	17.48
	53.88	83.88	134.54	149.41	163.43
Social Services :					
9. Education ...	162.54	170.70	172.60	184.51	184.59
10. Medical ...	54.58	63.16	62.94	86.15	90.08
11. African Urban Housing ...	12.76	17.70	27.59	4.26	4.26
12. Other ...	13.24	29.56	25.44	21.75	21.75
	243.12	281.12	288.57	296.67	300.68
General Services :					
13. Central and Local Administration ...	66.80	80.40	72.78	98.41	101.85
14. Law, Order and Defence ...	151.10	162.48	188.25	200.42	207.43
15. Revenue Control and Collection and Other General Treasury Services ...	6.02	6.20	5.89	7.35	7.35
	223.92	249.08	266.92	312.18	316.63
Unallocable Expenditure :					
16. Public Works ...	58.82	32.40	40.52	61.60	72.56
17. Other General Recurrent Items ...	141.00	149.00	162.16	189.62	194.18
18. Other General non-Recurrent Items ...	100.46	127.04	145.20	109.87	145.01
	300.28	308.44	347.80	361.07	411.75
Total Functional Analysis	1,014.84	1,121.96	1,276.53	1,402.42	1,509.68
Total Adjustments ...	157.78	181.22	156.21	156.94	157.30
Total Expenditure as shown on the Government Accounts ...	857.06	940.74	1,120.32	1,263.48	1,352.38

Source—Treasury.

Much a different picture holds for Liberia. Table III is a breakdown of total expenditure for 1964/1965. It shows that a little over one-third of total expenditure was directly related to economic and social development. National defence on the other hand, consumed 6 percent, whereas General Government (particularly the diplomatic service) took the biggest share of all expenditures.

Quite clearly, in spite of the limitations of the Tanzanian system due largely to lack of trained manpower and finance capital, it is preferable to the Liberian system. It has development as Government's primary objective. It more equitably distributes the benefits of this development and generally promotes egalitarianism in a way the Liberian system does not.

TABLE II (Tanzania)

Percentage breakdown of planned and actual central government development expenditure between rural, urban and national infrastructure (splitting expenditure for which benefits can roughly be apportioned between urban and rural areas e.g. roads, industries etc) :

**Percentage Breakdown of Total Central Government
Development Expenditure**

	1969/74	1969-1970		1970-1971	
	<i>Whole Plan Period</i>	<i>Bud- geted</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Bud- geted</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Rural Impact	56.0	48.8	46.8	48.3	45.5
Urban Impact	33.9	39.6	41.1	40.3	44.3
National Infra- structure	10.1	11.6	12.1	11.4	9.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Percentage Breakdown of Total Central Govt.
Dev. Expenditure Excluding Exp. on Nat. Infrastructure**

	1969/74	1969-1970		1970-1971	
	<i>Whole Plan Period</i>	<i>Bud- geted</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Bud- geted</i>	<i>Esti- mated Actual</i>
Rural Impact	62.1	54.8	53.2	54.5	51.2
Urban Impact	37.9	45.2	46.8	45.5	48.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source : Tanzania : The Economic Survey, 1970-1971, pp. 52-53.

TABLE III (LIBERIA)

FY 1964/65 : Functional Classification of Expenditures
(excluding foreign assistance ; including IMF)

	<i>Amount (\$ '000)</i>	<i>Percent Distribution</i>
1. Economic Development	6,669	15.4
Agriculture	871	
Commerce and Industry	319	
Natural Resources	263	
Communication	1,597	
Roads and Maintenance	2,294	
Development Corporation	1,325	
2. Social Development	8,353	19.3
Education	5,757	
Public Health	2,596	
3. National Defence	2,500	5.7
4. General Government	15,737	36.3
Legislative Services	544	
Administration of Justice	1,463	
Chief Executive	2,889	

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Local Government	670	
Foreign Affairs	4,147	
Treasury Services	1,182	
Information	430	
General Government	4,412	
5. Debt Service	9,636	22.3
6. Unallocated	441	1.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total Expenditures	43,336	100.0%

Source : Treasury Department.

FOOTNOTES

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Multi-National Firms in Africa

Some of the multinational firms have dollar assets much bigger than those of governments in the third world. Several have sales figures which would be higher than national incomes of some smaller European states. Their rates of growth are actually much faster. In 1971, they produced goods outside their country of origin more than the total value of world trade. All multinationals are not American ; there are multinationals from the Western European states too. But certainly the American firms are the largest, and the most powerful in penetrating markets of underdeveloped countries. Sixty per cent of the total of direct international investments come from America. The rest is mainly from Western Europe and Japan. But the multinational corporations pose quite different problems in different countries, depending on the general level of development of the economy. Even in developed European countries multinationals, particularly American multinationals have had trouble with governments over a wide range of issues. The tension between the interests of independent national development and the corporations is naturally much greater in underdeveloped states. This second problem inevitably figures as the central theme in the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies volume on *Multinational Firms in Africa*.

This study is important because the theme is of extreme topical interest for all developing countries, not of Africa alone. And, as happens quite often, its importance is more for the questions it raises, less for the answers that are implied in the argument. Recently the multinationals have attracted quite a lot of attention, not because they constitute qualitatively new economic phenomena, but, because of the deepening structural crisis of world capitalism, there is a concrete possibility of a modification of their previously dominant role. That does not mean of course that their activity is going to

be dramatically reduced overnight. Quite on the contrary it might lead to new articulations of imperialist economic penetration. But recent economic developments like the OPEC moves over oil export demonstrate that it is possible to curb the power of the multinational corporations by combined action. What is at stake in all this is the basic questions of anti-imperialism in the third world, and the question of falling a victim to or resisting neocolonialist solutions to the basic social issues of under-development.

Almost all contributors seem to share a common analytical framework. Though generally conscious of the political side of purely economic questions, they tend to put the question of imperialism in the framework of a centre—periphery model. There is nothing specially wrong about this model, abstractly. It is derived from an empirical understanding of the dominance—hierarchies in the imperialist economic structure. But the message of the models gets distorted when it is generalised to cover the socialist states too. This variant of the model tends to blur the lines of the basic contradictions in the modern world, and equate the socialist and capitalist countries. In this form, it obviously prevents understanding of reality, rather than helping it.

Several contributors suffer from a mistaken dichotomy between the industrialised states of all descriptions on one side of the contradiction and the developing states on the other. Fortunately, there are some correctives to this kind of argument too—in certain other contributions. This of course leads to a certain tension between two methodological paradigms assumed in various papers, and interpretive ambivalence. But the factual and statistical material furnished in the second part of the study will be found quite valuable.

Samir Amin's introductory framework is perhaps the most transparent example of this wrong handling of the centre-periphery model. It oscillates between the obvious and the very problematical. He tries to put the discussion on multinationals in the framework of Marx's theorem of a contradiction between the growing productive forces and what he calls "the persistently narrow nature of production relations" leading to crises. He reminds us about Marx's formulation that capitalism is forced to revolutionize production

continually, though every new phase of expansion involves new contradictions and new phases of "structural crises". Each phase of revolutionization of productive forces corresponds to a certain stage of the geographical expansion of the capitalist system. Coming out of each phase of maladjustment world capitalism finds a new level of balance or rather imbalance, through a new accumulation model. He sees the present difficulties of world capitalism as another structural crisis. Curiously, Amin believes that further evolution of the world economy would tend to drift towards either of two forms of an economic model which he thinks is implicit in Orwell's 1984. These two possible 'equilibrium states' are called models 1984A and 1984B. He admits that this involves a considerably simplified picture of the world, but is convinced that the options of humanity seem to be limited between these two rather repelling alternatives." These two different modalities of 1984 have a common characteristic : that of a simplified world, reduced to the capitalist mode of production. "He says. "In 1984 we can no longer speak of social formations in the sense we did for the past and the present, nor of a world system, since the latter implies a diversity of modes of production". Surely not a very heartwarming prospect, though it is also basically unrealistic. The serious distortion in Amin's world view can be seen from the fact that he does not consider it necessary to distinguish between countries over a very wide range—USSR, Brazil, India, Iran and South Africa. It is not quite surprising that he finds the future prospect of humanity very bleak, since he simply does not understand the qualitative changes in the revolutionary possibilities of the world after the second world war, the emergence of a socialist system, the differentiation among national liberation movements, and the growing strength of anti-imperialist forces. If one counts out the Socialist State system, underrates prospects of socialist transition in Italy and France, discounts Chilian "frontism", and "Nasserian models, one should not be surprised to find the world rather gloomy after these massive deductions.

Norman Girvan tackles a much more concrete problem the pattern of economic nationalist response to the multinational penetration. He notes that suddenly the omnipotent multinationals

seem to be in the defensive, and in the advanced countries they are also talking of a so-called "threat from the Third World." Girvan argues that this does not mean the end of neocolonial dependency, but the start of important and substantive changes in the structure and power relationships in the international economic order. He draws attention to the rather curious dialectic underlying these economic changes : on the one hand, the bargaining position of at least some third world states are improving vis-a-vis the imperialistic countries ; but it leads to greater inequalities among the third world states themselves, and secondly, among the classes in these countries. So though there is some trends of redistribution of economic power as a whole, it is problematic if it is leading to greater equalization or a new kind of equality. "It makes even more anomalous than before the practice of lumping all Third World countries together, and of lumping together all the people of any one Third World country." Girvan concludes "In other words, the category "Third World countries" now contains such wide heterogeneities as to lose its meaning altogether". This of course is a rather absurd stretching of the implications of an empirically valid fact—the gradual differentiation of third world economies, and of classes inside those economies. But it misses the fact that despite this process of differentiation there will be structural similarities. When one is talking of differentiation one is suggesting quantitative rather than qualitative differences. Girvan suggests that the anomalies arising out of this kind of lumping together can be avoided if we break down the unit of analysis, and analyse classes rather than countries. He thinks that the increased revenues from the reallocation of economic power tends to reinforce anti-popular political structures, strengthens a state or bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and, in some cases, even a private capitalist bourgeoisie. On the other side, the rise in oil prices lead to severe strain on the foreign currency reserves of the purchaser countries in the Third World. Because of the inegalitarian internal class structures, the cost of this is shifted to the economically weaker sections of the people. In spite of these changes in relative positions of international economic power, Girvan thinks the power of the multinationals have not been basically limited. Though this leads to greater state revenue, it leaves the

economy 'open' as before, and therefore receptive to the penetration of the corporations in new forms.

Extent and types of direct foreign investments in Africa are studied in the extremely informative paper by Helge Hveem. In some ways it is one of the best contributions to the volume, for the author shows trends over the whole continent, and the overall patterns emerge clearly. Hveem works within the definitional framework of Amin, Stephen Hymer and Hobsbawm, but advances a mass of data about foreign investments in individual economies. He also makes the rather necessary through simple point that the growth of the multinational firm is not something exactly new in politico-economic literature, particularly the marxian literature on this problem. Marx had noted the tendency towards centralization of capital, Lenin had traced the development of monopolies and the alteration of the structure of the bourgeois economy from a primarily competitive to a monopolistic structure, and its related tendencies towards external expansion and export of capital. Hveem points out that the motives outlined in the classics by Hobson and Lenin still hold to a large extent. Two other important analytical points about Hveem's paper are his emphasis on the monopoly over communication that is at the base of the functioning of the multinationals, and his accent on the cumulative hierarchical structure of the world economy. "This law of cumulative hierarchy means," explains Hveem, "that the present structure (and any past or future one) is the result of a process of accumulating control opportunities, where new ways and/or actors of control are superimposed, or superimpose themselves on existing ways and/or actors. The structure becomes a set of control layers, the more recent ones superimposed on the older ones, but without abandoning subordinate layers. This structure is a growing organism, a process of vertical extension of control." Hveem's figures show a rise in African investments in absolute terms, but a fall in relative terms—in the African share of total direct foreign investments. It shows that Japan's figures are just opposite to this ; i.e. Japan has invested relatively more in Africa. The paper shows breakups of country-wise investments—a specially useful indicator of government policies towards foreign capital. Nigeria stands out as the main field of investment in Africa, and Algeria as

the main disinvestor in the continent. This shows unequal dependency between the 'centre' and the different parts of its African periphery. Hveen compares various possible measures of dependency and shows two variants : share of foreign investments in the GNP, and share of monopolies at the national level. Calculations on these lines make it possible to grade countries on a hierarchy in terms of penetration of the economy by foreign investments. Taking 'high penetration' to be above 18 percent (since 18 percent is the average for Africa as a whole), 7 economies are highly penetrated by France, 4 by UK. Hveen points out that these figures show the existence of a modified version of the old colonial policy of spheres of interest. 12 African countries earned 60 percent or more of their total export income from one product in 1965. Social and economic consequences of foreign penetration are—economic dependency, disintegration or disarticulation of the economy, mass poverty and gross inequalities between classes. This gives us quite a complete and typical picture of the effects of neocolonial penetration not only in Africa but everywhere else in the third world and incidentally a very good counterpoint to the neocolonialist propaganda that satellite industrialization is a rare phenomenon that is beneficial to both the neocolonial and the neocolonised states.

R.H. Green's contribution is a sort of corrective to the rather distorted handling of the centre-periphery relations model of some of the other papers. Green demonstrates the underlying Eurocentric assumptions of much of even the radical critique of multinationals that is produced in Europe. He finds in them "an intellectually neocolonialist approach, however anticapitalist or paternalistically "pro-African" it may be. "It is an extremely significant point, since sometimes there is a remarkable deep-level affinity of assumptions between the conservative and apparently very left positions on problems facing the excolonial countries. Green reminds analysts that African-MNC relations are not zero-sum games—a very justified rebuke. The most important element that Green brings into the discussion is a dynamic perspective, a reminder that these economies were colonial just a few years back and naturally have to take up transitional strategies. He also stresses the fact that in a neocolonial situation the interests of a narrow privileged elite will

tend to coincide with the interests of the multinationals and imperialism. It is pointless to talk of a mass-based strategy of the African countries without taking into account the domestic power structures. A nationalistic bourgeois development is not logically impossible, he feels, but given the weakness of the position of the capitalist class, hardly practicable. In his opinion, the internal character of the elite has determined the differences between, say, Kenya's handling of the multi-national problem and Tanzania's. Green also sees in the present crisis the beginnings of a refashioning of the international economic order. He expects that the MNCs will alter the centre periphery relations and strengthen what he calls the middle class of nations : a chosen group of regional subcentres, propelling them towards a lumpenised capitalist development.

The collection contains a number of informative empirical studies on individual states. Bondestam studies the growth of the modern sector of the Ethiopian economy. It is followed by J.J. Jorgensen's paper on MNCs and the problems of indigenization of Kenya's economy in course of which he quotes a director of a foreign firm saying,

"Let us be frank. Kenya's economy is run 6,000 Europeans, and we are fortunate to have an African government content to leave it that way."

Jorgensen's critique of Kenyan indigenization is instructive. Indigenization has not led to production for domestic needs, use of indigenous technology or reorientation towards the needs of indigenous patterns of consumption. Through a detailed analysis of the agricultural, industrial and trading sectors, he comes to the conclusion that the process of political decolonization has led to indigenization of ownership of units of production in agriculture and commercial distribution, but much less in the manufacturing sector. The structure of the economy remains basically unaltered, still being oriented to foreign countries, basically thorough control of strategic sectors by the multinationals.

Tanzanian policies, studies by Neerso, reflect a different outlook. Tanzania decided to control foreign investments through exercising the control over the "commanding height" of the

economy by its "parastatals". It has been able to administer a strong dose of control to whatever foreign investment comes in. This had led to some disincentive to foreign private investment, since they always face the chance of nationalisation. But that has not prevented foreign capital from coming in. Initiative for investment decisions, Neerso says, has gradually shifted from the foreign companies to the parastatals. Controls over repatriation of profits, taxes on incomes, and other government regulations make it difficult for foreign investors in Tanzania to play the traditional role of colonial exploiters in the national economy. 'The Tanzanian government is well aware that this act may deter foreign investors from investing in Tanzania, but it considers this act necessary for government control of the economy', Neerso says about the 1972 Specified Companies Act. "Its basic principle is that if foreign investors cannot adapt themselves to the regulation considered necessary by Tanzania, she is better off without their investments. Tanzania is not making any effort to create a "favourable foreign investment climate". On the contrary, she is determined to make foreign investors comply with her aspirations; and if they are not willing to do this, she is determined to achieve development without their cooperation."

Two studies in the volume are on Nigeria, the country that is the most generous "host country" for multinational investments of foreign capital. O.O. Soley's study deals with the economy as a whole. I. Nzimiro's tackle two related questions of the penetration of the economy by the two largest multinationals operating in Nigeria—the United African Company and Shell BP—and an extremely interesting study of the structure and behaviour of classes in Nigerian society. Particularly interesting are the interweaves of the processes of political, social and economic backwardness that are brought out by Nzimiro's analysis. In the last three chapters in this section Tetteh A. Kofi analyses the problems of cocoa producing countries in their relation to MNCs; Biplab Dasgupta discusses the role of the international oil firms and particularly their dealings with African oil producing states, and M.K.K. Kabala Kabunda studies the careful installation of externally oriented economic structures in Zaire by the Unilever-Zaire group. The studies by

Kofi and Dasgupta fall in a slightly separate category, for they are studies of particular products. Kabunda's study of Zaire shows the same tendencies in an intensified form—multinationals distorting the growth process of a developing society and perpetuating backwardness by installing structures of backward and dependent capitalism.

Alternative strategies to the ones suggested and imposed by the multinationals are suggested in the papers by C.Y. Thomas and G. Massiah. In a separate study John Carlsen compares different modes of technology transfer. The argument points out that objective possibilities for accumulation do exist in these countries, but the major problem is to channelise these resources towards national rather than imperialist goals. Carlsen feels that developing countries can successfully use alternative sources of technology. Massiah argues that all other solutions are unacceptable to the exploited strata of the people except the building of socialism—a fine theoretical proposition, but bound to be ineffective if its stages and complexities are not clearly specified. He stresses that the consistency of a strategy for national independence will be determined by the anti-imperialist content of policies of the governments of developing societies.

Apart from the purely economic discussion of the trends of multinational penetration in Africa the volume poses some significant problems. How does one look at the multinational phenomenon? Is it entirely new, or in spite of being new in a specific sense, is it an old established trend? In terms of what historical processes should one look at the multinationals? What are the links between the multinationals' economic manoeuvres and imperialistic political strategy in the third world? How can countries of the third world resist the multinationals' power? And, finally, how does the struggle of the third world countries for economic independence relate to the other revolutionary processes in the world? These are questions facing all countries of the third world, not merely Africa.

Imperialism has proved itself to be an extremely flexible international system of domination. Political control of the colonies by capitalist imperialist powers started being challenged at the turn

of the century in almost all colonised areas. The first response of the colonial powers of this was characteristic. Overt use of naked power, it was believed at one time, would keep the colonial movements under control. Barring a few exceptions therefore the nationalistic challenge as it grew stronger intensified colonial repression of these countries. After the Second World War, the old international politico-economic structure was radically altered. The growth of a system of socialist states in eastern Europe facilitated the break up of the old colonial empires. But the process of gaining political independence does not guarantee a decrease in the dependence on the imperialist state, and their economies. Imperialism is primarily an economic phenomenon. When political independence of the former colonies became inevitable, imperialist states had to reconcile themselves to it, however reluctantly; but at the same time they tried to retain the old domination of these economies by a new structure of dominance and inequality in which the old type of political control would not be essential. World capitalism showed itself to be a more flexible structure than simple-minded nationalists had believed. Post-war experience has shown that it was quite possible to lose independence once again, though in a subtler way than before. Neocolonial domination retains most of the underlying structures of colonial dominance and dependency. It prevents basic industrialisation; it obstructs the process of gearing the economic production apparatus to domestic needs; it retains all the previous trade disadvantages; it tries to force developing countries to content themselves to be suppliers of raw materials and recipients of manufactured goods. These are not new inequalities. But these inequalities are reproduced in a new form and on constantly new levels. Neocolonialism therefore tries to create a situation in which imperialist countries will have the best of both worlds. They will still continue to drain away the surplus and put it to their own use; but they would avoid the odium of barefaced colonialism. Of course, the shape of development of a country is not determined by the terms of imperialist strategy alone. It is determined by a dialectic of the constraints of the international structure and the relation of social forces inside a particular country. Since previous capitalist development is usually quite low, it leaves

only two broad options. Attempts to build capitalism in excolonial societies involve two great errors. The first is the mistake of believing that imperialism is a thing of the past, and overlooking the structures of neocolonialism which are equally effective in exploiting the third world. The second is the utopian error of assuming that it is possible for third world countries eventually to grow into capitalist countries of the west European sort. That involves overlooking that imperialism cannot produce 'high capitalism' at both ends. High capitalism can grow in only one, and, as a necessary price for this, it necessarily produces dependent capitalist growth at the other end. So this, and not a classical type of capitalist growth, is one possibility. The other alternative is to move beyond a capitalist social organisation.

Multinational corporations play a significant role in the global imperialist economic and political strategy. Imperialism has been able to create a structure of graded dependency. Dependency ranges from the political imposition of a purely puppet regime, though control of the military and the vital industrial sector, to subtler penetration through collaborations of indigenous capital with multinationals. Events in Chile have shown that the multinationals might engage in very serious political activity to destabilise a government that does not fall in line with imperialist expectations. Business is not always their only business. Even through gradual penetration multinationals might try to take a country's economy towards dependency along a gradualist route.

A certain novelty of the multinational phenomenon cannot be denied. They represent yet another rung of organization of capitalist enterprises. They are enormously powerful, and enjoy greater manoeuvrability because of their relative independence from even governmental control. They take the rationalisation of production and exploitation of resources much further. They have increased efficiency, and mastered the technological revolution. But they replicate, on a new level, the structures of inequality in the world capitalist economic system. But these are after all not new tendencies. Marx had noted the trend towards concentration of capital. Lenin had more specifically analysed the combination of

firms and the emergence of cartels and monopolies. Marxian literature also analysed the growth of various forms of state-monopoly capitalism. Certainly the specific forms of this further development of the same tendency were not foreseen. But the multinational phenomenon basically extends the same internal logic of the capitalist structure.

Politically, if one does not make Amin's deductions from the revolutionary forces, the picture is not entirely bleak. Trade unions have also developed transnational links—a rather interesting secondary effect of multinational corporations that was not foreseen. Most significantly, third world states have found it possible to combine against previously all-powerful companies and at times even imposed their terms on them. This is not to say that the multinationals are no longer a force. But it would be wrong to underestimate the possibilities of resistance to forms of neocolonialist penetration, as some papers in the collection unfortunately do.

Processes of liberation do not exist in isolation. They do not move without reference to each other. Most often, by their common activity the entire structure of world society changes. They all gain by it. It is not always an exactly proportional, absolutely calculable gain. Further, it is not a totally gradualist process. Its movement is internally uneven and dialectical. But the success in the fight against imperialism is produced by a combination of all these forces. The growth of the socialist states, the growth of anti-capitalist movements in the advanced capitalist countries themselves are the main processes aiding the anti-imperialist strategy of the third world states. By mobilization of internal resources, by seeking alternative sources of technology in the socialist countries, and particularly by changes in the internal social structure in the direction of more equality, it is quite possible to resist multinational domination.

It is a seriously vitiated leftism that does not see the chances of liberation, but only the inevitable prospect of constant renewal of structures of enslavement. But if one does not see any difference between the imperialist states and the socialist states, if one is allergic to communist parties, and intellectually contemptuous about experiments in the third world, one is bound to be tormented by the

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gloomy visions of 1984. One arrives there by a method of simple reproduction of a simple political error. With other assumptions one can see a strong possibility of increasing anti-imperialist assertion. Because the multinationals are powerful, but less than the logic of history.

Multinational Firms in Africa. Ed. Carl Widsland — the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1975. pp. 425.

Busari Adebisi

Nigeria's Relations with South Africa— 1960-1975

'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and in the islands of the sea.'

—W.E.B. Dubois, *Souls of Black Folk*, 1903

This century is unique as one in which race and the colour of the skin have had tremendous impact on the mode and mood of relations among nations. The trend may stretch far into the twenty-first century unless racist ideology is abandoned in this century. The seed of the phenomenon in interstate relations lies deep in the nineteenth century when the imperialist powers reigned supreme and in their predatory adventures trampled upon the dignity of the coloured nations. The confrontation between the black and white races in Africa assumed the worst forms of violence yet known to mankind—pillage, torture, slavery, murder and war. When the 'civilising mission' was completed its agonising experience left a pent up resentment in the coloured nations against the imperialists. This resentment created by the colonial situation has been marvelously absorbed by the ex-victims of colonialism. Their political leaders now join in running the current world order witho t bitterness. But they seem determined that the old superior-inferior illusion of the white race must stop. The moral standard set by the United Nations through its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Declaration on the Gránting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the International Covenants on Human Rights present good argument against pre-war social relationship between the white and the coloured nations. Vernon Mckay once observed that "in their UN battles against aprtheid, Africans and Asians...

place a higher priority on the human rights provision of the Charter than they do on the preservation of peace.”¹ McKay, however, failed to realise that in Africa and Asia the white men’s direct and structural violence constitutes the greatest threat to world peace.

In the 1950’s the widespread sentiment to put a final end to white domination culminated in the formation of non-aligned bloc of coloured nations as a reaction to the cold war and imperialism. The first conference of non-aligned nations at Bandung in 1955, was a gathering of all independent non-white nations of Asia and Africa. The sponsoring states excluded Sweden and Switzerland, the white traditional neutrals,² while freedom fighters in South Africa and Portuguese colonies were invited to the conference. The speech of the Carlos Romula of the Philippines at the conference underlined the *raison d’être* of the parley. He said :

“I think that over the generations the deepest source of our confidence in ourselves had to come from the deeply rooted knowledge that the white man was wrong, that in proclaiming the superiority of his race, qua race, he stamped himself with his own weakness and confirmed all the rest of us in our dogged conviction that we could and would reassert ourselves as men.”

As the first step towards racial reassertion the conference

“reaffirmed the determination of Asian and African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries ; and pledged to use its full moral influence to guard against the danger of falling victims to the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it.”

Thus it became obvious that their strategy was anti-racism—“recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of nations large and small”,⁵ and not anti-racist racism.

A successful anti-racist crusade must go by the way of anti-colonialism because the two phenomena go hand in hand. In its function, racism is “an invented psychological justification invoking physical and even cultural traits as ordained and immutable, to camouflage exploitation and oppression by a class or ethnic group who impose their domination on other classes or ethnic groups.”⁶

Colonialism is the art of exploitation and emasculation of man and the pillage of his resources. Racism provides the smoke screen under which colonialism can proceed ; they are two sides of a single coin. The insistence of the new sovereign independent black, brown and yellow nations "that all forms of colonialism must be eradicated"⁷ emanates from an anti-racist ideology which they all share through historical experience.

The psychological by-product of the imposed white rule over non-white peoples manifested itself in the form of racial solidarity of blacks at the beginning of this century. The Pan-African Movement which was the institutionalisation of this unique racial solidarity gathered strength in the U.S.A., thanks to the pattern of the whites' 'civilising mission' in Africa which, according to James Baldwin, was "to cover the nakedness of the native, to hurry him into the arms of Jesus and thence into slavery."⁸ The attitude of the leaders of the Pan-African Movement to racial bigotry was a clear indication of the fact that race relations and decolonisation would rate highly as foreign policy determinants of future African states.

Little wonder that individual African states declared a firm stand against these twin evils directly after independence. The OAU which incorporates the spirit and principles of the early pan-African Movement is held together by common determination to eradicate "all forms of colonialism from Africa."⁹ Thus pan-African nationalism, declared opposition to the remaining vestiges of colonialism, apartheid and racism in Africa south of Zambesi. But the white redoubt in this region is determined to maintain white supremacy or baaskap. In the face of the apparent powerlessness of African states vis-a-vis white intransigence in the South, the choice of modus operandi presents a formidable problem.

Over the years the following types of effort have evolved :

- (1) Actions stipulated under Chapter 6 of United Nations Charter.
- (2) Actions under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, mainly some of the sanctions stipulated in the provisions of Article 41.
- (3) African regional non-violent actions—continental isolation etc.

- (4) Political, material and moral support for the freedom fighters through the OAU Liberation Committee.

In this article an attempt will be made to analyse the reaction of Nigeria to apartheid as a racist ideology. An assessment will be made of Nigeria's contribution to the relative success of the methods enumerated above.

The period of this study—1960 to 1975, will be subdivided into three parts. The first will deal with the relations of the country with South Africa from Independence to the end of civilian government in 1966, the second part will handle the relations of Gowon's government with South Africa and the third will assess the development in Nigerian—South African relations since the change of administration on the 29th August, 1975.

Nigeria and South Africa 1960-1966

Shortly before Nigeria became independent in 1960, two burning issues loomed large on the international horizon. The first was the issue of French nuclear blasts in the Sahara despite Nigeria's serious objections expressed by two different despatches to the U.K.¹⁰ The second, and the more seriously viewed, was the Sharpeville massacre in which sixty-nine peacefully demonstrating Africans were shot down by white South African Police. These two events galvanised articulate Nigerian public opinion against a perceived white conspiracy determined to wipe out the black race. The fear of such conspiracy—"atomic weapons from the North, brutalities from the South," was aptly put by Akwivu, member for Orlu South East in the Federal Parliament. He said :

"It is rather ominous that at a time the South African Government is making it abundantly clear that she has committed herself to a policy of the utter destruction of the African people, that the French, regardless of very strong world public opinion, insisted on testing their bombs in the Sahara. One can readily see, some amount of understanding to make it impossible for us to continue to exist..."¹¹

Although a comprehensive foreign policy statement was not to come until 20 August 1960, members of Opposition as well as radical NCNC back-benchers insisted on an official statement and clarification

on the nature of Nigeria's future African policy with particular reference to pan-Africanism and decolonisation. From the debate that followed a private member's motion urging "the Government to take appropriate steps to ban the importation of South African goods into the country,"¹² one could say that the majority of the Parliament members had a clear idea as to the role which the country should play in the liberation of Africa. According to the member, "God made us all equal and Nigeria by her size and position on the continent of Africa should not and must not move unconcerned while our brothers are being maltreated..."¹³ Another member (Mr. Okafor, Owerri West) suggested that the Government should enact a law making it possible for all white South African resident in Nigeria to be arrested.¹⁴ Mr. Akinyemi (Ilesha Rural) incurred the wrath of the Prime Minister by making it known that White South Africans in fact held "high executive posts in our Public Service."¹⁵

Although the Government supported in principle the motion on the boycott of South African goods, and the condemnation of the racist regime in South Africa, it was obvious, from its contribution to the debate, that it did not share equally the concern of the Opposition and Government back-benchers. For instance, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Zana Bukar Dipcharima, saw the command of technology as the only source of human dignity. Therefore, Nigeria should take care of technology first; "first thing first".¹⁶ The Prime Minister's contribution to the discussion was in defence of the British Prime Minister who came under fierce attack in the House for Britain's abstention from voting in the Security Council over the condemnation of South Africa for the Sharpeville massacre. The Prime Minister sought to convince the Parliament that Britain abstained from voting "entirely on a technical matter."¹⁷ The House was, however, not informed as to what the technical matter was. The truth was that the UN through the Resolution on the Sharpeville Massacre, paragraph 2, declared, for the first time, the South African situation as one "likely to endanger international peace and security." The implication of this is that the racist regime could then be made to feel the full weight of the sanctions under articles 41 and 42 of the UN-charter.

For the Opposition and enlightened Government back-benchers like Dr. Dalu Ezera, Mr. N. E. Elenwa, Mr. Akiwu and Mr. Okafor,

the most agonising moment came when in form of a resolution the Government suggested "that this House calls on the Government to send a message of goodwill through the proper channel to the Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of Great Britain for his tour of Africa and for his statement against the attitude of the Government of South Africa towards the race problems of that country."¹⁸ This was the first contradiction in Nigeria's attitude towards South Africa. The source of this initial confusion could be traced to the firm belief of the Government in the infallibility of Britain in all matters and particularly to the gaulibility of Balewa's administration.

It is remarkable that the government failed to implement the resolution on the boycott of South African goods. In 1959 Nigeria imported goods to the tune of 1,006,938 pounds sterling from South Africa. She exported 216,170 pounds sterling worth of goods and re-exports from Nigeria were worth 49,506 pounds sterling.¹⁹ Despite the boycott resolution passed on 5 April, 1960, Nigeria increased her imports from South Africa to 1,018,55 pounds²⁰ while domestic exports went down to 113,309 pounds and re-exports also decreased to 7,970 pounds. From 1960 trade figures, one gains the impression that the ban was on Nigerian goods in South Africa.

Nigeria became independent in a domestic milieu that was race conscious despite lack of settler experience. The brutality with which apartheid was identified and the indignity suffered by Africans under the system made for perfect agreement among the main political parties on a militant and dynamic policy against South Africa. The leadership role which Nigeria was to play in Africa, was conceived by most of the members of Parliament in terms of militant anti-colonialist policy. Ghana, had already set a pace which had to be equalled and surpassed if the leadership role was to be actualised. For example after, returning from All African Peoples' Conference held in Accra, to which all Nigerian main political parties (the AG, NPC and the NCNC) sent delegations, parliamentarians began to make more militant demands from the government. On 19th April 1960, Akwivu proposed the creation of a Ministry of Pan-African Affairs as a clearing-house for information about

Africa.²¹ In supporting the motion Dr. Kalu Ezera took the opportunity to deliver a short lecture on pan-Africanism. He said :

“Pan-Africanism is an idea—force that seeks the general liberation of all African peoples....also to unite all African peoples under a single state...It is simply to liberate Africa from the trammels of racial bigotry, political and economic subjugation and free all Africans from imperialism both black and white.”²²

As far as Ezera was concerned the South African government was a danger to Nigeria's security. He alleged that he had information about an impending South African attack on Nigeria scheduled for early 1961.²³ Parliamentarians constantly plugged “African personality” into their speeches, a phrase which the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, “citizen of the world”²⁴ found indecent. To either “African personality” or “nigerian personality” he preferred “human personality” because “the Africans I regard as human beings, like any other race in the world, and when I speak of ‘a personality’ for the African I speak of a human personality, and whatever we project, we in Nigeria are to project a human personality.”²⁵

In sum, a few months before independence, the Prime Minister displayed an attitude that lacked any special commitment to anti-racist ideology whereas the prevailing mood in the Parliament was clearly in favour of a well thought out and firm stand on the issue of institutionalised racism wherever it occurred. Certainly, the Prime Minister had a wonderful opportunity of gaining the support of all parties represented in the parliament and that of pressure groups by adopting a militant posture in its relations with South Africa. The issue involved was in no way divisive ; it was white oppression. It lacked the other ideological controversy over the choice between pro-Western or pro-Eastern policy. For a multi-ethnic but black society like Nigeria, a focus on white minority oppression could serve as an instrument of fostering national solidarity. Nkrumah's Ghana did this successfully. The Prime Minister was simply not conscious of the implication and the ramifications of South Africa's racist ideology. To this extent he could not strategise against it. A

greater short-coming of his was the refusal to seek the advice of his fellow parliamentarians on foreign policy. John Mckintosh observed that "within the Government, foreign policy was originally formulated almost entirely by the Prime Minister. There has been no Cabinet Committee on this subject and the Cabinet appears to have been told rather than consulted on major points."²⁶ There was, however, no doubt about the Prime Minister's heavy reliance on civil servants.

International environment was favourable to a militant policy towards racist South Africa on the eve of Nigeria's independence. The five-point resolution adopted by UN Security Council after the Sharpeville Massacre supports this view.²⁷

In all the African conferences held between 1958 and 1960, separate resolutions, couched in no equivocal terms, were adopted on the issue of apartheid in South Africa. Everywhere the racial policy of the Nationalist Government was frowned upon as immoral. The world, and more especially Africa, awaited the arrival of Nigeria, the greatest African nation to lend its full weight to the crusade against apartheid.

The foreign policy statement of the Prime Minister who until July 1961 also held the portfolio of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations (and got it back in 1964) came on August 20, 1960, only to confirm all he had been saying in bits. Functional cooperation was to him the only effective way of bringing about African unity. African political boundaries, which he recognised as artificially created, were to remain unchanged "until such a time as the people concerned decide of their own free will to change them or merge into one unit." An All-Nigeria Peoples' Conference resolution recommending that Nigeria should accept Pan-Africanism positively and "accept in principle the idea of a Political Union of African states on constitutional basis"²⁸ remained unheeded throughout Balewa's period of administration. He however mentioned his Government's determination to "do everything in our power to obtain the observance everywhere of...human rights, in particular, freedom from racial or religious discrimination."

In the statement no mention was made of decolonisation of dependent African territories let alone imperialism ;—a word which

the Prime Minister sparingly used throughout his tenure of office. Apartheid in South Africa which generated so much heat in Nigerian Parliament found no place. It may (however) be implied in his statement on human rights and racial discrimination. He had the opportunity to clear himself on these points during the debate on his foreign policy statement on 24 and 25 November 1960 after Chief Anthony Enahoro, Opposition foreign affairs spokesman, had identified "its failure to advance an aggressive anti-imperialist platform" as the "first glaring weakness" of Balewa's foreign policy. The parliament was informed by the Prime Minister that, "it is our policy to fight for the liberation of all states in Africa which are still under colonial rule." A year later, Jaja Wackuku, then the foreign minister, explained that Nigeria regarded South Africa as a country yet to be liberated from colonial rule. But the Prime Minister did not wish "to embarrass my colleagues in the Commonwealth" and therefore avoided discussions on apartheid. He also refrained from withdrawing the invitation which he had earlier extended to Dr. Verwoerd to attend Nigerian Independence celebrations for the same reason.

It was in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in March 1961 that the Prime Minister made his debut in an international conference as the leader of an independent and sovereign state. The main issue at the conference was South Africa's re-admission into the club after the country's adoption of Republican constitution. The Prime Minister went to the conference determined to oppose South Africa's apartheid policy. Although many people credit South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth almost exclusively to Sir Abubakar's opposition,²⁹ his statement on the issue showed his concern for the Commonwealth more than anything else. He said :

We Nigerians attach great importance to the Commonwealth which embraces people of all races, colour and creed. This being so it is incumbent upon every member nation to respect fundamental human rights or equality of individuals irrespective of race or colour of skin. The best course, therefore, for any member who feels she cannot accept this basic principle is to quit the club. South Africa's exit from the Commonwealth

will save this great family of nations embarrassment. I consider it is a blessing in disguise. Rather than disintegrate, the Commonwealth without South Africa will continue to grow from strength to strength.³⁰

The warm welcome he received on arrival in Nigeria for his "masterpiece of statesmanship"³¹ was an indication of what articulate Nigerian opinion wanted from their Prime Minister.

What impact did non-membership of South Africa in the Commonwealth have on South Africa? Nigeria's Prime Minister himself correctly answered the question: "The fact that South Africa is out of the Commonwealth does not solve the problem".³²

The fact was that the changing racial composition of the club had greatly diminished its value among South African political class. Hob-nobbing with "Kaffirs" as equal partners did not go down well with true believers in the ideology of apartheid. Beyond this, the kind of heart-to-heart talk among white members of the club, especially on defence matters, could no more continue before avowed enemies of South Africa. As far back as 1955, the organ of the ruling Nationalist Party, "Die Burger", wrote :

"Open-hearted and fruitful exchanges of ideas have already become impossible on many matters. For example, we believe that military and African affairs cannot with advantages be... discussed in the presence of India. A common ground diminishes in future, so the Commonwealth conference will more and more become a forum for platitudes while the real relations between Commonwealth states will be maintained through other channels...The meaning of South Africa's Commonwealth membership is in our relations with individual... members rather than with the whole wide heterogenous circle."³³

So far as Britain was concerned it was 'business as usual' with South Africa despite its withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Immediately after the conference a spokesman of Board of Trade announced that "there is nothing to prevent the situation staying exactly as it was so far as trade is concerned."³⁴ The Commonwealth Preference was kept intact. Ironically Nigeria also continued

to trade with South Africa despite the "heroic" performance of her Prime Minister at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. She imported South African goods to the tune of 94,898 pounds sterling and exported primary products worth 17,500 pounds sterling to South Africa, while re-exports were worth 658 pounds sterling. So in effect the exit of South Africa from the Commonwealth had very little impact on South African trade figures since Nigeria and other Commonwealth members maintained their former trade relations with her.

As a follow-up from her March performance, however, Nigeria terminated all the privileges of Commonwealth membership which South Africans enjoyed in Nigeria before the forced withdrawal of the country from the Commonwealth—"all South African nationals will henceforth be treated as foreigners."³⁵

Nigeria continued her campaign for South Africa's isolation at the International Labour Organisation in June, 1961. Nigeria's Labour Minister, Mr. J. M. Johnson, moved a resolution calling on the I.L.O. to expel South Africa on the ground that the practice of apartheid constituted a flagrant violation of both the letter and the spirit of I.L.O. Constitution. With 163 vote to 0, and 89 abstentions, the motion was carried. Abstainers were mainly government and employer delegates from U.S., Western Europe, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.³⁶ In the same manner Nigeria favoured the expulsion of South Africa and Portugal from the UN Economic Commission for Africa in 1963.

At the UN itself Nigeria's opposition to South Africa's apartheid policy was fierce. Somewhat annoyed that the Parliament and the Nigerian Press did not appreciate Government's effort in the world body. Jaja Wachuku described how his speech in the General Assembly of the UN persuaded the Western Powers to support a "strongly worded" Indian resolution against South Africa.³⁷

Nigeria's effort to make South Africa abandon her apartheid policy by isolating her was a change of position from Balewa's pre-independence stance. At that time Balewa announced his willingness to exchange ambassadors with South Africa if asked and even to visit the country if invited, in order to effect a change in South

Africa's apartheid policy.³⁸ But neither a request for the exchange of ambassadors nor an invitation to visit the country came from South Africa. The Nationalist Government was then in no mood to talk to "Kaffirs". In effect, Nigeria was one of the first African states to propose a sort of dialogue with South Africa. How Balewa would have behaved in 1971 when the Nationalist Government, in its bid for northward political and economic thrust, tried to sell the ideal of a dialogue among African states is open to question.

Aside from diplomatic, economic and political isolation of South Africa, the OAU committed itself to the liberation of that country by aiding African freedom fighters. At the founding of the organisation, a percentage of the annual budget of each member-state was to be donated into the Special Fund from which its Liberation Committee was to finance its activities. By implication, the OAU accepted the use of force as a means of fighting apartheid. Therefore it is obligatory for all member-states of the OAU to support the activities of recognised freedom fighters through the Liberation Committee. Nigeria's role during Balewa's era as a member of the Committee is little known since the activities and records of the Committee are kept secret. But her attitude to the Committee activities can be assessed in the light of her general attitude to decolonisation per se, and to revolutionary violence as an instrument for decolonisation in Southern Africa.

There was little doubt that Balewa was committed to the "liberation of every inch of African territory". In verbal battles against colonialism he was as relentless as Ghana. It was on the question of timing that both Balewa's Nigeria and Nkrumah's Ghana parted ways. While in 1960 Ghana and other militant African states, in collaboration with the Asian states, got the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution to the effect that lack of political, social and economic progress should not constitute obstacle to immediate decolonisation, Nigeria's Jaja Wachuku set the target date of the end of colonialism at 1970.³⁹ The logic of Nigeria's proposal was that by 1970 the subject peoples of Africa shall have been "ripe" for independence. This is a naive view because it assumes that colonialism is benevolent to the colonised and therefore the longer they remain under colonial tutelage the more the benefit

in terms of political maturity and economic progress and consequently in terms of post independence political stability.

Nigeria did not recognise revolutionary violence as a legitimate weapon in liberation struggle. Rather, she preferred to persuade the colonial powers to voluntarily liberate their colonies. Only a few members of Nigerian Parliament believed Jaja Wachuku when he told the House that his Government was rendering help to "political leaders from South Africa and South West Africa,"⁴⁰ because this statement was not in accord with his Government's general practice. For example, in April 1962, Mr. Holden Roberto, then head of the Angolan-government-in-exile came to Lagos to seek military aid. Balewa told Mr. Roberto that "we cannot assure you of training your armed forces...because it will mean that we are training you to fight your African brothers in the South."⁴¹ At that time unlike now, the most crucial problem was Portuguese colonialism and there was no disagreement whatsoever among the liberation movements on the question of Angola's freedom. All factions were committed to the liberation of Angola and Portugal was the enemy. Balewa merely found an excuse to reject the request for military aid. He would probably have said similar things to South African freedom fighters.

The close link between Balewa's regime and the West coupled with its dogmatic and moralist view of the UN-Charter were factors responsible for the inconsistency and lack of coherence in Nigeria's attitude towards South Africa from 1960 to 1966. In the harmless measures provided by the UN-Charter, Nigeria's record was very good. However, Balewa failed to realise that the peculiar situation in Southern Africa where the Western powers are involved called for peculiar continental measure. Again one observed that Balewa's administration underestimated the strength and capability of the racist Republic to survive economic measures and diplomatic isolation due to the support it receives from the western capitalist states.

Nigeria and South Africa under Gowon's Administration

The demise of the first Republic of Nigeria and the outbreak of the civil war marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new one

in the history of Nigeria's external relations. The Nigerian civil war, which began as a police-action against an act of rebellion but dragged on for thirty months, left an indelible mark on the country's attitude to Africa, to the East and to the West.

Nigeria's new political leadership lost faith in the West, in whose favour the first Republic practised a foreign policy of non-alignment. This change was due to the half-hearted support the country received from Britain initially and to America's studied "neutrality", as well as France's moral, political and massive material support for the rebellion. The Socialist camp proved helpful in all respects and gained in favour. The unflinching support which African states, with the exception of Gabon and the Ivory Coast as well as Tanzania and Zambia, accorded Nigeria has influenced her attitude towards Africa's crucial problems. The association of the West with Biafra overtly, and covertly, convinced the Nigerian leadership of the evils of imperialism and neocolonialism.

Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa saw the Nigerian civil war as an opportunity to attempt to bulkanise a state whose potentialities of national power constitute a threat to the racist trio South of Zambesi. Portugal accorded the Nigerian rebels unrestricted landing right in Lisbon, which was the headquarters of rebel European activities. Rhodesian and South African pilots flew Delfin fighters for the rebels while a substantial number of South African infantry mercenaries fought against Nigeria.⁴² The attitude of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa to Nigeria during the civil war proved the point that white supremacy in the South constitutes a danger to the security of all African states.

Post-civil war Nigeria accepts the liberation of Southern Africa as a vital national interest. General Gowon in his speech at the 1971 OAU summit conferences urged the Organisation to aim at liberating at least one colonised African territory every three years. Since the civil war, Nigeria has taken an anti-imperialist and anti-apartheid stand with some confidence. Thus it may be true that "if the war has done terrible things to Nigeria, it also has done a lot for it. To begin with, it has forced the federal government to develop the most effective army in Black Africa—and, as a result, Nigeria is obviously—the major military power that in part of the world."⁴³ Nigeria's

current attitude is that the use of revolutionary violence may be inevitable in liberating South Africa. This is implied in Nigeria's rejection of a non-aggression pact suggested by South Africa. In a television interview over the issue the Federal Commissioner for External Affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikpo said, "If South Africa does not accept the basic principles that African everywhere have the right to enjoy political freedom which is entrenched in the charter of the United Nations, then she must not expect peace with the Africans."⁴⁴

Nigeria's firm opposition to colonialism and apartheid has developed beyond mere verbiage. The late Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the effective liberation movement in Guinea Bissau in an interview in London, declared that his movement received continuous military aid from Nigeria. What is more Dr. Okoi Arikpo did announce that, "in addition to continued diplomatic pressure on South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia, the freedom fighters could look forward to an increase in the volume of material support by the Organisation of African Unity."⁴⁵ Such statement suggests that Nigeria has probably increased her contribution to the OAU Liberation Committee's fund.

In 1971 an innovation was made in the African policy of South Africa. The idea was to feign friendship with gaulle African states in its bid to escape continental isolation. The policy scored some measure of success to the extent that a number of African states—Ivory Coast, Busia's Ghana, Gabon, Malagasy Republic, Dahomey, Togo, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Niger and Upper Volta, suggested dialogue with South Africa as a means of effecting a change of her apartheid policy.⁴⁶ On the insistence of Dr. Okoi Arikpo the topic was discussed by the OAU Council of Ministers and a resolution was adopted against an unproductive dialogue with the unrepentant racists in South Africa. The decision was upheld by the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments. When Mr. Arsene Assouan-Usher, the Foreign Minister of Ivory Coast announced that his country would not be bound by the summit's decision General Gowon said it was "most unfortunate."⁴⁷

The bold and uncompromising nature of Nigeria's attitude towards South Africa is reflected in the stern warnings her spokesmen

often issue to the Western powers that aid and abet apartheid. For example, in an address to United Nations by Dr. Okoi Arikpo, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, made it clear that Western powers had a choice between fighting apartheid and remaining friends of Africa and staining "their hands with the precious blood of our people until we can tolerate them no longer."⁴⁸ The Western Powers who maintain political, and economic relations with Portugal and South Africa "are sowing the seeds of strife in Africa against themselves", he said. Mr. Edwin Ogbu, then Nigeria's Ambassador to the UN dismissed Western powers that trade with South Africa as "accomplices in the crime of apartheid". The British Government's decision to grant South Africa permission to buy seven wasp helicopters provoked Nigeria's withdrawal from the Commonwealth's Eight Nation Committee on the security of the Indian Ocean, as a protest against Conservative Government's disregard for African opinion."⁴⁹

It is however disappointing that Nigeria has not stopped trading with South Africa. Although South Africa's name does not appear in her trade records, one should have thought that our Government is aware that trading with South West Africa (Namibia), at present, is tantamount to trading with South Africa.⁵⁰

In accordance with the recommendations contained in Gainji's Report on measures to promote the end of apartheid,⁵¹ the Federal Government of Nigeria, has set up an Anti-Apartheid Committee whose function it is to promote public awareness of the evil of apartheid. In a television talk during the anti-apartheid week in 1972, Dr. Okoi Arikpo called on Nigerian "wherever they may be to continue to fight, in every way open to them, against the doctrine and practice of apartheid which zealously preach that Africans are by nature inferior."⁵²

The attitude of the second Republic of Nigeria to South Africa has done a lot to improve the old image of the country. Furthermore progressive African states like Guinea and Tanzania began to repose confidence in Nigeria as black Africa's greatest nation. The confidence and independence with which Nigeria pursued her anti-apartheid policy has, no doubt, encouraged other African states to step up theirs. But Nigeria's credibility suffered a huge blow in

1974 when it was widely rumoured that an official Nigerian delegation was seen in Pretoria negotiating oil-for-gold trade relation with Vorster's men. Although the Commissioner for External Affairs Dr. Okoi Arikpo promptly dismissed the rumour as "unfounded" it was later confirmed that some Nigerians did in fact, travel to South Africa to do business. Despite series of newspaper editorials demanding that such "unpatriotic" Nigerians be exposed and punished, Gowon's administration said nothing more about the matter. It was widely suspected that some businessmen close to the Government were involved in the clandestine business deal.

Murtala Muhammed's Administration and South Africa

After the July 29th, 1975 bloodless putsch the new military Government, under the leadership of Brigadier Murtala Muhammed and Colonel Joseph Garba as the Commissioner for External Affairs, announced that the conduct of Nigerian external relations would, more than ever before, emphasise the country's national interest. Would this mean, discontinuity in Nigeria's African policy? What would be the attitude of the new administration to South Africa? Those were some of the questions that agitated the minds of students of Nigerian policy after the announcement. Some knowledge of the experience of the new military leadership, however, helps in predicting the possible attitude of the new administration to the Republic of South Africa.

The most powerful people in the administration—Murtala Muhammed Olusegun Obasanjo and Danjuma were commanders in different sectors during the Civil War. They did not only have first hand knowledge of South Africa's intervention on the side of 'Biafra', they were also aware of the cost of such intervention to the federal side. To this extent, to them, South Africa is not just a hostile state because of her racist ideology, she is an enemy state that contributed to efforts aimed at disintegrating Nigeria.⁵³

The real test for the new administration's attitude came shortly after November 11, 1974 when Portugal unceremoniously withdrew from Angola without settling the question of succession. At first Nigeria's Commissioner for External Affairs announced that Nigeria was in favour of the formation of a government of national unity

in Angola. This was OAU's position on the Angolan situation. But Nigeria did not conform for long. During the first week of December the Nigerian Federal Military Government announced the recognition MPLA—government in Luanda as the legitimate government of the people of Angola.⁵⁴ The main cause of Nigeria's swing to the MPLA was South Africa's intervention.⁵⁵ This was again emphasised by Colonel Joe Garba in his discussion with Dr. Kissinger in Paris on the Angolan situation.⁵⁶ The most revealing of the official utterances on the Angolan situation was made by the Head of Nigeria Military Government, Brigadier Murtala Muhammed during the visit of Angola's Premier Nascimento to Nigeria when he publicly displayed two white South African regular soldiers captured in Angola. The Head of State said,

“Our Brothers and Sisters of Angola : Through this medium I bring you greetings and messages of goodwill from the Government and your brothers and sisters in Nigeria. I want to assure you that in your hour of need we are solidly behind you in your efforts not only to stand alone but give respectability and dignity to the black race.

Your struggle is, therefore, of significance to all Africans and black men all over the world and in Nigeria have implicit confidence and faith in your ultimate victory. Your struggle for justice, freedom, equality and humanity will succeed and it is only a matter of time before the South African racist regime and its international supporters are defeated. Time and history are on your side and you will surely win.

We in Nigeria are committed to the total liberation of the whole of Africa and we will not fold our hands to see our brothers and sisters in Angola subjugated, exploited and recolonised by the racials and imperialists in South Africa and their supporters. Never will any liberated African soil be colonised again.

Your struggle is therefore our struggle and we will support you both morally and materially until absolute victory is gained in Angola. In the traditional African way of life, we believe we are our brothers keepers.

We recognise that the MPLA truly represents the interests of the Angolan people and the African interests. We condemn in the strongest terms external influences colluding together to subvert and destroy the Angolan unity and the welfare of the Angolan people. We believe in and uphold the stand of the MPLA in striving to build a truly independent African nation, free to pursue independent and non-aligned policies in international affairs and within the comity of nations.

We want unity and concord among all the people of Angola. And we will like those people of Angola who are misguided and who are unwittingly being used against the interest of their country and Africa to tarry awhile, think and see the machinations of the enemies of Africa and the Black man in the events in their country and join hands with the forces of progress and unity.

I therefore appeal to all our brothers and sisters in Angola wherever they are and whatever their persuasion to unite and face a common enemy that is threatening to destroy and devour them.

Long live Angola! Long live African unity : Long live freedom and humanity over racism, imperialism and exploitation! Good luck and God bless.⁵⁷

That statement speaks for itself. At the end of Nascimento's visit the Nigerian government gave a sum of 13 million naira (over 14 million dollars) in aid to MPLA government.⁵⁸

Conclusion

Nigeria's relation with South Africa between 1960 and 1975 were influenced greatly by anti-racist ideology. This ideology was never articulated by any of the country's political leaders in both civil and military settings in any systematic or original version. But there is no doubt that it was adopted through identification with African and non-African Third World bodies which had consistently mounted a counter-offensive against racial arrogance and institutionalised racism. Aside from this, the United Nations has sought, since the adoption of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, to instal anti-racist ideology as universal standard.

This explains why the world body sponsored and coordinated efforts that produced the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and similar multilateral treaties.

Nigeria's political leadership in the immediate post-independence period failed to grasp the full implications of institutionalised racism South African style. Balewa's administration could not make up its mind whether to consistently work for global isolation of South Africa or to engage her in a dialogue while the pressure was kept on. As far as trade relations were concerned there was very little Balewa's government could do since the private sector of Nigeria's economy was totally controlled by multinational corporations based in the centre nations of Western Europe and North America. These corporations until very recently got round the economic sanction imposed on South Africa by importing South African goods into Nigeria through their home countries. Even in 1971 Portuguese and South African wines were openly displayed by British-owned Kingsway Stores.

South Africa's intervention during Nigerian civil war was patently an error of judgement. It brought the lesson home to the Nigerians that their country's size and potentialities constitute a threat to apartheid. The view widely held in conservative quarters that far away South Africa did not constitute any danger to Nigeria's security was also abandoned. To this extent, the moderate anti-racist ideology of Balewa's era could simply not match the new level of consciousness of post-civil war foreign policy decision-makers. Anti-apartheid ideology was not just based on solidarity with "our suffering brothers and sisters in South Africa", it sought to solve some aspect of national security question. This added incentive resulted in a more pronounced anti-apartheid stance during Gowon's administration.

We have not noticed any discontinuity in the attitude of the present administration to South Africa. On the other hand, the administration's recognition of MPLA's government in defiance of the OAU indicates that it is prepared to take decisions independently on matters relating to South Africa directly or indirectly even when such decisions do not accord with the position of the majority of African states.

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India and Africa

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE
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Mr. Gandhi's Call against Danger of Neo-Colonialism

India is and will be with the African countries in their endeavour to build their national strength as she has been with them in their quest for national freedom, stated the Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, in an introduction to a publication, *India and the African Liberation Struggle*, published recently in New Delhi.

"Ages ago", Mrs Gandhi added, "Africa and India were geologically linked. From the beginning of recorded history we have had exchanges of commerce and culture. Many of our plans are known to be of African origin. Africa and India both came under the domination of European powers and suffered economic exploitation and racial discrimination. Considerable as was our own deprivation in the colonial era, we know that Africa's tribulations were even greater."

The Prime Minister said that India had consistently identified itself with the aspirations of Africans. "We specially cherish the fact that it was in South Africa that the father of our freedom, Mahatma Gandhi forged his political weapon, namely satyagraha, (non-violent, non-co-operation) which he later taught to our people. African freedom movements have also acknowledged their debt to Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru," she said.

Referring to India's consistent support to African nationalist movements, Mrs. Gandhi said that "as a demonstration of our abhorrence of racialism, independent India was the first country to break off diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa. India and African nations have worked together for freedom, racial equality and economic fairplay in the United Nations and its agencies and in international conferences such as those of non-aligned

countries. It has been our policy to seek better bilateral relations with the countries of Africa. A large number of African youth have availed themselves of educational opportunities in India. More recently, Indian technicians are serving with African nations and participating in their technological transformation".

Calling upon the developing countries to guard against the danger of neo-colonialism, Mrs. Gandhi said that "we should all be alive to this danger and develop the strength to withstand such pressures. While seeking friendship with all countries, we should strive in particular to develop closer cooperation amongst ourselves. Diversification of trade and technological cooperation will lead to greater economic stability." (July 1, 1976)

South African Massacre Condemned

A public meeting held on July 1st under the chairmanship of the Congress President, Mr. D. K. Borooah, strongly condemned the "racist massacre in South Africa" and expressed its "solidarity with its fighting people".

Amdist thunderous applause from the capacity-packed house, Mr. Borooah assured the leaders of the liberation movements, still on in some of the African countries that "we will go as far as you can go." India from Mahatma Gandhi onward had championed the cause of freedom in Africa and would continue to do so in future as well.

The Congress General Secretary, Mr. A.R. Antulay, the Minister for Steel and Mines, Mr. Chandrajit Yadav, the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Bipinpal Das, the Chief Representative of the African National Congress, Mr. M. Moola, the current chairman of the OAU member states in New Delhi, Mr. Ahmed Nazmi Mostafa, and the CPI central committee member, Mr. Mohit Sen, also spoke. The meeting was also attended by diplomats and African students.

Mr. Borooah at the outset expressed his "horror and shock" at the way the "racist South African regime" had gunned down over 150 children. The people there had no rights and now they had been robbed of the right even to learn the language of their choice.

He said the role that the South African people had been playing in defeating the imperialist regime there would go down as a "glorious chapter in human history."

Mr. Bipinpal Das recalled the steps that the government had taken to help the liberation movements in African countries. India had not only helped the South African people but had imposed on that country all the sanctions agreed upon at the U.N. (July 1, 1976)

African Governments Appreciate Indian Stand

The heads of the African diplomatic missions here conveyed a message of appreciation and gratitude to the Government of India for the latter's condemnation of the Pretoria regime for the massacre of school children in Soweto and other South African townships.

The message was delivered by the Algerian Ambassador, Mr. Omar Oussedik, and the Kenyan High Commissioner, Mr S. K. Kimalel to Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavan on July 5, when the envoys called on him. Mr Chavan thanked the envoys and recalled the role Mahatma Gandhi played in launching the first anti-racist movement against the Pretoria regime.

The Foreign Minister is also reported to have told the Algerian and the Kenyan diplomats that India would continue to support the African struggle against racism.

Mr Oussedik and Mr Kimalel, according to sources here, characterised India's stand against the massacre of school students as a "positive" one and added that it was "in keeping with India's traditional and consistent policy" of supporting the African Liberation Movements.

They said the heads of the African missions had not the slightest doubt that India would continue to play "a leading role in denouncing the acts of violence and repression by the racist and colonial regimes in Africa." (July, 5 1976)

Indian Know-How for Non-Aligned

India is planning to give a substantial boost to co-operation with developing non-aligned countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the field of science and technology to reduce dependence of these countries on developed countries.

According to the department of science and technology, India has already entered into formal agreements with 16 countries for cooperation in science technology, including seven developing countries.

In addition, about 50 developing countries receive know-how, equipment and technical experts for their various development projects from India under the technical assistance programme.

India is also co-operating with many countries including developing nations through joint commissions and cultural assessments which include science and technology also (11, July, 1976)

60 Nations at News Pool Conference in Delhi

Nearly 250 representatives of 60 nations and four international agencies participated in the six-day ministerial conference of non-aligned countries on press agencies pool, which was inaugurated by the Prime Minister Mr. Gandhi, on 8 July in New Delhi Mr. V.C. Shukla, India's Minister of Information and Broadcasting, who led the Indian delegation to the conference, was elected president for the plenary, with four Vice-presidents from Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Peru and Zaire, representing Asia, Europe, Latin America and Africa. Iraq was elected the rapporteur-general of the conference.

The 60 non-aligned nations who participated at the conference as full members were : Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Cyprus, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Democratic Peoples Republic of Yemen, Arab Republic of Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libyan, Arab Republic, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palestine Liberation Organisation, Panama, Peru, Qattar, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

There were seven observer delegations at the conference, one each from Mexico, Ecuador and Bolivia, and four representing the

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) league of Arab states, Organisation of Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity and the UNO.

After the inaugural session, the conference constituted two committees to consider items on the agenda and report to the plenary body. The first committee was chaired by Mauritius, with Egypt as vice-chairman and Cuba as rapporteur. For the second committee, Ghana was the chairman, with Vietnam as vice-chairman and Senegal as rapporteur. The main items on agenda were constitution of the proposed news agencies pool and coordination of communication facilities among non-aligned countries.

The delegations from non-aligned countries included ministers, director-generals of news agencies, radio and television organisations, experts in mass media, government representatives and others concerned with communication facilities. The programme for the delegates to the conference included a meeting with President Ahmed and Indian ministers and officers in New Delhi, and visits to centres of tourist interest, such as the Taj Mahal at Agra (Uttar Pradesh) and Moghul Gardens in Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir), and the industrial complex at Bangalore (Karnataka). The delegates were also hosted by chief ministers of these states.

The 36-member Indian delegation included Mr Mohammad Yunus, Prime Minister's special envoy, as alternate leader, Mr. Dharam Bir Sinha, India's Deputy Minister of Information and Broadcasting, as deputy leader, and Mr Subroto Mukherjee, Minister of Information, West Bengal, Members of Parliament, representatives of the Indian press and government officers, as members.

The New Delhi meeting was the first of its kind on cooperation in the field of mass media among non-aligned countries. (July 15, 1976).

Move to Censure S. Africa in UN

India's permanent representative and acting president of the UN Council for Namibia Rikhi Jaipal on July 30th opposed a proposal to send a United Nations' fact-finding mission to inquire into Zambian allegations of South African aggression.

"There is no question of seeking the cooperation of the South African Government in regard to any inquiry 30 kilometres inside

Zambia. The Zambian Government had supplied all necessary evidence and if the council needs any more, this should come from Zambia, he said.

Mr. Jaipal was participating in the Security Council debate on Zambian allegations that South African troops attacked a Zambian settlement 30 kilometres inside its territory this month, killing 24 Africans and wounding 45.

"So far as the Council of Namibia is concerned, it is opposed to any action which would seek to confer any sort of legitimacy on the South African Government with regard to its presence in Namibia," Mr Jaipal said.

"A fact-finding mission would be such an act", he said. (July 30, 1976).

India Condemns Apartheid Policy of South Africa

India's Deputy Minister of External affairs, Mr. Bipinpal Das, said on 13 August in reply to a question in Rajya Sabha that the Government is aware of the recent violent incidents involving hundreds of persons of Indian origin in South Africa. The South African police, he said, reportedly used police dogs and other coercive methods on 13 July against traders of Indian origin in the Page View suburb of Johannesburg. There were about 240 shops in Page View owned and run by the people of Asian origin for the last 80 years or so. The South African Government, under the group areas act, declared Page View as "white area" and ordered the traders of Asian origin to vacate it by 30 June. When traders did not leave by that date and protested against eviction, police dogs were set on them and some of their merchandise was taken from their shops and thrown into streets. "We have not seen any report of injuries or deaths of the people of Indian origin in this regard", he said.

Mr. Das further stated that the Government of India has strongly condemned the policy of apartheid of South Africa in all international forms. It has also been observing a complete boycott of the South African regime in all matters and is giving material and moral support to the African liberation movements engaged in the struggle for emancipation of the remaining vestiges of colonialism,

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racialism and apartheid. The government will continue to give their full support to all future measures of the United Nations aimed at the early liquidation of colonialism and racialism in Africa, he added.
(August 13, 1976).

Elimination of Power Rivalry from Indian Ocean

The implementation of the Indian ocean peace zone proposal, was a subject of direct and important concern to India, said Mr. Y.B. Chavan, India's Minister of External Affairs on 25 September in New Delhi.

In a statement made before his departure for New York to lead the Indian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, Mr. Chavan said that the *ad hoc* committee on the Indian ocean, which concluded its session recently, "has recommended the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of a resolution which will extend the life of the committee and call for a continuation of the informal consultations with a view to convening the proposed conference in the Indian ocean. We attach great importance to the elimination of great power rivalry and military bases from this area and we hope that the great powers and the major maritime users of the Indian ocean will respond to the expressed wishes of the littoral and hinterland states."

Mr Chavan regretted that Bangladesh had inscribed an item on the agenda of the current session, entitled "situation arising out of the unilateral withdrawal of the Ganga water at Farakka". The nature of the problem, he said, was such that "it can only be solved through bilateral talks and in a spirit of mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation. The involvement of any third party, including the United Nations, will only complicate the situation and delay the solution. The general assembly would be well advised to leave the matter to be sorted out by the two parties without external interference." Mr. Chavan said that he hoped that "Bangladesh will abandon the path of confrontation and return to the ways of friendly discussions and negotiations."

Referring to the non-aligned summit meeting in Colombo, Mr. Chavan said that it was a major event which marked a significant step forward in the consolidation of the unity and solidarity of non-aligned countries. "We hope that the Colombo spirit will continue to

influence the decisions and resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly", he said. Non-aligned countries, he added, would coordinate and intensify their efforts towards peace, justice and equality."

Mr. Chavan observed that the situation in southern Africa, was becoming increasingly critical. "We cannot rest until the last vestiges of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism are eradicated from southern Africa and wherever they exist," he said. About west Asia, he said that the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must engage our serious attention."

India, Mr. Chavan said, "has consistently supported the convening of a world disarmament conference. We have also expressed the view that the special session of the U.N. General Assembly should be convened to consider disarmament questions, including measures to expedite the convening of the world disarmament conference."

On the economic side, Mr Chavan said that he hoped that "the current session will impart a political impetus to the dialogue between developed and developing countries as well as among the developing countries in the direction of more meaningful cooperation among themselves. We hope that the negotiations on the economic side would be marked by a positive spirit and that the focus would be on implementation and concrete decisions." (September 25, 1976)

India at Botswana, Lesotho Celebrations

India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Mr Bipinpal Das, left New Delhi on 25 September for Africa to represent India at the 10th anniversary celebrations of the independence of Botswana and Lesotho on 30 September and 4 October respectively.

An official handout issued on 15 September in New Delhi, said that Mr. Das "will take advantage of these visits to reaffirm India's continued support to the struggle of the people of Africa in that part of the continent." He would also visit the people's republic of Mozambique where he was expected to hold talks with the leaders of that country on further strengthening bilateral relations, and express India's support for the "heroic struggle in which the government and people of Mozambique are presently engaged." (October 11, 1976).

Ghana's Minister Extols India's Building Activities

Ghana's Minister for Works and Housing, Col. K. A. Jackson, said on 20 September in New Delhi that he was greatly impressed by the designs and techniques used by India for building houses for people of low and middle incomes in the metropolitan cities. He also paid rich tributes to the work of the Government of India in resettlement, Col. Jackson who called an India's Minister of State for Works and Housing. Mr H.K.L. Bhagat, suggested close co-operation and collaboration between the institutions of the two countries undertaking research in construction work. Col. Jackson said that India can help Ghana solve the problem of building materials.

Mr Bhagat said, "India would be only too happy to assist Ghana in the construction field."

During his 10-day visit to India, Col. Jackson had talks with the director of the national building organization and also visited its display centre. He visited the low-cost housing exhibition and colonies in Delhi where squatters have been resettled.

Indo-Kenyan Synthetic Unit at Nairobi

Fifty Indian experts will go to Kenya soon to help set up a six million Pounds-Sterling synthetic plant at Thika, about 45 km. from Nairobi.

This Indo-Kenyan industrial venture, which is expected to be completed before the end of next year, will be a major contributor for the development of Kenya's small-scale industry.

The plant will provide jobs to 500 Kenyans and 30 of them, belonging to all cadres, will be trained in India. (July 11, 1976).

Indo-Kenyan Cooperation for Self-Reliance

India and Kenya were "working closely for our common objectives of building a world free from economic and political exploitation," said Mr. Y.B. Chavan, India's Minister of External Affairs, on 26 August in New Delhi. He expressed "great satisfaction" that relations between the two countries were "excellent."

Speaking at a social function, held to honour Dr Munyua Waiyaki, Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Chavan said that

the Indo-Kenyan cooperation "has been shown at the Colombo conference of non-aligned countries which we have just attended. I am sure the delegations of India and Kenya will work together at the coming session of the United Nations."

Mr. Chavan also said that the fourth UNCTAD conference held in Kenya recently "showed once again the urgent need of bringing about a quick change in the economic conditions of the developing countries in order to free them from the continuing effects of economic exploitation during their colonial period." He was happy that India and Kenya were cooperating in the spirit of self-reliance and cooperation among developing and non-aligned countries. "We look forward to greater cooperation in economic, technical, cultural, commercial and other fields," Mr Chavan said.

Mr. Chavan also said that the name of President Jomo Kenyatta, the founding father of Kenya, is a household word in India. "Years ago when he was leading the liberation movement of your country from colonialism, his name was etched in the minds of the Indian people as one of the bravest fighters for freedom and racial equality," he said. "We recall how Jawaharlal Nehru sent his friend and a distinguished lawyer, Diwan Chaman Lal, to defend Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, when the colonial regime had imprisoned him. After the independence of Kenya, the progress and prosperity achieved by Kenya under the enlightened leadership of President Kenyatta has been remarkable. The qualities of statesmanship of President Kenyatta will be long remembered by historians."

During his day's visit to New Delhi on 26 August, the Kenyan Foreign Minister, Dr Waiyaki called on President Ahmed and the Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, and conveyed to her the greetings of President Jomo Kenyatta. Mrs Gandhi also requested him to convey her greetings to President Kenyatta.

During his talks with Mr Chavan, Dr Waiyaki exchanged views on international affairs and the further strengthening of close and friendly relations between the two countries. (August 28, 1976).

Construction of Ghat Airport Started

The international airport authority of India (IAAI) and the National Building Construction Corporation (NBCC) have started

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work on the construction of an airport at Ghat (Libya), the contract for which was awarded to India recently. (July 15, 1976).

ICA Invites Malawi Professor

Prof. Lewis K. Mughogho, Principal of Bunda College of Agriculture, Lilongwe, Malawi visited India from 9th to 27th August, 1976, at the invitation of the Indian Centre for Africa. During his stay in India, he visited Delhi, Sringar, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Coimbatore, Madras and Bombay. Prof. Mughogho visited various Agricultural Universities and research centres in the these places. (September 1, 1976).

Mauritanian President's to Visit India

The President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Mr. Moktar Ould Daddah, was accorded a warm welcome when he arrived on 24 August in New Delhi on a seven-day state visit to India. On his arrival at Palam airport, he was received by President Ahmed, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, cabinet ministers and other dignitaries.

Speaking at a social function arranged in his honour on 24 August in New Delhi, President Daddah said : "We in Mauritania appreciate the solid and active contribution made by the great Indian people in the liberation of the 'third world and the struggle it is waging for the recognition of its heritage and values." He also expressed his admiration for the impact Mahatma Gandhi made on the contemporary civilisation and the destiny of the 'third world'. He added that Jawaharlal Nehru exercised a tremendous influence on world events. He was one of the pillars of the policy of non-alignment which today finds a tremendous response in the countries of the the 'third world.'

Bidding farewell to President Daddah on 25 August at Palam airport, President Ahmed said that his visit has further strengthened the bonds of friendship between the two countries. "We are convinced that cooperation between our two countries will not only be mutually advantageous, but also contribute to unity and progress of all the non-aligned and developing countries as well as the cause of international peace," President Ahmed said.

The President of Mauritania was accompanied, among others, by the president of the national assembly, Mr. Abdul Aziz Sall, and Foreign Minister, Mr Hamdi Ould Mouknass.

President Daddah thanked President Ahmed and Mrs Gandhi for the warm hospitality extended to him and his delegation during their stay in India. (August 26, 1976)

Expansion of India—Mauritius Collaboration

Matters of mutual interest to India and Mauritius were discussed by India's Finance Minister, Mr. C. Subramaniam, and Mauritius Finance Minister, Sir Veerasamy Ringadoo, at a meeting held on 27 July in New Delhi.

India has a favourable balance of trade with Mauritius, Indian exports which include cotton piece-goods, cereals, artsilk and synthetic fibres, electric machinery and appliances, having risen from Rs. 113.4 million in 1969-70 to Rs. 602.64 million in 1974-75. India is interested in development of industry in Mauritius, and 14 joint ventures with Mauritius were approved by the Government of India, out of which 10 projects are under implementation. India is also providing technical assistance to Mauritius.

During his 12-day visit to India beginning on 27 July, Sir Veer asamy called on the Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, External Affairs Minister, Mr. Chavan, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission, and Commerce Minister, and visited industrial establishments in Delhi, Madras and Bombay. (August 10, 1976)

Mauritius Envoy Lauds Indian Assistance

The New High Commissioner of Mauritius, Mr. Rajmohunsing Jomadar, conveyed to President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed his country's gratitude for the "very generous assistance" extended by India in the implementation of projects undertaken by it.

Mr. Jomadar did so while presenting his letter of commission to the President. He said the government and the people of Mauritius followed with keen interest the tremendous progress India had achieved in scientific, technological, economic and other fields, particularly over the last few years. (August 3, 1976)

India to help Mauritius in Standardisation

The Indian Standards Institution has assured all help and co-operation to Mauritius in the introduction of standardisation and quality control in industrial development of that country. This assurance was given by the Director of the I.S.I., Shri B.S. Krishnamachar, when Shri Soobiah, President of the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Managing Director of the Mauritius Jute and Textile Industries, visited the Indian Standards Institution. He held discussions with Shri Krishnamachar about the promotion of standardisation and quality control in Mauritius and the help which India could provide in the field.

The Institution has already presented a complete set of Indian Standards for use by industry in Mauritius. Shri Krishnamachar offered full cooperation in providing technical know-how developed by India in standardisation and for training the technical personnel of Mauritius. The I.S.I. would also be prepared to send its technical experts to Mauritius. (August 26, 1976)

World Hindi Convention in Mauritius—Prime Minister's Message

The Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, in a message to the world Hindi Convention held at Mauritius has said that Hindi is to progress not at the cost of any other language but by taking them alongwith it, hand in hand like the members of family, the Prime Minister said.

Hindi is one of the world's greatest and richest languages. The language has grown and its literature has developed significantly, in India as also abroad, during the freedom struggle and after we attained independence. Today, Hindi is taught in the universities of many continents.

India is a multi-lingual country where the use of Hindi as a link language is increasing rapidly. In commerce and trade as well as in politics it is being used on a much larger scale than before. Though it is the mother-tongue of most of our millions many non-Hindi speaking people too can read, write and understand it.

Some people mistakenly believe that a language progresses through official patronage. A language develops when it finds a place in the hearts of the people. This is possible only when it keeps

its doors and windows open to absorb words from other languages and is able to give expression to the advances in knowledge.

Such conventions where the lovers of Hindi all over the globe get together are gratifying as they promote the idea of the brotherhood of man. (August 27, 1976)

Indian Assistance to Mozambique

India will extend assistance of Rs. 900,000 to Mozambique for purchase of goods and services from India, it was officially stated on 19 August in New Delhi. India also airlifted a consignment of medical supplies valued at Rs. 100,000 to Angola, and will gift stationery for school children in that country. (August 19, 1976)

India's Full Support for Namibia's Freedom Struggle

"To those who are still suffering imprisonment or exile, and to the freedom fighters of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), we renew our pledge of full support," said the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, on 26 August in New Delhi. The struggle for freedom was bound to succeed, she said.

In a message to the U.N. Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, on the occasion of the Namibia day, which was observed on 31 August, Mrs. Gandhi said : "Ten years ago the people of Namibia were compelled to take arms against South Africa's illegal occupation of their country and brutal suppression of its people. Many Namibians have laid down their lives for freedom. Many others languish in jails of the South African regime or in exile. On this day of remembrance, the government and people of India pay homage to the martyrs of Namibian liberation".

The South African regime, Mrs. Gandhi added, "continues to ignore the repeated calls of the U.N. for vacation of the illegal occupation of Namibia, and the holding of free elections under the supervision and control of the U.N. for the whole of Namibia as one political entity. Instead, it is proceeding with a so-called constitutional conference to implement its policy of Bantustans, to the detriment of the independence and territorial integrity of Namibia. We urge the U.N. to act effectively to thwart these designs of the South African regime."

Speaking at a function held on 31 August in New Delhi under the auspices of the Indian Centre for Africa-I.C.C.R. Mr. Bipinpal Das, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, said that the day was being observed to pay homage to the martyrs who laid down their lives ten years ago to save their country from white oppression. He demanded the immediate release of all prisoners held by white South African regime.

Mr. Daf said that "we support wholeheartedly what Mr. Sam Nujoma of SWAPO has said in Lusaka the other day that SWAPO can and will crush these puppets in Namibia."

The SWAPO president, Mr. Sam Nujoma, thanked India for material assistance to the liberation movement in Namibia, according to press reports of 5 September. Speaking at a ceremony in Zambia, at which the Indian High Commissioner to Zambia, Mr. K. Srinivasan, presented to him 45 cases of footwear, Mr. Nujoma said : "On behalf of the SWAPO of Namibia and the struggling masses of Namibia, I would like to express our profound gratitude to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Congress Party of India and, indeed, the Indian people for concrete material assistance which the Government of India have given us as a concrete practical solidarity to the oppressed people of Namibia in their just struggle for freedom and independence." (September 6, 1976)

Air Agreements Reached with Ghana and Nigeria

India has concluded air services agreements with Ghana and Nigeria. Under the terms of the agreements reached, Air India will be entitled to operate two services a week with Boeing 707 aircraft to Accra and Lagos. Ghana Airways and Nigerian Airways will have corresponding rights to operate to India.

The agreements were reached after talks in Accra and Lagos between the Indian Government delegation and the delegations of the Governments of Ghana and Nigeria. The Indian delegation which was led by Shri N.K. Mukerji, Secretary, Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation, has since returned to India. The delegation included Shri S. Ekambaram, Deputy Secretary and Shri R.V. Ranadive, Director Regulation and Information in the Civil Aviation Department. (August 30, 1976)

Information Minister of Senegal Calls on Shri Shukla

Mr. Dauod Sow, Minister of Information, Senegal who visited India to attend Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned countries on Press Agencies, Called on Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting. He has expressed the view that high cable tariff rates is one of the inhibiting factors which have so far retarded the growth of national news agencies. He felt that the Conference should also consider this issue and arrive at an agreed solution. He also supported India's view that bilateral arrangements among the non-aligned nations would greatly strengthen the news agencies of non-aligned countries.

Shri Shukla agreed with the views expressed by Senegal Minister and said that apart from the high cable tariff, the technological advance in tele-communications gave a decisive advantage to the international news agencies. He was confident that the Conference would review the situation and suggest suitable measures.

(July 7, 1976)

Seychelles Prime Minister's Visit to India

A warm welcome was given to Mr. F.A. Rene, Prime Minister of Seychells, who arrived on 22 September in New Delhi on a five-day visit to India. Mr. Rene was accompanied by his wife and daughter.

Among those who received Mr. Rene at the airport were Mr. Y.B. Chavan, India's Minister of External Affairs, and senior officer, of his ministry. During his stay in Delhi, Mr. Rene called on the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, on 22 September, and had talks with Mr. Chavan on bilateral matters.

(September 29, 1976)

Sudan Team Calls on Chattopadhyaya

INDIA and Sudan reviewed the working of current trade arrangements for 1975-76 between the two countries at a series of official level meetings, held from 20 to 31 July at New Delhi. It was stated at the meeting that bilateral trade was flowing smoothly and that the present trade exchanges should lead to further increases in trade volume between the two countries. The discussions were held in "a friendly spirit of brotherly cooperation,"

Dr. Vijay Gupta

The current trade arrangement valid from 1 November, 1975 to end of 1976 provides for a trade exchange of Rs. 548.20 million, trade between the two countries being governed by the most favoured nation type of an agreement, concluded in 1965.

The seven-member Sudanese trade delegation led by Mr. Mohy El Din Mahgoub Shoura, also called on Commerce Minister, D. P. Chattopadhyaya in New Delhi.

During the 20 minute talks the Sudanese leader gave Prof. Chattopadhyaya an idea of the trade and industry in the country.
(September 1, 1976)

India Wins Bronze at Tanzanian Trade Fair

The Indian pavilion at the Saba International Trade Fair, which was held at Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, in July was awarded the bronze medal according to Indian Council of Trade Fairs and Exhibitions, Bombay, which organised India's participation in the fair.
(July 14, 1976)

NSIC gets Tanzanian Contract for Small Industrial Units

The Small Industries Development Organisation of Tanzania has awarded a contract for setting up small-scale industrial units on a turn-key basis to the National Small Industries Corporation of India, a public sector undertaking under the Ministry of Industry. An agreement to this effect was signed here by Shri K. N. Sapru, Chairman, National Small Industries Corporation and Mr. Anangisye, acting Director-General of the Tanzanian Small Industries Development Organisation.

The total value of the contract is estimated at Rs. 20 million of machinery and equipment and erection of plants and covers the supply for the manufacture of sugar (Khandsari), white crystal sugar, hand-made paper, cloth (power loom), bicycle parts, tiles and bricks, pencils, wooden products, bolts, nuts, buttons, screws and rivets, band-saws and hand-saws, etc.

The plants will be set up in Tanzania by the NSIC on a turn-key basis and handed over. Tanzanian technicians and workers will be trained by the NSIC for running the plants under the agreement. The NSIC will also train one Tanzanian technician for each plant

at a similar plant in India.

The raw material requirements of the industries to be set up in Tanzania would be met by exports from India which will be paid for in foreign exchange. This agreement is the latest in a series of such agreements which India and Tanzania have had for cooperation in various fields. It is expected to further cement the close and friendly relations between the two countries. (September 15, 1976)

Small Units : India to help Uganda

India and Uganda have signed a 'Memorandum of understanding', envisaging far-reaching economic, technical and scientific co-operation between the two countries. The memorandum was signed by Mr. T.A. Pai, Union Minister for Industry and Civil Supplies, on behalf of India and Col. D. Sabuni, visiting Ugandan Minister for Industry and Power on behalf of Uganda.

The memorandum covers Indo-Ugandan co-operation in the setting up of small and medium scale industries in Uganda, sugar-making machinery, supply of equipment for textile mills in Uganda, vehicles, textile machinery, sugar machinery, expansion of Uganda's power generation capacity, mineral survey, training of Ugandan nationals in various disciplines and industries, establishment of joint ventures in Uganda by public sector units in India, etc.

India has agreed to assist Uganda in starting small and medium scale industries. A delegation of experts from India would visit Uganda at the invitation of its Government and on the basis of information furnished by the Uganda Government during the visit it would make specific recommendations for its consideration. Thereafter, further steps would be taken as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments for establishing such industries.

Uganda has expressed a desire for setting up further ventures in Uganda jointly with Indian public sector corporations or Indian manufacturers in respect of new industrial projects and the expansion of the existing units. India has taken note of Uganda's desire in this regard and it has been agreed that concrete proposals should be made by Uganda for its consideration. (July 3, 1976)

Colonel Sabuni, also called on the Union Minister for Energy, Mr. K.C. Pant and Union Commerce Minister, Mr. D.P. Chattop-

Dr. Vijay Gupta

dhaya. The Ugandan Minister was impressed by Indian technology, which he thought was relevant to Uganda and other developing countries. Colonel Sabuni said that his country wanted India's cooperation in the field of power and Uganda would like to buy electric cables and filament for bulbs from India. He added his country would also like to have Indian engineers and skilled workers for Uganda's power industry.

During his meeting the Union Commerce Minister, Mr. D.P. Chattopadhyaya proposed that specific areas for commercial and industrial collaboration between India and Uganda should be identified.

Both the Minister's agreed regarding the need for greater and diversified trade and commerce between the two countries.

India exports items like cotton textiles, engineering goods, jute and jute manufactures, chemicals and allied products to Uganda. A general purpose trade between the two countries continues to be in force since November last year. (July 3, 1976)

Indo-Zambian Agreement Ratified

India and Zambia exchanged on 7 August in Lusaka instruments of ratification for three agreements which were concluded during the visit of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to India in January 1975. These agreements cover economic, technical, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation between the two countries. (August 7, 1976)

Book Reviews

Rural Organization in Bukoba District, Tanzania by Jorgen and Karen Rald. Published by Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, 1975.

The book entitled "Rural Organization in Bukoba District, Tanzania" is based on research done in Tanzania from January 1968 to July 1971 by two scholars, Jorgen and Karen Rald. As the authors admit in the very first sentence of the Preface, the book is about people living in the rural areas in Bukoba District of Tanzania, describing in particular as to how the people of Bukoba District organise their life in society with regard to space and time. If that is so, I feel that the title of the book is inaccurate and inapt. By reading merely the title of the book one gets the impression that the book probably deals with the administrative organisation of Bukoba District whereas actually it deals with the varied aspects of the life of the Bukoba people. It would have

been a more correct description of the book, if the authors had used the word 'life' in place of the word 'organisation' to make the title read 'Rural Life in Bukoba District, Tanzania'.

The book may be divided into two halves. The first half of the book is devoted mainly to a study of the land use, land tenure and agricultural extension in Bukoba District. The second half of the book deals with the question of allocation of time and labour and income expenditure for selected households in Nshamba ward. The book concludes with a short outline of the social and political aspects of the farming system prevailing in Bukoba District.

The book is profusely illustrated as is obvious from the fact that it contains 31

pictures, 56 tables, 24 diagrams and 6 maps besides five appendices, a good bibliography and footnotes after each chapter. From diagrams, tables, and maps and also from the authors' own statement it appears that they have adopted modern techniques of investigation, research and data collection. Every study of rural life should rightly being, as the authors have done, with a study of land because the entire rural life centres round the land available and the uses to which it is put. The life of villagers cannot be seen in isolation from land which is the primary source of their living. In order to collect all the relevant information about land in Bukabo District the authors have relied upon the land use maps obtained from the authoritative sources. Without these maps it would not have been possible for the authors to collect authentic information on changes in cultivation techniques, results of extension service, wide-ranging standards of living, the composition of labour force and the variety in the size of land-holdings. The authors also tried to collect useful informa-

tion on socio-economic aspect of the farming system and rural society through personal interviews but they admittedly did not succeed much in these efforts for reasons not disclosed by them. Nevertheless, the book contains lot of factual material and data collected with painstaking labour.

The question now arises of the value and usefulness of all this data. As far as the scholars are concerned, the study sets an example before them as to how they should go ahead with the study of life in a rural area in all its aspects. To others this study may perhaps be of little interest or use. However, the Government of Tanzania might derive some advantage from this study since it is seriously implementing the policy of *Ujamaa Vijijini* as enunciated by President Nyerere. Under this policy the Tanzanian Government aims at establishing *Ujamaa* villages which are intended to be socialist organizations created by the people, and governed by those who live and work in them. The *Ujamaa* concept puts lot of stress upon the development of

people and the building up of socialism and democracy upward from the grass-root level. In these gigantic efforts the studies such as the one under review might be of some value inasmuch as they place before the Government the problems that are to be tackled to make the *Ujamma* concept a reality.

The book, in my opinion, suffers from two major defects. Firstly, the authors have not provided the readers with their 'conclusion' either after the end of each chapter or after the end of all the chapters in a consolidated form. The readers are left to draw their own conclusions. Secondly, the last

chapter of the book entitled 'The Social and Political Aspects of the Farming System' which, I think, is the most important part of the whole book is not as exhaustive as it ought to have been. Moreover, there is lot of ambiguity in this chapter which, I think, is due to insufficient space being devoted to the subject. For example, the writer talks of close relationship between social status and crops in the Bukoba farming system but does not define it in clear and unambiguous terms. In other respects the book meets the requirements of a standard analytical book.

S. C. SAXENA

Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy 1960-1966 by Gordan J. Idang, Ibadan University Press, 1973.

How far the state's Foreign Policy is determined by her domestic conditions and compulsions, to which extent it is influenced by the external environment—the interplay of international forces, and where, if at all, a line of differentiation can be drawn between internal and external factors: These are broadly the questions which have been debated among the scholars for the last thirty years or so.

Dr. Idang in this methodical study, sets out to examine the interactions between domestic political forces and foreign policy of the past-colonial African States with a dual purpose: Firstly, "to establish linkage between foreign policy and the domestic political forces"; and secondly, "to introduce readers to some of the intractable problems of foreign policy analysis." The work is a case study of Nigeria during the era of Sir Abu Bakar Tawafa Balewa. The book is a revised version of the author's Ph. D. dissertation of the New York

State University at Buffalo, and is a specimen application of contemporary research methodology in the United States.

The author, however, is aware of the tenuous distinction between domestic and foreign policies, and also conscious of the fact that making such distinction is "largely a matter of analytical convenience." While examining Nigeria's domestic factors and forces which influence its foreign policy, Dr. Idang does not ignore the importance of external factors which had their repercussions on Nigeria's domestic affairs, and is evident throughout this study. He explains the convergence of domestic and international politics emphasising the importance of the external sources of foreign policy which are no less crucial than the policy determinants that are derived from the political situation within the nation. The organization of this study is based on the conceptual scheme and the work is divided into four parts.

Part-I introduces the study by an analysis of official position taken by Balewa's Government in international relations—its aims and principles, its ideological bases and domestic compulsions. The second part deals with the dominant attitudes and perceptions, in which the author explains the role of Nigeria's elite in the foreign policy formulation, and the extent to which the policy-making is influenced by the parliamentary process and political parties, public opinion and the mass-media. The next part is concerned with the practice of foreign policy in which the organization and administration of Nigeria's foreign relations is explained, and how the foreign policy is manifested in Intra-African relations as also outside the African continent. Foreign economic policy is given a special treatment. The last part is the conclusion.

Dr. Idang in this systematic study, comes out with certain interesting conclusions: He argues that "European-driven framework" is no longer relevant in explaining

African nationalism which is primarily "a claim for equality of status" for African people in general and African states in particular. Further, "Pan Africanism is more a converging set of aspirations than a clearly worked out doctrine." Non-alignment is considered not as a policy but "as a techniques or basis for the conduct of foreign relations" that provides the African states an "important source of leverage in their relations with the great power blocs!" The African socialism comes out as "a natural and instinctive phenomena aimed at creating a society with minimal stratification patterns." And President Nyerere is quoted to supported this concept of African socialism: "the true African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethern and another as his internal enemies. He regards all men as his brethern—as members of his ever extending family" (p. 32). Yet another controversial subject, nationalism, in the Nigerian context, was not to be based on quasi-communist ideas as it would have been alien to their "philosophy". (p. 143)

Dr. Idang's is a scientific and objective study of the internal and external forces at work in Africa in general, and Nigeria in particular. It is perhaps more significant, in that, the theories and methods of social sciences are success-

fully applied in the study of practical politics. It is certainly a useful contribution to our knowledge and understanding of African affairs.

S.A.H.R. Bilgrami

Population Growth and Socio-economic Change in West Africa by John C Caldwell (ed.) New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1975, pp. XIII, 763, no price stated.

The Population Factor in African Studies by R.P. Moss and R.J.A. Pathbone (eds). London, University of London Press 1975, pp. 240 £ 4.50 net.

The field of African population studies has attracted the attention of many scholars in various disciplines for the past five decades. Workers who have contributed to African population studies include social anthropologist, demographers, economists, geographers and others, whose approaches may differ but who also share a great deal of common ground. These two books: 'Population Growth and Socio-economic change in West Africa' and "The Population Factor in African Studies" can be seen as major contributions to the growing literature in the field of African population studies.

'Population Growth and Socio-economic Change in West Africa' is divided into six major parts. The first provides a broad analysis of population growth and social change in West Africa. The first four chapters in this part analyses fertility patterns, trends and control as well as mortality levels, patterns and trends. The next three chapters examine the relationship between population, resources and economic development as well as migration and urbanization in the region. The last chapter reviews government population policies in the region and their implications

for population growth and distribution. Although the essays do not present new materials they provide a wealth of relevant information. The second part of the book focus specifically on Nigeria. The seven essays in this section discuss various aspects of population growth and social change in Nigeria including fertility level and change, family change, attitude to public health, migration and urbanization as well as Social and Economic implications of population growth. Parts three, four five and six of the book which focus on Ghana, Sierra Leone, other English countries and French-speaking countries in the region respectively, examine similar aspects of population growth and social change in the respective countries.

The second book, *'Population Factor in African Studies'* is a report on the proceeding of 1972 conference of the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom held in Birmingham. The book consists of twenty-seven contributions grouped into five sections: 'Historical Aspects', 'Linguistic

and Anthropological Aspects', 'Demographic and Biomedical Aspects', 'Social, Economic and Political Aspects' and 'Environmental Aspects'. Essays range in subject matter from 'Population in the Archaeological Past' to 'Social Life in the Burgeoning Suburbs'. From the variety of essays each reader will be able to choose his favourites. W.B. Morgan's 'Food Imports and Nutrition Problems in West Africa' presents a gloomy picture of an essentially agricultural region which has imported food for many years. Also interesting are the short demographic essays by W. Brass and K.H. Hill, 'Studies of Rural Hausaland' by M. Mortimore and Polly Hill and Jack Goody's report on 'Population Economy and Inheritance in Africa'. Some other contributions focus on ethnicity. For example, P. Spencer analyses the genetic and social relationships between two Kenyan pastoral groups, the camel-keeping Rendille and the Samburu who raise cattle. Similarly, Edwin Ardener's excellent essay 'Language, Ethnicity and Population' examines the nature of ethnic

Book Review

groups in Africa. He notes that during the colonial period the scale of units in the prevailing ethnic taxonomies was far from uniform.

It is not uncommon for collection of articles by a number of different authors to lack cohesion and commonality. These books are no exceptions. The editors are to be blamed partly for this weakness. However, the quality of writing in the two books are consistently good. But there is lack of common thrust to the

various articles. True the authors in the two books are concerned with the population problem in African studies, but this is not enough.

In summary, these two volumes provide a significant contribution to the study of African population. Although the two books do not present new findings, they will be useful for researchers and policy-makers in various parts of tropical Africa.

A.G. Onokerhoraye

Dem-Say—Occasional Paper—African and Afro-American Studies and Research Centre, Texas University

Dem-Say occasional publications of the African and Afro-American Studies and Research Centre (Texas University) contains interviews with eight Nigerian writers, taken in 1972-73. These are largely personal, they primarily deal with each writer's own way of working, the development of his craft, his evolution as a writer. They also acquaint us with the literacy activity in different centres in Nigeria, the formation of literary groups, the role played by certain individuals in their

functioning etc.

Here too one notices the change in the writers outlook that is gradually taking place all over Africa "The new poems are very different" says Michael J.C. Echeruo, one of the writers interviewed, "I do not speak for myself only, or even in my own voice, but with a communal voice because these new poems are about a more general experience.

Here too the voice of protest is heard more and more in

the writings of the Nigerian writers.

"I think there is a new maturity or a new sense of relevance that has emerged with the experiences of the war. The younger writers know that there is great deal to write about, they think that their work can and should have a message, that poetry is not simply the beauty of language or of phrasing, but the quality of the soul!"

The change in outlook is also manifest in the effort of the Nigerian writer to see the African reality from the African point of view and not

from the western point of view which had been the case earlier.

"I found it difficult to understand", says Obi Egbuna, "why outsiders still had the power to define Africa for us. Their definition was that Africa was primitive and everything western was good... So I wrote my book to make a political and cultural point to redefine our reality."

The interviews give valuable insight into the situation in Nigerian writing to day.

BHISHAM SAHNI

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B.O. Adebisi

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Manuscript should be type-written with double spacing and be in the form in which the authors wish them to appear in print. The right of editing the articles is vested with the Editorial Board. The original, as well as a carbon copy of the article, along with a summary of not more than 300 words should be submitted to the Editor. Contributors are, in their own interest, advised to retain a copy of their article as unpublished works will not be returned.

The authors are advised to include footnote material wherever possible. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively throughout the article. Bibliographical references should give the author's last name, date and place of publication and specific pages. Articles may be illustrated with line drawings and maps, classified as figures, to be submitted in final form (except size). Tables, if included in the text, should replace it and not duplicate it.

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Alliance for Oppression : Pre-coup Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa Versus Blacks

“Those who have been once intoxicated with power even though for one year can never willingly abandon it.”

—Edmund Burke

I

In Southern Africa black nationalism still confronts the fortress of white intransigence and a sophisticated system of repression. Although black Africa has moved down a bit since the overthrow of Caetano regime the radical change in Portuguese colonial policy cannot wipe off the effects of about five hundred years of brutalising varieties of repression. Portugal is responsible for the underdevelopment which Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola will have to fight for years. Despite its recent rhetorics about detente with free black Africa, the supremacist regime in South Africa continues to repress black majority. Rhodesia remains what it was in the days of the British imperialist, Cecil Rhodes—occupied Zimbabwe. The decision of successive British governments to do nothing effective to bring down Smith's fascist regime is seen in independent Africa as a sell-out that might make national liberation struggle of African freedom fighters a relatively more difficult exercise.

Looked at from historical point of view, such a view is sound. A similar sell-out in South Africa made apartheid, a reality. Britain granted to the Cape Province a representative government in 1853.¹ Then the vote was allowed to every literate male, 21 years old, with a minimum annual salary of £ 50 or landed property worth £.25

although Britain was aware that discriminatory economic practice made such conditions for the franchise unfair to Africans. The so-called liberal Cape proceeded in 1887 to pass the Parliamentary Registration Law otherwise known as the "Sprigg's Purge" which disqualified all voters who met the franchise requirements by virtue of their occupation of tribal land. Specially designed for Africans, the law was effective enough to ease 30,000 Africans out of political participation. Another draconian measure followed in 1892—the Native Franchise Act. This law increased property qualification for the vote. The success of this law in eliminating Africans from Active politics was so great that two years later, Cecil Rhodes, the patron saint and founder of Rhodesian oppressive system asserted, "We have not given them—the Natives—any share in the government and I am of the opinion, rightly so."²

Finally in 1959 the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act was passed as the legal foundation for the erection of Bantustans. With that law the last pockets of African participation in South African politics was flushed out. Britain simply looked on as the apartheid state was installed by the Nationalist Party.

But it becomes clear that Britain does not mind that Zimbabwe becomes a more sophisticated fascist state if one takes a hard look at Britain's policy in her "kith and kin" colonies.

The objectives of British policy in the "Kith and kin" territories are "retention of British influence" and "sound and responsible leadership in Africa".³ In practice Britain has always demonstrated a firm belief that in such territories the objectives can best be achieved through her "Kith and kin"—the white settlers. This explains the frantic effort of the colonial office to prevent the disintegration of the old Central African Federation. Britain installed white superiority wherever white settlers occurred in British colonies. It was amply demonstrated in the socio-economic privilege enjoyed by whites in Kenya despite the famous British Government declaration of 1923 that "should the interests of white settler's conflict with those of Africans those of the latter would prevail".

By the early sixties when the 'settler lobby' became urgently active in the Conservative Party it became obvious that Conserva-

tive Government would be more vulnerable to any settler pressure from Salisbury than Labour government. For the Labour Party has become prisoner of its own rhetoric—NIBMAR, and cannot boast of an intra-party pressure group irrevocably committed to settler interest, like the settler lobby in the Conservative Party. This pro-settler conservative pressure group consistently promotes settlers' interest in the Parliament and by their involvement in the work of the Joint East and Central Africa Board whose policy it is

“—to maintain and strengthen British influence in Africa. This must involve...the maintenance and safeguarding of the interests of trading and settler communities which bear such grave responsibilities for the peaceful progress of Africa in the years to come ... The Board is able through its contacts with Parliament, the radio and the press to play an increasing part in counteracting those corrosive and ill-informed views which have caused so much damage to British interests in Africa during the decade ... The dangerous forces to which the British position in Africa is exposed must be defeated...”⁴

From the declared aim of the Board we get to know that British interest in East and Central Africa is defined in terms of British investment and in terms of settler-community interest. In Rhodesia and South Africa where Britain has the bulk of her investments in single African states, the interest of African and settler-community interest are mutually antagonistic. By simple inference, Britain should be expected to throw its lot with the settlers. Again in the declared aim of the Board mention is made of “the dangerous force to which the British position in Africa is exposed” which must be defeated. The “forces” in question can only mean African nationalism in Southern Africa; the forces of decolonisation. In other words, the Board is determined to preserve the status quo in Rhodesia. Given the preponderance of conservative heavyweights who have been chairman and executive members of the Board, the Board's aim must have influenced Conservative Party's policy in the ‘Kith and kin’ territory of Rhodesia tremendously.

Dr. B.O. Adebisi

One should consider the influence of the following past chairmen and executive members of the Board in the Conservative Party.

Lord Alport, director of Conservative Political Centre 1945-50, minister 1955-61, British High Commissioner in Central African Federation 1961-63.

Sir Archer Baldwin, Conservative MP 1945-59.

Sir Frederick Bennett, Conservative MP since 1951, an advocate in the High Court of Rhodesia 1947-50, Bennett has business interest in South Africa as well as in West Indies.

Bernard R. Braine, Conservative MP since 1950 after leaving Indian and Pakistan Civil Services in 1948. Executive member of Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association.

Douglas Dodds-Parker, Conservative MP 1945-59, 1964—, Dodds-Parker has business interest in Rhodesia.

Lord Colyton, Conservative MP 1950-6, Minister of State for Colonies 1952-55. He has business interest in East Central and Southern Africa as well as in Malaya.

J. Vaughan-Morgan, Conservative MP since 1950, has business interest in Guyana.⁵ These are people on whom Ian Smith can always count for support. British monopoly capital is on the side of racism.

Racism and apartheid are rightly seen as crimes against humanity for the racial arrogance of the whites in Southern Africa with a corresponding devaluation of African institutions and the determination to maintain white rule can lead to genocide as the 1961 Sharpeville Massacre showed. Institutionalised racism in South Africa, more than anywhere else in the world, is "an invented psychological justification invoking physical and even cultural traits as ordained and immutable, to camouflage exploitation and oppression by a class or ethnic group, who impose their domination on other classes or ethnic groups".⁶ Unlike in the U.S.A. where a minority different in physical and cultural characteristics is exploited;

racism in Southern Africa is national exploitation of the majority. Its version of oppression, pillage and exploitation remains unparalleled in contemporary history. The mere fact that in Rhodesia another system of oppression and exploitation is developing before our eyes is a sad commentary on the present world order. The old Caetano-Smith-Vorster axis was designed to ripen into a full-blown partnership in apartheid for two main reasons: Firstly, apartheid, like all other systems of oppression, tends to defend itself beyond its border. Secondly, the white minority regimes evolved a kind of domino theory. The "Sunday Times" of Johannesburg urging South African whites and government to stand by Rhodesia in the early days of economic sanction wrote: "Rhodesia's ability to stand up to the strain imposed by sanctions is governed by the amount of help which she may receive from South Africa. There are as great risks in not helping Rhodesia as in helping her ... the long-term interests of South Africa demand the maintenance of white rule north of Limpopo ... We need to save Rhodesia because in doing so we shall go along to saving ourselves."

This paper will discuss the socio-political and economic arrangements as well as style of administration in precoup Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, and the patterns of co-operation among the three states to sustain Portuguese colonialism and apartheid in Rhodesia and South Africa.

II

Police-State as a prerequisite for Institutionalised Racism and Apartheid

White racism in Africa is a product of Western imperialism. In East, Central and South Africa imperialism combined the exportation of goods and capital with the exportation of its never-do-wells and adventurers into the forcibly acquired territories. Imperialists superiority of weapons broke the primary resistance of the Mashonas, Matabales, Xhosas and the Zulus in Southern Africa. Imperialist metropolises then handed over political power to a commercial firm—the British South Africa Company, and subsequently installed white minority domination in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Possession of political power and the control of agents of violence—police and army of racists,⁸ secured for the settlers and consequently Western capitalist states the exploitation of African peoples and the pillage of their natural resources. The socio-political development in Rhodesia since 1923 has been a systematic implementation of racial, political and social thought. The same can be said of the region now known as South Africa, since 1652 when a victual station was established at the Cape of Good Hope to serve the logistic need of Dutch ships plying Holland-East Indies route.

Racists as political and social theoretists belong to the anti-democratic school. Madison Grant whose work displays the influence of Gobineau⁹ and Chamberlain,¹⁰ for instance, sees the undesirability of democracy in its "transfer of power from the higher to the lower races, from the intellectual to the plebian class."¹¹ He rejects universal adult suffrage on the ground that it "...tends towards the selection of the average man qualified by both education and integrity ... From a racial point of view it will inevitably increase the preponderance of the lower types and cause a corresponding loss of efficiency in the community as a whole ... the tendency in a democracy is toward a standardization of type and diminution of the influence of genius. A majority must of necessity be inferior to a picked minority and it always resents specializations in which it cannot share".¹² True to type, the racists in Rhodesia and South Africa have waged a continuous war against 'one man one vote' right from the founding of the enclaves. When Ian Smith of Rhodesia was asked: "Are you an advocate of eventual majority rule in this country (Rhodesia)"? He promptly replied: "No, I cannot in all honesty claim that I am an advocate of majority rule this is the last thing I would advocate—in fact quite the reverse".¹³ And Vorster as a general in Ossewa Branding organisation declared, "We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism. You can call this anti-democratic principle, dictatorship if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism and in South Africa Christian Nationalism".¹⁴ In fact the conceptual model of man in all forms of racism and apartheid is collectivist and organic which makes it worse than the

liberal model. This makes apartheid a natural ally of National Socialism and Fascism.¹⁵

In order to maintain the undemocratic political systems of Rhodesia and South Africa, excessive use of force and repression by the power-that-be is inevitable. Accordingly the style of administration as well as social legislations are repressive. The numerical strength of the oppressed in both systems demands that the agents of violence be effective each time they are called out because a single failure may spell the doom of the regimes. The end result is that Rhodesia and South Africa have become police-states reminiscent of Adolf Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. Portugal [pre-coup] was also an effective police-state.

Whereas it is now common knowledge that apartheid South Africa is a police-state where "intolerance of political views and delegation of far-reaching and drastic powers to the police and other officials"¹⁶ is the order of the day, the world is little informed that under British supervision Rhodesia has built up a system of police-state. Preparatory steps towards the installation of a police-state really began with the passage of Land Apportionment Act in 1930, and Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934. These two acts institutionalised segregation in all spheres of Rhodesian life. Since then Rhodesia has accumulated racial laws meant to keep the African "in his place". The Defence Act of 1955 made military training for all Europeans compulsory. This law is supposed to facilitate the mobilisation of all whites against Africans in case of an armed conflict between the two races. The law excludes Africans from enjoying the same military facility; not even the "civilised" African with Anglo-Saxon reinforcements and the vote is deemed fit for military training. The exclusion of Africans is only logical given the Rhodesian situation. It explains the purpose of white military training.

The enemy against whom Europeans are being prepared is internal and black. Thus the settler government in Salisbury accepts the inevitability of black-white bloody confrontation. The rationale behind the Defence Act is to ensure that blacks come to the

inevitable rendezvous of violence with inferior skill and weapons. Attempts are also made to postpone a bloody confrontation by keeping low the level of consciousness of African masses. For instance, a Preventive Detention Act was passed by the Rhodesian minority Parliament in 1959. The target of this law were articulate Africans and effective African nationalist movements. Section 3(2) of the Act empowered the government to detain without trial "during the governor's pleasure", any body who the government thought to be "potentially dangerous to public safety". Such a person "shall live in such a district or portion of a district as may be specified in the order and shall not depart therefrom for any purpose". In this way the power to detain "difficult" African was reinforced by the one to create South Africa's Robben Island-type of detention camps. Because the regime was not very sure of the position of the judiciary at this stage, any detainee could not resort to the law courts. By May 1959, 100 persons were under detention : they were all Africans. Other vocal members of African community were subjected to frequent and rigorous searches at unholy hours. The African National Congress (ANC) was declared an illegal organisation. This might be called the end of the first stage in the making of police-state in Rhodesia.

The second stage began in 1960 with the passage of the all embracing Law and Order Maintenance Act. This law was no doubt, meant to sustain U.D.I. which was to come five years later. Under the Act, to make any statement "indicating or implying" that it would be "incumbent or desirable unlawfully to cease to work or to refrain from going or returning from work is an offence punishable by seven years imprisonment".¹⁶ Section 26 of the Act made it illegal to try to convince a person to join or to refrain from joining a political party. Thus all political activities normally permitted in democratic states are penalised. Ostensibly any person accused of any offence under the Law and Order Act is entitled to legal defence. In reality legal defence of Africans charged with any offence under the Act could constitute a crime. Mr. Baron succeeded in attracting the wrath of the government for defending "munt".¹⁷ Said Lord Gardiner when Baron was detained, "He has never

himself taken part in politics and has committed unforgivable sin of daring to appear for Africans".¹⁸ White Rhodesians normally do not waste their sympathy on 'traitors' like Mr. Baron. Victimisation of defence counsels made it easy for an African to get convicted for a statement like : "Now have nothing to do with Berman ; he is a quisling" Bvunzawabaya in Rhodesia Vs. Bvunzawabaya case, 1963, initially received two years imprisonment for this statement. He later succeeded in getting it reduced to six months by the Supreme Court.

The Law and Order Act is also designed to punish politically motivated crimes, especially terrorism which, by the time the law was passed, was rampant in the rural areas although the regime kept it out of public knowledge. Section 33A with its 1964 amendment documents this fact. Under the section arson attracts capital punishment if committed on a residential building. Possession of bomb irrespective of its calibre is also punished by death. Further, under Act 88 of 1964 up to twenty years imprisonment could be given for possessing any "offensive material". Conscious of the fact that the struggle for political independence in most African colonial territories was mounted by political parties, congresses, syncretistic movements, women and workers association,¹⁹ Smith's regime designed the Industrial Conciliation (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 1964 to abort any alliance between the toiling masses of Africans with any political party. Section 46 of the Industrial Conciliation (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 1964 prohibits any registered trade union or employer's organisation from affiliating to a political party or permit any political party to take advantage of their services, equipment or facilities.

Hard on the heels of U.D.I. came the proclamation of second state of emergency on November 25, 1965. Mr. Lardner-Burke, Law and Order Minister acquired frightening powers to be able to handle successfully "enemies of Rhodesia"—'Saboteurs from Zambia', 'Communists', 'African organisations' and their 'shadow cabinet'. Visibly, Lardner-Burke was in the grip of a type of hysteria paralleled only by what observers noticed among the Afrikaners just before the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950 was enacted. Lardner-Burke immediately vested in the police the power to detain indefinite-

ly and without any obligation to inform the Minister of Law and Order of the act. - On November 25, 1965 Lardner-Burke reported to the Parliament that 323 people were held in detention. On February 2, 1966 he gave the figure to be 343 whereas Amnesty International's figure, as in February 1966 was 1,100 people. One of two things must have happened. Either the Minister of Law and Order deliberately lied to Rhodesian Parliament or he had no idea how many more people were in police detention! Wha wha, Gohakudzingwa and Sikombela detention camps were teeming with Africans.²⁰

After ensuring that enough draconian power existed to suppress critical political views and dangerous activities, a battery of police-state supplementary laws were enacted to make for neatness. The control of publication Order in 1966 was to guarantee that news items appear where the regime wants them in newspapers. It was also meant to make the publication of any undesirable material in the newspaper impossible. It became a crime for the editor of any censored newspapers to mention this fact in his newspaper or leave blank spaces. Lastly came the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill which was to serve notice on Rhodesians that the police state will be around for a long time. And Ian Smith confirmed it: "Well, in all honesty, I must say to you that this will continue as long as we think it necessary as long as we think it is for the good of Rhodesia. But I hope that we can get away from it as soon as possible. I am not prepared to do away with it just to appease an outsider's opinion".²¹

In the last stage of its development, the Rhodesian police-state clamped down on the university. University teaching staff came under the notorious category of 'enemies of Rhodesia'. It all started when forty of them signed a petition protesting against Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The mutual lack of confidence that developed between the regime and the university seemed to have forced the regime to seek to control university activities. For example, hand-outs meant to augment teaching came under stringent scrutiny so did internal university documents.²² Members of teaching staff who found the new situation intolerable had to resign. A full-blown police-state had arrived in Rhodesia.

In the compartmentalized, artificial, racist society where relationships are defined in irrational terms of racial differentiation and roles are allotted according to the colour of the skin, those in power would need all the coercion they can muster to extract obedience. Apart from apartheid South Africa from whose socio-political and economic system the Rhodesians have borrowed substantially, Metropolitan Portugal, a mature police-state, under Salazar and Caetano, had always shown interest in sharing her experience in repression with Rhodesia in order to retain her own territories where she was engaged in a last-ditch battle with African freedom fighters.

The state of democracy in the metropolitan state often conditions the style of administration in the colonies. Absence of democratic institutions in Portugal since 1926 when Dr. Salazar came to power made Portuguese colonialism so far the most unbearable on the African continent.

The catholic church, commercial interests and the military coalition set up by Dr. Salazar, remained firmly in control of political power under Caetano. No political parties apart from the official Uniao Nacional (National Union) were allowed to function. The Gestapo-type PIDE, later renamed General Directorate Security, empowered the police, like in Rhodesia and South Africa, to hold citizens in detention. Under Portuguese detention law, the police could detain any person for a period of six months in the first instance, without a specified charge brought against him. After a few hours of freedom the individual could be rearrested and detained for another six months. The process could be repeated indefinitely. The similarity between the Portuguese detention system and South Africa's Nine-day Police Detention law is noteworthy. The condition in Portuguese detention camps were identical with what Africans experience in Rhodesia's Wha Wha, Gonakudzingwa and Sikombela and in South Africa's Robben Island. In Missombo, Angola, before he died Salazar erected a dehumanising camp for Africans.²⁴

While in Rhodesia and South Africa the law tells Africans 'their place,' long years of Portuguese colonial practice—500 years, have evolved racist style of administration and social relations not

quite different from apartheid. For example, in Angola and Mozambique, Portugal operated a pass system similar to that of South Africa. A.U.S. official document states : "The Civil Identification Archives issues personal identity cards.... On certain occasions the cards must be presented to the local administration or the local PIDE representative. Proper identification aids one for example, to obtain permission to move from one district to another or to obtain a labour permit for a new job. In the major cities the movement of Africans in certain quarters is restricted by a curfew".²⁵ Like in Rhodesia and South Africa territorial segregation existed in Portuguese colonies—"at Ceca and in the Limpopo Valley in Angola the authorities established white colonies into which no African was admitted".²⁶

Above all, Portuguese racism was manifested in the 'assimilation' system. A system which conferred the rights and obligations, of second-class Portuguese citizens on Africans after they have been completely shorn of their cultural heritage and forced to acquire Portuguese cultural reinforcements. Political participation under Portuguese system was tied up with literacy. The indirect way of barring Africans from active politics was by ensuring that very few could read and write. Thus five-hundred years of Portuguese 'civilising mission' in Africa produced 5% literacy in Guinea-Bissau, 10% in Angola and 15% in Mozambique.²⁷

III

Mechanisms for Exploitation

The most benevolent colonial situation is exploitative. The functional purpose of racism and apartheid is exploitation as Han Suyin has pointed out. Therefore the distinction between colonialism, racism and apartheid is mainly academic. This explains why independent African states regard the situation in Southern Africa as colonial. All other factors being equal, the rate and nature of exploitation of any given colonial people and their natural resources depends on the level of economic and technological advancement of the metropolitan state. The economic under-development of Portu-

gal exposed Africans in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau to the most crippling type of exploitation in colonial history. Let us take a quick glance at the economic and social condition of precoup Portugal.

The per capita Gross National Product of Portugal as at 1967 was estimated at \$457. About 68% of the population of Portugal earned in that year on the average between \$7.50 and \$21.50 weekly. These figures were the lowest in Europe that year. Unbelievably, 40% of Portuguese people are stark illiterates.²⁸ The social condition in metropolitan Portugal is nothing better than what one sees in Egypt. For instance, in 1962 out of about 2.2 million dwellings in Portugal 12% lack kitchens, a staggering 72% have no running water, 60% are lit by paraffin lamps or candles and 62% have no sewage.²⁹ In illiterate Portugal technology had come to a halt since the 19th century. Little wonder that Portuguese so-called "overseas territories" (which are more than twenty-two times its size) maintain Portugal. This is a reason why decolonisation was anathema to Salazar's and Caetano's Portugal.

The first Portuguese economic activity in her African colonies was slavery. Thus Portugal was responsible for shipping between 7 and 15 million Africans to the Americas under the most deplorable conditions. Angola alone was supposed to supply slaves "until the end of the world".³⁰ Coupled with the inhuman business in human merchandise was an internal slavocratic economic system based on slave labour. The Portuguese law on slave-labour stipulated that every able-bodied man was under obligation to work, "if they do not fulfil it, public authority may enforce a fulfilment".³¹ The law remained in force as quoted until late in 19th century. Since international public opinion abhors all forms of slavery the Portuguese replaced slave-labour system with an equally inhuman if not more vicious labour system. This system of primitive exploitation was practised in either of two ways. Either Africans were simply rounded up and carted off to the Portuguese plantations and mines in Angola and Mozambique or they were forced to cultivate a particular type of crop under conditions quite similar to the one

stipulated by the Rhodesian Land Husbandry Act. Of course the government unilaterally decided the selling price of the crop. Furthermore Portugal exported forced-labour. Under an agreement signed with Portugal in 1928 and renewed in 1934 and 1952, South Africans could recruit up to 100,000 Angolans for South African mines. In exchange, the South African regime guaranteed that 47.5% of all imports and exports for Transvaal would be channelled through the port of Lourenco-Marquis. Without the right to take along his family, the Angolan worker laboured under sub-standard conditions for the equivalent of about one dollar per day. A sizeable portion of the wages was normally deposited with a South African Bank until the expiration of labour contract duration. All the interest on the wages, the wages and indemnities of accident victims flow into Portuguese government coffers. Apart from all these, a bonus, calculated per head of worker recruited was collected in Lisbon. It is no over-statement to say that colonial resources including labour prevented the collapse of Portugal since the Second World War.

Africans in Rhodesia are caught in the cross-fire of two competing exploiting classes. These are the local whites, that number 225,000 and international capitalist class composed mainly of Britons, Americans and West Germans. The nature of Rhodesian economy should throw some light on my view.

Rhodesia depends very heavily on foreign trade. She exports tobacco, sugar and minerals while she imports a wide variety of manufactured goods. Before U.N. mandatory sanction on Rhodesia, exports were 38 per cent of the national income while imports accounted for 34 per cent.³² Against the international capitalist exploiting class, the local whites can put up a weak competition because of the structure of the economy. Britain is the main supplier and buyer in Rhodesian economic system. The bulk of Rhodesian imports and exports are handled by British businessmen, British banks finance them and they are transported in British vessels. Beyond this, British investment in Rhodesia has been estimated at about \$300 million. American investment of about \$150 million comes second. It goes without saying that a sizeable portion of the surplus produced in Rhodesia finds its way to Britain, the U.S. and

West Germany. This is particularly so because the big companies in primary production in Rhodesia are not locally based and because their interests, varying from Zambian Copper to South African mines, are generally diversified but less so in Rhodesia. A white coalition of rural bourgeoisie, wage-workers and petty bourgeoisie, which incidentally wields political power in Rhodesia, must engage in extreme exploitation of Africans in order to enjoy a high living standard so as to make up for the profit siphoned off by international capitalism. TIME magazine painted a vivid picture of the success of white coalition's exploitative mechanism in this manner: "Few communities in the world can match the sun-drenched affluence that Rhodesia's hardy settlers have achieved for themselves. Lions still command the distant escarpments, and elephants, baboons and rhinos forage in the valleys of rivers bulging with hypos. But on the rolling veld, brushed with elephant grass and flowering jacaranda trees, the whites have carved out a tidy empire of modern tobacco farms and cattle ranches that has brought modest prosperity to the land. Taxes are low so are prices; and for whites, wages are high enough to permit all but the most menial workers their own cars, homes and servants. Salisbury, with a white population of 88,000 spread out over 30 square miles, claims more swimming pools than any U.S. city of its size....

By law, white workers must be given preference over black; the average black income is \$200 a year, the average white income \$2,000. A white telephone repairman is accompanied on his calls by his black assistant, who carries his six-pound tool kit, hands the boss his screwdrivers with operating-room efficiency, earns bare subsistence wages and at days end, rides seven miles by bicycle or overcrowded bus to Highfield, one of the outlying African townships into which Salisbury's 300,000 blacks are crowded".³³

Territorial segregation in Rhodesia means more than detesting "to live with stinking munt". The superexploitative system in Rhodesia rests on it. It was therefore not surprising to objective observers when in 1959 the half-hearted attempt by "liberal" Edgar Whitehead to amend the Land Apportionment Act (Amendment) 1941 was opposed by settler legislators because the Land Apportionment

Act "is the cornerstone of our Society".³⁴ The first Land Apportionment Act, passed in 1930 split the country into "European areas" and "Native Reserves". Another one was passed in 1941. The second Land Apportionment Act gave Africans 42 million acres or 8% of all available land. Settlers allotted themselves 52 million acres of Rhodesia's best portion of land. 3 million acres were left under forest while 57,000 acres remain unoccupied. 75% of white lands are yet to be utilized ; "the landlords are not Rhodesians."³⁵

The economic significance of the Land Apportionment Act has been thoroughly analysed by Giovanni Arrighi.³⁶ On the productivity of African land he wrote : "Given the techniques employed by the peasantry and the type of soil allocated to them, this move from shifting to continuous cultivation produced progressive soil erosion and thus decreasing production of African land..., the progressive decreases in the productivity of land were tantamount to a progressive decrease in the overall productivity of the peasantry".³⁷ This method of decreasing peasant productivity turned out to be a way of increasing the supply of labour apart from the pool created directly by the Act itself by allowing settlers to enter into agreements whereupon "a native or his family shall be permitted to occupy a portion of such land under condition that he supply labour to such owner or occupier."³⁸ Through legislation—Native Registration Act, 1936 and the Pass law, the power to unilaterally pitch wage-level for the pool of African labour created by the Apportionment Act was indirectly given to the settlers. Arrighi saw the division of Rhodesian economy into two non-competing racial groups implied in the Land Apportionment Act. He meant that the economic competition which could ensue between "(a) white agrarian bourgeoisie and African peasantry ; (b) white and black bourgeoisie in both the produce and labour markets ; (c) white and black petty bourgeoisie in retail trade ; and (d) white and black wage-workers in the skilled labour market",³⁹ had been banished from Rhodesian life. Thus the white settlers in Rhodesia were determined to eliminate the competitive potential in the African masses. What the Land Apportionment Act could not achieve the Land Husbandry Act which prescribed how the African should cultivate

the land—"they are not allowed to grow cash crops as Virginia tobacco ; if they are grown, they are strictly controlled".⁴⁰ This racist 'parallel development' ideology of the settlers becomes a political weapon because economic criteria are employed in measuring political maturity ; since annual income and possession of landed property are linked up with the vote.

The system of exploitation in South Africa is identical with what obtains in Rhodesia. In Rhodesia, the on-going 'parallel development' is more or less the same as Nationalist Party's declared policy of apartheid—"separate development" which works hardship for Africans the same way as the Rhodesian system. The rate of exploitation in South Africa is however much higher than anything Rhodesia can boast of. One should remember that the Republic is an advanced capitalist state much more endowed with slave-labour from the Bantustans, Malawi and Lesotho and 'natural resources than Rhodesia. The gold and diamond mines are enough attraction for investment. British investment is followed by American and German investment in South Africa. As to the returns the New York Times reports :

"American companies in South Africa have reported an average the following ratio of earning to investment in manufacturing enterprise : 19.7 per cent in 1961, 24.6 per cent in 1962, 26% in 1963, making this the most lucrative market for U.S. participation in manufacturing enterprises anywhere in the world. One company reported 100% return."⁴¹ The returns get out of the Republic only after the white rulers have ensured that enough surplus is retained to maintain baaskap. This is a reason why apartheid pays Africans only one-tenth of white workers wages. Mr. Harry Oppenheimer president of Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, in 1972 called for a more liberal wage policy for blacks, because international capitalism finds the present wage-structure inhibitory to economic expansion since it allows millions of African workers very weak consumption power ; while better consumption power could sedate blacks out of agitation.

III

Functional Collaboration of Racists

As correctly perceived by Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa, the future of white supremacy depends on the strength of the 'white fortress' which the three states are determined to erect. If the trend in the partnership had continued, apartheid South Africa stood to come off with the greatest dividends. As at now the economic position of South Africa is second to none in Africa. South Africa alone is responsible for 22 per cent of Africa's gross national output, 40 percent of its industrial output ; she handles 20 percent of Africa's export and 18 percent of Africa's imports. In extraction industry, South Africa enjoys a special place in the western capitalist economy. But politically outside Southern Africa, South Africa is in isolation built up for her by African states. In order to change her world image South Africa must silence independent African states or befriend them. The primary aim of South Africa in the partnership, therefore, is a northward thrust economically and politically. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia says of the thrust : "Apartheid is on the offensive...The Boer trek is still on and is now instrument to the wide concept of neo-colonialism".⁴²

The alliance among Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa was a rather comprehensive one. The alliance had also an ambitious economic project which was supposed to ripen into a Southern African Common Market. Uncertainties about the future of Rhodesia prevented the establishment of concrete institutions along that direction. All the same, on the eve of the coup that ousted Caetano enough economic cooperation existed to sustain a more elaborate economic structure.

South Africa and Portugal were determined to neutralise the effect of U. N. Mandatory Sanction on Rhodesia when it was imposed. Single-handedly, South Africa supplies Rhodesia with enough oil and metals to keep Rhodesia's vehicles on the road and her manufacturing industries employed. She maintains a wide network of insurance and credit arrangements for Rhodesia in order to stabilise the foreign exchange value of Rhodesian currency.

Gradually South Africa is replacing Britain as the buyer and supplier of Rhodesia's exports and imports.

The war of national liberation going on in Angola and Mozambique prevented adequate flow of investment from Western capitalist states despite the huge amount of money spent by Portugal to influence journalists through free trips to urban Angola and Mozambique. South Africa not only served as go-between for Portugal she also invested in Angola and Mozambique. South Africa has \$ 300 million involvement in the Caborra Bassa scheme and acquired oil exploration concession in Angola and now pipes natural gas from Mozambique. Western capitalists were interested in the racist common market because they do not only dominate South African economy but also have interests that are scattered all over Southern Africa. The formation of a self-sufficient economic cum-military system in the region could have made for more efficient functioning of these monopolies.

Perhaps a more urgent area of cooperation among the racists was the physical defence of the territories they occupy. The substantial territorial gain made by African freedom fighters in Angola by the early sixties and the panic created by the activities of Zimbabwe nationalists among white community provoked secret military agreement among the whites of Southern Africa. South African police, troops helicopters and armoured cars protected the Smith regime since August 1967 until early 1975 thanks to the connivance of Britain. One of the special tasks of South Africa was to guard the site of the controversial Cabora Bassa Dam in Tete province. In Southern Angola where the Portuguese have been having problem of containing nationalists thrust, the South African Air Force (SAAF) helicopters did scouting work for their allies. In Natal white middle-class was mobilised in support of Portuguese effort in Mozambique. Under the aegis of Mozambique soldiers' Comfort Fund, white professionals and business interests in Natal donated generously. Their feeling has been succinctly put by Aid Parker a Natal "Sunday Tribune" journalist : "It is our war as much as theirs".

The military might of South Africa itself is owed to Western capitalist states under whose patents and supervision she manufactures military hardware. France, Italy, West Germany ensure that the military budget of the Republic equip its arsenals with modern weapons.⁴³ *In 1967 the world was alarmed that the Republic possessed the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Late that year, the Washington Post⁴⁴ reported that West German scientists were erecting nuclear reactors and developing Harp missiles for South Africa at Tsumels in Namibia. In exchange South Africa supplied West Germany about 100 tons of unpure uranium oxide.*

Apart from holding the 'Zambesi line' the defence cooperation among Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa had another purpose. It was meant to cow and harass militant African states who have adopted the 'liquidation of remaining vestiges of colonialism in Africa as their vital national interest. In Southern Africa, Tanzania and Zambia came readily to mind and in West Africa, Republic of Guinea and Nigeria are the only nations worthy of mention since Nkrumah government was toppled in 1966. Since it has proved impossible to install quislings in the states mentioned above, Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa frequently harassed them.

Zambia has been subjected to South African and Rhodesian threats since UDI. In October, 1967, the Prime Minister of the Racist republic, Vorster, threatened to hit Zambia "so hard she would never forget it." In joint operations Rhodesian and South African air-crafts made series of sorties into Zambian territory. To demonstrate the degree of havoc they could perpetuate, the racists destroyed a span of Luangwa bridge in June 1968. Luangwa bridge is one of the major arteries out of Zambia. Hence Kenneth Kaunda saw himself constrained to tour Europe searching for military aids to augment the ground-to-air missiles he bought from Britain.

Portugal's incursions into moderate Senegalese territory was reported to the United Nations and investigation confirmed Portuguese involvement. On the 22nd November, 1970 the Portuguese attempted an invasion of Republic of Guinea in a well-planned military operation. It failed. Some day independent Africa would realise that

her political independence remains fragile unless she can collectively defend it as a unit. As the racists wax stronger more threats, blandishments and actual invasions are to be expected. For unless they are dislodged or emasculated the racists will seek to serve as king-makers in independent Africa in the bid to protect *baaskap* beyond its present borders and destroy "encirclement." The overthrow of Caetano's regime was a blow to the racist alliance but given the determination of Ian Smith and Vorster to protect 'the last bastion of European Christian civilisation' and the bigotry and hypocrisy of Western capitalist societies, a bloody confrontation between exploiting whites and blacks might be inevitable. Much will depend on the attitude of Ian Smith and Vorster regimes towards Angola and Mozambique.

FOOTNOTES

1. Govan Mbeki, South Africa : The Peasants Revolt, Penguin, p. 23.
2. Govan Mbeki, *op. cit.* p. 24.
3. Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945/1961, Clarendon, 1971, p. 306.
4. Joint East and Central Africa Board Annual Report, 1956, pp. 6-7.
5. For the biographical notes on Lord Alport, Sir Archer Balduin, Sir Fred. Bennett, Bernard R. Braine, Douglas Dodds-Parker, Lord Colyton and J. Vaughan-Morgan, I am indebted to Goldsworthy *op. cit.*, Appendix I.
6. Han Suyin, "Race Relations and The Third World" in Race, July 1971, No. 7, Vol. XIII, p. 4.
7. The Sunday Times, Johannesburg, November 21, 1966.
8. E. D. Morel, The Black Man's Burden, Monthly Review Press, 1969, Chapter 5.
9. Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, Essay on the Inequality of Human Races, New York, 1915.
10. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, New York, John Lane, 1912.
11. Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, New York, 1921, p. 12.
12. Madison Grant, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
13. Newsweek, December 19, 1966, p. 33.
14. Quoted in J.E. Spence, "After Verwoed" in *The World Today*, October 1966, pp. 4-5.

15. For an analytical discussion on the similarity among the conceptual model of man in apartheid, National Socialism and Fascism, see A. James Gregor, *Contemporary Radical Ideologies*, Random House, 1968, pp. 237-256.
16. See R. A. Hasson *op. cit.*
17. 'munt'—is the Rhodesian version of 'Kaffir'; the South African derogatory appellation for blacks.
18. House of Lords Debates, Vol. 27, No. 15, pp. 128-9.
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20. For a most revealing description of the living condition in Rhodesian detention camps, see Moses Makine, "An Iota of Difference in *Africa South*", Vol. 3, 1959, p. 62.
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23. See Mark B. MacGuigem's report in *Toronto Globe and Mail*, February 28, 1967.
24. A De Oliveira, "Salazar's Portugal" in *Angola: Views of A Revolt*, issued under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations, 1962.
25. Handbook for Mozambique, Washington, February, 1969, p. 313.
26. A De Oliveira, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
27. D. M. Abshire and Samuels (eds.), *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* New York, Praeger 1969, p. 185.
28. A De Oliveira, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
29. *Africa Today*, *op. cit.*
31. J. Venter, *The Terror Fighters*, Capetown 1969, p. 91.
32. *Business Week*, Nov. 20, 1965, pp. 40-41.
33. *TIME*, No. 5, 1965.
34. Quoted by Richard Monock, "Rhodesia: Historical Background" in *Monthly Review*, Vol. 17, No. 8, Jan. 1966.
35. Joshua Nkomo, *Rhodesia: Case for Majority Rule*, New Delhi, 1966.
36. Giovanni Arrighi, "Rhodesia: Class and Power" in *New Left Review* No. 39, Sept/Oct. 1966.
37. Giovanni Arrighi, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
38. Giovanni Arrighi, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
39. Giovanni Arrighi, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
40. Joshua Nkomo, *op. cit.*
41. *New York Times*, January 25, 1965.
42. Kenneth Kaunda, quoted by Brain Bunting, *The Rise of South Africa Reich*, London 1969, p. 474.
43. Keith Irvine, notes that the 1960/69 defence budget of South Africa—\$ 358 million rose to \$ 2148 million in 1967/68. See *Current History*, Feb.; 1968. Current estimate is about four times that figure.
44. *Washington Post*, November 3, 1967.

Dr. Dike Nworah

The Organisation of African Unity and the International Labour Organisation, 1963—1973 : A Decade of International Co-operation

Studies on labour relations in various African countries have, undoubtedly, made notable contributions to the sociology of the localities described, and have invariably also provided the basis on which other larger social policies could be formulated.¹ Nevertheless, it is still possible that this over-concentration with micro-analysis of situations, even when absolutely necessary, has not always succeeded in placing the overall African social landscape in its proper historical perspective. Moreover, the absence of studies on institutional relations could be forgiven when no institutions exist ; but it cannot be easily explained when they exist. Thus, if the Organisation of African Unity is still an important force to be reckoned with in contemporary African history, it should be rewarding to examine the nature of the relations between this continental organisation and the International Labour Organisation if only to illuminate the social dimensions in the diplomatic experience of African States and their involvement in international organisation.

The necessity for close co-operation between the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations Specialised Agencies was recognised by the Charter of the former and statutorily adopted as a policy by the United Nations.² And in consonance with the declared aim of fostering this international co-operation, the OAU strove to participate in the deliberation of the ILO which on its foundation in 1919 had adopted a constitution based on the precept

that 'universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice'.³ Many years afterwards, the Philadelphia Conference of the ILO, held towards the close of the Second World War, would still declare that "poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere."⁴ By 1944, then, the ILO had adopted a detailed "Recommendation" which defined, among other policies, "the basic aims and standards for promoting the well-being and development of the peoples of dependent territories."⁵ This "Recommendation" provided "the basis in 1947 for several Conventions directed specifically towards non-metropolitan territories and dealing with freedom of association, labour inspection and social policy in general."⁶ The Convention on social policy was revised in 1962 to make possible its ratification and continued application by independent African states. Thus, even before accession to independence, African States had participated in the work of the ILO.⁷

But with increased membership, due to its principle of universality of membership and of representation,⁸ the history of the ILO since 1963 had been marked by a rapid transformation in its activities and working methods in response to the changing needs of a rapidly changing world of which the formation of the OAU was one. For example, the balance of power principle on which the ILO had based its operations would have to be made applicable to the new situation brought about whereby over half of the total ILO membership came from Africa and Asia. Adjustments had to be made both in the ILO Conferences and in its Governing Body. At the same time, independent African states, on joining the Organisation, had to confirm the obligations in respect of the ILO Conventions accepted on their behalf by the colonial powers previously responsible for their international relations. Thus by 1965, the ILO Director-General could report no fewer than 759 ratifications by African States, more than half having been made since 1960.⁹

It is worthy of mention that before the OAU began to reinforce them, some machineries for co-operation between the ILO and Africa had already existed, and were even being progressively improved and enlarged to meet the rapidly changing situation. The hub of that machinery was the ILO's African Advisory Committee.

Established in 1958, it composed of twenty governments, ten Employers' members and ten workers' members, and advised the ILO Governing Body on African problems. It also made recommendations on the advisability of ILO meetings in Africa and on the composition and agenda of such meetings.¹⁰

With the formation of the OAU, however, African co-operation with the ILO became more militant. The 1963 session, for example, was so far the most stormy session of the Conference when African delegates withdrew in protest against the presence of the South African delegation and demanded the expulsion of South Africa from the Organisation. Consequently, in 1964, the ILO adopted a unanimous Declaration condemning the policy of apartheid and also approved an amendment to the ILO Constitution which now made provision for powers of suspension and expulsion.¹¹

At the same Conference, a resolution was adopted calling on the Governing Body of the ILO "to assist African countries in development generally and to promote schemes for workers' education and vocational and technical training." The resolution specifically invited the ILO to review its whole regional policy, in relation to the role of regional advisory committees and conferences, and the problems of implementing international standards. It requested the Governing Body to ensure that the ILO programme and structure were fully adopted to African needs, to speed the appointment of Africans to regional posts, and to aim at a greater degree of decentralisation in its regional activities.¹² Three offices dealing with technical co-operation were subsequently established at Lagos, Addis Ababa, and Dar-es-Salaam, to negotiate programmes of technical co-operation, supervise those being executed and to follow up and evaluate their activities.¹³

It could be inferred, therefore, that these fast developments were a positive part of the efforts by African Ministers of Labour, under OAU auspices, to present a united African front at international meetings. Despite the difficulties confronting diplomatic co-ordination among African States, the African Ministers of Labour after the foundation of the OAU, had nevertheless made a number

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of concrete recommendations one of which was that the Secretarial aspect of their annual conferences should be undertaken by the OAU Secretariat. As Diallo Telli later reported to the Ministerial Council, "they had fully understood the necessity of associating labour as well as the ILO in their Conference."¹⁴

Onwards, each session of the ILO Conference was always preceded by an African Labour Ministers' meeting which provided an important forum for the harmonization of African States' points of view on different social problems. During most of these conferences, the OAU Secretariat closely co-operated with the African Group in producing information directly from competent authorities to enable the group usefully prepare studies requested by the Specialized Commissions of the ILO, and thus respectably accelerating co-operation in the social field.¹⁵ By October 1966, these efforts had enabled Africa to increase the number of its representatives in the ILO Governing Body,¹⁶ and to obtain a substantial increase in volume of the General assistance granted to Africa by the ILO.¹⁷ And despite the reproach of the OAU Secretary-General by the Council of Ministers in December 1965 for signing agreements of cooperation in October of the same year with ILO and ECA without explicit instructions,¹⁸ it seems that the ILO agreement was a factor in the favourable response by the ILO to the pressing demands by the African States for greater attention.

Thenceforward, the OAU Secretariat never relented in its efforts to achieve co-ordination of African strategy over social questions in international forums. For instance, it had helped to convene the meeting of the African Ministers and Officials responsible for social affairs held in Cairo in April 1967 with the intention of preparing a united African platform for the world Conference scheduled for 1968.¹⁹ Although twenty-six African States were represented at the Cairo Conference, the time devoted to it was unfortunately rather short, and insufficient attention appeared also to have been given to African co-operation, the harmonization of African views, and the preparation of a single African platform for the world conference.

The Cairo Conference, nevertheless, made one recommendation which indicated the importance of the role of the OAU in mapping out the operational strategies. It requested the OAU to invite, "subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers, a small group of experts from Six Countries to meet at Addis Ababa in order to formulate an African platform and harmonize African views on social welfare and community development."²⁰ Thus, when the African Labour Ministers met in Geneva for the 51st Session of the ILO, they took these recommendation into consideration, and laid stress on the imperative necessity" of harmonizing relations between Governments, employers and labour.²¹

By the end of 1968, it was more definitely certain that the OAU was becoming more actively and closely associated with the Conferences of African Labour Ministers, not only in the sphere of social development, but also in the global plane. For example, the OAU had bestirred the Seventh Session of the Conference of African Ministers to reach clear decisions before the ILO Conference of that year.²² However, because of a number of obstacles, the Ministers' Conference could not be held in Africa. It was held in Geneva only a few days before the 52nd ILO Conference. Their collaboration could not go beyond the then burning preoccupations of the ILO in 1968, most of which were connected with the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Therefore, in spite of the determined efforts of the OAU Secretariat, the African delegates could not divorce themselves from the prevailing mood in Geneva, and only succeeded as the OAU Secretary-General reported, "in aligning their position as to the best means of strengthening the practical action of the ILO in promoting (and controlling) human rights."²³ But, on the racial question, the African delegates could not but centre their activity "on a more decisive orientation of the work of the ILO on behalf of the victims."²⁴

This active role already enhanced by the personal attendance of three African Heads of State at the ILO Conference in Geneva²⁵ was further emphasized by the solid front presented in the African demands that the structure of the ILO should be improved so that "justice, equity and democracy should be introduced," and in the

persistent plea by the OAU that, "substantial qualitative and quantitative improvements [be] made for the benefit of African peoples and governments."²⁶ The OAU provided African Labour Ministers with rewarding advice on the problems of the International Labour Office in February 1972, in particular those concerning the proposed regionalization of the activities of the Turin Centre for Technical and Vocational Training,²⁷ and provided a strategy for survival when a serious crisis arose in the ILO Office from the unilateral decision of the United States authorities to reduce their normal financial contribution to the ILO.²⁸ In 1972, the OAU co-ordinated the position of African States at the Ninth Session of the Conference of African Labour Ministers held in Geneva before the 56th Session of the ILO in which the OAU also participated.²⁹ It was instrumental in the decision by that Conference to hold the Tenth Session of the African Ministers Conference at Kampala (and not at Geneva) to enable African States elect their representatives to the ILO Governing Council for the period June 1972 to 1973.³⁰

The participation of African States in the ILO Affairs, we have seen, was based on the conviction that the forum was a unique opportunity to prove not only Africa's devotion to the high ideals of social justice,³¹ but also to demand international assistance for their social needs. It was natural that the OAU, whose charter was the embodiment of these needs and ideals should play a significant role, not only in maintaining an institutional relationship through an agreement of co-operation with the ILO, but that it should also comply with the one aspect of its charter hitherto difficult to observe, that is the harmonization of African policies in international organisation.

Despite its work in the interest of youth, women, safety and health of workers, vocational rehabilitation and discrimination between the sexes in employment, despite the ILO commitment to comprehensive programmes of human resources, social institutional development and conditions of life,³² the most sensational role of the OAU was in inducing the ILO to condemn the racial policies of South Africa, to call on the South African Government to take

measures to end apartheid, and to demand an annual report from the Director-General on the subject. South Africa was forced to withdraw from the ILO;³³ yet African States had induced the ILO to resolve to co-operate with the UN "in seeking and guaranteeing freedom and dignity, economic security and equal opportunity for all the people of South Africa."³⁴

No doubt, a crusade against racial discrimination anywhere and at all times could be a contest laden with variable sensations. And in the last analysis, it is the successful struggle for co-ordination of African policies with respect to this particular International Organisation that was the most spectacular and the most positive aspect of the co-operation between the OAU and the ILO.

FOOTNOTES

1. Micro-studies on labour relations in Africa are Legion. For an illustration of the most recent publication, see V.N. Godfrey 'A Broader Role for National Provident Funds: the Zambian Experience' in *International Labour Review* Vol. 109, No. 2, Feb. pp. 137-152; N.O. Addo, 'Foreign African Workers in Ghana' in *International Labour Review* Vol. 109, No. 1, Jan. 1974, p. 47-68; H. Joshi, H. Lubell, and J. Mouly, 'Urban Development and Employment in Abidjan, *International Labour Review* Vol. III, No. 4, April 1975, pp. 289-306 and R.J.C. Ford, 'The Village Polytechnic in Kenya' in *International Labour Review*, April 1975, p. 307-320.

2. For an analysis of the statutory provisions and relationship, see B. Boulys-Ghali, 'The Addis Ababa Charter' in *International Conciliation*, No. 546, Jan. 1964, pp. 31-35.

3. *The ILO and Africa* (International Labour Office Geneva, 1966), p. 11.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. See David A Morse, *The Origin and Evolution of ILO and its Role in the World Community* (New York 1969).

9. *The ILO and Africa*, op. cit., p. 13.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

11. See Morse, op. cit., pp. 37-39.

12. It is significant to note that in 1952, only 2.7 per cent of the total expenditure on ILO programmes was incurred in Africa ; it increased to 10.2 per cent in 1950 ; 27 per cent in 1962 ; and 33 per cent in 1964. By 1965 Africa had the largest number of ILO assignments.
13. See *ILO and Africa* op. cit., p. 14.
14. OAU Council of Ministers, CM/168 (Part 7) in CM/Cttee C/SR. 3 (IX) September 1967, p. 9.
15. CM/119. Oct. 1966, pp. 15-16.
16. In June 1965, Oumar Baba Darra, Secretary of State for the Civil Service and Labour of Mali was unainmously elected Chairman of ILO Governing Body for the year 1965-1966. He was the first African to hold the post.
17. CM/119, Oct. 1966, pp. 15-16;
18. See CM/SR. 4 (VII).
19. CM/168 (Part 7, in CM/Cttee C/SR. 3 (IX) Sept. 1967.
20. CM/168, (Part 7), p. 8.
21. CM/168 (Part 7), p. 9.
22. *Ibid.*
23. CM/212 (Part 2) September 1968.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Emperor Heile Selassie, Presidents Ahidjo and Kaunda where presen at the 50th Session ; thus demonstrating Africa's interest in the ILO.
26. CM/270 (Part II), September 1969, p. 6.
27. CM/351. February 1971, p. 20.
28. The USA had decided to reduce her contributions by 5 per cent.
29. CM/412, February 1972, p. 16.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
31. cf. George C. Lodge, *Spearheads of Democracy Labour in the Developing Countries* (New York, 1962) p. 228.
32. D. Morse, op. cit., p. 88; and ILO *Pamphlets*.
33. See *ILO Programme for the Elimination of 'Apartheid' in Labour Matters in South Africa*. February 1964, also *ILO and 'Aparthied'*, (ILO, 1968).
34. Morse, op. cit., p. 39.

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The Secret History of the Italian Fascist Occupation of Ethiopia—1935—1941

Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1936-6, the greatest colonial war ever fought on the continent of Africa, and the collapse of the League of Nations' effort to restrain the aggressor, was followed by the establishment of the short-lived Italian colonial empire. This event, which was proclaimed on May 9, 1936, four days after the fascist occupation of Addis Ababa, ranked in fascist mythology second only to the Duce's march on Rome in 1922, and took place in an atmosphere of euphoria approaching delirium which set the tone of much subsequent fascist propaganda. The realities, even from the point of view of the Italian administration, let alone from that of the subject population, were very different as the present article, based largely on then confidential or unpublished fascist and other Italian sources, attempts to show.

The atmosphere in the first months of the occupation was summed up by Patrick Roberts on the British Legation in Addis Ababa, who, writing on December 16, remarked that the Italians in Ethiopia were "fed on propaganda which eschews plain statements of fact and prefers the language of bombast and self-laudation. Italian soldiers are always 'brave' their leaders' speeches are always 'vibrating' and Italy herself is always 'great' and 'powerful' and 'noble'. Certain nouns, in fact, never seem to appear without the adjective consecrated by the intensity of national pride and, can it be, by a lurking lack of self-confidence which seems to reassure itself by such a noisy beating of the drum."¹

The triumph of fascist colonialism as painted in such propaganda had in fact little relationship to the actual situation in East

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Africa, for the supposedly monolithic regime was, as we shall see, soon to be rent with internal dissention, while the vast and largely inaccessible empire was still largely unoccupied. Many areas of the country could not in fact be brought under Italian control without expensive and long drawn-out campaigns of "pacification," in some cases necessitating the prior construction of roads. The possibility of effective economic development was even more remote, as was recognised by a leading Italian soldier, Marshal Caviglia, who confided to his diary on May 6, the day after the occupation of Addis Ababa, "one must not forget that to develop Ethiopia we need two or three generations and many milliards which we do not have."²

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One of the first problems facing the fascist leadership in the initial phase of the occupation was that it had embarked on the invasion without any precise plans for the government of the country. Fascist thinking on the empire was moreover hampered by the fact that General Emilio De Bono, one of the founders of fascism, a sometime Minister of the Colonies, and the principal architect of the invasion, had been dismissed early in the campaign for his failure to achieve the rapid advance demanded by Mussolini. His successor, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, once a royalist opponent of fascism, was regarded as a political illiterate with the limited mentality of a soldier and vitally no understanding of the conceptions of fascism. Fascist policy for the empire had therefore to be framed largely in Rome, without the support of the local commander-in-chief, and took the form of directives from the supposedly infallible Duce and his doctrinaire Minister of Colonies, Alessandro Lessona, neither of whom had any knowledge of local conditions.

Mussolini, a man of violence who had murdered his political opponents in Italy, thus stifling opposition to his regime at home, was determined on a ruthless policy of repression in the belief that it would crush Ethiopian resistance. Though aware of the assistance obtained from local collaborators during the invasion he envisaged only a limited role for them. Dismissing the proposal that Dajazmach Haile Sellasie Gugsä of Tigre, one of the earliest

collaborators, be given the title of Highness, he telegraphed to Badoglio on January 18, 1936, saying, "it is understood that he had no more than a purely local value...it is necessary that Gugsä remain within the frame of the indigenous hierarchy without taking away from him that which we promised him, but also without giving him exaggerated hopes of obtaining that which we cannot and must not give him."³

Deeply concerned at what he considered the need to maintain Italian prestige *vis-a-vis* the colonial population the Duce later telegraphed to Badoglio, on April 23, shortly before the occupation of Addis Ababa, that "for obvious reasons it is necessary to reserve precedence for the national [i.e. Italian] troops."⁴ As the Italian army advanced to the vicinity of the Ethiopian capital Mussolini, learning of the looting which preceded the seizure of the city, despatched a further telegram, on May 3, instructing his commander to embark immediately on a policy of terror. "Your Excellency", he declared, "must give orders that, 1) All those who are caught in the city or surroundings with arms in their hands shall be summarily shot. 2) All the so-called Young Ethiopians, barbarous, cruel and pretentious persons morally responsible for the pillage, shall be summarily shot. 3) These who have not surrendered their fire-arms and ammunition within 24 hours shall be summarily shot. I await a word confirming that these orders have, as always, been executed."⁵

Badoglio, who was slated to head the new Italian military government of Ethiopia, occupied Addis Ababa two days later on May 5, but was unwilling to execute the Duce's brutal orders to the letter, with the result that though many looters were summarily executed the shooting of the Young Ethiopians was not carried out as instructed.⁶

On the subsequent proclamation of the empire, on May 9, Badoglio was appointed Italy's first Viceroy of Ethiopia, and two days later received his first governmental instructions from the Duce. The latter, determined as far as possible to eradicate all trace of the old Ethiopian regime, gave orders that the Ethiopian term *Nagusa Nagast*, or King of Kings, should under no circumstances be applied

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to King Vittorio Emanuele of Italy. In a telegram of that day the dictator declared : "The title...of the chief of the defunct Ethiopian Empire is evidently not such that it can be given to His Majesty the King, not even in the indigenous languages. Your Excellencies will see to it that in official acts the title of Emperor assumed by His Majesty is translated in Ethiopian Qesarza-Ethiopia to the Emperors of Rome. Likewise in Arabic the title will be Quisa al-Habashah."

Badoglio, though accepting this directive, seems to have had little comprehension of the philosophy behind it. His approach was one of military convenience rather than of political doctrine, for his experience in the campaign led him to favour a pragmatic policy, at least in the initial phase, based on temporising with the chiefs. His ideas, which had parallels with the British colonial system of "indirect rule," were formulated in a long telegram which he despatched to Mussolini on May 16. He declared that "the problem of the political organisation of the vast conquered territory" had acquired "urgent and maximum importance." There were essentially two methods of governing : "that of direct relations between our political organs and the populations, and that making use of local chiefs as intermediary organs." Both systems had "merits and defects," but the latter was clearly the one he preferred. He argued that a policy which "neglected families and persons connected with the millennial system of Ethiopian feudalism," would "create furnaces of discontent and disorder," and that a system making use of local chiefs would "more rapidly achieve a satisfactory order on which later to found an organization corresponding more to the objectives of our occupation." He had decided, however, "not to follow rigidly either one system or the other," but to apply whichever seemed more suitable in particular circumstances, with the object of achieving "a satisfactory political situation as soon as possible," even if this necessitated "concession to the old state of affairs" when that could more rapidly assist the "normalisation of internal conditions".⁸

The Viceroy proceeded to inform his chief in some detail how he proposed to govern the various provinces. In the region between

Shoa and Eritrea, he declared, "there were local noble families which it was not convenient to slight because they had exercised command for generations and have authority and prestige which can be valuable for us." Such personages included the descendants of Emperor Yohannes in Tigre, Sabagadis in Agame, the Wagshum in Lasta and others in Yeju, Ambasel and Wallo: beyond the Takaze river the noble families were of "less importance" though still "usable in the administrative sub-divisions." In accordance with this policy the entire province of Tigre, he explained, had already been assigned to Haile Selassie Gugsa, and it seemed suitable to assign Agame to Fitawrari Sabagadis, Yeju to Dajazmach Ayalew Beru, and Wag, Ambasel and Wallo to other local families. Since Ras Seyoum of Tigre, an enemy who had by now submitted, could not be "denied a certain authority in northern Ethiopia," and since his province had been already allocated to Haile Sellassie Gugsa, the Viceroy proposed placing him in Semien or Begemder with a mandate to "pacify and govern that not easy region."⁹

Gojam, Badoglio went on, had likewise formally been ruled by King Takla Haymanot who had enjoyed friendly relations with the Italian travellers of his day. Italy therefore had "moral duties" towards his son, Ras Haylu, who had already shown himself "faithful to us," and whose "indisputable authority" could be of "undoubted value" even outside Gojam, for he had "profound knowledge of Shoa, Begemder and the Galla regions near to the Blue Nile." The Viceroy therefore proposed entrusting him with the administration of Gojam.¹⁰

Shoa, the heart and most important province of the ex-empire, Badoglio believed, required especially "prudent" treatment. He accordingly proposed compromising as far as possible with the old regime, by "allowing much, both morally and materially, to the old order of things." He therefore considered it advisable to employ in the administration "all those elements of the previous government who could be used," and that they should be allowed to retain the "prerogatives" they had formerly enjoyed.¹¹

Badoglio's proposals for the rest of the country also placed emphasis on ruling through traditional chiefs. The Azebo, Raia and

Yeju Gallas were thus to be established as an autonomous residency or administrative unit.¹² The Dankalis, in both Ethiopia and Eritrea, were to be jointly governed from Assab, with residencies on the coast and in the interior.¹³ Aussa was to have "a certain autonomy" under a local chief subordinate to Italian officials.¹⁴ The Galla countries south of Shoa and the Blue Nile were to retain their "primitive individuality," and wherever possible have "their old systems of internal rule" preserved.¹⁵ On the other hand, Harar, described by Badoglio as "geographically an extension of the Shoa mountain system," should, he urged, remain administratively part of Shoa, the more so as this would have the convenience of keeping the whole of the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway in Ethiopia under a single jurisdiction.¹⁶ Such proposals, he concluded, could be expected to assist the "rapid normalisation of internal conditions."¹⁷

The Duce and his fascist advisers, notably Lessona, seem to have taken a poor view of the above plan which appeared to confirm them in their opinion of the Viceroy's incapacity to govern in fascist style. Badoglio's telegram was in consequence ignored. Soon afterwards its author made clear his desire to be relieved of his post. General Rodolfo Graziani, the commander of the southern front, was appointed interim Governor-General on May 21, and on the following day Badoglio returned to Rome at his own request. Graziani, who later came across a copy of Badoglio's telegram, complained that its attitude was based on the premise that "the government of the various regions" should be "entrusted to the great native chiefs" in recognition of "their descent and feudal influence," though "Italian officials should exercise control beside them." For his own part he rejected his predecessor's approach on the ground that though it "could have been attractive at the first moment, because it favoured the illusion of an immediate pacification, power in the hands of the great local chiefs, naturally armed, presented too great difficulties for the future."¹⁸ This contention was probably shared by the fascist leadership in Rome, for the idea of preserving any vestiges of the former government of Ethiopia ran directly contrary to the racist and totalitarian tenets of fascist thought.

Lessona, the chief fascist theoretician of the empire, now came forward with his own proposals. Instead of retaining Ethiopia's former administrative units and making substantial use of the country's old aristocrats, as Badoglio had urged, he proposed the division of the Italian East African empire into five clearly defined new administrative units, each to be commanded by an Italian general. This arrangement, as Graziani later noted, meant the exclusion of the great native chiefs from any office or influence, and hence the rejection of "indirect rule" through the traditional Ethiopian hierarchy.¹⁹ Lessona subsequently recalled that when he made his proposal to the Duce the latter "approved it without objection," and adds truthfully, though maliciously, that it "could not have been otherwise because Mussolini was completely in the dark regarding native politics in Abyssainia. He said to me that he wished immediately to see to the nomination of the governors. He indicated to me the name of General Pirzio Biroli, leaving me the choice of the others."²⁰

The Minister of the Colonies, who was thus given permission to draft the governmental system for the empire, proceeded with the detailed formulation of his plan, and, on June 1, an official ordinance for Italian East Africa, the *Ordinamento organico per l'Africa Orientale Italiana* was, as Graziani later recalled, "peremptorily" issued in Rome.²¹ Article 1 divided the Ethiopian empire into three governments, designed to take their place side by side with the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somalia both of which were expanded territorially at Ethiopia's expense. The new administrative units consisted of Amhara, with its capital at Gondar, Galla and Sidama, with its capital at Jimma, and Harar with its capital at the city of the same name, while Addis Ababa was made into a separate governorate. The result, as a contemporary Italian colonial authority, R.S. Salis, proudly explained, was that the Ethiopian empire lost all juridical existence in Italian law.²² The Ordinance went on to state, in Article 11, that each of the five governments would be under a Governor nominated by Royal Decree on the advice of the Minister of the Colonies. Such Governors, according to Articles 12 and 13, were dependent on the Italian Viceroy and had to execute general political, administrative and military orders from the Ministry of the

Colonies via the Viceroy, but each Governor was responsible for his own government, and was to correspond directly with the Ministry of the Colonies on matters relating to the ordinary affairs of his government.²³ The Governors were thus simultaneously responsible to Rome and Addis Ababa.

In accordance with Lessona's plan the government of the empire was then divided among five generals, i.e. Guzzoni in Eritrea, Pirzio Biroli in Amhara, Geloso in Jimma, Nasi in Harar, and Santini in Somalia,²⁴ while Graziani, renowned for his ruthless "pacification" of Libya, was appointed the Empire's second Viceroy on June 11.

Lessona meanwhile was drawing up guidelines for the administration's attitude towards Ethiopian chiefs. In a telegram sent to Graziani on June 15 he declared that he rejected "any form of indirect government," and that "above all the re-establishment of the authority of the Rases in individual provinces should be prevented." This did not "mean that we wish to carry out a policy of repression against the Rases who have submitted and cooperated loyally with us. On the contrary Your Excellency can give freely and generously, if he wishes, in political expenses and in honorific titles. But the populations must at every moment have the clear feeling that they depend exclusively on Italian authority and that the village or district chiefs whom we nominate are only native functionaries dependent on individual and regional commissioners, and are without any political authority. Personal relations with Ethiopian chiefs," he concluded, "should likewise be marked by the maximum courtesy and tact, but with the total and absolute exclusion of any act that might be interpreted as a recognition of a prestige and authority which were definitely destroyed by our victory."²⁵

The above principles were further elucidated by Lessona in a telegram to Graziani on August 4 which stated that Mussolini did not consider it "opportune that Ras Seyoum be called to take part in the consultative organs of the government." The Minister of the Colonies added in a memorandum of August 5 that Italian policy should be based on the motto, "No power to the Rases," an axiom which had been explicitly ordered by the Duce. The population,

the Minister proclaimed, must have the "very clear feeling that Italy does not govern on a *metayer* basis," i.e., by sharing power with "native" chiefs, and "that Italy has sufficient force and authority not to have to deal with anyone to make herself obeyed." Conceding that "one could not destroy in 48 hours a social order installed for centuries," he accepted the principle that local chiefs could "serve as intermediaries" for the Government, but bluntly added: "the natives must feel that the chief speaks only in the name of the Government and that if he still enjoys any prestige it is because the government has granted it to him."²⁶ The Italian military authorities in Ethiopia nonetheless found it necessary to make considerable use of the leading collaborator, Ras Haylu, who was employed in fighting against the Patriots and was in receipt, according to an entry in the diary of the Italian journalist Ciro Poggiali, of a monthly subvention of no less than 100,000 lire a month, 20,000 of which was his personal allowance.²⁷

Graziani on taking over the functions of Viceroy thus found himself subject to far more explicit directives than his predecessor, but accepted them, at least openly, with good grace, for he replied to Lessona's memorandum, on August 17, that it had laid down guiding principles which had "already been and will be even more faithfully followed in the future."²⁸

Notwithstanding this courteous reply the Viceroy was by no means satisfied with the administrative structure which had been established for the empire. He was angered, as he subsequently revealed in his memoirs, by the appointment, without consultation with him, of the five provincial rulers, all of them generals with the right to communicate directly with the Ministry of the Colonies in Rome. This arrangement of divided responsibility led him into an immediate clash with Lessona, for the Viceroy and the Minister of the Colonies each interpreted the ordinance of June 1 in his own way. As early as June 5 the latter telegraphed to Graziani, and to the governors of Eritrea and Somalia, to inform them that the various governments of the empire "should henceforth correspond only with the Minister of the Colonies from whom exclusively they

would receive instructions and communications.”²⁹ The Viceroy rejected this interpretation of the Ordinance, but the Minister emphatically replied, on June 11, that he had “not, I say not, in any way modified or suspended the application of the law.”³⁰

Conflict also soon developed between the Viceroy and his provincial governors. On June 23 Graziani complained to them, by telegram, “Your Excellencies frequently despatch telegrams directly to the Minister on various questions without sending them for information to the Governorate-General which in consequence remains in the dark on important questions.” He instanced the Eritrean Government’s plans for telegraph lines which extended beyond Eritrea and affected the whole of Ethiopia. He therefore “specifically ordered” that, except in matters of “ordinary administration,” for which it was possible to communicate directly with the Ministry, he should be informed of all communications involving military, political, juridical, economic and other matters, and added that he had explained to the Minister of the Colonies that copies of all important telegrams to the various governorates should be sent to him for information. The provincial governors should take note of his “mode of governing and commanding which did not include the word ‘abjure’.”³¹ Not content with this admonishment he sent the governors a further telegram, on June 26, revoking previous permission for them to inform Rome of “news of a politico-military character” which had therewith to be supplied to him alone, “even if negative.”³²

Lessona rejected Graziani’s interpretation of the statute. On August 12 he ordered the Viceroy thenceforward not to communicate with any Ministry, including the Ministry of Press and Propaganda, except through the Ministry of the Colonies.³³ Graziani, however, refused to brook any such constraint. On August 31 he proudly telegraphed to the Minister that he “insisted on expressing his opinion on any matter” as he did not want the functions of the Viceroy to be reduced to a branch of the Ministry. Were this to come about he would be “very ready to cede the position to a successor.”³⁴ Lessona, still adamant, replied, on September 8, that

"excessive centralisation of powers at Addis Ababa would retard and often annul all activity in the peripheral regions, though he admitted that "to find right limits" was difficult but not impossible."³⁵

While the Minister for the Colonies, the Viceroy and the provincial governors wrangled for power little was done to create an effective administration. Though fascist propaganda at home depicted the empire in glowing terms there was much disillusion in Addis Ababa. Poggiali, who was shocked by the low capacity of many of the Italian officials, noted in his diary on September 21 that the Italian judge in the Addis Ababa court did not know a word of Amharic, that on one was making any effort to learn it, and that the often highly legalistic proceedings were conducted entirely through the aid of a "black interpreter" who knew only enough Italian to ask for a glass of water. Exclaiming that the proceedings were incomprehensible to the accused, and hence a "swindle" and an "infamy," the Italian writer could not help remarking: "the natives ... do not have any confidence in us ; if he is white, they reason, he is against us." All this, he commented, was not surprising as the Italian officials came "not through a spirit of patriotism or adventure," but because "service in the colonies counted as twice the normal," and the officials were "all old men going as fast as possible to a pension."³⁶ In a subsequent entry, on October 16, he spoke of the difficulties facing the new empire, and sadly observed that a young brigadier of the finance guards who did not even know how to speak Italian properly, crowds of people coming from Italy with the purpose of obtaining monopolies, or demobilised soldiers looking for posts in the colonies, "unfailingly set back solutions, raise difficulties, put sticks in wheels, and render everything inconclusive." All this, he declared, was living testimony of the empire's slow-moving, obstructive, impotent and useless bureaucracy."³⁷

* * *

In Rome meanwhile Lessona had become involved in another dispute, namely with his predecessor De Bono. Difficulties between

the two fascist leaders began in the summer of 1936 when Lessona started investigating a contract for the development of the Massawa-Asmara road which De Bono had granted as High Commissioner for Eritrea in the period of preparations immediately prior to the Ethiopian war. The contract had been awarded to a certain Salvatore Scalera of the road-building company of S.I.C.E.D.P. which had a paid-up capital of only 5,000,000 lire but had contributed no less than 300,000 lire to the Asmara fascist newspaper. Lessona discovered that the sum agreed upon far exceeded actual construction costs. He therefore suspended payments to the company,³⁸ and attempted to scale down the contract from 120 to 67 million lire.³⁹ Scalera thereupon appealed to his patron De Bono, who wrote to the Duce as the latter's "old, affectionate servant", on September 9, 1936, recalling the contractor's "great fascist and patriotic merit" as revealed by his generous contributions to party funds, and appealed to Mussolini for "justice, your justice."⁴⁰ The fascist dictator advised De Bono to avoid becoming involved in the case, but the former commissioner for Eritrea refused to listen to such advice, declaring it his "sacred right to do so."⁴¹

While the dispute smouldered on several observers began remarking that De Bono's road-building in Libya and also been particularly expensive. The fact that subsequent construction work was noticeably cheaper was pointed out by Lessona's patron, Marshal Balbo, one of Mussolini's first collaborators, in an article in the journal *Nuova Antologia*, which was summarised in the Rome daily *Il Messaggero* of February 26, 1937. Such a statement, and the publicity afforded to them, greatly incensed De Bono who abandoning the pose of unity among the fascist leaders, wrote an indignant letter to the *Messaggero*, which appeared on February 27, stating that the first roads had naturally cost more than those built subsequently, and that Balbo's assertions had led the public to believe that there must have been much "swindling."⁴² Tension between De Bono and Lessona became so acute that there was talk of them resolving their differences by a duel. Mussolini was obliged on February 27 to appoint a "jury of honour" of four fascists to determine whether the matter should be resolved by resort to arms,

but expressly forbade them from inquiring either into Lessona's actions as a Minister or into the facts of the road contract under dispute.⁴³ The jury unanimously concluded that the quarrel resulted from the two officials' work, which was outside its competence, and could not therefore be settled by "gentlemanly proceedings."⁴⁴

News of this clash among the fascist leaders could not be kept from the press, to Mussolini's irritation.⁴⁵ The whole affair, according to a confidential fascist report of February 28, created "disgusted surprise" in Italian political and journalistic circles, and it was particularly regretted in that it had appeared in the foreign press and could thus be "exploited by anti-fascist elements both in the country and abroad."⁴⁶ The Rome correspondent of *The Times*, who spoke of widespread public suspicions as to "the existence of corruption" in connection with road-building in the colonies, commented, "The washing of fascist linen of any hue in public is so unusual that the greatest curiosity has been aroused by this polemic about colonial affairs being allowed to achieve the prominence it has."⁴⁷

Notwithstanding fascist disquiet at such publicity De Bono and Lessona continued to vent their mutual hatred as they struggled to gain a favourable decision from the Duce on the Scalera affair. De Bono, who was closer than Lessona to the Duce, wrote him many passionate letters. On April 28, for example, he denounced the Minister as playing a "trick" which was "neither just nor honest,"⁴⁸ and on May 7 of carrying out "pure acts of brigandage,"⁴⁹ while on December 17 he declared: "either I am not fascist or it is obvious that the manner of action of the Minister of the Colonies is certainly not that to serve either Fascism or the Regime."⁵⁰ Lessona, who was equally vehement, was quoted in one fascist report as having boasted that he would build his "political fortune" on the corpse of De Bono and of the latter's secretary Colonel Butturini.⁵¹ Both contenders also attempted to cast their quarrel in historical terms. De Bono declared on May 17 that it would be "interesting" to read his letters when published after his death—in 2002, which he hopefully referred to as the eightieth year of the fascist era. Lessona in a letter of October 3, the second anniversary of the

invasion of Ethiopia, commented that on that "historic day" for the life of the Nation" he would "never have been able to think" that he would have had to pass through such "hours full of bitterness" as De Bono had caused him.⁵² During the investigations there were many charges of fraudulent evidence and intimidation of witnesses, as well as bitter remarks as to the political reliability or otherwise of the various parties to the dispute. In the end De Bono won the day. On October 4, 1937, Lessona agreed, on the Duce's direct orders, to accept the terms of Scalera's original contract.⁵³

* * *

Graziani throughout this time had continued to wage his own struggle with Lessona with the aim as far as possible of controlling communication between Rome and the Empire's provincial governors. On February 15, 1937, he telegraphed Geloso, the governor of Galla and Sidama, declaring that "in order to avoid disagreeable misunderstandings" it was necessary to note 1) that all communications regarding military operations and reinforcements as well as matters of a political character be sent exclusively to himself, it being his responsibility alone to correspond on such questions with the Ministry; 2) that all telegrams or letters to the Ministry on ordinary administrative matters should always be sent to him so that he be kept in touch with events, and 3) that everything dealing with political and military affairs was his sole prerogative for which he alone was responsible to the Minister, and that he was "legitimately jealous" of this prerogative.⁵⁴ Justifying his position to Lessona in a subsequent telegram of April 4, he argued that it was essential that the individual governors should be subordinate to him, and that they should not be allowed to send to the Ministry proposals concerning which his government was in many cases in ignorance, a particularly serious matter should these involve the commitment of funds.⁵⁵ Such appeals, like those sent by Graziani earlier failed to move Geloso, for on October 30 the Viceroy accused him of "frequent" violation of orders as manifested by unauthorised communication with Rome.⁵⁶ The division of authority, as Graziani later recalled in his memoirs, was thus "from the outset the cause

of infinite disagreement" and "contributed to creating discord between the Minister and the Viceroy's government, as well as between the latter and individual governors inclined to avoid direct control by elastic interpretation of the law."⁵⁷

Differences between Lessona and Graziani were not confined to matters of procedure but soon extended into areas of policy. Lessona's approach to colonial government, the Viceroy later complained, was unduly modelled on that adopted in Libya at the time of its conquest by Italy in 1912, and was thus a system of government "neither with the chiefs, nor against the chiefs, but without the chiefs." No allowance was made for the different situation in Ethiopia where "feudal power" and the "moral stature" of the chiefs was "much stronger and more potent" than in Libya.⁵⁸ Graziani, though renowned for his ruthlessness in that Italian colony, which had earned him the nickname of "hyena of Libya," was well aware of the tenuous position of his armies in East Africa, and therefore, like his predecessor, felt it necessary to temporise with the Ethiopian leaders. He states that his stay in the country had taught him that "the best method" of dealing with "subject chiefs and populations" was to make government directives clear while removing from the chiefs "the illusion that they could be restored to direct government of the population." He thought that the latter should be made to understand that they "owed obedience" to the Italian officials. "Chiefs and sub-chiefs" ought to be "nothing but advisers" to the Italian administration. Referring to his differences with Lessona he claims that he placed greater emphasis than the Minister on the need to achieve the "loyal pacification" of chiefs and populations, including the "surrender of all arms" and "absolute obedience to orders," but asserted that tact should be combined with firmness as he saw "neither reason nor necessity in procuring the reputation of a hard man, but rather felt the "advantage of leaning toward generosity."⁵⁹

Lessona, with his usual dogmatism, saw no such need for caution, and later complained that the Viceroy, "through fear that his Libyan past had caused him to be considered a cruel man,"

ruled with "excessive indulgence."⁶⁰ Graziani, for his part, confirms that he and the Minister did not see eye to eye, and that his attitude was regarded in Rome as one of "weakness".⁶¹ This charge, if we can believe Poggiali, was also levied against him by Guido Cortese, the fascist party secretary in Addis Ababa, who went so far as to complain that the Italian regime in Ethiopia was "anti-fascist".⁶²

With a view to obliging Graziani to develop a firmer and more oppressive policy the authorities in Rome bombarded him, as he records in his memoirs, with "a series of peremptory and draconian orders" which "disturbed and complicated the calm development of events." Some of these orders, he says, were signed by Mussolini and others by Lessona, but "the formula was always the same : the Duce directs, the Duce orders, the Duce wishes."⁶³

The first of these "draconian orders" dealt with the treatment of the Young Ethiopians whose execution, as we have seen, Mussolini had ordered as early as May 3, 1936. Graziani shared the Duce's aversion to these young men, most of whom had studied in France where, he declares, they had become "embued" with modern democratic and Voltarian ideas," which had made them a "hostile nucleus, and the more dangerous because capable of terroristic acts." On reaching Addis Ababa he had the young men arrested as a "precautionary measure," and decided on placing them in a concentration camp at Danale in Somalia. While carrying out what he calls this "normal police measure" he nevertheless received "peremptory orders" from Rome, prescribing their "immediate summary trial."⁶⁴ These orders were embodied in a telegram of July 10 from Lessona which recalled Mussolini's earlier command and declared it "necessary that such orders be executed completely" so that the Young Ethiopian be "eliminated without mercy."⁶⁵ Graziani, however, refused to follow these instructions and was supported by the local Italian director of political affairs, Avolio, who also "adopted an attitude of absolute opposition to these orders."⁶⁶ The young men remained in detention but were not executed.

The Viceroy later recalled that he was bombarded with many such orders, which, as he points out, were later seized after the

fascist collapse by the American Intelligence Service. "I order you", said one of them, 'to apply a rule of terror.' 'Without the law of a hundred percent retaliation it is useless to hope for a rapid submission and pacification,' suggested another. 'Take action that all prisoners, as soon as captured, are executed,' enjoined a third. 'I order that all chiefs, wherever captured, be immediately shot.' And again : 'I repeat to you that it is necessary to establish a regime of absolute terror.' And so on."⁶⁷ Many of the telegrams sent to him from Rome were indeed couched in such vain as is apparent by scrutiny of the documents themselves.

Graziani is, however, less than honest in remaining silent about his own apparently whole-hearted acceptance of the policy of terror which is equally well documented. He was responsible in this period for the execution on July 30, 1936, of the Ethiopian bishop Abuna Petros, news of which was, however, strictly excluded from the fascist press.⁶⁸ On September 11, he ordered "reprisals without mercy in Lasta" where "villages must be systematically destroyed in order that the people be convinced of the inevitable necessity of abandoning their leaders." On December 12 he telegraphed one of his commanders, General Tracchia, to "disarm and liquidate without mercy and illusions," and, noting that the people of Shoa were now "obsequious," he added : "I ask you not to be moved." Several of his telegrams also gave orders for the use of yperite and asphyxiating gasses, while Poggiali tells in his diary of numerous executions of Ethiopians caught in the possession of arms.⁶⁹ The Viceroy, anxious to place himself in a favourable historical light, ignores such acts, merely asserting in his memoirs that he was under constant pressure from Lessona to adopt a policy of greater ruthlessness, and recalls: "I asked, implored in vain that I be accorded full confidence, be allowed to act with freedom of action and decision. The Minister agreed in principle, but if I then resisted the application of some orders the severity of which seemed to me absurd and dangerous this sharpened the defeatist campaign against me who was accused of having lost my old bite, of being enfeebled and worse. Echoes of this campaign, destructive at least in its intentions, reached me from Rome through multiple channels, but did not succeed in

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making me depart from the principles of equity and equilibrium which I had traced.”⁷⁰

A further, somewhat bizarre dispute between Graziani and Lessona arose out of Mussolini's decision to remove the pre-war statues of Emperor Menelik and the Lion of Judah from the Ethiopian capital. Lessona, who was instrumental in giving Graziani the relevant orders, declared that the dismantling of the Menelik statue in particular had been decided upon “to give a manifest proof to the Abyssinians that the regime of the Negus was finished.” The Viceroy, however, refused to comply with the command which, the Minister complains, “terrified Graziani” who said that it would cause “all the Shoans to rebel.” The Minister, on the other hand, refused to accept what he regarded as such prevarication, and repeated his orders once again insisting that the removal of the statue would show “the Abyssinians that the regime of the Negus was dead.”⁷¹

Graziani in his memoirs complained bitterly against such pressures from, Rome, and declared : “at Rome things came to be considered in the reverse : instead of the difficult and displeasing reality an entirely euphoric dream; and accusations of incapacity and inertia against him who struggled on the spot against rebellions wherever they occurred, despite extreme lack of means and possibilities with which to confront them, scarcity of provisions and the urgency of resolving the problem of the internal occupation of the territory.”⁷²

* * *

Behind the dispute between Graziani and Lessona lay the fact that the Italian military situation in Ethiopia immediately after the “conquest” was far more serious for the invaders than was allowed to appear in their official press. A truer appreciation was made by Patrick Roberts who noted that this period was “a very serious one for the Italian High Command” which “manifested unmistakable nervousness”, and records that the Viceroy had gone so far as to compare “his situation, in speaking with me, with that of Gordon at Khartoum.”⁷³ Graziani, for his part, later recalled in a letter to

De Bono the Italians' "*weak military situation in the capital* in May 1936", and frankly admitted, "mine was consequently a policy of expediency." He claimed that this policy was tending to detach almost all the Chiefs from the rebellion."⁷⁴ In his memoirs he complains that Lessona's policy towards the chiefs caused "the greater part" of them to "lose hope of recovering the government of the provinces," with the result that they "distinterested themselves" in the Italian government and even turned to hostile and sabotaging acts." This development was particularly serious at a time when Graziani's principal concern was the "penetration of the western provinces" which was essential in view of Mussolini's desire to create the impression of a total and complete conquest.⁷⁵ The situation was especially "delicate", the Viceroy claims, in Amhara province, where Pirzio Biroli, had "stumbled into an intensely uncertain and chaotic situation," for the region "had been occupied by the Starace column almost without firing a shot," as a consequence of which "the entire population had remained armed, weapons in the hands of the local chiefs." This, the Viceroy somewhat patronisingly added, was "a very delicate situation that only a very expert hand would have turned to our advantage and certainly not Pirzio Biroli, a valourous soldier and a good commander experienced in campaigning, but not prepared for political action."⁷⁶

Ethiopian Patriot activity moreover expanded considerably in June. Graziani admits that resistance then became "even bolder and more menacing," particularly around Addis Ababa, along the railway line, and on the all-important road to the north. The military situation was so serious that Mussolini gave him orders to send reports by radio telegraph every two hours, while Poggiali, then in Addis Ababa, noted in his diary on July 14, "the city is in confusion; we are still in a state of war. One is invited to return home at dusk because it is dangerous to travel about by night. Around the city there are threatening armed bands."⁷⁷ The Patriots launched a full-scale attack on the capital on July 29.⁷⁸ Foreign observers suggest that the Italian military authorities at this time displayed considerable incompetence, Roberts for example declaring that "though the Italians were spared the humiliation in the eyes of

the world and the set-back to their plans which failure to control Addis Ababa would have involved, the manner in which they handled the situation was such that the few observers of the event from within formed a scarcely less unfavourable impression of their military capacity than if they had failed to hold their own.”⁷⁹

At this critical juncture Lessona arrived in Addis Ababa for his first and only visit to the empire, and did so, according to Graziani, “to control the truth of things.” The tour had, however, an inauspicious start, for during his rail journey from Jibuti the Italian command learnt that the Patriots were massing along the line. At Dire Dawa, the Minister of the Colonies recalls, he received a telegram from Graziani warning him that the Ethiopians were planning to attack his train, and advising him therefore to continue the journey by plane. “What would the officials and soldiers of the train’s escort have thought of me,” he later exclaimed, “if it continued without me? And the natives?” He therefore decided to proceed all the way by rail, but to avoid night travel. As anticipated, the Patriots attacked, and some fifteen miles from the capital, the Minister records, “I found myself in the middle of a battle between Blackshirts and rebels.”⁸⁰

Lessona, who was accompanied by Cobolli-Gigli, the fascist Minister of Public Works, succeeded, after some delay, in continuing his journey to Addis Ababa where he arrived on October 12. Graziani claims that the Minister escaped only “miraculously,” and that the incident had the effect of persuading the latter that “the situation was in truth not rosy.”⁸¹ The attack, according to Poggiali, created “general satisfaction” among the Italians in Addis Ababa who reasoned that it would force the authorities in Rome into an awareness of “the true situation in Africa. Up to now,” he explains in his diary, “in Italy they do not believe in the insurgency; they believe it to be exaggerations by the military to get itself honour and to earn honours.”⁸² The attack, one of the first incidents to reveal continued resistance to the occupation, also gained the Patriots international publicity. A report from Jibuti published by *New Times and Ethiopia News* in black type under the heading “Italian

Minister takes Refuge under Chair," declared, "the Italian Minister of the Colonies was greatly surprised when his railway carriage was attacked. Eyewitnesses say that he hid himself under his chair, and that one of the railway servants put lots of parcels on him."⁸³

On his arrival in Addis Ababa Lessona adopted a stern and arrogant stance. Poggiali records that the reception for the visiting Minister on October 15 was marked by "extreme coldness." Only two chiefs, one of them Ras Seyoum, replied with a few words to the Minister's "insignificant chatter," while Lessona, following the new fascist racial policy of isolation from the "natives," "offered his hand to no one," and this created "stupified gloom" among the Ethiopians present. They were further "disoriented", the diarist says, in that they had been led to believe that they had only two rulers, namely the Duce and his representative the Viceroy, whereas it was now apparent that the Minister was superior to the latter in the hierarchy. This created surprise, the more so as the ministers of pre-war Ethiopia had been far less important than Rases or members of the imperial family. Graziani, Poggiali adds, was "most displeased with this state of affairs which empaired his authority in the eyes of the natives."⁸⁴

During this visit it became clear that Lessona's differences with the Viceroy were even more profound than had previously been suspected. The Minister subsequently wrote of the latter in critical terms, claiming that "in the nervous state in which Graziani had fallen he was not in a condition to judge events in their proper light." The Viceroy's basic assumption, he complains, was that "a gesture of force on our part would be mistaken for a provocation and could produce incalculable consequences. The possible slaughter of the Addis Ababa Italians was one of his principal preoccupations."⁸⁵

Lessona, on the other hand, rejected this approach, and insists in his memoirs that he was of an "entirely different opinion" as to the needs of the situation, and felt that Graziani's reactions were "bereft of that dignity upon which depended the respect of the native population."⁸⁶ Determined on introducing a tougher attitude into the administration he at once informed the military command that

"the presence of rebels nestling in the mountains a few kilometres from Addis Ababa could no longer be tolerated." A "native" brigade was accordingly ordered to prepare for immediate action against the "rebels." Though its general had reported that his men were exhausted, they were instructed to be ready to attack after forty-eight hours, for Lessona declares that he wished them to be "on the offensive to reaffirm their military superiority."⁸⁷

During his stay in Addis Ababa the Minister also decided to act on the vexed question of the Menilik and Lion of Judah statues which the Viceroy had still failed to remove. Taking advantage of the presence of the Minister of Public Works he decided on immediate action. Lessona recalls that having failed to change Graziani's view of the undesirability of dismantling the Menelik statue he and his colleague undertook the work during the night without informing the Viceroy.⁸⁸ The latter, not surprisingly, was greatly angered by this action, and comments that "the two enterprising ministers, acting together without communicating anything to me, the Viceroy and Governor-General, betook themselves in the night to the monuments and ordered some gangs of workmen to knock them down."⁸⁹ Writing with obvious bitterness he noted that "Cobolli-Gigli directed the act of vandalism ; Lessona watched in a closed car. When the innocuous statue fell they uttered the ritualistic [fascist cries of] *alala*." Turning to the implications of this act he adds : "That night brought to an end a senseless rite which exasperated the mind of the population, engendering hate, and certainly did not contribute to the auspicious pacification of minds."⁹⁰

Lessona and Graziani also clashed on economic policy, the Viceroy later recalling that there were "violent encounters between them". One of these arose over plans for a Viceregal Palace which the authorities in Rome wished to erect at a cost, Graziani says, of "a hundred millions." He declares that he was "firmly opposed" to the project on the grounds that "as long as Addis Ababa lacked the most essential elements of civil life he would not have such a sum pledged for a work which was not of immediate necessity, as the New Palace [i.e. the former palace of Emperor Haile Sellassie] was quite

enough for the needs of the moment." Mussolini, he states, took a poor view of this argument, and "pronounced that from it one could conclude without doubt my absolute lack of imperial spirit".⁹¹

Behind such bickering, it should be reiterated, lay continued fascist concern with Ethiopian Patriot resistance. The Viceroy later observed that guerrilla activity in the Addis Ababa area increased in July and August, 1936, but that these events, which had "made Mussolini tremble", were later "ignored and made to be ignored. Not a word of 'arrests in the act' reached the ear. No news of them were given in the press ; so that the deluded Italian people now considered Addis Ababa 'an eldorado of delights.'⁹² Graziani and Lessona disagreed as to how to handle the "rebellion." The Viceroy states that he continued to be under strong pressure to adopt a policy of greater ruthlessness : "Because I wished to avoid all reprisals against the very numerous elements suspected of complicity," he declares, "I was reproached for it by Rome as a weakling, and again urged to a regime of terror. The highest orders emanating from Lessona in the name of the Head of the Government peremptorily laid down that all chiefs captured in fighting, that is to say in their role as rebels, should be executed."⁹³

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The conflict between the Minister and the Viceroy reached such lengths that Lessona in his efforts to destroy Graziani attacked him not only for his alleged weakness, but also for severity—the execution of Aberra, one of the sons of the prominent Ethiopian noble Ras Kassa. Noting in his memoirs that the Ras was "the most powerful feudal leader of the Negusite Empire" Lessona claims that the young man's submission "would have represented a fact of notable importance," but that the Viceroy enticed him to surrender, and then allowed one of his henchmen, General Tracchia, to have him shot. Lessona, oblivious of his own previous exhortations towards a policy of greater ruthlessness, and ignoring the fate of Aberra's two brothers, who were also killed by the Italians, comments that "the act raised my indignation ; it was an infamy and an error damaging our prestige." Graziani, he adds, "from that moment came to be considered by the natives as a faithless man."⁹⁴

Lessona saw in this incident a means of discrediting his enemy in Mussolini's eyes, and began canvassing the idea of replacing Graziani by the King of Italy's second cousin, the Duke of Aosta. Arguing that the execution was a "mad gesture," he admits that he urged upon the Duce "the extreme gravity of the matter". Mussolini, however, was still an advocate of terror, and took little interest in the young chief's death. Writing of his fascist master the Minister recalls : "I did not find in him the same reaction as mine", and adds : "I did not succeed in making him understand what disastrous repercussions it would have. He did not take any measure in respect of Graziani whom I would for that reason have quickly replaced, having offered a new proof of his scarce political sensibility which the ruler of a state, as he was in effect, must possess."⁹⁵

Graziani thus survived Lessona's manoeuvres and was still Viceroy on February 19, 1937, the day of the famous attempt on his life when two Eritreans, Abraha Deboch and Moges Asgedom, hurled bombs at him during a palace reception in Addis Ababa. Wounded by many grenade splinters he was temporarily obliged to retire to hospital.

Lessona, whose hatred of the Viceroy was not mollified by the assassination attempt, has left a vivid account of how the news reached the Duce who was at that time on a ski-ing holiday at Terminillo in the Italian mountains, and how he, the Minister, attempted to turn it to his advantage. "The news was so grave," Lessona recalls, "that I decided to interrupt the pleasant repose of the Chief of the Government, and I called him on the telephone." The Duce, "deeply impressed by the event and preoccupied by the possibility of repercussions," immediately declared that he wished to confer with his Minister of the Colonies in person, and accordingly asked him to drive up at once by car to meet him. "I found Mussolini in skier's attire and, after having enquired on the reasons for the crime, passing thus in review the governmental work of Graziani, he invited me to go out with him...on the snow. After some paces he stopped and said to me drily, 'Graziani after what has happened cannot any more remain Viceroy ; it is necessary to replace him' "

"And I who had in the past skillfully hinted at the name of the Duca d'Aosta, wishing to leave to him the choice of the name, promptly replied, 'I share your opinion. But who shall we send? We should have a great name ready.' And he replied, 'I have it'. Then I asked, as if unaware and inquisitive, 'And who would it be?' 'The Duca d'Aosta,' responded the Duce.' My heart," the scheming Minister adds, "gave a bound of joy."⁸⁶

Mussolini, however, was still opposed to the immediate removal of Graziani on the ground that it would imply too much of an admission of failure. The decision was therefore delayed, to the disgust of Lessona, for the greater part of a year.

In Ethiopia meanwhile the attempt on Graziani's life had produced significant repercussions. The wounded general temporarily handed over many of his duties to Vice-Governor Petretti, described by Poggiali as a "type of bureaucratic pine-kernal, fastidious and inconclusive," while the Addis Ababa fascists, led by their secretary Cortese, decided on ruthless reprisals. They accordingly instigated the infamous three-day massacre of February 19 to 21 in which fascists run amok murdering thousands of defenceless Ethiopians, thereby greatly swelling the ranks of the Ethiopian Patriots.⁸⁷ Another Italian general, Pesenti, later declared that this act of repression cost the Italian treasury "at least half a milliard (of good money) spent in military operations (more or less unsuccessfully)."⁸⁸

The Viceroy, after a short period of hospitalisation, returned to his command in a state of extreme excitement, and embarked on a policy of revenge and terror fully in accordance with that which his superiors in Rome had been demanding for the previous nine months. On March 1, he telegraphed General Nasi, the governor of Harar, to shoot all the "Amhara notables and army officers" who had surrendered, and added: "it is time to put an end to it. Your Excellency may keep in mind that those who made the attempt on my life—which although a miserable thing yet represents Italy—were all Abyssinian notables in the very same positions who had received pardon in many places"⁸⁹ On March 17, Graziani sent Mussolini informa-

tion on the "executions ordered in consequences of the attempt on my life," and declared, "I cannot deny that some Ethiopians have shouted as they faced the firing squad, 'Long live Ethiopia' ", but he had in consequence ordered executions to be "carried out in isolated spots where no one, I repeat, no one can witness them."¹⁰⁰ On March 19, he telegraphed Lessona that being "convinced of the necessity" of "eradicating" the "evil" travelling minstrels who opposed Italy he had "given orders that all wandering minstrels, soothsayers and wizards in the town and its surrounding be arrested and shot."¹⁰¹ On May 12 he despatched telegrams to the provincial governors to express support for any action taken against the "rebels", including steps "to eliminate all the Amhara chiefs large and small," and declared that "once the chiefs were eliminated" it would be easily possible to deal with the population at large.¹⁰² A week or so later he ordered the summary execution at Shoa's principal monastery of Debra Libanos of "all monks without distinction."¹⁰³

Graziani also asserted himself *vis-a-vis* the Italians in Addis Ababa. So far from being the spent force some imagined, he soon afterwards succeeded, as a British report states, "in securing the recall to Rome" of the fascist secretary, Cortese, "who had given the word for the holocaust to begin." The fascist's removal seems to have led to a fall in Italian morale in Addis Ababa. The same British report observes, "To the military and economic complications must be added the petty jealousies and disputes between the local Italian officials. The rivalry, always latent, between the professional soldiers and the officials of the Fascist party came to a head after the massacres."¹⁰⁴ This interpretation was confirmed by Poggiali who claims that Cortese was recalled for slandering the Viceroy and informing Starace, the party secretary in Rome, that the attempt had resulted from the Viceroy's "too lax" policy towards the "natives."¹⁰⁵

Lessona, whose title was changed on April 8 from Minister of the Colonies to Minister of Italian Africa, meanwhile continued in his hostility to the Viceroy whose behaviour, he claims, now grew increasingly abnormal.¹⁰⁶ "After the attempt," he declares, "Graziani had a most grave nervous breakdown which accentuated his outbursts

of anger, his persecution mania and his fear," as a result of which he spent his nights "surrounded by barbed wire, machine-guns, armoured cars and a battalion of guards," and ordered "our victorious troops to re-enter the protection zones (barbed wired camps) because the rebels were becoming always bolder, and were now camped a few kilometres from Addis Ababa."¹⁰⁷ The general appears indeed to have been seriously affected by the attempt, for Mussolini's son-in-law Ciano noted several years later during the fighting in Libya in 1940: "it seems that his nerves are quite shaken since the attempt on his life. They tell me that even in Italy he was so afraid of attempts on his life that he had his villa at Arciruzzo guarded by at least 18 carabinieri."¹⁰⁸

Graziani in his mood of terror now urged the Duce, according to Lessona, "to send the principal local chiefs of all the Empire, into a kind of prison in Italy, and despatched an enormous number without distinction, faithful and non-faithful."¹⁰⁹

The Viceroy in this period of repression and suspicion came into increasing conflict with Pirzio Biroli, the Governor of Amhara, to whom, Lessona claims, he showed himself both "jealous and hostile." The Viceroy, he declares, "falsely complained" of the "weakness" of Pirzio Biroli because the latter had not allowed himself "to go to the truly deplorable excesses in which Graziani fell." The result, according to the Minister, was that "the Viceroy, not succeeding in persuading Pirzio to adopt a line of political severity," decided to take action on his own initiative. On one occasion he had two "native suspects drowned in Lake Tana, a criminal act," Lessona declares, "which the governor of Amhara learnt about only through his own police." On another occasion, as Graziani himself announced by telegram, he ordered "the destruction of all the *tukuls* [i.e. huts] in an entire valley" for no other reason than that some shots were fired in that area against an Italian column of troops. Lessona sums up his indictment by declaring that Graziani had changed from being "too weak to too strong," gave the impression of having "lost sense of measure," and by his behaviour revealed that he lacked "faith in himself," as well as "balanced examination of events. The differences

between Graziani and me", the Minister of Italian Africa concludes, therefore "became more and more accentuated."¹¹⁰

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Such disputes and recriminations were intensified for the fascists by the grim reality of the Italian failure to crush the Ethiopian Patriot movement, a particularly serious matter in view of Mussolini's ambition to embark on further wars of conquest. Mussolini's concern at the military state of affairs in the autumn of 1937 was noted by his Ciano who wrote in his diary on September 13 that the Duce was "annoyed" by the Gojam "revolt" which was "of a considerable size." On September 23 Mussolini's son-in-law again referred to the fighting, remarking that Lessona had reported to his master that there were "numerous revolts, but localised." The diarist nonetheless comments that they were "hindering demobilisation" and constituted "a burden on our finances." He feared moreover that "at Mascal", i.e. the feast of the Cross, "something on a larger scale may break out."¹¹¹

Despite the undoubted achievements of the occupation, particularly in the field of road-building, morale among the fascist administration in the empire was also low. A British Somaliland Intelligence report for August 6 observed that persons with a knowledge of the area were "pessimistic" about Italy's future, and added, "lack of training among the officials, lack of cohesion between departments, discontent in the forces generally are among the reasons for this pessimism." A Sudanese Military Intelligence Report similarly spoke of administrative confusion, and declared: "The District Commissioners and Governors, untrained and with no knowledge of the natives, produce nothing but administrative chaos, which, with its consequent lack of protection against the voracious soldiery, is antagonising those native tribes who are friendly... Marshal Graziani, when approached about the persecution of these natives, is reputed to have said that he was doing his best to control the country, but 'what could be achieved when the sweepings of Italy were sent out to him to run the country with?'"¹¹²

Italians in the empire were also critical of the administration. On April 13, Poggiali recorded that Morigi, the vice-secretary of the fascist party in Addis Ababa, was "exasperated with the delays and incomprehensions" of the "Swiss marine" as the uniformed officials of the Civil administration in Italian Africa were nicknamed.¹¹³ There was also much talk of corruption among officials, Poggiali noting on July 14 that the resident at Addis Alam, Captain Corda, was said to have requisitioned an ox for two dollars but had made the "natives" sign a receipt for twenty. His frauds had, however, been found out and he was accordingly being repatriated.¹¹⁴

Disgruntlement among the Italian "native troops" was likewise revealed by Poggiali who noted that during General Tracchia's repression the "native troops" at Dabra Berhan had got drunk, and that "*in vino veritas* they had shouted that they did not want to fight any more", and that the Italians "stay in their forts and send us to be killed." The Italian troops, regarding this as mutiny opened fire on the "natives", some of whom were wounded. Forty-three "natives" were later sentenced to be shot. Their grave was accordingly dug, and the condemned men were drawn up in a line and marched off to their place of punishment where they were promptly executed. On counting the bodies they were, however, found to number forty-seven. The *askari* on the way to their execution had apparently passed through the village on market day and in the crowd four unfortunate passers-by or traders had got entrapped with the forty-three and not been allowed to leave them. "Thus," Poggiali comments, "four innocent men without even understanding what had happened to them were also dragged to the edge of the grave, drawn up, and received the machine-gun shots which sent them into the other world. When the incident was reported to the general he was not too disconcerted: 'one more or less', he would have said, 'there are so many Abyssinians and they are all equally deleterious to us'".¹¹⁵

The general atmosphere of disorganisation in this period was also described by Helm of the British Consulate who telegraphed to the Foreign Office on November 22 that the Italian administration

seemed to be "losing heart," and added : "in recent months interference from Rome has steadily increased especially in the economic field...economic situation has got steadily worse. I am authoritatively informed that it is causing great anxiety. The Italians are being worn down by sheer passive resistance of natives." The British Acting-Consul, Stonehewer-Bird, confirmed this view, declaring that "none spoke with any hope of the future, most of the leading officials were being replaced and those who were remaining were applying for leave."¹¹⁶

* * *

In Rome meanwhile Lessona was relentless in his intrigues to obtain the removal of Graziani whose failure to crush Patriot resistance was arousing alarm and impatience in fascist circles. The Minister seems to have been supported by Turati, the former fascist party secretary, who is quoted by Ciano as telling him on October 9 that there was "nothing to be pleased about" concerning the empire. Mussolini's son-in-law, however, was unwilling to support Lessona against Graziani, for he notes, "the Minister is more to blame than the Viceroy. We must have faith and leave the man on the spot free to act or else replace him. But not torment him with questions of detail and keep his hands tied."¹¹⁷ Lessona, of course, had no such qualms, and took advantage of each and every difficulty in the empire to discredit his enemy. Graziani's "actions in command", he later recalled, "furnished me with convenient reasons," and he adds : "Many times from the day upon which Mussolini announced to me his decision to replace him I argued verbally and in writing the necessity of recalling the Viceroy...finally I repeated in writing the reasons which necessitated the immediate removal of the Viceroy from office, declaring that as Minister I declined all responsibility and preferred to leave my office rather than continue to divide the responsibility for the Empire with Graziani."¹¹⁸

Such pressure was beginning to succeed. "Mussolini," Lessona relates, "read my report, and was moved by my arguments" ; as we were about to enter the Council of Ministers he said to me that we would have definitely to proceed. He announced in fact a few minutes later, during the verbal report made to the ministers, that

Graziani's behaviour showed signs of derangement and that, in the interests of the Empire, it was necessary to replace him." On November 15 he accordingly sent the Viceroy an autograph letter of recall. "Seven months," Lessona comments, "had passed from the day of the attempt in Addis Ababa after which Mussolini had declared to me that the position of Graziani was unsustainable and that it rendered necessary his recall to the Fatherland ! It seems a pleasantry but is the pure truth."¹¹⁹

Lessona, though exultant at this victory, was in no real position to rejoice, as his own power was beginning to crumble as had been apparant in fascist circles for some time, for already on November 2 Ciano had noted in his diary that Balbo was "trying to save his stooge Lessona."¹²⁰ Mussolini, without telling the latter, now decided that the Minister's term of office should not extend beyond that of the Viceroy.

Lessona, who appears to have been unaware of his impending fail, states that on learning that the Viceroy was at last to be replaced, he was very happy. and "wished to show the Duce and the country that if up to now it had not been possible fully to pacify Ethiopia this was exclusively due to Marshal Graziani's open rebellion against the wishes of the responsible Minister."¹²¹ He claims that he hoped moreover that Graziani's departure would open the way for a more fruitful partnership between himself and the new Viceroy,¹²² but this was not to be. He recalls that when he entered the Duce's office, apparently on November 19, Mussolini "could not hide his embarrassment." Pretending to read a newspaper and talking as if discussing any ordinary piece of business, he informed Lessona that the communique on Graziani's replacement by the Duke of Aosta would be given that day, and added : "Naturally you also must leave the Ministry because, in dealing with a royal prince, it is better that I resume it."¹²³ Mussolini, who had by then overcome his earlier embarrassment, then raised his head, and turned "his large eyes on me, wide open, as he did when he wished to be imposing."¹²⁴ Ciano, who met the fallen minister on the same day, notes : "Lessona informed me that the blow has fallen. He

was very sad." Mussolini's son-in-law, who of course saw fascist politics from the inside, comments: "He asked for it. He has never been frank or friendly to those who have helped him. He has always tried to make trouble. Now he has fallen into his enemies' hands and they will go on kicking him after he is down."¹²⁵ These words were prophetic, for early in the following year proceedings against Lessona were initiated, as Ciano later noted, questioning the validity of a diploma stating that he had participated in Mussolini's march on Rome of 1922.¹²⁶

Rumours of Graziani's imminent recall had meanwhile burst within hours of the meeting at which the decision was announced. *The Times* Rome correspondent reported that there were "good grounds" for stating that the appointment of the Duke of Aosta would be published "in the next few days." Quoting the official Government line he added: "Marshal Graziani's retirement... has become necessary owing to the serious effect on his health during the bomb outrage in Addis Ababa in February last."¹²⁷

News of the change of Viceroy, which marked a new phase in the history of the empire, was officially released on the following day. *The Times* Rome correspondent, retailing official views, declared that "the Duke of Aosta's appointment is presented here as a change from provisional government of an essentially military character to a more settled and normal administration." Turning to the Duce's assumption of the role of Minister of Italian Africa, his fifth portfolio beside that of Premier, the correspondent added, "Signor Lessona...has resigned in order to take up the chair of political and colonial history at the University of Rome, and Signor Mussolini has once again taken the duties of the Colonial Ministry under his own care. The building up of a strong civil Government is going to be no easy task, and Signor Mussolini no doubt feels that this matter should have his direct attention when the prestige of a Royal Prince is involved." To assist the Duce the fascist general Teruzzi, then recently returned from the Civil War in Spain, was made Under-Secretary for Italian Africa.¹²⁸ Ciano for what it is worth was scarcely impressed by these appointments, for

he confided to his diary that Teruzzi was "considered a loyal but mediocre executive—in fact more loyal than mediocre,"¹²⁹ and added, on December 3, that the new Viceroy was "very conscious of the weight of his responsibilities, which is a good sign," but continued : "he still seems to me rather bewildered."¹³⁰

* * *

The fall of Graziani not surprisingly created considerable excitement in Ethiopia. A British Foreign Office report stated that the Viceroy's recall was "regarded in many quarters as a successful attempt by the Fascist officials to reassert their supremacy" after the removal of Cortese, and had "accordingly caused much despondency in Government circles at Addis Ababa."¹³¹ *The Times* Jibuti correspondent similarly reported on November 25 that Graziani's "removal", though not "altogether a surprise," had produced a "discouraging effect among influential Italians", and, turning to the "unsatisfactory" state of administrative affairs, for which Lessona was regarded as "the arch-culprit chiefly responsible," added, "Interference by the home authorities has become more and more marked for some time past, and there are signs that this has sapped the spirit of the colonial administration."¹³²

Among the Ethiopian Patriots, on the other hand, Graziani's fall created much rejoicing. The deposed Viceroy later quoted the Ethiopian author and collaborator Afaqarq Gabra Iyasus as declaring that "news of the recall was heard by the rebels with great enthusiasm,"¹³³ while the British Consul in Naples records hearing from an Italian businessman in Italian East Africa that after Graziani's departure "disorders broke out, with fighting at various points; the position became serious, and one effect was that the already heavy transport charges rose by leaps and bounds, in view of the grave risks taken by drivers in conveying provisions up to Addis Ababa and elsewhere."¹³⁴

Graziani, though given the title of Duke of Negelli by way or compensation, considered his dismissal a personal affront. He nevertheless endeavoured to remain in Ethiopia in charge of the

army. Recalling this in later life he observed that "well knowing the most difficult task which awaited the new Viceroy," and in order "not to abandon him, I declared myself ready to remain at his orders as commander of the troops."¹³⁵ This proposal had such strong backing that the fascist authorities actually caused it to be announced, as a British Foreign Office report stated, that "the Marshal had accepted the new Viceroy's invitation to stay on as his right-hand man."¹³⁶

The Duke of Aosta, however, refused any idea of collaboration with his discredited and much hated predecessor, and is quoted by Lessona as declaring, "I do not want Graziani as commander of the troops. If the Duce demands it I will without more ado renounce the position of Viceroy. Dear Lessona I have known Graziani since I was a major...and under his orders. I have always seen him betray all his heads except General De Bono, because De Bono always allowed him to do what he wished. If I accepted him as collaborator he would end by betraying me also." The Duke, according to the former Minister of Italian Africa, thus "give a clear refusal to Mussolini's request, and without entering into the details confided to me, he explicitly said to him that he did not intend to have Graziani as commander of the troops."¹³⁷ The latter, mortified by what he considered this ingratitude, subsequently complained in his memoirs that his offer had not been "understood."¹³⁸

The Duke of Aosta's decision to have no dealings with Graziani soon leaked to the Italian public, for it was announced, on January 9, 1938, that the former Viceroy would not in fact be staying on as successor's "right-hand man." This announcement was followed by what a British report describes as Graziani's "precipitate departure" from Addis Ababa.¹³⁹ On returning to Italy, on February 26, the discredited general was, however, accorded a special welcome at Rome railway station. "The Duce," Ciano records, "was there, and the whole of the upper hierarchy, civil and military. Only Badoglio was missing." The latter's absence, in view of the relations between the two former Viceroys, was perhaps not surprising. Turning to the oration given to the marshal, Mussolini's son-in-law sagely observes: "The welcome of the crowd

was, on the whole, organized and therefore of a warmth that failed to convince. In the car the Duce said to me : 'Graziani must have been pleased that I embraced him. He fought well but he has governed badly.'¹⁴⁰ The former Viceroy, for his part, took a poor view of his successors. Ciano quoted him, on May 26, as being "not very convinced of the possibilities of the Duke of Aosta", and arguing, "He is weak and too much in the hands of his subordinates. This was to be expected for royal princes are used to respect but not to command." A "rather similar opinion," Ciano added, was also expressed by Gasparini, the former governor of Eritrea.¹⁴¹

Graziani's departure left the Italian administration at the beginning of 1938 even more dispirited than before. The military situation was so critical that Mussolini found it necessary to telegraph the Duke of Aosta, on January 1, to display "a great exhibition of force." Evidently aware of the failure of his previous policy of unmitigated terror the Duce stated that he would accord Ethiopian prisoners "due process" of trial, but that the Patriots still fighting should receive "war without quarter."¹⁴² His feelings at this time are evident from an entry in Ciano's diary for January 8 which states : "The Duce is anxious about the Empire—Gojam is in revolt. The rebels number 15,000. Our garrisons are besieged."¹⁴³ The British Acting Consul Stonehewer-Bird telegraphed from Addis Ababa, on January 11, "Outlook is clearly gloomy and will become more so if bickering locally and with Rome continues."¹⁴⁴ A Foreign Office report of January 14 declared that except for some improvement in communications "in almost every other respect the situation has deteriorated," and that reports of constant friction among the top Italian administrators could not "be regarded as auguring well for the efficient future government of Abyssinia. It would be too much to say that there was the risk of a complete Italian collapse but unless Italy makes a greatly increased effort, both in the military and economic spheres, it is unlikely that she will be able to bring the Abyssinian venture to a successful conclusion for at least some years to come."¹⁴⁵

The Duke of Aosta, for his part, was appalled by the situation bequeathed to him by his predecessor. Stonehewer-Bird reported

after meeting the new Viceroy on February 15 that the latter was "very frank in expression of his views," and "realised that Italy had 'bit off more than she could comfortably swallow.'" She had rendered her task more difficult," the Duke added, "by serious blunders, first of which was pouring into the country hundreds of thousands of Italians, most of whom were undesirable, and the second of which was the mistaken policy adopted as a result of attempt on Graziani's life."¹⁴⁶ In a subsequent conversation, on November 19, he told the Britain Acting-Consul that "another capital mistake had been the removal of all influential Ethiopians after the attempt on Marshal Graziani," and that "he was trying to get back as many as possible of those who had been exiled to Italy" and wished "within limits" to "restore the old order of things" existing in pre-war times.¹⁴⁷

In accordance with this policy the Duke of Aosta sought to obtain the collaboration of the principal Ethiopian nobles remaining in the country as well as of the leading ecclesiastics. Such personalities received generous subventions as well as honours and titles, and occasional visits to Rome, where they would be received in audience by the Duce. The leading collaborators and their subventions as of December 1939 were as follows :

<i>Name</i>	<i>Annual salary, in lire</i>
Ras Haylu Takla Haymanot	490,492
Ras Kabade Mangasha	172,000
Ras Getachaw Abata	156,000
Ras Amde Ali	98,616
Afa Caesar Afawarq Gabra Iyasus	54,000
Dajazmach Habta Michael Inadu	54,000
Dajazmach Liben Iazew	96,000
Dajazmach Asrat Mulugeta	96,000

The chief personalities of the Ethiopian Church received a total of 525,700 lire, of which the two Bishops, Abuna Yohannes and Abuna Issaq, received 158,728 and 78,288 lire respectively.¹⁴⁸

Despite his liberal pretensions the Duke of Aosta was responsible for implementing the increasingly rigorous racial discrimination

introduced at this time,¹⁴⁹ and was indeed an apologist for it. In a conversation with Stonehewer-Bird in the second half of November he studiously ignored the evolution of racist ideology in fascist thought, which had resulted in anti-Semitic legislation in Italy itself, and sought to claim that his compatriots had introduced racial segregation primarily for the benefit of the "native." He thus told the Englishman that "the decision to segregate Europeans as far as possible from others was dictated primarily by the interests of the native. I must imagine, His Royal Highness suggested, that the United Kingdom, desirous of ridding itself of its surplus population, had collected some two hundred thousand of the worst elements in the East End of London and exported them to one of the African colonies. The position would then be roughly what it is today for Italy in Ethiopia." The Viceroy went on to remark that "if the Italian population were allowed to mix freely with the natives there would be countless incidents and a mongrel race in a few years...He was, however, arranging to have about a dozen seats reserved in the cinemas for the good class native."¹⁵⁰

Italian policy towards the Ethiopian Patriots was at this time somewhat relaxed in accordance with Mussolini's directive. An Italian eye-witness, Luigi Lino, later informed the Italian journalist *Del Boca* that they now began to be given trials, "though they were almost invariably sentenced to be hanged," while Rizzi, president of the Italian military tribunal at Dessie, subsequently recalled that "when Graziani was Viceroy, an Ethiopian suspected of being a rebel was summarily executed, but when the Duke of Aosta arrived... only those Ethiopians who were found to be armed when captured were sentenced to death."¹⁵¹

The Duke's attempts at governmental reorganisation were, however, greatly hampered by opposition, and disloyalty, within the ranks of his administration, as a result of which government, according to British reports, sank to new depth of inefficiency. On January 14 Stonehewer-Bird reported that the new Vice-Governor-General, Enrico Gerulli, had "started sending telegrams to Rome without reference to the Viceroy," and had "received a very sharp rap over the knuckles" from the latter. The Acting-Consul, com-

menting on the resultant power struggle, observes : "perhaps the Duce's idea was that he himself would run Abyssinia through Cerulli with the Duca d'Aosta as a puppet Viceroy."¹⁵² Cerulli, whose importance in the local establishment is apparent from the prominence given to his tours of inspection in the official press,¹⁵³ was described as an administrator of low calibre. Stonehewer-Bird complained on February 28, that the Vice-Governor-General was "both very busy and slow to take a decision,"¹⁵⁴ and added, on March 1, "Cerulli's pomposity and bad manners and general unsuitability for his job are making him extremely unpopular with every one from the Duke downwards."¹⁵⁵

The general atmosphere of chaos in the spring of 1938 was graphically portrayed in a telegram which Stonehewer-Bird despatched to London on March 29 : "Entire administration is at sixes and sevens, nobody can get anything done and it seems certain that Viceroy has no real power." One of the principal difficulties, he added, was that Cerulli had been "sent here to do the bidding of Rome ; everything has to go through his hands and to foreigners and Italians alike he has consistently shown himself obstructive and incapable of independent or constructive thought." Turning to the situation as a whole the Acting-Consul concluded, "I can only think that the worst forecasts expressed at the time of Marshal Graziani's dismissal are being realised and that situation may become desperate."¹⁵⁶ On April 5, he reiterated : "Signor Cerulli appears to have become increasingly independent of the Viceroy, everything except military matters is concentrated in his hands, though an expert linguist he is no administrator. The result is that under Signor Cerulli there is only a collection of little men who do what they are told by the Vice-Governor-General who in turn does the bidding of Rome and the local Fascio. The administrative machine which at no time has functioned with real efficiency is in a parlous state, and on all hands I have been hearing grave doubts expressed about the future."¹⁵⁷

The administration was now more than ever rent with feuds and corruption. On April 8 Stonehewer-Bird quoted a prominent

colonial official, Denti di Piranjo, as declaring, "Apart from the fact that he had no manners Cerulli had none of the other necessary qualifications for this job." Adding his own comment the Acting-Consul observed : "Cerulli is not the man to hold or express any views contrary to those dictated from Rome."¹⁵⁸ The atmosphere of those days was later summed up by Maurice Weerts, representative of the French firm of Besse, who recalled, "The corruption in the Italian administration was beyond description. Many Italians had enlisted in the Blackshirt Legions raised in the Middle East, their aim was to get rich soon, by any means ; quite a few of them could speak Arabic and they were useful therefore in places where Moslem Ethiopians or Arab merchants were numerous. They multiplied manifold the practices they had used in Egypt and elsewhere and since their aim coincided with the aim of most of the members of the Fascist Party, collaboration on an ever increasing scale took place immediately. Bribery was everywhere, shameless ; civil servants, officers, contractors, laywers, particularly lawyers, were involved."¹⁵⁹ Remarkable confirmation of this allegation is given by none other than the Duke of Aosta himself who was quoted by Ciano, on June 23, 1938, as complaining that 50 per cent of the colonial officials were "incompetent and 25 per cent thieves."¹⁶⁰

The advent of the Duke of Aosta, so far from improving government efficiency, thus led, according to a Foreign Office report of April 8, to an "unquestionably deteriorating system of administration." Explaining this statement the memorandum reiterated that "nobody can get anything done" and that the Viceroy "has no real power. The Vice-Governor-General apparently regards himself as the agent of Rome, everything has to go through his hands and to foreigners and Italians alike he has consistently shown himself obstructive and incapable of independent or constructive thought."¹⁶¹ This chaotic state of affairs was confirmed in a *Sudan Military Intelligence Report* for May which declared : "The general administration of the new Empire does not appear to augur well for the future," and added : "It is understood that there is intense friction in Addis Ababa between the military and Fascists...The unsettled state of the country is attributed to the paucity of experienced

administrators and the financial crisis generally...behind all the pomp and display there are open muttering, want and poverty in Italy and worse in Abyssinia."¹⁶²

Corroboration for these statements is to be found in a report of December 15 by the Italian Commander-in-Chief in East Africa, General Cavallero, who spoke of the "grave deficiencies" in Italian "political action" in Ethiopia due to the "mediocre quality" of a "major part" of the commissioners and residents. He spoke of the "deplorable consequences" of employing young, inexperienced and insufficiently instructed personnel, and declared that "too many" officers displayed "serious lack of orientation and good sense, and were often devoid of the moral qualities required for their work." Such officials, he concluded, left "much to be desired," lacked the "habit of coordinated work, and, with rare exceptions, were dilettanti often furnished with vivid native intelligence, but with a superficiality which could be extremely dangerous."¹⁶³ The general was also discontented with his own position, and requested the fascist party secretary, Farinacci, to show the Duce a memorandum in which he complained that the decree appointing him had been deliberately withheld from publication, and that he was kept in Addis Ababa with the ranks of general, grade two, and had thus been outstripped by several colleagues inferior in years of service.¹⁶⁴

* * *

Militarily the Italian position in 1939 was scarcely better than a year or two earlier. On January 1, Ciano noted in his diary that the Duce was very much dissatisfied with the situation in East Africa," and added: "Amhara is still in a state of complete revolt, and the sixty-five battalions that are stationed there are compelled to live in fortini," i.e. forts.¹⁶⁵ The Duke of Aosta, fully aware of the significance of this state of affairs, warned Mussolini of the danger which would result if Italy, as the fascists wanted, became involved in a war in Europe. Ciano reported on March 14 that the Viceroy "urges us to avoid a conflict with France which would bring on to the high seas the task of pacifying our empire and would jeopardise the conquest itself."¹⁶⁶ Shortly afterwards the Italian

Foreign Minister noted in his diary that though the Duke "spoke with considerable optimism about the condition of the Ethiopian Empire among the people who have come from there he is the only optimist."¹⁶⁷

The Viceroy, unable to crush Patriot resistance or to curtail inefficiency and corruption, put the blame for the empire's shortcomings both on the low calibre of his officials and on the errors of the Graziani period. The British Ambassador in Cairo recorded that at the end of March the Viceroy had spoken to him of "his present difficulties in Abyssinia" which "weighed heavily upon him. They have," the ambassador continued, "been aggravated by the effects of undue haste in conquest and initial ignorance of the circumstances of the country. He harped on the utter lack of trained officers and officials and on the embarrassment caused by the presence of well over a quarter of a million Italians, many of them riff-raff (he, by decree, had himself deported undesirables) for whom no adequate provision could be made." Turning to the continued resistance to Italy the Viceroy spoke of "native disaffection to Italian rule in Shoa and Gojjam regions as an inevitable after-math of military events and a bitter fruit of Italian official mishandling of the chiefs," and added, "The Duce had urged 'extermination' of dissident elements but had been persuaded that other and conciliatory methods should be tried out."¹⁶⁸

* * *

The last part of the occupation coincided with the political dominance in the empire of the notorious Teruzzi, a leading fascist, controversial for his alleged corruption, who as Under-Secretary for Italian Africa undertook three highly publicised tours of the empire, in May and June 1938, January and February 1939, and February 1940.¹⁶⁹ During his period in office he emerged as one of the principal fascist experts on the empire as well as a major investor in the para-statal transport company on which account he was later attacked. His visits aroused a surprising amount of animosity and seem to have had a largely negative effect on Italian morale in Africa. After the first appearance Stonehewer-Bird reported on

November 9, 1938, a revealing conversation at which he had remarked to a "highly placed" Italian official that despite the general ignorance of conditions in the empire "Teruzzi at least ought to be able to appreciate the situation as he had been out here for several weeks. The trouble was," the official replied, "that Teruzzi now poses as omniscient in all matters concerning the empire and would listen to no one."¹⁷⁰

Criticism of Teruzzi is also said to have been voiced by Cerulli, who after the Under-Secretary's second visit referred to the touring fascist luminary as an "ourangan", or "hurricane". Stone-hewer-Bird commented that this was "a pretty good description" as Teruzzi had "roared around upsetting everything and everyone." Turning to the latter's unsavory reputation with women, then a major subject of gossip in Addis Ababa, the Acting-Consul added that "a good illustration" of the feeling towards him was "afforded by the question put by an Italian ex-naval officer to the English wife of an Italian official: 'Why does Teruzzi prefer brunettes? Because gentlemen prefer blondes.'¹⁷¹

Discontent with Teruzzi was even more strongly voiced at the time of his third visit. The British Consul, Frank Gibbs, reported on February 21, 1940: "General Teruzzi arrived here...with a flourish of trumpets. According to the local press, the Minister of Italian Africa was given a tremendous reception on his arrival here. In actual fact all those Italians who could stay away without getting into serious trouble did so. Many of them were suddenly indisposed and remained in their beds until well after the Minister's arrival. The majority of Italians loathe and despise him, and openly criticise him in their conversation with foreigners. Some shrug their shoulders and exclaim, 'What do you expect, he (Teruzzi) has to be kept on because he was one of the first in the field but it is a great pity that such a man should be at the head of matters. Italy is a young country and in course of time such hangers-on will be eliminated!'"

The discontent here expressed was largely due to Teruzzi's personal involvement in the transport monopoly, as was noted by

the Consul who recalled that the Under-Secretary was Director of the C.I.T.A.O., the transport monopoly in Italian East Africa, and that "all the lorry drivers and others employed by the C.I.T.A.O. were placed under strict surveillance a day or two before Teruzzi's visit and all those who could not be trusted were rounded up and kept in custody. Agents of the secret police were busy all over the town in case somebody happened to express public disapproval of the Minister.....

"Prior to the Minister's arrival the police discovered that all the 'Evviva il Ministro' hand bills posted up in one section of the town had been altered to 'Abbasso il Ministro'. There ensued a frantic search in the other parts of the town to ascertain whether the same thing had happened, but whoever was reasonable confined his attentions to only one section. The rest of the town was simply smothered with 'Evvivas'".¹⁷²

The intense dissatisfaction generated by the visit was confirmed by another member of the British Consulate, Gilbert Mackereth, who wrote on March 21 : "The Minister's tour has been extensively reported in the local press and the glowing accounts of the wild enthusiasm with which he was everywhere received are in striking contrast to the marked signs of unpopularity which have led in certain places, notably in Asmara, to demonstrations of discontent on the part of Italian transport workers.

"In Asmara it is said that the lorry drivers assembling by order of the Fascio, and who were told to shout 'Duce ! Duce !' in the traditional Fascist manner, whistled and booed and raised derisive cries of 'Citao, Citao', alluding to the parastatal transport company of which Teruzzi is a director, and which is generally held responsible for the unemployment and losses suffered by local lorry owners and drivers. Similar demonstrations are said to have taken place in Dessie and Gondar. In Jimma it is reported that an attempt was made on the Minister's life by an Italian due to the sent back to Italy. The revolver shots were fired but no one was injured.

"Soon after his arrival in Addis Ababa General Teruzzi addressed the assembled Fascists of the town. No meeting could

have shown less enthusiasm or spontaneity in its cheers. No sound was made until the Fascist group leaders raised one of the usual cries, and even then, the crowd would only respond in the most half-hearted manner. This indeed was in spite of the most elaborate precautions taken to avoid a repetition of the Asmara demonstration by the 5,000 or more Italian unemployed now present in Addis Ababa.

"When the Minister drove through Addis Ababa from the airport on his arrival the streets were deserted except for the formations officially on parade and for those natives who had been ordered to attend. Italians other than blackshirts were conspicuous by their absence."¹⁷³

Teruzzi's unpopularity reached its peak at the time of the fascist collapse in the spring of 1941, as can be seen in an open letter to Mussolini written a few months later by an Italian resident of Asmara who declared that the Under-Secretary had taken to his bed in the Villa Italia "the most vulgar prostitutes" to be found in the capital's brothels. Addressing the Duce, the author declared that the empire was "already decrepit and putrifying", and that "the people's faith in You was already shaken", when they received the visit of "Excellency Teruzzi, better known as an insatiable vampire, as the fleecer of the transport industry and the supporter of all monopolies." When news of his behaviour, including "the fleecing to the transport industry for his own personal advantage" became known, "from that moment the people no longer believed in You. It was the beginning of the collapse of morale."¹⁷⁴

* * *

Dissent and misgivings among the Italian population of the empire, and the consequent erosion of the enthusiasm with which the occupation of Ethiopia had once been regarded, were intensified by the outbreak of World War II in September 1939. On January 27 of the following year British Consul Gibbs noted that it was "fairly obvious that the administrative machine" was "not running smoothly," and added: "Some Government Departments seem to

be in a continual state of reorganisation, and dual control by Government and Party officials alike does not help matters. On the contrary it tends to arouse suspicion and more often than not results in delay in confusion."¹⁷⁵

The increasing discontent among Italians in the empire, which was of course denied expression in the controlled press, was later voiced by an Italian barber at Nefasit who told the British war correspondent Richard Dimpleby in 1941 of widespread dissatisfaction with the police and the compulsory adulation of the Duce. "Last year," the Italian complained, "the army engineers came down and carved a head of him in the rock. Everyone had to go to the unveiling." Asked who was in charge of the proceedings he replied, "the chief of police," and added, "These bloody policemen think they own the colony. All swaggering about and threatening to report us to Asmara if we grumble." Voicing a common complaint, he declared that the police were constantly taking bribes.¹⁷⁶ Further evidence of popular opposition to the regime is to be found in the already-cited open letter to Mussolini, whose author went so far as to claim that it was the revulsion against fascist corruption, and the consequent "collapse of morale, which allowed the English to occupy the empire."¹⁷⁷

* * *

Mussolini's entry into the European war in June 1940, the penultimate act in the drama of Italian fascism, created considerable alarm both in Italy and in its colonial empire which, as the Duke of Aosta had long realised, was in no position to wage war against the British empire. Badoglio, who learnt of the Duce's decision as early as May 26, later recalled that he felt "absolutely desperate" and exclaimed, "It is suicide." Ciano took a similar view. Badoglio, who visited him immediately afterwards, says the Foreign Minister was "very unhappy over Mussolini's decision" and "kept on saying 'Mussolini is mad.'"¹⁷⁸ Ciano in his diary was, however, more discreet, and merely wrote, "The adventure begins — God save Italy."¹⁷⁹ Marshal Caviglia, another observer of the Roman scene, also testifies to the prevailing mood of uncertainty. On the fateful

day, June 10, he wrote in his diary that a friend had asked him what he thought of the situation. "Everything", he had replied, "depends on France. If the French regain their strength and succeed in stopping the Germans Hitler is cooked." "Then", interjected his friend, "Then we also will be cooked." "We will lose the colonies", Caviglia answered, "but if the French do not succeed in stopping the Germans Hitler will occupy France, and Italy will take what she wants to take, or rather," he added significantly, "what Hitler will allow us to take."¹⁸⁰

Many Italians in the empire, which was now isolated from the motherland, were naturally even more preoccupied with the extension of the war. Though the controlled-press wrote enthusiastically of Hitler's victories in Europe Konovalov, a Russian emigre in Addis Ababa, recalls that the news was "received with a feeling of perplexity.....nobody dared to openly criticize the decision of the Duce, but every Italian, except some well-established Fascists; understood that if changes were to come, they would not be good for them. Nearly all were depressed."¹⁸¹ One Italian Francesco Pierotti, an airman at Jimma, later wrote that though "it was forbidden to doubt the infallibility of the supreme head" there were grave doubts as to the Duce's wisdom in becoming involved in a struggle with Britain and France. Reflecting on the opening of military operations against the British in East Africa he added: "why this war! Here there is so much to do without war. The pacification of the territory is not at all finished; in Gojjam there are still fires of revolt We have so much to do in the Empire and now we must fight also against an external enemy!" One of his friends, who was also alarmed at this necessity, declared, "Mussolini has never been in Italian East Africa, he has not seen what the empire, is otherwise this war would never have been made."¹⁸² Another Italian, Bruttini, likewise later recalled, "We did not believe in an immediate victory," and commented that it was a "painful sacrifice," for it endangered the empire which would have absorbed hundreds of thousands of Italian settlers who would have "soon have become millions."¹⁸³ The lesson of these events was not lost on Lessona, Mussolini's old Minister for Italian Africa, who though apparently silent at the

time, later sadly remarked that his erstwhile master's Germanophile policy had been disastrous for Italy's "Abyssinian conquest."¹⁸⁴

Faced with the armed might of Britain, the increasing activity of the Ethiopian Patriots, and massive desertion, in some cases actual mutiny, among the "native" levies, the much vaunted, but in fact long dispirited, fascist empire crumbled in a matter of months."¹⁸⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371/20927/25.
2. E. Caviglia, *Diario (Aprile 1925 marzo 1945)* (Roma, 1952), pp. 144-50.
3. A. Del Boca, "Mussolini sulla guerra di Etiopia", *Il Giorno*, 14.11.1968.
4. *Ibid*, 19.11.1968.
5. R. Graziani, *Ho difeso la patria* (Roma, 1937), p. 109. See also del Boca, "Mussolini sulla guerra di Etiopia", 15.11.1968.
6. Graziani, op. cit., p. 581.
7. Del Boca, op. cit., 19.11.1968.
8. United States of America, The National Archives, Microcopy No. T, 821/472/565-6.
9. *Ibid* 821/472/657-8.
10. *Ibid*, 821/472/571.
11. *Ibid*, 821/472/573.
12. *Ibid*, 821/472/589.
13. *Ibid*, 821/472/589.
14. *Ibid*, 821/472/570.
15. *Ibid*, 821/472/571-2.
16. *Ibid*, 821/472/572.
17. *Ibid*, 821/472/573.
18. Graziani, op. cit., p. 99.
19. *Ibid*, p. 101.
20. A. Lessona, *Memorie*, (Firenze, 1958), pp. 271-2.
21. Graziani, op. cit., p. 101.
22. R. S. Salis, *Storia e politica coloniale italiana* (Messina, Milano, 1938), p. 307.
23. Italy, Ministry dell' Africa Italiana, *Ordinamento organico pe. l' Africa Orientale Italiana* (Addis Ababa, 1936), pp. 2, 4, 7, 8.

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24. Graziani, op. cit., p. 101.
25. U.S.A., National Archives, 821/472/109-10, 139.
26. *Ibid*, 821/472/139.
27. C. Poggiali, *Diario A.O.I.* (Milano, 1971), p. 105.
28. U.S.A., National Archives, 821/472/20.
29. *Ibid*, 821/472/4.
30. *Ibid*, 821/472/106.
31. *Ibid*, 821/472/44-5.
32. *Ibid*, 821/472/49.
33. *Ibid*, 821/472/21.
34. *Ibid*, 821/472/68.
35. *Ibid*, 821/472/24.
36. Poggiali, op. cit., pp. 90-1, 113.
37. *Ibid*, pp. 100-1.
38. Oxford, St. Antony's College, Captured Italian Documents, 034485.
39. *Ibid*, 03472.
40. *Ibid*, 034732.
41. *Ibid*, 034488-9.
42. *Il Messaggero*, 16.2.1937.
43. St. Antony's College, 034646.
44. *Ibid*, 034643, 034377. See also G. Bianchi, *Rivelazioni sul conflitto Italoetiopico* (Milano, 1967), pp. 206-9.
45. St. Antony's College 034377.
46. *Ibid*, 034377.
47. *The Times*, 4.3.1937.
48. St. Antony's College, 034407.
49. *Ibid*, 034440.
50. *Ibid*, 034460.
51. *Ibid*, 034734.
52. *Ibid*, 034467, 034690.
53. *Ibid*, 034720.
54. U.S.A., The National Archives, 821/472/75.
55. *Ibid*, 821/472/78-9.
56. *Ibid*, 821/472/83.
57. Graziani, op. cit., p. 101.
58. *Ibid*, p. 102.
59. *Ibid* pp. 106-7.

60. Lessona, op. cit., p. 305.
61. Graziani, op. cit., p. 107.
62. Poggiali, op. cit., pp. 238, 242.
63. Graziani, op. cit., p. 108.
64. *Ibid*, pp. 108-9.
65. U.S.A., National Archives, 821/472/172.
66. Graziani, op. cit., p. 109.
67. *Ibid*, p. 109.
68. Poggiali, op. cit., pp. 75-7.
69. Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice, *Documents on Italian War Crimes Submitted to the United Nations War Crimes Commission by the Imperial Ethiopian Government* (Addis Ababa, 1949), I, 26, 61, II, 39; Departement de la Presse et de l'Information, *La civilisation de l'Italie fasciste en Ethiopie* (Addis Ababa, n.d.), I, 29-30. See also Paggiali, op. cit., pp. 69-70; *New Times and Ethiopia News*, 27.2.1937.
70. Graziani, op. cit., p. 109.
71. *Ibid*, p. 308.
72. *Ibid*, p. 110.
73. F. O., 371/20927/25.
74. Bianchi, op. cit., p. 212.
75. Graziani, op. cit., p. 110.
76. *Ibid*, p. 117.
77. *Ibid*, p. 117.
78. Salome Gabre Egziabher, "The Ethiopian Patriots : 1936-1241" *Ethiopia Observer* (1969), XII, 70.
79. F.O., 371/20927/25.
80. Lessona, op. cit., p. 307.
81. Graziani, op. cit., p. 125.
82. Poggiali, op. cit., p. 98.
83. *New Times and Ethiopia News*, 14.11.1936.
84. Poggiali, op. cit., 991-00.
85. Lessona, op. cit., 307.
86. *Ibid*, p. 307.
87. *Ibid*, pp. 307-8.
88. *Ibid*, p. 308.
89. Graziani, op. cit., p. 126.
90. *Ibid*, p. 126.
91. *Ibid*, p. 127.

92. *Ibid*, p. 129.
93. *Ibid*, pp. 130-1.
94. Lessona, op. cit., pp. 305-6. See also Poggiali, op. cit., p. 259.
95. Lessona, op. cit., pp. 406-7.
96. *Ibid*, pp. 312-13.
97. Poggiali, op. cit., p. 114.
98. G. Pesenti, *Fronte Sud (La guerra in A.O.I., (1940-1941))* (Bertello, 1950), p. 75.
99. Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice, op. cit., I, 16-17, 47.
100. *Ibid*, I, 51.
101. Ethiopia, Department de la Press et de l'Information, op. cit., I, 61-3.
102. Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice, op. cit., I, 190-1.
103. U.S.A., The National Archives, 821/468/37.
104. F.O., 371/22020/195.
105. Poggiali, op. cit., pp. 238, 242.
106. Lessona, op. cit., p. 272.
107. *Ibid*, op. cit., pp. 306-7.
108. G. Ciano, *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943* (New York, 1947), p. 322.
109. Lessona, op. cit., pp. 306-7.
110. *Ibid*, pp. 310.
111. G. Ciano, *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938* (London, 1925), pp. 12, 14, 16.
112. F.O., 371/20937, Somaliland Camel Corps (K.A.R.) Buroa (British Somaliland) *Monthly Intelligence Report*, New Series, No. 52. p. 2. See also F.O., 371/22027/295, 300.
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114. *Ibid*, p. 245.
115. *Ibid*, p. 258.
116. F.O., 371/20229, 237/371/22020/7.
117. Ciano, *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938*, p. 19.
118. Lessona, op. cit. pp. 310-12.
119. *Ibid*, pp. 311-12.
120. Ciano, *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938*, p. 28.
121. Lessona, op. cit., p. 341.
122. *Ibid*, p. 340.
123. *Ibid*, p. 341.
124. *Ibid*, p. 341.
125. Ciano, *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938* p. 34.

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127. *The Times*, 20.11.1937.
128. *Ibid*, 21.11.1937.
129. Ciano, *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938* p. 34.
130. *Ibid*, p. 40.
131. F.O., 371/22020/195.
132. *The Times*, 26.11.1937.
133. Graziani, op. cit., p. 158.
134. F.O., 371/22021/74.
135. Graziani, op. cit., p. 158.
136. F.O. 371/22020/195.
137. Lessona, op. cit., p. 316.
138. Graziani, op. cit., p. 158. See also P. Pisanti and others, *Graziani* (Roma, 1956), p. 256.
139. F.O., 371/22020/195.
140. Ciano, *Ciano's Diary 1937-1938*, p. 81.
141. *Ibid*, p. 121.
142. St. Antony's College, 004908-9.
143. Ciano, *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938* p. 62. See also p. 141.
144. F.O., 371/22020/26.
145. *Ibid*, 371/22020/195.
146. *Ibid*, 371/22020/145. See also 371/22021/191-2.
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150. F.O. 371/22022/248-9.
151. A. Del Boca, *The Ethiopian War, 1935-1941* (Chicago, 1969), p. 248.
152. F.O. 371/22028/156.
153. *Corriere dell' Impero*, 1.7. 1938, 1.8. 1938.
154. F.O. 371/22021/215.
155. *Ibid*, 371/22021/221-2.
156. F.O. 371/22021/240.
157. *Ibid*, 371/22021/17.
158. *Ibid*, 371/22021/21, 23.

159. Letter from Maurice Weerts, 18.12. 1972.
160. Ciano, *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938*, p. 130.
161. F.O., 371/22012/221-2.
162. *Ibid*, 371/22027/300-4.
163. St. Antony's College, 095215.
164. *Ibid*, 095245-6.
165. Ciano, *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943*, p. 3.
166. *Ibid*, p. 42.
167. *Ibid*, p. 44.
168. F.O. 371/20927/25.
169. See *Corriere dell' Impero* for these periods.
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Dr C.E. Emezi : **Development of Administration in Nigeria**

In the literature on public administration in Africa, there are two conceptions of public administration. The more pervasive conception views administration as the perfection of instruments for carrying out policies. It focuses on the activities of the official mind.¹ Recently, greater attention is being paid to resources for creating innovative change from the grassroots. This trend in the social sciences invariably should affect our conception of administration.

This paper sets out to review the second conception of public administration, namely development administration. First, we will present an overview of the acceptable meaning and significance of development administration. Secondly, we will review the general pattern of development in Nigeria and will take a stand on the need for change in this pattern of development. In the process, we will specify some of the desirable outcomes of such reform.

We will suggest that meaningful and rational efforts towards national development should embrace efforts to arouse and mobilize the zeal of the total population, so that they can contribute their quota to the aggregate of the progress within the society of which they are part. This objective has been described in terms of electing "the increased participation from the periphery of the social order inward to the core".² This emphasis serves to draw a sharp conceptual line of distinction between the processes and activities used to foster development from the top down and those geared to the task of generating development from the grassroots.

Generally, administration is concerned with the leadership and the direction of groups to the accomplishment of desired objectives.

Public administration is the process by which public objectives are defined, and plans and policies formulated therefrom executed. Development is now the key word and concept in public administration.

Lately there has sprung up a body of theorists and professionals concerned with drawing a more explicit line of demarcation between administration as a pattern of activity with the object of ensuring that public programmes and services are maintained and executed efficiently and effectively ; and administration as an activity oriented largely to unleashing active socio-economic and moral change.

The basic contrast between these two view-points turns around the feeling by certain people that traditional administration has been obsessed with the aim of the perfection of instrumentalities for improving the management of programmes, and less with the need to investigate and actualize substantive innovations.

Accordingly, the thrust of development administration, as an intellectual concept has been singled out as being focused on achieving change. Administrative development on the other hand, is regarded as mostly addressed to the goal of reform in administrative procedure, that is, to improving the instrumentalities of administration.

In the study of new nations, little attention has been given to administration and administrators as significant and critical elements of government. In much of the literature, there seems to have been an implicit assumption that administration is obedient to whosoever controls it. This may be as a result of the British concept of the role of administration in the governmental process.³

It is the intention of this paper therefore, to reverse this trend and to focus more directly on development administration as it is practised in Nigeria.

It is germane to define, or at least suggest an operational conception of development. The qualification is necessary because it is no longer easy to define development in modern scholarship.

II

Common to the study of politics in Africa is the concept of political development. For some people, political development means primarily the pre-requisite political environment essential for economic and industrial development. Thus political development becomes merely the creation of the political and governmental conditions necessary for realizing higher economic performance.

A second and related concept of political development places emphasis upon governmental performance, and thus development involves an increase in administrative performance and a greater capacity for carrying out public policies. A third way of defining political development has been that of associating the extent to which patterns of behaviour identified as "modern" tend to prevail over those considered to be "traditional". The fourth concept of political development involves the test of general performance of the entire system. The fifth view relates political development to the creation of a viable nation-state, capable of performing effectively in a modern world. The sixth view relates development to national power. Finally there is the view that political development can properly mean democratic development.⁴ All these concepts relate to political development, but what is development per se ?

The concept, and hence the problem of development is historically a very recent one, and it is worth remembering that it is not at all native to underdeveloped areas but is strictly a Western notion. It is the unity and universality of the pressures for development that have led people to see the world as divided into two categories of society, developed and less developed.

The concept of development carries a number of implications. They can be summarized under four headings : (a) A set of definition priorities which constitute the meaning of development as a process, and the notion of being developed or underdeveloped as a state.

(b) A set of values which make development desirable if not mandatory.

(c) The interconnection between the two categories of developed and underdeveloped societies.

(d) The recognition of an implicit rank order of development—at least in the mind of the analyst, but possibly also in that of the participants.⁵

We can summarize the various concepts of development as follows : Development can be viewed as aggregate yardstick such as in the use of Cross National Product, income per capita etc. This gives development an economic outlook. Development again can be viewed in terms of the degree of infrastructure such as communication network, transportation, education etc. existing in a country. In this and the proceeding notion, there is a tendency to use a ratio of X product to the population.⁶ This gives development a comparative overtone vis-a-vis the developed and the underdeveloped countries. In other words, this approach seems to tick off each of those items considered a desideratum to development. This third approach looks at development as concerned with ideologies and values. It seeks to examine the degree of freedom existing in the society, the worth of the individual, his participation and contribution to the total society. Here the emphasis is on the freedom of choice.

For the purposes of our work, we conceive of development as a process of humanization, or a process of even distribution of social welfare and social justice. From this standpoint then, development administration is concerned with seeking resources (men and materials) for creating a humanized society. It is no longer concerned with administering out of date policies.

Public administration with a focus on development administration can be defined now as guided or managed change. The goal of administration becomes conscious change ; that is, the taking by hand of the forces of change. Development administration can thus be viewed as governmental administration for the purpose of promoting social and economic development in 'transitional' societies.

Professor Dwight Waldo in reviewing the trend and general aspects of public administration, observed that the rise of develop-

ment administration is related to the official objectives of the United States and its administrative agencies in fostering development in underdeveloped areas. He pointed out that one of the aims of the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society of Public Administration was a special interest in the administrative problems of developing countries seen in the total context of their social, cultural, political and economic settings.⁷

Merle Fainsod, in examining the structure of development administration, stated that development administration is a carrier of innovating values. It embraces an array of new functions assumed by developing countries embarking on the path of modernization and industrialization. It involves the establishment of the machinery for planning economic growth and mobilizing and allocating resources to expand national income.⁸

III

Let us examine the concept of development as it relates to planning in Nigeria. Planning for development has assumed a major role in administration in most of the third world countries.⁹ Planning is essentially a decision-making process which provides a basis for effective action in the future. In the developing countries, planning encourages the establishment of the pre-conditions for economic take-off. It marks a period of active public and private preparation before industrialization takes hold.¹⁰

Betram Gross in discussing planning in developing countries, observed that, the slow process of change that brought economic development in rich countries will not do. The new states are committed to what he called "century skipping." For 'century skippers', national economic planning is the indispensable instrument of rapid change.¹¹

The role of development administration therefore as an agency and organization of government is to develop plan objectives and activate people and groups to perform in accordance with those objectives.

Plans for industrial expansion in Nigeria rely heavily on the state. State enterprises bears the brunt of development in the fields of communication, heavy and light industries. The expansion of the private sector depends also on the support from the State. The private sector is helped because of lack of domestic entrepreneurial skill and capital. In this situation, the promotional function of government and direct participation is necessary for industrial as well as commercial growth.

Unfortunately the problem of planning for development in Nigeria is the difficulty of translating policies and plans into accomplishments and deeds. Professor Kenneth Galbraith while observing planning in developing nations said that "much of present planning targets are set for visible physical accomplishment—for capacity in place of production".¹²

The current experience of development in Nigeria strikes one vividly as grandiose in terms of its technological imperatives. The watch-word seems to be that the more sophisticated or complex the technology involved, the better the plan concerned. This seems to satisfy the image of a future industrial power we are wishing for ourselves! The entirety of the picture of development which has found favour in the country is one that is top-heavy and biased in favour of urban centres and of advanced technology. At the moment, far too many of the nations diverse raw materials are not relevant for the high-technology industries that dominate the national thinking in matters of economic development. The current habit of over-centralizing initiatives for plan-conception and implementation in a single stratum of government, is a distinct and an avoidable hindrance to the attainment of a healthy degree of flexibility in the allocation of national resources.

IV

Because development plans deal primarily with economic activities, they invariably focus attention upon economics. It is often assumed in this country that economic development should be analysed by the tools of economics alone. What is often overlooked is

that "economic growth is only part of the complex social, political, psychological, cultural and economic process called 'development'.¹³

Development is presented in economic terms to mean higher standards of living, more goods and services, more employment etc. These are seen as accurate indices of development. It is assumed that many sociological and political obstacles to progress will disappear when economic obstacles are removed. It is an underlying belief that economic planning which made the success story of the twentieth century Socialist world could be repeated in the country. This has been the motive force behind development administration in the country. The planning process in the country emphasizes economic growth to the near exclusion of all other aspects of development.

When we appraise the obstacles to plan implementation in Nigeria, we discover that attitudes of administrators as well as the mass of the population are important to economic growth. This is why we suggest that plans for development must accommodate the level of economic and cultural achievement of the country. Otherwise, the mass of the people may resist the plans and programmes. For example, the mass people of the rural areas do not see why they should pay 'development taxes'. Urban civil servants grumble that they are the ones who pay regular taxes while the business group pay little ; yet it is the business group that receive all government patronage. This is an area of conflict which we must bear in mind in drawing plans for development. We must again bear in mind the fact that in Nigeria, a national political culture has not fully emerged, hence it will be difficult to say what should be the consensus in national planning. With a particularistic value-system among the periphery of society, it will be wrong to concentrate plan-conception in one stratum of government. This is why we have suggested that planning should start from the grassroots. If we accept development as humanization, and social justice, it is the mass of the population that are the beneficiaries.

Furthermore, there should also be a reappraisal of our aims and methods in selecting plan projects. There should be an appre-

ciation of the potentialities of projects requiring intermediate technology and know-how in place of our grandiose projects. There should also be a firm conviction to invest more available resources towards attaining the purpose. Above all, there is need to consult the wishes and desires of the local people and their spokesmen in the initiation and preparation of projects.

The reward of such a new approach will likely be a pattern of free flow of ideas and commitment between the core and the periphery. It will provide a framework of cooperation between the people and the government. It is here suggested that modern techniques of the social sciences be utilized to overcome resistance to change and push forward the will to change. This means that national economic planning should be subordinated to certain objectives that transcend economics. Among these are political stability, the building of a new kind of society, and social justice.

Techniques of economic calculations no matter how valuable, are not enough to provide a sound basis for either formulating or implementing national economic plans. Economic growth occurs not first from economic activity, but from the interaction of political, social and cultural changes that are interrelated in mutual causative fashion with economic change.

V

The traditional concern of writers in public administration as we stated earlier has been efficiency and effectiveness in policy implementation. The civil service is thus regarded primarily as the instrument of the organization of the State.¹⁴ Ideally, the civil servant ought to execute policy rationally, maximizing governmental outputs and minimizing cost inputs. The idea of rational decision-making is crucial to Herbert Simon's administrative theory.¹⁵

Recently the functions of the civil service are expanding, and this phenomenon is particularly noteworthy in the new nations. This rapid development is as a result of government undertaking many activities that in other mature countries would have been taken by established economic institutions. The bureaucracy has thus

become the load-bearing structure in the society, acting as the nation's inner shell.

Planning and plan administration is taking a growing importance in the administrative field. Development administration in Nigeria usually involves the rapid multiplication of new administrative units which have to be coordinated with each other as well as with existing departments. Some of the examples are the National Price Control Board, Water Board, the State School Boards, Rent Control Board etc. The proliferation of these new organizations makes the task of central direction, control, and coordination difficult. This multiplication of structures and functions dissipate the effectiveness of administrators.

"There is hardly a Permanent Secretary, particularly at the federal level and in the 'older states', who is not having to combine his normal duties with either the chairmanship or membership of one or more Boards of Public Corporations or enterprises in which the government has an interest. Yet any one of these boards might be expected to require the full attention and concentration of any one man. With such a spread of interest, it is hardly surprising that most of our top public servants have not had enough time to devote to the formulation of new ideas and new plans, that they have been so overburdened as to leave hardly any time for other than the mundane and the routine."¹⁶

This overburdening of top administrators have created problems of significant magnitude especially in the area of innovation. ".....In Nigeria, all we have from the Military bureaucratic complex is a creeping inertia which stultifies change and attempts to make a virtue out of an innate conservatism".¹⁷ Thus it will appear that the innovative capability of the administrative sub-system is low because of this problem of responsibility overload.

In order to successfully implement the socio-economic development programmes in this country, it has been suggested that there has to be more people trained with a development ideology.

the function of such an ideology, seems to be the mobilization of the masses for the vast task of development. The ideology of development is an approach distinguished by its faith in government leadership and planning.¹⁸

The civil servant required for development administration must differ considerably from that in the classical model. Administrators with commitment, managerial and planning skills should be recruited to initiate and execute national development programmes. This commitment should not be based on doctrinaire political ideology, but on agreement and selection of national priorities. "More urgently than ever before, we do need rapid change if we are ever to cope with the pressing problems of our society, such as the problem of rapid rising unemployment, of inflation and of ever widening gap between rich and poor and between town and country. When those on whom policy-making rests understand that much, perhaps they will then begin to realise the dangers inherent in the inertia of government."¹⁹

Since we are concerned with development as humanization, it includes the development of human quality. A key to development administration is to forge an educational system capable of meeting the needs of society in its mobilization efforts. Our educational system must be organized all levels to respond to the needs and requirements of economic and social change. The special contribution of education to the birth of a new society would be to help forge a new form of critical attitudes to problems and goals.²⁰

In summation, we have noted that over the last decade the Nigerian government has been expanding the scope of its activities in economic and social fields. "Unfortunately, existing administrative resources and organization have proved grossly inadequate for this expanded intervention."²¹ This has created administrative bottle-necks which are not conducive to rapid economic and social development. We say that development administration as humanization, is a sure vehicle of economic development and social change. Towards this goal, planning assumes a cardinal role, because national

planning is a device for initiating development. It was observed that planning in Nigeria has failed in one major area, and that is in activating people and groups to perform in accordance with planned objectives. It is suggested that serious attempts via education must be made to eliminate obstacles to plan implementation before we embark on new and grandiose plans.

FOOTNOTES

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4. Lucian W. Pye & Sidney Verba (eds.) *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton University Press Princeton New Jersey 1969) pp. 11-12.
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7. Dwight Waldo "Public Administration" in *Political Science* edited by Mariad D. Irish published by (Prentice-Hall International 1968) pp. 171 and 181.
8. Meril Feinsod "The Structure of Development Administration" in *Development Administration* edited by Irving Swerdlow published by (Syracuse University Press 1963) p. 2.
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14. E. N. Gladden, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
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16. *Nigerian Opinion*, Vol. 8, Nos. 6-8 1972 published by (The Nigerian Current Affairs Society Ibadan 1972) p. 55.
17. *Ibid.* pp. 55-56.
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Dr Micheal A. Ojo :

How the Trusteeship Colonies became Independent

The Trusteeship system is the method provided in Article 75 of the United Nations Charter for administering certain non-self-governing territories. The Trusteeship system of the United Nations, like the Mandates System of the League of Nations, was established on the principle that colonial territories wrested from defeated enemies, should not be taken by any victorious nation but should be administered by a mandatory or trust power under international supervision until they would be able to determine their own future status.

The involvement of the African states with the United Nations began before the independence of most African states. A number of African territories were supervised by the United Nations as 'trusts' (deriving from the Mandate System of the League of Nations, which covered the former German territories after World War I). After World War II, the United Nations Trusteeship Council was charged with ensuring that the particular trust territories were advanced to independence by the respective European powers, most especially Britain, France, Belgium and Italy. Inspection teams visited the territories for observation and recommendations. The Trust Territories of Africa included Tanganyika (British), British Cameroon, French Cameroon, British Togo, French Togo, Ruanda-Urundi (Belgium), and Former Italian Somaliland.

The European states involved, with the cooperation of the United Nations, began to prepare for the self-government and independence of the trust territories right from early 1950's. In the case of former Italian Somaliland, a specific ten-year deadline for indepen-

endence was established. Many African statesmen came to New York to present evidence before the Trusteeship Council, and hence realized the great plan of the international body for decolonization in Africa.

The Trusteeship plan made the General Assembly call upon the mandatory powers to place their mandates under the trusteeship system. The mandatory states would then, in the period between the first and second parts of the first session of the Assembly, negotiate agreements with the members of the Big Five not holding mandates, as well as those states bordering the proposed trust territories. It was hoped that the second part of the first session of the Assembly, the Assembly then approved the draft agreements and on that basis proceeded to organize the Trusteeship Council.

A. The Cameroun

The Cameroun was a German Protectorate from 1884 to 1916, but it was divided into two sections after World War I—and placed under the League of Nations Mandates under British and French administration. They were converted into United Nations Trust territories after the Second World War.

(1) *British Cameroon* : In the British Cameroon, the northern half of the territory was considered as part of the Northern Region of Nigeria while the Southern half was administered as a part of Eastern Nigeria ; and later, it had regional status in the Federation of Nigeria. The Legislative and Executive Councils in the British Cameroons grew up in one of the Nigerian Regions as in the case of the Northern and as an autonomous organ within the Nigerian Federation.

British policy in the case of self-government of dependent areas took the form of development through three main stages : (1) gradual training of the indigenous population but under control of the administration through its official majorities ; (2) change to majority control by the inhabitants of the territory, still subject to the Governor's assent : (3) Genuine autonomy :¹ At the beginning of the

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period of trusteeship the Cameroons did not have any representative in the Central Legislature of the Nigerian Government, although Cameroonians were members of two of the regional councils. Under the Nigerian Constitution of 1954, the Cameroons had representatives in the Central Legislature. The southern section of the Cameroons was granted one member of the Council of Ministers—the section which served as the principal instrument of the policy for the federation.

Regionally, the Southern Cameroons was empowered to have its own legislature, in which Africans, made up of the overwhelming majority, as well as an executive council consisting of the Commissioner of the Cameroons as President, three Ex-Officio-Members, and four unofficial members appointed from among members of the legislature.

The Northern Cameroons was an integral part of Northern Nigeria. Her representatives were on a consultative committee, representing the interest of the Northern Section in both the Northern Regional government and the federal authorities.

At last, the Federal Executive Council created a portfolio for trust territory affairs, a post held by a Cameroonian minister.

Under the Constitution of 1954, the Central Organs of the federal government were given general legislative and executive powers, and the powers could be vested in the Governor.

Regionally, the Southern Cameroonian bodies were in control of their local affairs, subject to the assent of the Commissioner of the Cameroons, to assure that nothing was done that would violate the trusteeship agreement. All this made it clear that Cameroons have reached the second stage of their political development, through the context of Nigerian political development. When Nigeria became independent, the Cameroons also became independent as part of Nigeria.

The United Nations ordered a plebiscite to be conducted in order to allow the British Cameroons to decide freely what to do

and where to go, whether to stay with the Federation of Nigeria or join the Republic of Cameroun. The plebiscite was conducted in February 1961 at the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly in April 1961. The Trusteeship Council decided to forward the result of the plebiscite to the Assembly. The plebiscite commissioner reported that in the Southern Cameroons 94.75 percent of the registered people voted. Of these, 233,571 favoured joining the Republic of Cameroun ; 97,741 favored staying with the Federation of Nigeria.²

In the Northern Cameroons, out of a total of 243,955 valid votes cast, 146,296 votes were in favour of joining the Republic of Cameroun ³

As a result of the plebiscite, the United Nations General Assembly decided that the Trusteeship Agreement concerning the Cameroons should be terminated, in accordance with Article 76 (b) of the Charter and in Agreement with the Administering authority. On June 1, 1961, the Northern Cameroons joined the Federation of Nigeria as a separate province of the Northern Region of Nigeria and was then called "The Sadauna Province".

On October 1, 1961, The Southern Cameroons joined the Republic of Cameroun.⁴

(11) *French Cameroun* : On December 13, 1946, the First General Assembly of the United Nations approved Cameroun's status as an associated territory within the French Constitution of 1946 which instituted ARCAM (Assemblée Representative du Cameroun). This body approved taxes and controlled almost all aspects of the territory's life. In 1952, it was transformed into ATCAM (Assemblée Territoriale du Cameroun) and in 1957 it was changed to ALCAM (Assemblée Legislative du Cameroun).

From 1941, the municipal regime applied to two urban communities, then to five others in 1947 and in 1950 and 1952, it was extended to all urban and rural areas of Southern Cameroon in an initiative unique in Africa. Cameroun's constitution which was approved by a degree of the legislative Assembly on April 16, 1957, provided for the transfer of power to a legislative assembly with finance, defence, and the diplomatic service, the remaining responsi-

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bilities went to the tutelary power. The government was presided over at that time by Andre Marie Mbida who wielded the executive power.

In February 1959, the United Nations held a special session to deal with the trust territory because it was moving toward independence under nationalist pressure. The major nationalist party, UPC, was outlawed in 1955, on the charge that the leaders were heading an insurrection. The French were working with other elements led by Ahmadou Ahidjo, who wanted to become the first President. The problem was that the UPC, through its exiled president Felix Moumie was demanding that the United Nations should not grant independence to Cameroun until an election, supervised by the United Nations is held ; because, that was the only election that could be fair and just and it could allow the UPC to participate.

In the fall of 1958, the General Assembly adopted a compromise resolution introduced by the Indian representative and it was adopted and accepted by all sides. It stated that the Trusteeship Council should send one of its visiting missions to Cameroun so that a special resumed session could hear the report of the Mission and then decide about election on the basis of the hearings. The Mission, composed of Haiti, India, New Zealand, and the United States. India was at that time the leader of the anti-colonial bloc in the United Nations. Because of India's attack on France on the very issue, Africans in the United Nations regarded her as their representative on the Mission. Unfortunately, their shock came when the Mission turned in a strong report stating that Ahidjo's government was representative beyond doubt and that there should be no elections. It was understood later that India did not attend the resumed session. Those who attended the session were of the opinion that UPC was pro-communist.

Ghana, Guinea, and Tunisia pressed very hard to have the African Group declare their stand on this issue separately from the Afro-Asian Group. The remaining six states in the African Group were at the beginning reluctant to support the proposal because Ahidjo had spoken to them promising to support the African Group

wholeheartedly when Cameroon achieved independence. Despite all the activities that took place, seven members of the African Group introduced an amendment to the report. When the resolution was put to the vote, two other members of the African Group—Liberia and Ethiopia—changed their views. Liberia voted for the resolution, while Ethiopia abstained from voting.⁵ At last, it was agreed that an election under the supervision of the United Nations would be held before Cameroun becomes independent.

In March, 1959, the United Nations adopted the French Proposal to end its trusteeship in Cameroun, and on January 1, 1960, the territory of Cameroun became independent.

B. Tanganyika

At the beginning of World War II, Tanganyika's chief task was to make herself as independent of imported goods as possible. With her experiences during the war period, she felt very confident that she could take care of herself. She no longer thought of Europeans' superiority. She began to think of equality of man and thereby thought of advocating for freedom from the European rule.

The most important postwar development was the British government's decision to place Tanganyika under the United Nations' trusteeship. Under the terms of the trusteeship agreement, Britain was called upon to develop the political life of the territory. The development started in early 1950's with the introduction of political parties. The first political party was the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). The first two African members were nominated to the Legislative Council in December 1945. This number was increased to four, with three Asian non-official members and four Europeans.

In the year 1950, there was an advancement: the three races were given a better representation on the unofficial side of the council with ten nominated members each. The first elections to the unofficial side of the council enabled the TANU to show its strength. All candidates supporting TANU won the elections even among the

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Europeans and Asian candidates : only those who supported TANU were elected.

In 1959, a constitutional committee unanimously recommended that after the elections, in 1960, a large majority of the members of both sides of the council should be Africans and that those elected members should form the basis of the government. The approval of the British Colonial Secretary was obtained for these proposals in December 1959, and in September 1960, a predominantly TANU government took office. The emergence of this party and its triumph were due to the leadership of Julius Nyerere.

In April 1961, the General Assembly was made to know that the government of the United Kingdom and Tanganyika had agreed that Tanganyika would become independent on December 28, 1961. The Trusteeship Agreement for the territory would cease to be in force. The session of the Trusteeship Council in the summer of 1961, received information from the United Kingdom's government on the proceeding of the constitutional conference held in Dar-es-Salaam in March 1961, and it was also in the process of transferring powers.

Tanganyika had been noted by the United Nations as one of the significant cases where cooperation and racial harmony allowed the administering power to introduce constitutional changes before granting independence. The most significant aspect of such changes was to allow Africans to take part progressively in the legislative and executive branches. Specifically, such steps included rearranging or reconstructing the legislative council so as to allow African members with a large majority, elected by a broad electorate and transferring the primary responsibilities for conducting the territory's affairs into the hands of non-official ministers.

In 1961, the General Assembly was made to know that before attaining independence, Tanganyika would have full internal self-government on May 1, 1961. On that date, the Governor, the Deputy Governor, and the two official ministers would no longer be members of the Council of Ministers, and the Council of Ministers

would be renamed the Cabinet. With self-government, many of the powers exercised by the Governor would no longer be in use, and in general, the Governor would act on the advice of the cabinet. The conference in Dar-es-Salaam agreed that up till independence day, defence would continue to be a reserved subject, and the Governor would arrange to familiarize the ministers with their respective responsibilities. After all this information from the Dar-es-Salaam conference had been made known to the General Assembly and the Assembly's approval was obtained, Tanganyika became an independent state on December 9, 1961.

C. Togoland

Togoland was an indeterminate zone between the military states of Ashanti and Dahomey

German missionaries arrived in Ewe territory in 1847 and German traders were soon established at Anecho. It was recognized as a protectorate in 1885 and its coastal frontiers with Dahomey and the Gold Coast were defined by treaties with France and Great Britain.

On August 7, 1914, at the beginning of the First World War, British and French colonial troops from the Gold Coast and Dahomey invaded Togoland and on August 26, secured the unconditional surrender of the Germans. The Western part of the colony was administered by Britain, and the Eastern part by France. After Germany renounced its sovereignty in the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations in 1922, issued Mandates to Britain and France for the administration of their areas in Togoland.

In 1946, the British and French governments placed their areas in Togoland under United Nations Trusteeship. The areas were then known as British Togo and French Togo.

(i) **British Togo** : Britain administered Togoland as an integral part of the Gold Coast. Right from the start, the territory had no separate legislative or executive organs, but it was represented in

the territorial organs of the Gold Coast. When the Trusteeship Council was reporting on the administrative condition of Togoland, it was stated that :

The administering authority considers that geographic, economic, and other factors and not the least the common tribal origin of large parts of the population on both sides of the frontier, demand that in the interests of the people...the trust territory should be administered as an integral part of the Gold Coast. It considers further that the same factors, which include substantial differences between the peoples of the Northern and Southern sections of the Territory—the same differences as those existing between the Northern and Southern parts of the Gold Coast—also make it impracticable to administer Togoland as an integral unit with the Gold Coast framework, but require that the Northern section of Togoland should be closely associated with the Northern territories of the Gold Coast and the Southern section with the Southern peoples of the colony.⁶

In 1954, when Gold Coast received a new constitution, the Legislative Council was transformed into a body consisting entirely of persons elected directly by universal suffrage from one hundred and four constituencies covering the Gold Coast and British Togoland. The Gold Coast cabinet was appointed by the Assembly. Togoland's position in this system was described in a report submitted to the United Nations. It reads thus :

Togoland is treated in matters of representation and participation in the functioning of the political institutions as if it were part of the Gold Coast. The electoral boundaries, which are not related to the boundary between the two territories, determine the representation of its people in the Legislative Assembly : there are fourteen constituencies which lie wholly or partly within the territory. The election results determine their participation in the government : two Togolandese were in fact chosen by the leader of the successful party to serve as

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Minister of Education and Ministerial Secretary to the Ministry of Local Government, respectively.⁷

Britain suggested to the Ninth General Assembly that the time had come to consider the termination of the trusteeship for British Togoland. Representatives of the indigenous population of both Togolands were heard.

The Fourth Committee and the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a visiting mission appointed by the Trusteeship Council to visit the territories and hear the views of the inhabitants as to their future. They may choose to be independent and stand as an independent Togoland, or, join the Independent Gold Coast, or join some other self-governing or independent states.⁸

The Mission was appointed at the Fifteenth Session of the Council, and its detailed terms of reference adopted at the sixteenth session. The Mission composed of representatives of India, Australia, Syria and the United States. The Mission spent six weeks in the territories during August/September 1955. The Mission received many hearings from the people. In the British Togoland, two main views emerged : (1) Federation with the Gold Coast, supported by the Convention People's Party and the Northern Peoples' Party ; (2) Unification with an independent French Togoland, supported by the Togoland Congress Party, the All-Ewe conference and a few Southern chiefs. All parties in the territory as well as the administering authority, agreed to have the plebiscite to determine the wishes of the people.

The Trusteeship Council considered the report of the Mission at the Fifth Special Session (October/December 1955). The Council decided to transmit the report of the General Assembly, as a useful basis for further action. The General Assembly considered the report at its Tenth Session. The plebiscite was held on May 9, 1956. The chart below gives a breakdown of the official results by district :

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<i>District</i>	<i>Union</i>	<i>Separation</i>	<i>Rejected</i>	<i>Total</i>
Ho	7,487	18,987	35	26,503
Kpandu	8,581	16,959	49	25,589
Buem-Krachi	28,178	18,775	57	47,010
Gonja	3,166	2,729	—	5,895
Dagomba	28,083	6,549	603	35,235
Damprusi	17,870	3,429	351	31,650
	93,365	67,422	1,095	161,882 ⁹

At its Eighteenth Session, in the summer of 1956, the Trusteeship Council, after being notified of the plebiscite results, adopted, a resolution, and recommended to the General Assembly that appropriate steps should be taken in consultation with the British, to end the trusteeship agreement for the territory. The effective date should be the same day as which the Gold Coast attained its independence. British Togoland was given the chance to be part of the Gold Coast and also to be independent with her.

(ii) **French Togo :** French Togo was administered by a Commissioner, assisted by a consultative executive council of officials. French Togo formed into a district until 1934, when a kind of economic union was established with Dahomey : this was replaced in 1936 by a qualified integration with French West Africa that lasted ten years. After the Second World War, French Togo sent a deputy to the French National Assembly, a counsellor to the Assembly of the French Union, and two senators to the Council of the Republic. A representative assembly was concerned with internal affairs.

Considerable emphasis was placed on the capacity of the local inhabitants to participate in the policy-making organs of the French union. Both the Cameroun and Togoland allotted deputies to the

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National Assembly, representatives to the Council of the Republic and delegates to the Assembly of the French Union and the Economic Council.

At the territorial level, Togo had an assembly, based on a single electoral system, but without real legislative authority. The Assembly could make decisions on such matters as tourist traffic, administration of movable and immovable property within the territory, local taxes, town planning and contributions. It could not pass resolutions on political matters. Real Policy-making power remained in the hands of the chief administrative officer as the representative of the French Government.

French Togo became an autonomous republic within the French Union on August 30, 1956. This status was confirmed by a plebiscite held in October 1956, under French auspices. Nicolas Grunitzky was appointed Premier. Following United Nations' representations, elections held in April 1958 favored complete independence and rejected Grunitzky's Parti Togolais du Progres (Togolese Progress Party) and was in favour of Sylvanus Olympio's Comite de l' unite Togolaise (Togolese National Unity Party). Independence was celebrated on April 27, 1960.

D. Somaliland

Somaliland was in a different position in comparison with other African trust territories. It was the only trust territory for which there has been a definite time limit by which it should attain independence. It was part of its trusteeship agreement that it should become a completely independent state by 1960. Resolution 294 (IV) of the General Assembly was followed in placing it under trusteeship and it called upon the Trusteeship Council to include in the trusteeship agreement an annex of constitutional principles based on the draft annex submitted by India. The draft was significant as an indication of what principles were thought important by a state recently emerged from colonial status.

The following is the summary of the resolution :

1. Sovereignty is vested in the people of the territory.

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2. An Administrator, appointed by the administering authority, should be the executive authority in the territory.
3. To assist the Administrator, the latter should appoint a Territorial Council of five representatives of the principal political parties or organizations in the territory.
4. The Administrator should consult and be guided by the advice of the Territorial Council in all matters except those relating to defence and foreign affairs.
5. The Administrator, with the consent of the Territorial Council, (enlarged by such other representatives as he should choose to summon for the purpose), should normally act as the legislative authority, with the proviso that in exceptional circumstances, subject to United Nations control, the Administrator could promulgate necessary ordinances.
6. The judiciary should be appointed by the Administrator, and not be removable except with the consent of the United Nations.
7. All authorities in the territory should "respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
8. The United Nations may amend the above rules.¹⁰

Because of the very short period of trusteeship, there was an element of coercion in the protecting period of the administering power. The Somalis were to be developed in the democratic system, but because the majority of the people were not experienced in the democratic system, the time between 1950 and 1960 seemed not sufficient to bring them up through the gradual reconciliation of ethnic group political structures with Western notions of adequate political organization. It was also noted that if such an experiment could be successful in Somaliland at such a short period, it would put a pressure on other administering authorities to speed up the political development in their territories. There were sufficient obstacles for Somaliland to go through, from dependent territory to

independent state. But if Somaliland could go through all the obstacles successfully, other African trust territories should be able to make it.

These obstacles, as they affected the political development of the area, included that only about ten percent of the land was arable or good for agriculture. Water was in short supply.¹¹ The land had no important mineral resources but there was a possibility of oil deposits.¹² About four-fifths of the population were nomadic cattle raisers living under the poorest of circumstances.

Political development within the territory proceeded on two lines: (1) The Somalization of the Italian administration and (2) the creation and development of separate territorial organs of government. As of 1956, according to the Italian representative on the Trusteeship Council, all District Commissioners were Somalis: one of the Regional Commissioners was a Somali, and six Somalis were appointed assistants to the Directors of various government departments and participated in the work of the Administrative Committee.¹³ In general, the vast majority of positions in the civil administration, were manned by Somalis, and the Italians inaugurated the "Escuela Politica Administrata" where the inhabitants of ability were trained to assume top-level positions in the administration.

The most important developments in connection with territorial organs of government was the Territorial Council (which was provided for in the Trusteeship Agreement), and the Municipal Councils in areas of permanent settlement. The members of the Territorial Councils became elective officials, whereas, originally they were appointed by the administering authority. Election in the Municipalities was by direct male suffrage, while representatives of the nomadic population were indirectly elected through ethnic councils. The 1958 plans called for the introduction of direct elections throughout the territory. Ethnic considerations, similar to those in Tanganyika led to the allotment of seats in the Council on the basis of sixty for Somalis; four each for Italians and Arabs, and one each for Indians and Pakistan i.e. Pakistanies.¹⁴

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With reference to the degree of legislative authority given to the Territorial Council, the Council exercised no real legislative power, but the delegation of such council was to be the next step taken in the devolution of political authority. The same thing in the case of executive responsibility in the form of the number of governmental secretaryships with responsibilities of the ministerial nature was envisaged.

"This will gradually be increased as the chairman of the standing committees in the Territorial Council, to be known as the Legislative Assembly, are appointed as parliamentary assistants to each secretary."¹⁵

In the permanently settled areas, the administering authority developed some forty-two municipal councils, which later had broad powers of decision, including the levying of taxes and control over expenditures within limits. The Somali members of the councils totalling two hundred and eighty-one were elected by direct male suffrage, while the remaining thirty-seven seats were appointive, distributed among the Arab, Italian, Indian, and Pakistani residents. At that time, the municipal councils constituted the nearest move to effective self-government in Somaliland, and they appeared to have functioned successfully. But an analysis of population and voting statistics revealed that they represented political involvement of a small part of the population.¹⁶

Following the progress of the British Somali, the Italians rapidly pursued social and political advancement though economic development proved much more difficult. Italians tried hard and prepared Somaliland for independence under the United Nations trusteeship. The British protectorate became independent on June 26, 1960. Somalia followed and became independent on July 1, 1960. The two territories joined and formed the Somalia Republic.

E. Ruandi-Urundi

Ruandi-Urundi was a United Nations Trust Territory until 1961. It lies in Eastern Equatorial Africa, and was administered by Belgium. The Kingdoms of Ruanda and Urundi were founded

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by Tutsi people from Ethiopia, who subdued the Hutu. Ruanda was a powerful state in the 14th century, and the history of its kings or bami (singular Mnani) is known from traditions describing their wars and ethnic struggles. Ruandi-Urundi came in contact with Germany in 1890 and became part of German East Africa.

During World War I, Ruandi-Urundi fell into Belgian hands, and in 1924, Belgium formally accepted the administration under a Mandate of the League of Nations, which was replaced by a United Nations Trusteeship in 1946.

The Territory retained its identity and a separate budget. It was linked with the Belgian Congo by an administrative union in 1925. Each native kingdom remained separate with her own sovereign, justice, administration and taxation. The feudal structure and the dominant position of the Tutsi remained, although the Belgians eliminated the medieval features of the regime and afterwards sought to establish a more democratic atmosphere, which implied the political emancipation of the Hutu.

In 1959, ethnic war in Ruanda caused the expulsion or departure of many of the Tutsi, and Nwani-Kigri later went into exile. In the same month of November 1959, the Belgian Government made a statement of policy concerning the future of the territory. As per the statement, the administering authority was to establish a system of local government—based upon election legislatures in Ruanda and Urundi, which would gradually receive autonomy under Belgian supervision. Belgium also invited Ruanda and Urundi to organize a community, though it did not specify or explain in detail the concept of community.

The Trusteeship Council centered its views on the reports of the visiting mission which was sent to the territory in March 1960, mostly to investigate the ethnic groups' war in Ruanda; the Council had a belief that if representatives of all sections of political opinion and of the administering authority could meet and discuss together, they could do a lot to achieve national reconciliation. The Council

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also considered it reasonable to invite United Nations observers to attend the conference.

Unfortunately, the conference did not materialize immediately, but instead, two conferences of a more limited character took place in Brussels. The first of the two conferences took place on June 26-30 of 1960. It was attended by Ruanda leaders, while the second conferences took place between November 15 and December 8, 1960 and was for Urundi. The United Nations' representatives did not attend any of the two conferences. The conferences opened the way for electing the local communal councils of the two kingdoms. In the case of Ruanda, the local elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the anti-monarchist parties, notably, the "Parti du Mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTE). It won 2,623 out of a total of 3,126 seats.¹⁷ Working on the results of the election, and also on the pending legislative elections, the Belgian administration established a provisional government in October 1960 and the provisional government was largely composed of Hutu representatives.

When the Trusteeship Council met in July 1960, it agreed with the administering authority's intention to hold legislative election under the supervision of the United Nations early in 1961. The elections were supposed to be through universal adult suffrage, and was to constitute national assemblies for Ruandi and Urundi.

Belgium invited the United Nations in November 1960 to send an observer team to the territory to watch the national elections beginning on January 15, 1961. Realizing that the time and the political atmosphere would not be conducive to a satisfactory election, the General Assembly requested that the Belgians should call a full representative conference of political parties before the elections so as to bring about national harmony and thereby the elections had to be deferred. Then, in addition, the General Assembly set up a United Nations Commission for Ruandi Urundi, to attend the political conference, and to supervise the elections. The elections were to be held in the territory, in 1961 on the basis of direct universal adult suffrage. Belgium was not prepared to

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postpone the elections at first, but when the conference of the political leaders was called at Ostend, in January, with the attendance of the United Nations Commission, Belgium agreed to postpone the elections.

For the unrest in Rudanda, the United Nations considered national reconciliation to be the most pressing need of the trust territory. It was understood that the disturbance forced thousands of Ruanda inhabitants to leave their homes and take refuge elsewhere. The Trusteeship Council advised that Belgium should resettle the refugees and grant an amnesty to political prisoners and refugees. Belgium assured the Assembly that it favored an amnesty but could not apply such a measure because she considered most of the prisoners or refugees to be common criminals. And again releasing some individuals might spark new disturbances, therefore, she further put it forth that amnesty could not be the symbol of reconciliation ; but, for it to be effective, and to signify a genuine desire to forget the past, only the people of Ruanda could decide upon it.

Belgium, in November 1960, revoked the state of emergency in Ruanda-Urundi ; this state of emergency had been referred to by the United Nations as an obstacle to reconciliation.

In December 1960, the General Assembly recommended that the measures adopted by the administering authorities reinstate the powers of the Mwani and allow him to return to Ruanda and function until the wishes of the people were known. The Assembly also decided that a referendum should be held under the supervision of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi in order to ascertain the wishes of the people concerning the institution of the Meami. The Commission proceeded to fulfil its mandate and after attending the Ostend Conference, went to the territory to prepare for the legislative elections. The provisional government of Ruanda staged a coup d'etat in which the communal councillors, acting as an electoral college, elected a legislature, and the government adopted a constitution and declared Ruanda to be a republic. In Urundi, the provisional government had also been set up. With all these

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problems, the United Nations Commission returned to New York to obtain further directives from the General Assembly.

After receiving the Commission's report, the General Assembly called upon the administering authority to carry out in full, its previous recommendations concerning the territory. Declaring that the administering authority was obliged to create the necessary conditions and atmosphere for conducting the national elections properly, the Assembly called for an immediate, full and unconditional amnesty and for "broad-based" caretaker governments in both states. It decided that in August 1961 Belgium should hold the referendum on the Mwani of Ruanda and the legislative elections, supervised by the United Nations, on the basis of direct universal adult suffrage. It requested the United Nations' Commissioners to return to Ruanda-Urundi at the earliest possible date to assist and advise the administering authority in implementing the Assembly's recommendations. In the case of amnesty, it created a three-members special commission to examine the cases of persons convicted of "very grave crimes" with a view to securing their release from prison or return from exile not later than two months before the elections.

The elections were held in September, 1961 under United Nations' supervision. The Hutu won the election in Ruanda and the Tutsi Party won in Urundi. The two states rejected the United Nations' proposal that the two states should federate, they wanted to be two independent states. They attained complete independence on July 1, 1962 as Rwanda and Burundi.

Conclusion

Decolonization in the Trusteeship Colonies was not difficult because the Colonies were under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The United Nations passed some resolutions and told the Administering powers to abide with the resolutions and allow the Colonies to be free. In some cases plebiscites were conducted to show what the people really wanted to do and their opinions were respected. In conclusion, it can be said that decolonization

was not difficult in the Trusteeship Colonies except in Namibia, a trusteeship Colony under a Settler Colony.

FOOTNOTES

1. James N. Murray, Jr., *The United Nations Trusteeship System*, (Urbana, Illinois : The University of Illinois Press, 1957), p. 223.

2. *Report by the U.S. President to the Congress 1960-1961 : U.S. Participation in the U.N.* (Department of State Publications, 1961), p. 112.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa : The Politics of Independence* (New York : Random House, Inc., 1969), p. 36.

6. United Nations, *General Assembly Official Records* : New York : Ninth Session, Report of the Trusteeship Council Covering the period from July 1953 to July 16, 1954, pp. 53-54.

7. United Nations Document T/L 579, Annex One qualification to this is that no Gold Coast legislation could be applied in Togoland if in conflict with the Trusteeship Agreement.

8. Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Ninth Session, Resolution 860 (IX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations 1953/54.

9. "People of British Togoland vote on their country's future." *United Nations Review*, Vol. 2, No. 12 June 1965, p. 9.

10. *United Nations Document T/420*, Paraphrased.

11. United Nations, "Halfway to Independence" *United Nations Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July 1954), p. 51.

12. *The New York Times*, January 9, 1955, p. 19.

13. General Assembly, *Official Record : Tenth Session Report of the Trusteeship Council Covering the Period from July 17, 1954 to July 22, 1955*, pp. 115-116.

14. The total indigenous population of Somaliland (estimated 1953), was 1,263,509. In addition, there were approximately 5,000 Italians, 3,000 Arabs and 1,000 Indians and Pakistanis.

General Assembly : *Official Records : Tenth Session, Report of the Trusteeship Council Covering the Period from July 17, 1954 to July 22, 1955*, pp. 115-116.

15. Somali control of Legislative functions and positions in the government were increased in May 1956. As of that time, the Legislative Assembly was given powers over internal affairs, except for Italian state employees and Italian

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contributions of Somaliland, and Somalis were nominated as Prime Minister and Ministers of the Interior, Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, Finance and General Affairs. "The Trust Territory of Somaliland Prepares for 1960", *United Nations Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (August, 1956).

16. In the municipal elections of 1954, there were 50,740 registered voters; of these 38,119 or only about 30 percent of the total indigenous population, participated in the election. *United Nations Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (August, 1956). pp. 60-61.

17. The Report of the President of the United States to the Congress 1960-61, *Department of State Publication, International Organization and Conference Series*. Released, September 1961, p. 109.

Virendra Tripathi

John Pepper Clark— Nigerian Poet and Dramatist

Most of five hundred or more culture groups speaking their different languages in the present Africa of 280 million people, have for a long time had both oral prose and verse. Most pre-literate peoples use social leisure and freedom practising the social arts, reciting verse, singing songs, dancing and playing musical instruments.

Most early poetry of any society to popular poetry in the sense it was usually chanted or sung to many listeners. The listeners often joined in chorus, individuals or groups added to the original verses. Sometimes that original form and substance either by individuals or by groups could be changed beyond recognition.

After the writing down of a people's language, or after a culture group becomes literate, a cleavage sets in. This is not only between oral and written literature, but between 'popular' poetry and prose and what comes to be called scholarly, educated or 'literary' poetry and prose.

African legacies of prose and poetry have at least two levels of awareness, the popular and literary. But involvement with all the possibilities of a more universal human appeal is already there.

In West Africa modern writings appeared as late as 1940's. But the number of writers grew quickly. Especially so was the case with Nigeria. In spite of hundred or more indigenuous languages Nigerian writers, who wanted to reach beyond community, chose English language as their medium of expression. Outstanding among modern Nigerian writers is John Pepper Clark, who is both poet and playwright. He has also written critical prose.

For the student of Nigerian literature J.P. Clark is interesting not only for the quality of his poetry but for his historical importance as one of the first poets to begin writing the type of verse that should eventually laid the foundation of a national tradition of Nigerian poetry.

Apart from the absence of a written tradition which made the creation of a genuine national verse tradition, a difficulty, the Nigerian poet also had to contend with the prejudice that the writer in a developing country is free from those sophisticated inhibitions which stifle creative mind.

Writing in a kind of explosion, under the extreme pressure of experience, writing only if cornered by life, as it were, and then having got the thing off his chest losing interest and turning to the next thing.

Pepper Clark writes a slightly different kind of poetry. He chooses themes, which could be turned as 'internationalist'. Some of his poems are replete with disturbing sense of verbal exuberance. He writes the kind of poetry that puts him in the tradition of Western-oriented humanism. He is most self-consciously aware of his role as an artist. His subjects are chosen from all over the place and his forms are varied.

His is a highly personal poetry, dealing with issues that form the subjects of one man's speculative and imaginative mind. A kind of philosophy pervades a number of his poems. Although he does not raise any moral questions. Yet express the importance of man's healthy instincts for his survival, man's constant concern as an aspect of his very existence and man's attempt to cope with the process.

Clark's *Casualties* (1970) is mainly a collection of poems on the Nigerian crisis. The poems are presented more or less in a chronological except for the first two 'The Casualties' is the poets attempt to interpret dishonest peace activities in terms of tragedies of war.

A Reed in the Tide : A selection of poems was brought out in 1971. This is his second poetry volume. The poems carry the impression of space and time. For the poet must not merely translate emotions or ideas from life of one culture into language of another, he must create a product that is a new whole in itself.

In 'Agbor Dancer' the poet expresses a sense of alienation from native culture, which should have sired his poetic creations. The subject of 'Agbor Dancer' is indigenous, its literary model is 'scripal' in origin, its theme and even the alliterative pattern point to 'Kubla Khan'.

Those sick-insect figures ! The rock the dance
Of snakes, dart after him daddy long-arms,
Tangle their loping strides to mangrove stance.

Imagery, visual effect, especially of movement—the fluidity of dance, the speed of chase and feeling of impotence which the long dangling arms convey.

Political disintegration, massacre and civil war—these terrible events cast shadows before them in Nigerian writing from about the end of 1964 onwards. In a poem written in that year J.P. Clark had already noted the wary of the situation in which Nigeria's first and foremost nationalists Nnamdi Azikwie and Awolowo found themselves, that one powerless President of an independent republic which he had spent thirty years of his life campaigning to create and the other in prison on a political charge. In his poem 'The Leader' Clark laments the loss of not only a childhood hero but perhaps of an ideal of national unity also.

This poem records above all the collapse in power and prestige of this first generation of political leaders.*

They have felled him to the ground
Who announced home from abroad
Wrestled to a standstill his champion
Cousin the killer of cows. Yes, in all that common

And swamp, pitched piecemeal by storks,
No ignana during a decade of tongues
Could throw or twist him round
While he rallied the race and clan
Now like an alligator he lies
Trussed up in a house without eyes,
And ears : Bit of bamboo
Flung to laggard dogs by drowning
Nearest of kin, has quite locked his jaws.

Pepper Clark is very good at realising a composite image. The subtlety of relationship between the poet and the apprehended subject makes him one of the finest African poets. In dealing with African subjects he demonstrates exceptional skill. He has ability to draw upon and express forcefully a tradition he knows very well. In the tradition of most African societies the community takes precedence over the individual. But the latter may raise a cry on behalf of the former, whenever its structure is threatened.

Speaking for community, from positions of protests and anguish at the same time Pepper Clark has emerged as a new and vital force and has injected fresh richness and vigour in Nigerian literature, yet continuing best traditions of African literature.

A poet writing in an alien language and thinking in his own idiom faces a monumental clash. He has a long tradition of signs and songs. Sighs and simmerings. To express in modern idiom man's most meaningful experience, the trapping of the past which normally connect man to the golden age of the ancestors have been vulgarised, being now laced with the flimsy glories of paved streets.

The Three Plays was published in England in 1964. This collection includes Clarke's three important plays i.e. *Song of a Goat*, *The Masquerade* and *The Raft*. All the three are tragedies in classical tradition. The theme of *Song of a Goat* and *The Masquerade* is impotency. In *Song of a Goat* elder brother loses his wife to younger brother because he cannot give her child. Younger

brother feels the guilt all the time and finally hangs himself. The elder brother then drowns himself into the sea. *Song of a Goat* is Clark's first tragedy and is widely known.

In 'The Masquerade' the curse of impotency for three generations. The futility of suffering by one who did not do any wrong, who had no share in his own making and yet had to live and give is poignantly brought about by the play wright.

The third play 'The Raft' is also a tragedy. Destiny is ordained. No human being could avert the doom that is his inevitable heritage. A fatality, a queer sense of satisfaction in surroundings. A quest for understanding. This play is more of of philosophy, less of a drama. All the three plays of Clark deal with the theme of sin in one way or the other.

A literature of sin is most naturally developed in a society suffering from a surfeit of experience—an excess which it cannot control because of a derangement of values. Nigerian society offered unlimited experience amounting almost to anarchy, which enabled its writers to materialise the themes of sin and evil.

And a society which suffered not from a surfeit but from poverty of experience and far from being to fluid its values were altogether too rigid. John Pepper Clark did not pick up exceptional but necessarily a typical problem—typical despite all variations. In can be defined as the problem of the reconquest, of the re-acquisition of experience in its cultural, aesthetic and above all subjective aspects.

John Pepper Clark was born in 1935 in the Ijaw country of Niger delta in Nigeria. He founded the literary magazine 'The Horn', when still a student at college. He has been making his living from writing in one form or the other. From 1960 onwards he worked as a journalist and later in 1962 went on a Fellowship to Princeton University. After his return he became the leading editorial writer in the staff of *Lagos Daily Express*.

Dr. Vijay Gupta

India and Africa

(A QUARTELY CHRONICLE FOR
OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1976)

Call for End to Oppression in South Africa

Systematic and inhuman denial of basic rights to the indigenous peoples in southern Africa had troubled the conscience of every thinking, sensitive individual in the world, said Mr Om Mehta, India's Minister of State for Home and Parliamentary Affairs in Madrid. He expressed the hope that the oppression in Southern Africa would end and Namibia and Zimbabwe would soon join the ranks of civilized, independent nations and there would be majority rule in South Africa as well.

Addressing the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference as the leader of the Indian delegation, Mr Mehta said that with the release from colonial domination of hundreds of millions of people who represented a resurgent world community, the era of cold war and power blocs had been proved irrelevant. "We could not, at the same times overlook the fact that economic exploitation of some of the nation, representing these peoples persists in one form or other, making them vulnerable to external pressures and influences," he said. What was needed, he added, was the passion for peace and for civilized conduct in international relations. World peace to be real must encompass every nation and it was only through mutual trust and cooperation among all nations that a stable peace could be achieved.

(October 1, 1976)

India's Call to U.N.—Liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia

India has urged the U.N. to concentrate during the coming year on its historic responsibility of liberating Zimbabwe and Namibia. Failure to live upto the demands of these responsibilities would

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only result in their taking up arms to liberate themselves with such help as friends might offer them.

Mr. Jaipal, India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations speaking in the General Assembly on the implementation of the declaration on the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples said that in spite of UN demands the colonial powers have proved to be extremely reluctant to surrender power to the people except under sustained political, economic or military pressure since they seemed immune to moral pressures.

The hardnuts of decolonization had remained impervious to United Nations resolutions on questions such as the liberation of Zimbabwe, the removal from Namibia of the illegal regime, the liquidation of apartheid and the establishment of a separate new nation state for the Palestine Arab people. Mr. Jaipal said that these were the hard core problems of colonialism and racism, problems which had a colonial legacy and had also a bearing on the maintenance of international peace and security. (October 6, 1976)

Tributes to India for its Role Against Apartheid

Members of the United Nations community, committed to the cause of racial equality, paid on 5 October, a unique tribute to India at a session of the U.N. Committee against Apartheid, convened specifically for that purpose. Spokesmen for nations from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the socialist group of states praised India for the role it has played, beginning 30 years ago, in championing the cause of the peoples of South Africa who have been the target of racial discrimination.

It was the first time that the Committee, set up 12 years ago to eradicate the evil of apartheid, had honoured a member state. Mr Y.B. Chavan, Minister of External Affairs, addressed the Special Committee meeting. He later commented "it was a moving and touching experience."

The struggle in South Africa against apartheid, Mr Chavan said, "is entering its final phase. There is no doubt that it will suc-

ceed. Apartheid is a lost cause, and it stands universally condemned. The struggle for freedom and racial equality began in the minds of men centuries ago. There is no substitute for freedom, and there is no alternative to equality."

Wishing the committee speedy success "in what is perhaps the noblest and oldest cause in the United Nations," Mr Chavan said that "man's unfinished revolution is in South Africa and this committee has a major role to play in bringing it to a successful conclusion."

Welcoming Mr Chavan, the Chairman of the Special Committee, Ambassador Leslie Harriman of Nigeria, said that thirty years ago, at the very first session of the General Assembly, India brought up the question of racial discrimination in South Africa and made it an international issue. After recalling how Mahatma Gandhi had launched his passive resistance campaign in South Africa even before he did so in his own country, Mr Harriman said that Nehru had not only helped forge Asian solidarity with Africa but had consistently urged the people of Indian origin in South Africa to identify themselves with the aspirations of the African majority.

Mrs Elizabeth Sibeko, representative of the Pan African Congress, was among those who spoke praising India and Mahatma Gandhi. She said the Azanian people were proud that Mahatma Gandhi was a party to "our struggle". She spoke of the "very specialities" existing between Azania and India.

The Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Mr Shevel, speaking on behalf of the Committee members from the socialist countries said that India had played an important role from the start in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, racism and apartheid and in the consolidation of the forces of world peace. He said there were unshakable ties between the socialist countries and the countries liberated from the colonial yoke.

Mr Carlos T. Alzamora (Peru), speaking on behalf of the members from Latin American countries, said that India's example had inspired the leaders of the Third World and would continue to be an incentive until the common goal was achieved—the total elimination

of apartheid. The Latin American countries were fully committed to the struggle for the freedom and dignity of people, he said.

Mr Frank E. Boaten (Ghana) speaking on behalf of the members from African countries, said it was appropriate to commend India for its long struggle in the United Nations and elsewhere for freedom, independence and human dignity. India had taken the lead against apartheid before most of the independent African states themselves became members of the United Nations and had built a solid foundation for their later activities on the matter.

Mr Imrad Idris (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the members from Asian countries, said, it was indeed fitting to commemorate the 30th anniversary of India's initiative in raising in the United Nations the question of discrimination. The efforts begun at that time had led to the weakening and "impending eradication" of apartheid. Mr Idris paid tribute to India for its pioneering action in warning the international community of the dangers of apartheid and elevating the question to a major international issue. (October 6, 1976).

India-UAE assure assistance to African Liberation Movements

India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), "reiterated their firm resolve to continue their principled support to the struggle to liquidate apartheid, racial discrimination, colonial exploitation and domination in Southern Africa, and expressed their determination to assist the liberation movements there by all possible means."

This was stated in the joint communique issued on 7 October at the end of a four-day state visit by the President, Mr Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed to the UAE. He was accompanied by Begum Abida Ahmed.

Both sides, the joint communique said, reaffirmed their adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter and reiterated faith in the policy of non-alignment. They were confident that "the wide acceptance of the declaration issued by the Colombo Conference of heads of state and government of non-aligned countries would make major contribution to international peace and cooperation, and to the creation of a just international order." (October 7, 1976).

India Welcomes Joint Stand on South Africa

India welcomed the joint stand taken by the Presidents of the five African 'frontline' countries on Rhodesia, said Mr Bipinpal Das, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs on 7 October in Maputo (Mozambique). Speaking to newsmen on his arrival in Maputo on a four-day visit, he expressed the hope that an African majority government would soon be formed in Rhodesia. "India is interested in further developing bilateral cooperation with Mozambique," he said. During his stay in Mozambique, Mr Das had talks with leaders there on international problems including the situation in South Africa, and also on Indo-Mozambique cooperation in economy, technology, and culture.

Earlier Mr Bipinpal Das represented India in the 10th independence anniversary celebrations of Botswana on 30 September in Gaborone. He handed to President Seretse Khama of Botswana a special message from the Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi and conveyed India's congratulations and greetings. Mr. Das also presented to President Seretse Khama a symbolic contribution of pulas 5,000 (Rs. 50,000 approx) on behalf of the Government of India for the new university campus under construction by the Botswana government.

Mr Das also held discussion with the Botswana Foreign Minister and other ministers. At the meeting which took place on 28 September the discussions centred on the "rapidly evolving situation in Southern Africa and on bilateral cooperation." A delegation under the Botswana Minister of Works, Transport and Communications will visit India within a few weeks.

Mr Das also represented India in the 10th independence day celebration on 4 October in Lesotho. (October 8, 1976)

India for cordial ties with Africa

Speaking in Nairobi, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra Mr. S.B. Chavan said "we are vitally interested in very cordial relations with all African countries especially Kenya. Developing countries need to come closer to each other and need to appreciate each others

difficulties."

(October 10, 1976)

Indira Gandhi visits Africa on a Mission of Solidarity

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi paid a ten day visit to Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zambia. This visit, at such a crucial juncture in African history, has not only consolidated Indian friendship with them but also once again highlighted India's consistent support to liberation movements on the threshold of their victory.

Besides meeting government leaders of frontline states of Tanzania and Zambia, Mrs Gandhi also took the opportunity to meet liberation leaders to get their own assessment of developments and to assure them of India's continued support.

Her meeting with these leaders came in the midst of intensive efforts initiated by frontline presidents to forge unity among various factions of liberation movements. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of her talks with President Nyerere had stressed the supreme need for unity and steadfastness of purpose at this historic moment so that the true representatives of the people are able to determine the future of their country.

President Nyerere and President Kaunda who are veteran leaders of independence, in their talks with Mrs. Gandhi, acknowledged India's diplomatic, moral and material support to liberation movements in South Africa.

The discussions that took place at Port-Louis, Dar-es-Salaam and Lusaka revealed similarity of approach on various other political and economic issues between India and these countries. This itself apparently stemmed from similarity of background of India and the African states which she visited.

The Prime Minister's visit to these countries is considered as symbolic of the cooperation among developing countries. Realization was particularly evident in these countries that India as a developing country with technological capability is willing to cooperate with them without any motive of acquiring influence.

The heads of all these countries stated appreciatively about the service rendered by Indian experts in their countries. (October 12, 1976)

India and Mauritius urge full support to struggle in Zimbabwe

India and Mauritius have called upon the non-aligned countries to support the representative of the people of Zimbabwe so that effective majority rule is established there as expeditiously as possible.

This was stated in a joint communique by the Prime Ministers of the two countries at the end of Mrs Indira Gandhi's four day visit to Mauritius from 8 to 11 October. The communique noted that the freedom struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia had reached "a decisive phase". The communique also reaffirmed continued moral and material support to the struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of the South-West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) for liberation from illegal occupation by South Africa. Mrs Gandhi and the Mauritius Prime Minister, Sir Seevoosagar Ramgoolam expressed confidence that the triumph of liberation in Zimbabwe and Namibia would lead to the end of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa.

The Prime Ministers of India and Mauritius expressed their deep concern over the escalation of foreign presence in the Indian Ocean and regret at the continued military build up in Diego Garcia. Along with other littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean and non-aligned countries, they agreed to strengthen their efforts and cooperation towards realisation of their desire to maintain the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. (October 12, 1976)

India condemns Multinational's league with racists

The Indian delegate Mr K. P. Unnikrishnan told the U.N. that American dominated multinational corporations acted hand-in-glove to continue their stronghold in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Mr Unnikrishnan said it would be a fatal error to imagine racism in Southern Africa operated in splendid isolation. In his view they were intimately linked with multinationals and also with the western military industrial complex and were an integral part of it.

Reading out some statistics Mr Unnikrishnan told the Committee on Trust and Non-self-Governing Territories that the interests

of the United States, represented through multinationals in South Africa were larger and were growing faster than in any other African country. Their turnover exceeded 15 billion dollars in 1974 and was growing at an annual rate of 20 per cent.

He said that there were 350 multinationals operating in South Africa. Earlier this year a consortium of 28 banks arranged a 200 million dollar loan for the South African Electricity Commission.

(October 14, 1976)

India Demands—UN. must stand by Africans

The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Y.B. Chavan said in New Delhi that UN should not rest until the last vestiges of colonialism and racism were eradicated from the face of the globe. He thought the situation was critical particularly in Southern Africa and it was imperative that white minority rule should quickly yield to majority rule. The national liberation movements have been left with no option but to armed struggle. He added that the illegal regime in Zimbabwe which has no basis in law or in the will of the people must yield to majority rule without any delay in case further bloodshed was to be avoided.

Mr. Chavan said that Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, during her recent visit has given an ample proof of India's firm commitment to the cause of freedom and human dignity in Africa. He asked the UN to take concrete steps to assume in practice responsibility for what belongs to it in law. The U.N. must consider practical means to eradicate apartheid and racism from South Africa.

(October 25, 1976)

India seeks World help for S. African Blacks

Indian delegate Mr. Brahmananda Panda M.P. told the UN General Assembly that the world community should lend its support to the downtrodden majority in South Africa. Mr. Panda highlighted the explosive nature of the situation in South Africa. He pointed out that in spite of the white minority regime being denounced as illegitimate and as many as 150 resolutions adopted by the UN condemning apartheid, adequate impact on the white regime had not been made. He also referred to the frustration caused by

the veto power exercised by some of the western nations on resolutions favouring sanctions before the Security Council.

Mr Panda said, in the circumstances "the downtrodden majority in South Africa has no option but to resort to force to acquire and exercise its legitimate rights." We must support the majority until white regime abolishes the existing legislation depriving the black majority of its political and economic rights and social equality.

(October 28, 1976).

Indian support to liberation struggle

All India Congress Committee in a resolution has said "In Africa the successful conclusion of the liberation struggle in the Portuguese colonies and the intensification of National Liberation Movement against white minority regimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia has brought the final movement of total liberation in that continent very near.

The AICC welcomed "the positive outcome of the Prime Minister's recent visit to Africa which was a timely reaffirmation of India's moral and material support to the cause of liberation in Africa." It pledged "support to the struggle of the brave people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO for liberation from illegal occupation by the fascist regime of South Africa." AICC condemned "the massacres in Soweto and other townships and reaffirmed its solidarity with the courageous people of South Africa under the leadership of the African National Congress in their struggle to end apartheid and to achieve majority rule. AICC denounced the policy of creating Bantustan and supported the stand not to recognize the sham independence of Transkei.

(November 20, 1976)

Co-operation with Africa, P.M.'s call to Envoys

The Prime Minister, told Indian envoys in African countries that India could discuss with these countries the potential areas of exchange of experience and cooperation in economic and technological fields. Inaugurating a four-day conference of heads of Indian missions in 14 African countries south of Sahara, the Prime Minister impressed upon them the need for such discus-

Vijay Gupta

sions as African countries were now engaged in building up viable economic and technological infrastructures.

Prime Minister said that India had always attached importance to the Afro-Asian relations and added that Mr Jawaharlal Nehru had envisaged this even before India's independence." We seek friendship with African countries," she said. She pointed out that non-alignment was another strong link between India and the African countries. In this context she referred to attempts to divide the non-aligned world but said that these attempts had not succeeded.

Prime Minister told the envoys that India had been giving moral and material support to the liberation movement not for narrow reasons but on grounds of principles. (December 1, 1976)

Call to support South African People

The National Federation of Progressive Writers Association of India called upon all freedom loving democratic peoples of the world and governments to actively support the struggling masses of Southern Africa.

Call was given at meeting of writers and intellectuals addressed by Professor Vijay Gupta of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Shri Shivdan Singh Chohan, a prominent Indian writer, Mr. Moosa Moola, African National Congress Representative in New Delhi, Shri H.K. Vyas, Editor of a Hindi daily and Mr. H.N. Mukherjee, M.P. The speakers exposed the brutalities of the White racist regime in Southern Africa and expressed their solidarity with the African people. (December 18, 1976)

Gandhi Jayanti in Cairo

Gandhi Jayanti (Mahatma Gandhi's birthday) was celebrated in a befitting manner in Cairo. Speaking on the occasion, Mr. Yousef Al-Sehai, Chairman and Chief Editor of the Al Abram group of Arabic Papers described Mahatma Gandhi as one of the greatest men of the twentieth century, even one of the greatest men in the whole history of mankind.

He said Gandhi was able to reach the highest level of human enrichment of vast experience and of extensive thought and was the

foremost among men in grandeur and sublimity. (October 5, 1976)

Work on Indo-Kenyan Textile project begins

The construction of a £ 6 million synthetic textile plant—a joint venture of J.C. Textile Group of India and Kenya's Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation has started at Thika. The textile project is one of the major ventures taken in hand

(November 25, 1976)

India-Lesotho Economic Cooperation

A number of areas for economic cooperation between Lesotho and India were indicated during the talks between Mr K.D.J. Raketla, Minister of Commerce and Industry of Lesotho and Mr. T.A. Pai Indian Minister of Industry. The areas of cooperation related to road development, supply of buses and tractors, planning and setting up of small scale industries, establishment of textile manufacturing and processing centres, planning and setting up of a technical institute, assistance in the construction of buildings and low-cost housing, power generation system and construction of an airport and a few hotels.

India offered training facilities in India in these areas. Indian Minister, Mr Pai also indicated that consultancy services for drawing up master plans of development for various industries and infrastructure in Lesotho could also be provided.

India and Lesotho had signed in August 1976 a five year agreement on economic and technical cooperation providing among other things for setting up of joint industrial ventures in that country. Under the agreement India will send to Lesotho experts and extend training facilities for Lesotho personnel in India. (October 26, 1976)

B.H.E.L. to erect Power Plant in Libya.

The State owned Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited is to fabricate and erect a power station of 540 mega watts in Libya. Announcing this to newsmen in Madras Mr. Krishnamurthy, Chairman of BHEL said the 1020 million rupee turnkey project was the biggest export order that any firm in India secured so far.

(November 5, 1976)

Mozambique Thanks India for Support

President Samora Machel of Mozambique has thanked India for her consistent moral and material support to the people of Mozambique during the freedom struggle and after independence. Mr Machel conveyed his thanks to Mr. Bipinpal Das, India's Deputy Minister for External Affairs.

The discussions between the two leaders revealed a close identity of views between India and Mozambique on a wide range of subjects including the urgency and importance of organizing concrete action with a view to making the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

Mr Das extended an invitation to President Machel to visit India. He reiterated India's total support for legitimate aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa and the efforts of Mozambique and other frontline African states to help the achievement of these aspirations.

Mr Das had an hour and half long meeting with the Vice-President and Minister for Development and Economic Planning Mr. Marcelino Das Santos. During the meeting a long term agreement on technical and economic cooperation was also finalized.

(October 10, 1976)

Indian Technical aid to Uganda

India has agreed to extend assistance to Uganda for the development and formation of sugar, textile and small and medium scale industries. According to a joint communique issued at the conclusion of the visit of the delegation led by the Minister of State for Industry, Mr. A.P. Sharma to Uganda, the Ugandan Government sought India's assistance for establishing four small-scale industries in the country and the Indian delegation agreed to offer necessary assistance on terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon by the two governments.

The Communique says that India has agreed to offer experts to Uganda in the fields of technological, geological and mining surveys. India will also provide training facilities to Ugandans in the fields that will be identified by Uganda (December 15, 1976)

Zambia's Highest Award presented to Mrs Gandhi

The award of Zambia's highest honour "the Grand Champion of Freedom-First Division" was presented to Mrs Gandhi by President Kaunda in Lusaka at an investiture ceremony, attended by a distinguished gathering.

The citation said 'Mrs Gandhi continued to champion the noble cause of human equality and social justice in India and elsewhere in the world' whereby your courage, outstanding leadership and statesmanship have earned India great admiration and respect in the international community and for your success in providing a shining example to women the world over to take up the challenge of building nation on the basis of equality and for your personal commitment to the total liberation of Southern Africa."

(October 16, 1976)

Zimbabwe leaders Meet Mrs. Gandhi

Mr. Joshua Nkomo, President of the internal faction of the African National Council, Zimbabwe met Mrs Gandhi in Lusaka during her visit to Zambia. Mr. Nkoma gave his assessment of the developments in relation to Rhodesia.

Mrs James Chiherama, representing the Bishop Muzorewa group of the African National Council also met Mrs. Gandhi.

(October 16, 1976).

Book Reviews

Cranford Pratt ; *The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968* (Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy) London, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 309.

Tanzanian experiment of building socialism has attracted attention of scholars all over the world. Pratt's volume is one further contribution to our understanding of Tanzania. The author looks at Tanzanian politics and its further profile of development sympathetically. He brings into sharp focus the values cherished by Nyerere and his world-view Nyerere is concerned not with Tanzanian development alone. He is interested in African destiny which is closely related to the anti-colonial movements in Africa. Pratt's chapters on Tanzanian foreign policy do not underscore this fact. Admirers of Nyerere are having a critical look on Tanzania's performance; and a prominent fact of Tanzanian development is the growing role and prosperity of Tanzanian bureaucracy. During the last decade,

bureaucracy has emerged as a very prosperous social group. Another criticism of Tanzanian development is that the role which rich farmers are playing in Tanu is hardly conducive to the establishment of socialism in any country. As Pratt observes :

"Nevertheless, in many rural areas, leadership, particularly in the cooperative, in local government and in TANU, had increasingly been exercised by the economically more successful African farmers."

Within Tanzania, Nyerere has devoted supporters who feel that socialism would be built and TANU is the greatest safeguard against any possible distortions. Critics point out that socialism cannot be built with the help of prosperous farmers and bureaucracy. It is also alleged

that Nyerere's goal of 'self-reliance' and Arusha Declaration are getting diluted because of foreign aid from the World Bank and other capitalist countries. Within Tanzania intellectual opinion is polarized on the outcome of Nyerere's effort. One fact must be stated very clearly that Nyerere has broken with the majority of African countries who are

following a neo-colonial path of development. And this needs sympathy based on critical appreciation of the objective situation of Tanzania, nature of its anti-imperialist struggles and its present role in Africa.

Pratt is more sympathetic and less critical in his appraisal.

—C.P. BHAMBHRI

Goran Hyden and Adebayo Adedeji : *Developing Research on African Administration : Some Methodological Issues : Nigeria : University of Ife Press, 1974, pp. 199.*

Studies of Administration on the Third World countries have been always conducted by the former colonial masters. It is a welcome sign that the 'local' scholars are addressing themselves to the issues of administration confronting the national governments of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Studies in Administrative problems of the Third World countries have to be diagnostic and prescriptive. Scholars have to find out bottle-necks in administration and make suggestions for its restructuring. Such an exercise raises many 'methodological' issues in Research in

Public Administration ; and the present edited volume concerns itself with issues of methodology in research. The canvass of this book is quite broad, and scholars have critically examined the relevance of various approaches of study, like, case method, Participant Observation, Documentary Research etc. etc. The focus is on 'problems' of research. And this is a right step. Before conducting actual research, the relative merits of various approaches or techniques should be carefully examined. This collection of papers is a very good 'guide' to researchers. The volume

has become rich because the authors have given illustration from their field of work. Field experiences are the best guide for undertaking research. Goran Hyden rightly observes:

"The development of an academic discipline is always the result of a fruitful exchange between theory and reality. So far the emphasis among researchers in administration in Africa has been too much on theory—and often theories at too high a level of generality. There is now a great need to let African administrative realities present themselves more genuinely. To allow this, participant observation may be a particularly suitable method. The precondition, however, is that the researchers take this method seriously and help develop the various techniques on the basis of African experiences in administrative and organizational research.

Colin Baher while writing about 'experiments' in public administration states :

Our pre-occupation so far with matters peripheral to the

core of our subject-experimental research in public administration-matters such as practical, trial-error experimentation in administration, research into experiments, and experiments having implications for public administration, suggests that the core is small and possibly non-existent. This is because of the nature of our discipline, which-like, for example, geography-has no well-defined boundaries, but rather lies within the area of overlap between a number of related subjects. Just as much experimentation in geography is strictly experimentation in geology, meteorology and biology, so much experimentation which could be said to be in public administration is, in fact, in the fields of other social sciences. I have preferred to place these under the heading of experiments having public administration implications.

I recommend this book strongly to all serious scholars of public administration in the countries of the Third World.

—C.P. BHAMBHRI

Micheal Dei-Anang : *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations 1957—1965 : A Personal Memoir*, University of London : 1975, Pages 83, Price £ 1.50 net

This small book is published as a part of Commonwealth Papers series in administrative memoirs written by retired public officials. Dr. Michael Dei-Anang was the Principal Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1959 to 1961 and head of the African Affairs Secretariat from 1961 until the coup of February 1966 which brought to an end one form and style of administration in Ghana. The book is the administrator's account of the foreign service of Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah and portrays the dilemmas and challenges faced by career civil servants. The book will have to be evaluated in the background of the knowledge of the author's own concepts of commitment. Author says 'on the one hand I was anxious to maintain and indeed did much to establish, an administration wedded to the practice of procedures by recognised routines and properly trained personnel : on the other hand I felt the need to respond to the

political aspirations of my government with particular reference to its pan-African vision in so far as it evolved a clear ethos and declared objective'.

The book contains six chapters dealing with what Nkrumah expected of his civil servants, reconciliation of orthodox policy of diplomacy and the new policy making, the Author's experience in the secretariate, policy practice in Africa, policy practice outside Africa and the summary chapter on African administration. This memoir in parts also reads as a biography of Nkrumah, a personality which dominated Ghana's external relations.

Nkrumah's personal involvement in the more important aspects of work in the Foreign Ministry was considerably deep. In the author's view he was an impatient administrator expecting perfection without regard to the cost and availability of material and

human resources. Author's own experience with Nkrumah as a person unmindful of cost and expenses, trying to succeed unconventionally without looking to consequences could well be corroborated by other accounts available in the biographical literature on Nkrumah. The author cites an interesting example of this attitude of Nkrumah's mind when the 'Job—600', a complex of buildings for Organisation of African Unity Conference was constructed in 1965 within a record period of less than a year at an exorbitant price of 8 million pounds. Dei-Anang critically remarks 'Thus 'Job 600' may add to the architectural beauty of Accra but in the absence of Nkrumah it has been converted to serve as offices for a number of government ministries...'

The development of the administrative structure and their organisation during the early period of independence is the theme of the second chapter. Interesting to the Indian reader is the account of the stimulating experience of the Author during his stay in India to study something of the ad-

ministration of the Ministry of External Affairs, together with the procedures for running of the household in the Presidential palace in New Delhi and the way this experience was utilised in bringing about certain changes in Ghana.

Nkrumah's commitment to Africa was total ; therefore the centre of external policy was Africa and all the activities outside Africa were designed to promote African cause. While he never allowed the African Affairs to go out of his control, the Foreign Ministry was identified in his mind as a slow, inactive and orthodox service incapable of reacting effectively to his needs. This resulted in the birth of the African Secretariate in 1961 as President's diplomatic arm. The operation of parallel organizations of the Foreign Ministry, the African Affairs Secretariate and the Bureau of African Affairs, not only proved impossible but was responsible for duplication of effort, insufficient use of available resources as well as the crisis of confidence. Nkrumah was not willing to realise that diplomatic work was sometimes a

slow business and patience, tact and caution were essential in obtaining results which might not always be spectacular or immediate.

Nkrumah was overwhelmingly obsessed with creating continental outlook and for this purpose he followed two methods. One of them was to assist freedom fighters in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Rhodesia and South West Africa. He was in continuous pursuit of making the world increasingly aware of an 'African presence' in international relations. The conferences for diplomatic purposes were the other method used for the promotion of African image. In this context, the brief but lucid account of the birth of OAU at the 1963 Addis Ababa Conference shows how Nkrumah strived till the last minute, in spite of his disappointments, to emphasise the concept of unity for Africa. Dei-Anang feels that Ghana's pan-African posture not only helped put her in the forefront of African affairs but raised the blackman in the eyes of the world and created a new image of Africa described as

African personality. During this period Ghana inspired a number of independent African States to participate in international negotiations. For the management of external relations, African presence, decolonization through the U.N. and non-alignment were the three major policy areas. Particularly supporting vigorously anti-colonialism and at the same time maintaining good relations with western powers was a very difficult game for Ghana.

In the summary chapter Anang forcefully brings out his differences with Nkrumah's views on the civil service. Nkrumah had a basic suspicion of the civil service machinery even when it was managed by his own people. Contrary to this the author maintains that the suspicion was unfounded as far as his long experience of service with African colleagues was concerned. None deliberately sought to run down any project which was properly conceived. Nkrumah had his own 'African way' meaning by that an attitude of mind rather than a formal system which sometimes created em-

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barassing situations and misunderstandings. To illustrate this point the author narrates Kulungugu case where an assassination attempt was made on President's life. The Author strongly feels that 'until African bureaucrats have evolved recognised African procedures of administration, they must be on their guard for possible conflicts between the African style and certain forms of recognised protocol'. Anang is completely opposed to the idea of importing administrative models from outside Africa but at the same time suggests the need for an indigenous administrator to secure a synthesis of the best elements from his own past and the new ideas

which his contacts with a changing world bring to notice.

Since the book is based on author's own experience as a civil servant in Ghana, it is an extremely valuable account which could provide useful guidelines for the politicians and administrators in independent African Countries. It also drives home the point that excessive concentration on foreign affairs at the cost of attention to the domestic economic progress could prove fatal for a small nation. Clarity, brevity and lucidity of style are the major merits of this book.

Priya Mutalik-Desai.

Southern Africa in Perspective—Essays in Regional Policies :
Edited by Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale ; The Free Press,
New York, and Collier-Macmillan, London ; Pp 418. Price not
given.

Southern Africa, an area of just over two million square miles comprising Angola, South-West Africa (Namibia), South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Rhodesia, Malawi and Mozambique, can be much larger than the sum of its parts, according to Dr. Eschel M. Rhoodie, one of the contributors to this volume. "What may turn out to be the most significant and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa since European colonial disengagement is presently occurring in Southern Africa," he says.

Dr. Rhoodie bases his hope on the region's rich endowment of minerals, particularly gold, diamonds, uranium, copper, platinum, chrome and asbestos besides vast reserves of coal and iron ore. But he does not attach much significance to the explosive combination of black and white in Southern Africa which alone in this continent has a permanent white population. No

wonder, in debates at the General Assembly of the United Nations, the region is frequently identified as a threat to world peace. And yet this writer talks of "harmonious coexistence between black and white states of the region."

This book, primarily written for the American reader, includes 23 essays by political revolutionaries, academic experts and national spokesmen. Its main value lies in its comprehensiveness. Viewpoints of political protagonists and antagonists have been freely given. Profiles of individual countries and trans-national studies give the reader both the micro and macro view of Southern Africa.

The introductory chapter by Dr. Richard Dale, secretary of the African Studies Committee at Southern Illinois University, surveys recent literature and summarizes areas for further research. With the index and suggested readings, it is a valuable research guide.

In the concluding chapter, the other editor of the volume, Dr. Chrstian P. Potholm, extrapolates a set of possible scenarios relevant for the last three decades of the twentieth century. He writes: "The textual richness of Southern Africa contains a wide range of possibilities, particularly when the potential exogenous inputs are added to an analysis of the region. Moreover, this is a propitious time to explore these possibilities for we are now in a halfway, twilight period when it seems too late for peaceful evolution to African majority rule and too early for a revolution of significant magnitude (however inspired and generated) to reorder the sub-system radically." Perhaps, he is taking too much for granted.

There are chapters on country profiles, African nationalism, Afrikaner nationalism, interstate relationships, liberation movements, Portuguese colonialism, military balance, etc. The accent throughout, however, is on future economic and political prospects.

Dr. Yashpal Tandon, a former senior lecturer in inter-

national relations at Makerere University College, who has contributed the chapter on the Organisation of African Unity and the liberation of Southern Africa, says that the situation in the region is rapidly developing into an armed conflict, both OAU and South Africa acting as if they are belligerents. "While African states have scarce resources to deploy in the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa, the white-controlled regimes of this area control formidable resources with which to respond to the challenge of the OAU and the liberation movements. South Africa has built a powerful neofascist state, a state in which human beings are methodically categorised into various racial groups and their behaviour regulated accordingly. Any deviation from this pattern, even by the whites, results in a merciless application of 'corrective measures' that range from police surveillance of inter-racial sexual contacts to confinement in prisons which have *sophisticated* instruments of torture to elicit confessions from even the most stubborn and courageous. The African population is placed under a

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tightly controlled economic system that is designed to ensure their continual dependence and vulnerability for what the South African regime hopes will be an eternity."

Dr. Tandon's analysis is supported by news reports we often get from the region. He, however, finds a lot wrong with the tactical handling of many of the issues by the OAU. In the arena of international diplomacy, the OAU has not been able to make the United Nations adopt the course of action it has proposed.

Though the book takes note of the recent independence of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi, the chapters on Angola and Mozambique have become out of date with the liberation of these countries. Still, the totality of approach of the editors is unique as they treat the individual units in the

region as parts of a subsystem rather than as discrete, disjointed entities. This helps them to apply techniques of cross-national comparison and subsystem analysis. Attention has been focused on inter-African relations which is a sorely neglected field of study.

A serious omission in the book is lack of maps and other illustrations. These would have helped the reader to better understand and appreciate various viewpoints and formulations presented by the writers. However, *Southern Africa in Perspective* is the first book to give a balanced, and comprehensive view of the nine states of the Southern African subsystem. The editors hope that the kaleidoscopic images which the contributors present in the various essays will stimulate the readers and others interested in Southern Africa to begin to cope with some of the unfinished business there.

K.N. Sud

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Dimension of mass Involvement in Botswana Politics : A Test of Alternative Theories : *John D. Holm, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills/London, 1974, PP. 62.*

The continent of Africa is a vast mine for the research scholars in all disciplines. There was a time when Africa used to be by and large neglected by them. That situation changed as one African country after the other attained independence and started playing important part in the comity of nations. Today the continent of Africa is drawing the attention of the scholars in an ever increasing number. One of the fields of study and research which has captured their interest is the nature and extent of the people's involvement in the politics of their country. This is indeed an interesting subject for study particularly with respect to a continent where the old tribal institutions are still well-entrenched with the tribal chiefs still exercising considerable influence in the governance of their country, and where the new political institutions have not yet taken deep roots.

Most of the scholars studying African politics have focussed their study on the role

of elites in shaping the contours of the new political institutions that have been, or are being, established in African countries. Very little inquiry has, indeed, dealt with the character of citizen involvement in those institutions particularly at the local level where, as African elites often claim, popular influence is the most extensive. Holm chose a more difficult task for himself by venturing to examine the character of mass political involvement, a field normally shunned by scholars due to difficulties involved in the process particularly in a backward country.

Certain theories regarding people's involvement in politics already exist. The author proceeds to examine their validity in relation to Botswana. He specifically takes up for consideration four hypotheses which may possibly explain change in the character of selected dimensions of citizen involvement in Botswana's local politics subsequent to the introduction of council system in 1965 and examines the uti-

lity of each one of them. After examining the hypotheses he develops his own theory that the extent of political mobilization and syncretism varies with the criteria used to identify covariation of political involvement and that the extent of socio-economic mobilization and syncretism depends on the dimensions of political involvement being examined. Further, he propounds the theory that mobilization patterns are manifest in more passive forms of political involvement and that syncretism is more apparent in more active realms of involvement.

The author proceeds extremely systematically in his work. He divides his study into five sections. The first section explores the literature of political involvement insofar as it relates to dimensions of citizen change. In the second section he outlines the general character of the sample on which the analysis is based. In the third section some general aspects of the historical and cultural context of Botswana politics relevant to the study have been examined by him. In the fourth section the extent to which the political mobili-

zation and syncretism hypotheses are substantiated by the political involvement of respondents has been examined. In the fifth and final section the relationship between the dimensions of political involvement and the socio-economic structure has been treated.

This is indeed a very rational division of work. The way the author planned and executed his research, overcoming all obstacles, should, I believe, inspire and guide others interested in the study of peoples' involvement in the politics of their country. Moreover, Holm deserves credit also on account of the fact that his study throws some light on the politics at grassroot level in Botswana on which not much literature is available at present.

The only defect that I could detect in the book is a little terseness in the language at certain places and brevity at the cost of clarity. I wish the author was more exhaustive in the exposition, analysis and discussion of his ideas and conclusions. These minor shortcomings, however, do not at all detract from the general importance and quality of his work as a whole. Indeed, it will be unfortunate for the library as well as for the students who throng there if its shelves were without Holm's book under review.

S. C. Saxena


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